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Prachi Aryal

Feminist Foreign Policy and South Asia: A scuffle between values and change

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Nepalese Battalion received UN Medal.
Photo Credit: United Nations, licensed under Creative Commons.

‘The personal is political.’

The above sentence, coined by Carol Hanisch, encapsulates a simple yet pervasive truth about women and their struggles. Women’s lives in the public domain have for a long time been affected directly by gendered power hierarchies and beliefs. Their participation and inclusion in the public domain are determined by the norms and beliefs laid out in the society. However, this politics of domination and subjugation do not exist only in the public domain but also affect the personal lives of people. Personal spaces and family lives are governed by gendered notions that put men in a higher pedestal than women. The personal and political are intrinsically linked, for one, the values imbibed in the personal also influence the political behaviour of women.

South Asian women, have been historically marginalised and excluded from active participation in the political sphere. In recent times, multiple developmental programs have attempted to decrease the regional gender gap in education, employment and political participation by focusing on women centric development, however, the Global Gender Gap Report 2020, highlights that South Asia has the second largest gender gap among the eight other regions of the world.

The gender gap, visible in the education, social and employment sector, is also reflected in the foreign policy and diplomatic decisions of the countries in the region. Female representation remains scarce in important positions in the international arena. Diplomacy as such is a gender-neutral term that does not differentiate between male and female participants, however, the hierarchies established in these societies makes it a male-dominant field. Without proper representation of female voices remain unheard and neglected in internal and international spaces. Female political agency in most South Asian countries is scarce. Female parliamentarians make up only 13% of parliamentarians in India, 21 % in Bangladesh, and Nepal tops the list with women comprising 33.5 % of the federal parliament. Though these statistics show a considerable improvement from previous years , they are not proportional to the female population living in these countries.

Despite improvement in terms of the political representation of women in various South Asian countries, ground level problems remain which need to be addressed to ensure feminist outlooks are taken into context when making international decisions. Complex patriarchal power structures in these countries limit the participation of women. In Nepal, for example, the 2015 constitution prevents women from providing their child with the right to citizenship. The only parent able to confer Nepalese citizenship is a ‘male’ member of society. This prejudicial notion limits women’s participation in society. Their participation becomes directly linked to a male member of society and they their roles are confined as just daughters and wives This limitation in role also manifests in the political decision-making process in times of war and conflict where a similar binary between the genders is adopted, labelling men as the protectors while women are the objects that are need of protection.

In a similar vein, in India, through protests like that of Shaheen Bagh, political representation and inclusivity has improved , with more women asserting themselves in the public sphere. However, international and diplomatic decision-making persists in excluding women from senior positions. As Khullar highlights, a false hard-soft diplomatic dichotomy has been created where defence, military, power and security are reserved as male domains and diplomatic decision-making surrounding topics of international trafficking, migration, women empowerment and human rights are labelled as soft-domains. An outlook that women rely on emotions and focus on soft-issues is still prevalent in many countries in the region and women ministers are often assigned positions based on the same assumption while diplomatic decision-making remain dominated by male leaders. Therefore, the diplomatic and foreign policy structure that has been monopolised by men does not allow space for feminist voices.

Allowing women more representation not just in internal but also international politics will open up new avenues for countries to make way for a more inclusive society. A feminist foreign policy will ensure that women who are confined to the domestic spheres are also represented in the decision-making process. A feminist foreign policy (FFP) agenda can act as a fresh perspective and opportunity to view war and peace from a different lens. FFP emphasises that gender is not an accidental but an intrinsic part of military, economic and diplomatic relations between nations. It allows countries to develop a holistic outlook towards decision-making in the international security arena by incorporating the voices of women and other marginalised communities.

Women’s issues in many societies are viewed through a cultural lens of culture while issues surrounding men are considered political. These traditional notions bar women from being active participants in the political arena. The responsibility to protect and various international agendas are also used patriarchal tools to advance strategic interests in interventionist wars across the world where men are responsible for the protection of women. In the light of this underrepresentation and exclusion from the mainstream international agenda, the inclusion of women in negotiation tables and their decisions should be taken into consideration. Hearing the voices of people from traditionally underrepresented groups in society will shed light upon the intersectional impact of any decision-making process.

