Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

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Photobolsillo

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By Laura Hamilton

Sánchez, Gervasio. Photobolsillo (La Fábrica, Spain, 2011)Gervasio Sánchez: PHotoBolsillo

Amazon, paperback new from $15.60

My first exposure to the work of Gervasio Sanchez was his exhibition, Antologia, in Madrid last year. Exhibited in an old warehouse, his photographs were made even more haunting by their surroundings. In his work, he captures the human aspect to war – depicting people both during and after conflict has ended.

Although I had never heard of him before I lived in Spain, he is one of Spain’s biggest war photojournalists, winning various prizes over the years and covering many major conflicts: from Central America to Lusophone Africa to Eastern Europe and various other places in between. He has also focused on more specialist issues, such as the desaparecidos in Latin America; the people who ‘disappeared’ during conflicts and their families do not know what happened to them. Through this focus he raises awareness of problems that are frequently ignored post-conflict by broadcasting them to the outside world.

My experience in Madrid led me to want to see more of his work, to learn more about what he had done and where he had been. Pasión y Memoria (Passion and Memory) stood out to me since it is not only readily available, but it also featured a selection of his work, rather than focusing on one specific conflict. Published as part of the PhotoBolsillo series, which focuses on Spain’s most important photographers, it contains an introduction by Sandra Balsells, a fellow photojournalist. Following this, each image in the book has a simple caption, explaining where the photograph was taken and the year. Portraying everything from victims of mines in Mozambique, to child soldiers in Peru, this small book of black and white images allows you to travel with him through his experiences and see conflicts through his eyes. The photographs depict emotions and people’s experiences of conflict. Although I am not familiar with the work of many war photojournalists, I know that his work makes me feel as if I am able to see a side of conflict that is frequently forgotten in newspaper reports.

Many of his images feature children and highlight their resilience after conflict. For me, one of the most powerful images is No. 42. The image features two young boys in Panama, hanging off the skeletal remains of a building after the invasion in 1991. If you were to replace their surroundings, it would look no different to a photograph of children playing on a climbing frame. However, their smiles contrast with the bombed out remains that surround them, a reminder of the warzone where the image was captured. Yet they are still playing games, swinging off posts and appearing to be in a race with one another. Whereas many war photojournalists only capture the misery of war, this photo, along with many of Gervasio Sanchez’s other images, shows the hope that still exists after a conflict.

I would recommend this book as a starting point for Sanchez’s work. Although the photo captions are written in Spanish, the introduction, which gives an overview of his career, is provided in both English and Spanish. Nonetheless, the images themselves are powerful enough that they need no words to explain them.

Panetta Speaks at King's

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By Amelie Sundberg

To most of my friends beyond the War Studies Department at King’s Leon Panetta doesn’t quite achieve celebrity status or the description as ‘cool’. But Friday morning was definitely cool. As I battled through the snow to the Strand building I couldn’t help but notice the big men in overcoats with ear pieces - not the common tourists at Somerset house. I felt very privileged to be one of the lucky students about to see Panetta’s ‘Big Speech’ of his European Tour, probably one of his last major speeches as US Secretary of Defence.

To be honest, I realised that I had no idea what to expect from the man in charge of the world’s strongest defence establishment and former director of the CIA. His affable composure surprised me. Perhaps I am simply a victim of good speech writing, but I felt I saw a glimpse of Leon the human, just like us, which made his career even more inspiring.

Panetta’s speech in many respects was predictable. After a few words on the current hostage situation in Algeria, his main focus was on the Transatlantic relationship and NATO. Particularly predictable was his frequent referral to the ‘special’ US-British relationship. Having said that, I enjoyed Panetta’s historical anecdotes. Recalling his memories as a little boy during the last years of the Second World War, he said that Roosevelt and Churchill’s personal friendship and “clear-eyed resolve” had inspired a generation in war and continues to inspire us today. He sees NATO as the fulfilment of their dreams to ensure that “the world would never again descend into turmoil”. Panetta thinks that the transatlantic alliance is today facing a turning point, where it might retreat from its responsibilities due to altered priorities and fiscal restraints or could demonstrate creativity and the commitment to remain resolute.

On the one hand, the world is witnessing a period of conflict coming to a close - the Iraq war is over, NATO has declared troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014, Al Qaeda has been largely dissembled and the intervention in Libya is drawing to a close. On the other hand, Panetta challenged Britain, warning us to “make no mistake” about the threats posed, to both the US and Europe, by Al Qaeda affiliate terrorist groups, the continuing conflict in Afghanistan, nuclear intentions of North Korea and Iran, and the consequences of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria - which, “make no mistake”, will fall.