The war-peace dichotomy, a fixture of traditional foreign policy, can be overcome by addressing issues surrounding migration, border policing and increased securitisation through a feminist lens. South Asia has an admirable history in terms of women residing in positions of power with Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal electing female leaders. However, despite such headline progress women in parts of South Asia are still subjected to discriminatory practices and are excluded from social and political participation. Adopting a feminist foreign policy in such a situation will allow countries in South Asia to assert their commitment to gender equality by addressing intersectional issues in both internal and international arena. Commitment towards a feminist foreign policy can also impact the global standing of countries and can help strengthen diplomatic ties.

Bhutan’s well-kept secret: The Lhotshampa Exodus and the plight of the 100,000

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One of 7 refugee camps in eastern Nepal that have been housing 108.000 Bhutanese refugees since the early 1990s. Photo Credit: Katrine Syppli Kohl, licensed under Creative Commons

Bhutan, a small nation tucked away in the Himalayan region of South Asia is famous for its young-Monarch and its use of Gross National Happiness to measure prosperity. The entire world looks at Bhutan as a peaceful and prosperous nation with picturesque landscapes. However, a dark part of Bhutan’s history is often side-lined from discussions in the mainstream international sphere.

Over recent years, there has been a great amount of debate surrounding the migrant and refugee issue and a lot of attention has been directed towards the Mediterranean region. However, little to no discussion or attention has been given to the Lhotshampa refugees who were forcefully evicted from Southern Bhutan during the 1990s. Bhutan, often known as the last Shangri-la has generated one of the highest numbers of refugees in Asia.

Who are the Lhotshampa?

The Lhotshampa people are an ethnic minority in Bhutan who are of Nepalese descent and have lived in Bhutan since the 1600s. Most of the people migrated to Bhutan as commissioned traders and craftsmen to help in infrastructure projects like building Stupa’s and roadways such as the Thimpu-Phuntsholing highway. The population of these minorities flourished as they settled in Southern areas of Bhutan, and they were given the name Lhotshampa; meaning the people of the South. The migration to Bhutan continued largely unregulated with no government supervision and the minorities’ population grew over the years with most given Bhutanese citizenship.

Historical Context of the Ethnic Tension

The growing number of ethnic minorities was viewed as a threat to the Bhutanese cultural and national identity and differentiation between the population began to take shape with the introduction of series of discriminatory practices aimed at excluding minorities. Since the 1980s the government of Bhutan comprising primarily Ngalong; descendants of Tibetan Buddhists who make up the majority population of the country, introduced a series of discriminatory measures politically and culturally excluding the minorities.

With the introduction of the Citizenship Act of 1977 and 1985 the requirements for obtaining citizenship were tightened. The Acts established a cut-off year, 1958, as proof of being Bhutanese citizens. The year 1958 was stated as the cut-off date as most of the Bhutanese people were provided identification cards. Residents unable to supply this proof were categorised as illegal immigrants and were evicted from their properties and detained. Following these acts, a census was carried out in Southern Bhutan in 1988 with the aim of classifying the residents between nationals and non-nationals. This was an exercise deliberately aimed at othering the Lhotshampa minorities. Furthermore, Bhutanese in the northern region were provided citizenship on the basis of their race whilst the residents of the Southern borderland were required to produce identity documents in order to prove themselves as true-Bhutanese.

The process of systematic discrimination grew as people deemed ‘illegal’ were forced to sign voluntary migration and leaving certificates and were evicted from their land with little or no compensation while people who protested these laws were imprisoned, tortured and harassed. Through the ‘One Nation, One People’ Policy, the government imposed cultural and linguistic restrictions including removal of minority languages from the curriculum to imposing a strict dress-code policy. National integration policies based on northern Bhutanese traditions and cultures were mandated by the monarch, with the intention of erases ethnic minority cultures. The cultural code imposed a dress regulations called “Driglam Namzha” which are based on northern Bhutanese garments and identity markers. Furthermore, the royal decree also included a halt to the use of Nepali; the language used by the minorities as a classroom language and replaced it with Dzongkha.

Discriminatory practices like these introduced by the government fuelled ethnic tensions and created a large outflow of refugees as many fled the country seeking refuge in Nepal. The number of registered refugees in Nepal reached an excess of 100,000.

Plight of the Refugees

The Lhotshampa minorities who fled the country to seek refuge in Nepal have been denied re-entry into Bhutan on the grounds that they are illegal migrants. The refugees were settled into different camps in the South Eastern region of Nepal. As of 2007, there were over 108,00 refugees were living in seven camps in Nepal.

The aim to repatriate the people and provide them the right to return to Bhutan has been stalled as the government of Bhutan refuses to recognise the minorities as legal Bhutanese citizens. The lack of urgency and attention paid to the refugees has led to the prolonged plight of a people who have been consigned to live in camps for over 25 years. Though many refugees have been resettled abroad under United States and other neutral country schemes, many refugees continue to fight for their right to return. With two functional camps still in Nepal, the refugees still have hopes that they can one day return to a place they call their homeland. There are still over 18,000 refugees in the remaining camps in Nepal, most who live with the hopes of returning to their homeland.

The governments of Nepal and Bhutan, as active members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, must urgently engage in dialogue to find a solution to the problem. The diplomatic relations between the countries have remained bitter since the start of the crisis, despite multiple attempts to resolve the problem the two nations have been unable to reach a plausible solution. The bitter relationship between the two nations will hopefully improve when the crisis is mitigated with proper dialogue between the nations.

The failings of Regionalism: SAARC and its struggle to thrive.

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Following the growing tensions between India and Pakistan, the 2014 summit was the last where all member states participated. Photo Credit: President Mahinda Rajapaksa, licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0.

The ongoing COVID crisis has exacerbated the disparity between states whilst also creating a new opportunity for regional cooperation. In South Asia, a region characterized by political disharmony and strategic schism, regionalism, though entrenched, hasn’t been able to prosper as possibilities of further integration and cooperation look uncertain.

Regional cooperation and interaction have become an important feature of the international order. The increasingly globalised and liberalised world that calls for interaction between all states has witnessed a regional reaction with states striving to keep their regional linkages intact. In South Asia, this need for interconnectedness has long been recognised and multiple attempts to create a spirit of pan-Asian cooperation were championed in various conferences like the Asian Relations Conference and Bandung Conference. However, these attempts at cooperation and integration failed as newly independent countries began to prioritise national security and development over regional cooperation. Subsequently, this led to more sub-regional cooperation as this offered a more viable and manageable option for the newly independent states.

The formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, was a regionalist project aimed at promoting cohesion in the South Asian region. With, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Maldives as founding members, and Afghanistan joining in 2007, SAARC was the first of its kind in the region. It was established with the aim of promoting social cohesion, economic and cultural cooperation, as well as encouraging self-reliance, mutual assurance and collaboration within the region.

South Asia is a critical geostrategic area bordered by China, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, with the nations bound together by ‘geographical proximity’ over cultural or economic proximity. Cooperation between the nations in South Asia is vital to ensure holistic development in the region as large disparities remain between states.

However, over recent years, SAARC has been at stalemate and has struggled to make progress as compared with other regional organisations. Owing to a long history of colonialism and disjointed power structures in the area, attempts at region building haven’t yielded positive outcomes. The competing power struggles that emerged after the end of colonialism and the violent cartographies which arbitrarily demarcated nascent states created significant international tensions, with each nation concerned about the expansionism of the others.

One of the many reasons that hinders multilateral cooperation between South Asian nations is that the region is comprised of unequal partners. Identified as one of the poorest, most socially complex and underdeveloped areas in terms of trained human resources the region struggles to maintain cohesion and cooperation. Of the many nations, India has emerged as a prominent power in the region whilst most countries like Nepal still fall under the rubric of “less developed country”. The rise of India as a prominent global power has also exacerbated tensions within the region creating an apprehensive atmosphere about its influence in South Asia.

Furthermore, many of the participating SAARC nations have competing power interests and are deadlocked in geopolitical stalemate. The most prominent nations, India and Pakistan have been in a protracted state of pseudo-conflict over border disputes since their inception. Similarly, there exists a similar border issue with Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as India and Nepal. The cartographic issues coupled with insurgencies and cross-border conflicts often exacerbate the differences between the countries.