Panetta also paid considerable attention to the “fiscal austerity in full force on both sides of the Atantic”. He seemed worried about the implications of defence spending cuts (as high as 20%) in most European countries over the past couple of years. The US is facing similar hurdles, required to meet $487 billion in budget reductions over the next ten years. Not only did Panetta stress that the new US Defence Strategy of last year shall seek to invest in a leaner, more agile force, developing fields such as intelligence, space, cyber capabilities and special operations in order to make up for reductions. He confidently asserted that the US must remain the strongest military force in the world. He also emphasised that no one state can meet these threats alone, and so alliances must move beyond the cold war frame work and modernise into a flexible and rotational model. Duplication is no longer necessary, and “the time has come to share”.

One of Panetta’s biggest fears is the cyber threat that could cripple our economies and infrastructure instantaneously. Thus NATO must develop a role within cyber defence. Lastly, Panetta boldly asserted that Europe should not worry about the US turning away from us in its “pivot” towards Asia- rather, we should join them in developing new regional partners.

The message that I found most harrowing in Panetta’s speech was his observation that he will probably be the last US Secretary of Defence to have direct memories of the Second World War. This really is a new generation, a dawn.

Although a cynic might interpret Panetta’s calls for collaboration, quoting Churchill’s assertion that ” our friendship is the rock on which to build the future of the world”, as mere rhetoric for the declining US ability to act alone. But the bleak reality is that gone are the days where we can afford to pick and choose our allies - we must strive to foster defence friendships throughout the world if we are to prevent sinking in today’s sea of fiscal austerity and unpredictable threats. I am inclined to agree with Panetta’s strong, but still positive, challenge to Europe to adapt to the reality of the 21st Century.

Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq

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By Amelie Sundberg


Rampton, Sheldon and Stauber, John, Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq (Hodder Headline, Australia, 2003)

Amazon, Paperback New from £4.99

 

For those of you Chomsky-haters, do not be deterred by his praise for Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber’s bold work, ‘Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq’. This is a refreshing eye-opener into the Bush administration’s ‘public relations’ campaign following the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing War on Terror, particularly the US invasion of Iraq 2003. I have already used a couple of the scandalous propaganda stories to spice up a few lagging dinner conversations over the holidays.

The authors collect convincing evidence to answer questions surrounding notorious war reporting that has been suspected of US propaganda. The first chapter conjures up the vivid scene of Kuwaitis waving US flags after their ‘liberation’ that dominated the US press in 1991, and quickly moves on to point out that US soldiers handed out these flags, effectively staging the famous photographs. Similarly, the authors question the objectivity of the widely circulated images of Iraqis pulling down the statue of Saddam Hussein - only around 200 people took part and Reuters long shot images show that the rest of the square was empty. So much for the Washington Post’s headline, “Iraqis Celebrate in Baghdad.”

The book’s strongest selling point is how it details the corporate edge to the administrations PR campaign post-9/11; blaming this business-like approach for losing the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ in the War on Terror. Charlotte Beers, former executive for a corporate advertising firm was appointed undersecretary for state for public diplomacy. The book paints a good picture of the disconnected attempts to ‘sell’ the US to the Middle Eastern ‘consumers’. It is doubtful that US officials trying to persuade local editors in the Middle East to publish positive stories would ever soothe anti-US sentiment or that simply dropping leaflets would divide the Taliban. Unsurprisingly, promoting the message of US freedom clashed with previous US policies of support for repressive regimes, such as Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Interestingly, the Iraq Public Diplomacy Group (set up by the US) coached anti-Saddam Iraqis to look good on talk shows and write opinion pieces as early as 2002. Fabricated stories were also used, such as when a 15-year-old Kuwaiti girl falsely told of the story of Iraqi solders pulling hundreds of premature Kuwaiti babes from their incubators. This was published in a press release by Hill & Knowlton (then the world’s largest PR firm) in their ‘Citizens for a Free Kuwait’ campaign.