Various attempts at regional economic cooperation have also suffered at the behest of different economic policies and power relations between the countries. In 2004, the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement was signed with the aim of establishing a free-trade area amongst the countries by 2016 to facilitate holistic economic development. However, this initiative failed due to the hostile relationship between India and Pakistan. The strategic rivalry between the countries has led to the breakdown of multiple initiatives.

In 2017, India launched a satellite to ensure better communication in the South Asian region and all members of the SAARC welcomed it though Pakistan refrained from taking part in the venture. Events and agreements like these promoting cooperation between regional nations have often been stymied by political manoeuvring leaving little chance for mutually advantageous cooperation.

The increasing anxiety between the states in the region has led to more sub-regional cooperation activities becoming viable options for smaller nations. These have led to the formation of organisations like Bangladesh, Bhutan India Nepal Initiative (BBIN) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) for the coordination of trade and economic agreements. Similarly, as the hegemon in the region, India continues to pursue a strategy of reaching out to broader cooperative organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to further its growth strategy, thereby antagonising smaller South Asian regional players who may feel left behind.

Owing to the asymmetric and divided nations left by colonial rule, the South Asian region still struggles to create a cooperative environment in the region. The disintegrated cooperation between the nations coupled with their divergent political interests in the region will only create a stalemate that will disrupt chances of regional development and cooperation. It is essential that all member states work towards tackling their competing political interests and differences to ensure the revival of regionalism in South Asia.

Sri Lankan War Crimes: Will victims ever receive justice?

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by Prachi Aryal

A tank rusting by a tree in the area around Elephant Pass. The area is strategically significant - it has a military base which controls access to the Jaffna peninsula - and has therefore been the site of several battles between Tamil rebels and the Sri Lankan Army in the Sri Lankan civil war. The area is currently under the control of the LTTE, which captured it from the Sri Lankan Army following a fierce battle in April 2000. Photo by Thomas Berg is licensed with CC BY-SA 2.0

The United Nations Human Rights Council recently passed a resolution allowing the collection, consolidation, and preservation of information and evidence surrounding the gross violations of human rights that occurred in Sri Lanka during the Civil War. Sri Lanka’s Civil War was a protracted conflict that took place between 1983 and 2009 resulting in over 100,000 deaths and 60,000 enforced disappearances.

The Origin of Ethnic Violence

Having gained independence from British rule in 1948, Sri Lanka has since been in a constant struggle for peace, with its Sinhalese-Buddhist majority in near-perpetual tension with its minority populations, who have been systematically excluded through discriminatory practices. The government, in a series of attempts to disenfranchise minority populations, made Sinhala the official language and Buddhism the nation’s primary religion. The actions taken by the government reduced the scale of civic participation for minority groups that spoke other languages. The Tamil migrant plantation workers and Muslim minorities had reduced access to education and government jobs, relegating their position in society. The Sinhalese government, who were wary of British favouritism towards Tamils during colonial times, enacted these discriminatory procedures, ultimately sowing the seed for prolonged ethnic strife.

The growing feud, divided along ethnic lines, concurrently led to the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran. The organization, formed in 1976, began campaigning for a Tamil homeland in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. Started initially to campaign for an independent Tamil homeland, the LTTE morphed into an armed group as members became increasingly convinced it was the only way to affect change. In 1983, the LTTE ambushed an army convoy thereby triggering to a fully-fledged armed conflict between the group and the government.

The LTTE employed tactics of suicide bombing and guerrilla warfare to coerce the government into negotiations. The conflict waxed and waned through fragile peace processes brokered by third-party mediators and finally came to an end in 2009 when the government employed a ferocious military offensive against the group.

The conflict witnessed a period of gross human rights violations from both the LTTE and the Sinhalese majority government. Lasting almost 30 years, it resulted in over 100,000 deaths of which almost 40,000 were civilians. The war also led to over 60,000 disappearances and internal displacement.

Aftermath of the conflict: scars of the past

Following the end of the conflict in 2009, the Sri Lankan government has faced increased scrutiny from the international community. Some attempts have been made to promote reconciliation in the country but without much effect. Tamil families are still searching for thousands of people who disappeared during the war.

The government has attempted to promote national cohesion and integration through the introduction of bilingual policies and civic education. The bilingual policy essentially establishes Tamil as a national language alongside Sinhala, with the aim of fostering communication and integration between ethnic groups. Similarly, through the introduction of civic education, the school curriculum is instrumentalised to promote cohesion amongst different ethnic groups. However, the policies seem to have had little effect on inter-communal relations and are concentrated only around the urban areas, rather than in rural spaces where the conflict was mostly conducted.

Similarly, the reparation program, limited only to education, seems to have done little to heal the scars of families who continue to search for their missing loved ones. A report by Amnesty International states that Sri Lanka has one of the world’s highest number of disappearances, with a backlog of investigations on over 60,000 enforced disappearances.

In 2015, The Sri Lankan government committed to establishing four mechanisms of transitional justice: a Commission for Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, and Non-Recurrence, the Office on Missing Persons, the Office for Reparations, and a Judicial Mechanism with a special counsel by co-sponsoring Resolution 30/1 at the UNHCR. However, despite multiple efforts, the commission is yet to achieve any substantive result. Furthermore, with the initiatives led by the same nationalist politicians and generals who were in office at the end of the war, the commission finds itself in a place with reduced freedom of operation.

Sri Lanka Today

The Human Rights Watch World Report 2021 has highlighted that the human rights situation in Sri Lanka has deteriorated under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s administration. Rajapaksa was the defence secretary during the civil war period, and with his election reconciliation looks like a far-flung goal. The government revoked its commitment to the UNHCR and is continuing to appoint individuals implicated in war crimes into the administration.

There is a rise in Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism fuelling sectarian divides and the country is witnessing new waves of violence. The systematic prejudices that resulted in the conflict remain unaddressed and a new fear of sectarian policies continues to trouble minorities. Various reports have highlighted the shrinking civil society space and the increased surveillance and intimidation of human rights activists, victims of past abuses, lawyers, and journalists. Furthermore, the government has taken several decisions, for instance, banning the Burqa and Niqab alongside targeted closures of Madrasas (Islamic educational institutions), stoking the fear of another ethnoreligious rift.

Hopes for accountability

The UN Resolution passed on the 23rd of March, offers some hope in the reconciliation process for victims. The resolution grants the UN human rights office (OHCHR) permission to gather evidence for future prosecutions and make recommendations to the international community. It thereby significantly ramps up international scrutiny and gives hope to the victims waiting for justice. The resolution, if upheld, may herald the beginning of an end to the culture of impunity in Sri Lanka.

The resolution comes at a time when the Sri Lankan government is, yet again, being criticised for marginalising various minority communities and targeting civil society actors. It is hoped that the report will pave the way for a process of accountability and reconciliation amongst the people in Sri Lanka.

Prachi Aryal is an MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world.

She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.

On the verge of Statelessness

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By Prachi Aryal

People from the state of Assam stand in que to verify their documents. Source: PTI

Hannah Arendt in her book ‘The Origin of Totalitarianism’ raised citizenship as the “right to have rights”. In the Indian state of Assam, over 1.9 million people are being denied citizenship, and thus rights, after the Government of India on August 31, 2019 released the National Register of Citizens (NRC) . The list ostensibly attempts to identify illegal immigrants especially those who percolated through the porous border with Bangladesh. The NRC’s update in the state was the first since 1951, following long-standing demands from the indigenous Assamese people.

Historical Significance of the NRC

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 was a crucial event that signified the end of colonialism, the birth of two nations and the emergence of varied national identities for its residents. The cartographic solutions of post-colonial countries have impacted the language of citizenship as they grapple with regulation of the movement of people across territories that are contiguous and porous.