Rather, ‘shared value’ television advertisements featuring attractive American Muslims going about their daily lives were much more successful as ‘perception management’ tools on the home front. Such shows reinforced the US population’s trust in an accepting and ‘free’ US. Propaganda was so successful that as a result of the Pentagon’s attempts to foster support for the invasion of Iraq, an astounding 66% of US citizens believed that Saddam was involved in 9/11. Further ‘newspeak’ helped to rally the population around the flag. For example, the phrase ‘axis of evil’ was reminiscent of the axis powers during WWII and ‘coalition of the willing’ misleadingly implied that there was enthusiastic support for the war in Iraq beyond that of the US and the UK. Television news coverage of the war was accompanied by patriotic music such as drumbeats, images of the American flag, maps, graphics and constant banners declaring the ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. The politician Jesse Ventura said that the phenomenon reminded him of the Super Bowl.

One of the key scenes that I will take with me from this book is the description of a reporter asking then US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, whether he lied after 9/11 to encourage support for the war effort. Asking not to be quoted, he responded by quoting Churchill: “sometimes the truth is so precious it must be accompanied by a bodyguard of lies.”

‘Weapons of Mass Deception’ is definitely selective and overtly seeks to cast the Bush administration in a bad light. Some would argue that in so doing, the book is hypocritical by itself propagating a strong anti-Bush message. But let’s be realistic, any book that hopes to act as an exposé has to be presented in this manner – in my view this does not undermine the validity of the arguments being made.

Considering our daily dependence on news I think a fresh dose of re-examining the role of the press is healthy - just read it a pinch of salt. If any of you are cynics like me, this is great read; well researched and offering more than just conspiracy theories.

Spontaneity and consciousness in the Arab Spring

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By Leo Graham-Dullaert

We have been handed a cartoon of the Arab Spring. Despite the enormous advances
in the technical quality of reporting from areas of conflict, humans have not kept pace
with the machines. Even some of our best broadcasters have fallen prey to some of
our most basic human flaws; at best – laziness, at worst - prejudice. The cartoon we
have received is one of innocent well-meaning rebels fighting evil, faceless regimes.
Rubbish? Let me try and persuade you.

In trying to be a good student of the social sciences I want to be balanced, I want to
understand the dynamics of the conflicts for which we have received such consistent,
24/7, high-definition, battle-embedded footage. On the one hand I feel that I might
have achieved a quasi-cosy relationship with the Syrian rebel forces (witness the
undeniably enthralling coverage by French photojournalist Mani on Channel 4 News)
and an enduring rapport with the Libyan freedom-fighters. Meanwhile, I remain on
decidedly frosty, inhospitable terms with their establishment-propping counterparts. I
don’t really want to dash into polemic soap-box barracking over the bias in Western
media, but I would like some balance and some insight into this faceless “other side”.
I am fairly sure Bashar Al-Assad is not patrolling the streets alone, nor was Gaddafi
likely to be found harrying the frontlines in Misrata without support.

However, rather than simply complaining about the one-sided nature of the press
coverage, I wanted instead to make one specific complaint. The rise of Leninism
sparked a fierce debate between its followers and the Economists (along with
the Mensheviks and others) regarding the spontaneity and consciousness of the
revolutionary organisation. In essence, the latter believed that a revolution must arise
spontaneously (with certain economic conditions aligning), while the former believed
political consciousness must be led by the Party (i.e. the intellectuals, and funnily
enough perhaps Lenin himself) and that the workers themselves could not achieve
such political consciousness alone. And so it is along these lines that I feel I have
been presented with a certain caricature of the Arab Spring:

In the UN-peacekeepers’-blue corner we have the freedom fighting rebels, imbibed
with organically-grown, grassroots consciousness of their worthy cause. While in the
Stalinist-red corner we have the regime-backing sheep meekly led by a vicious elite;
this group of faceless foot soldiers being incapable of attaining any form of “self”
consciousness.

Perhaps there is some truth to this dichotomy, but I cannot believe it to be so vividly
black and white, or indeed blue and red. In any case, why are we so desperate to
create such a dichotomy? Are we saying that the public cannot handle a conflict that
does not feature a nice clean delineation between good guys and baddies? Heroes and
villains? Cowboys and Indians (I won’t speculate too much further on that one)? At
best we, or the press, are saying exactly that. At worst, perhaps these dichotomies
serve a more political purpose. Moreover the hypocrisy within these divisions of good
and evil is difficult to ignore. We have celebrated the rebellion within these far-flung
societies and demonised the regimes who seek to quell them. Yet on our own doorstep
we instantly branded our own Summer of Discontent in London last year as the
mindless actions of criminal youth. It seems to me a desperate state of affairs when
some of the most balanced analysis comes from a musician (even if he is an artistic
genius).