The Northeast region of India is tucked away in a remote corner of the subcontinent wedged between China, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The mass exodus of people from Bangladesh (then East-Pakistan) following the Liberation War on 1971 to the state of Assam has fostered a political climate in which questions of ethnic identity, language and migration are central. During the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan and became the independent country of Bangladesh, the Assamese fear of influx of immigrants was accentuated. The rising fear of threats to Assamese identity and indigeneity led to an anti-immigration movement in 1980s. This period witnessed heightened communal riots and bouts of violence that led to the Nellie massacre, killing almost 1800 Muslims. The movement ended with the signing of the Assam Accord in 1985.

The Assam Accord was a Memorandum of Settlement signed by the Governments of India and Assam, and the All-Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) in New Delhi on August 15, 1985. It established a system that used date of entry to India as the basis of determining citizenship. The Accord legitimized the citizenship status of those who had entered Assam from then East Pakistan before 1 January 1966, while a provision for 10 years of disenfranchisement was set for those entering between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971. The accord further recommended that people who had entered after 24 March 1971 would be deported as illegal migrants.

The implications of the NRC

The August 31st list has left 1.9 million on the brink of statelessness, of these many are amongst the Muslim minority. The people excluded from the list do not have an alternate Bangladeshi citizenship and are mostly people who come poor backgrounds without access to proper paperwork.

The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs has amended the 1964 Foreigners (Tribunal) Order to establish tribunals across the country to monitor the complaints of people excluded from the NRC. If they are declared foreigners by the quasi-judicial courts, they can make an appeal to the State High Court or the Supreme Court.

The quasi-judicial courts have been criticized as being led by inexperienced people who often hold bias against Muslim communities. Moreover, the long battle of litigation puts immense pressure on the minorities in Assam.

With annual flooding and calamities hitting the poor in the state of Assam, the reliance on nearly 50-year-old documents as the basis of their citizenship renders them uniquely precarious. The NRC exercise is the worst-case scenario of how in a weak capacity state like Assam, where documents are poorly distributed, excessive reliance on paper to mediate citizenship works as an instrument of exclusion. The people who are unable to prove their citizenship will either be deported or placed in detention camps.

The Problematic created by NRC and CAA

At the heart of the problem of statelessness is the geneses of the NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA). The CAA mandates that Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan will not be treated as illegal immigrants. Instead, they will be eligible for citizenship after six years of residence in India. This is in accordance with the fear of many constitutionalists and observers that the laws, rule and jurisprudence on citizenship in India has become increasingly inflected by religion.

As highlighted by N.G. Jayal, there has been a transformation from the jus soli or birth-based principle of citizenship to a more jus sanguinis or descent-based principle in India. The enactment of CAA signifies a conspicuous deviation from the religion-neutral conception of citizenship contained in the constitution, thereby undermining the principle of jus soli.

Rizwana Shamshad mentions how the current popular discourse of Hindu nationalists in India advocates for the citizenship for Hindu Bangladeshis whilst demanding deportation of Muslim Bangladeshis. This results in the false narrative of identifying Hindu Bangladeshis as ‘refugees’ whilst labelling the Muslim Bangladeshis as ‘infiltrators.’ These narratives are then used for advocacy and campaigning during elections to secure votes by resonating with ‘hyper-nationalist’ emotions.

Furthermore, by rendering people stateless, India stands in violation of various articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantee freedom to choose residence and enshrine equal rights to minorities. Exclusions by the state based on race and descent also violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

The uncertain battle ahead

The geneses of the NRC and CAA set out a path of uncertainty for the many minorities in the region of Assam. Through the CAA those who are excluded from the NRC and identify as any religion other than Muslim can get the status of refugee and hence seek citizenship in India. However, the Muslim population will not have any legal recourse to claim refugee status and will be labelled illegal immigrants. The immigrants face risk of indefinite detention and deportation.

The plight of these 1.9 million people has been overshadowed by the current pandemic. With minimal resources and in constant fear they risk being detained indefinitely without the access to legal recourse. The concern remains that the move to continue with the NRC, the poor from a weak capacity state will be the most disadvantaged. In trying to maintain popular support along the religious lines, India might create a new cohort of stateless people.

 

Prachi Aryal is an MA student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her research interest is inclined towards Gender, Human Rights, and Cross border conflicts in transitioning nations and how visuals from conflict zones play a role in communicating the realities of conflict to the broader world. She completed her BA in Journalism from the University of Delhi, India.