And so I ask a question familiar to this very debate – what is to be done? A
fairer representation of the seismic events we have witnessed would consider the
hitherto neglected deeper workings of each group of belligerents with which we
are concerned. Have these uprisings been truly spontaneous in their nature, or
has someone, somewhere, learned-of-Lenin, covertly imbued a certain political
consciousness? Equally, is there no element of self-conscious support for the various
regimes?

Britain, Rwanda, and the DRC: Using aid for diplomatic aims.

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By Katie Cornish

In July, the UN released an interim report alleging Rwandan government support to the M23 rebels
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UK, Rwanda’s largest bilateral donor, withheld scheduled
budget support, with Prime Minister Cameron setting out conditions for resumed aid. A few months
later, Andrew Mitchell released the funds on his final day as international development secretary, a
decision sparking much controversy. Two months later, Mitchell’s successor, Justine Greening, has
again suspended direct budget support to the Rwandan government.

On the surface, withholding aid from a government backing a rebel group guilty of raping women,
pillaging villages, and recruiting child soldiers seems obvious. If the Rwandan government has
resources to finance war in the DRC, then it must not need the UK’s budget support. But the decision
to withhold budget support may pack more than it appears, and relying on aid as a political carrot or
stick has the potential to be quite problematic for the aid effectiveness agenda.

In 2005, donors and recipient countries met in Paris to discuss aid effectiveness. The result was
the Paris Declaration, which highlighted five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation,
managing for results, and mutual accountability. The Paris Declaration was later followed up by
the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, which renewed donor and recipient commitments to the Paris
Principles. At both forums, donors committed to using recipient government systems to deliver aid
wherever possible, directly supporting recipient development strategies and priorities.

So what does this have to do with Britain’s decision to withhold budget support from Rwanda?
There are a few key elements of the aid effectiveness agenda that the decision contradicts. First and
foremost is a commitment to mutual accountability. Under the Paris Declaration, donors commit to
“provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner
authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens.” Not only did
the British government provide very little notice that aid would be withheld, in a matter of months
that decision was both retracted and reinstated. Treating aid like a tap that can be turned on and off
poses obvious challenges for effective budgeting and planning.

Secondly, the decision contradicts principles of alignment. Under the Paris Declaration, donors
agree to “draw conditions, whenever possible, from a partner’s national development strategy or
its annual review of progress in implementing this strategy.” Alongside this, additional conditions
require sound justification and should be coordinated amongst donors to the extent possible. Using
aid as a political bargaining chip contradicts commitment to agreed-upon conditions, risking an aid
culture where recipients must cater to ever-changing donor conditions. Furthermore, using aid as a
political stick may very well be ineffective when there is a lack of consensus amongst donors, as is
the case with the response to Rwanda.

Finally, the decision challenges the principle of ownership, whereby donors agree to “respect
partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.” Principles of aid
effectiveness suggest that development should not be imposed by the West, but rather that
developing countries should own their development process. Once an agreement has been made
between donors and a recipient country, the recipient’s obligations are limited to the likes of demonstrating accountability for donor funds, establishing sound development strategies, and
working to strengthen institutions. If donors are truly committed to this value, than these should
be the only conditions imposed and donors should refrain from using aid to interfere in national or
regional politics.

This entry does not intend to condone the actions of the Rwandan government, but rather highlight
the dilemmas that policy makers are confronted with when it comes to the delivery of effective
aid. If one believes that aid should be completely benevolent and separate from politics, then they
must be prepared for these types of contradictions. On the one hand, donors face pressure to
achieve sustainable development results and good value for money through aid effectiveness. On
the other hand, they are encouraged by constituents and rights groups to use aid to send highly
political messages to support peace. But the reality is the two cannot often coexist. Aid cannot be a
bargaining chip for diplomacy and an effective tool for sustainable development.

At the end of the day, donors will have to make tough decisions regarding the use of aid. Should aid
be used as a diplomatic tool for peace in the DRC, at the risk of disrupting services and development
for the poor in Rwanda? Politicizing aid inherently requires donors to take chances. Should the
Rwandan government respond positively to pressures from the UK and others, it may yield positive
results for Rwandans and Congolese alike. Should it fail, the poor and vulnerable in Rwanda and
DRC may suffer. Donors can either approach aid with as much neutrality as possible, or take
responsibility for the short and long term consequences of politicizing aid. With a basket of both
hard and soft diplomatic tools available to donor governments, does aid have to be one of them?