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Rafaella Piyioti

Cyprus’ policies on migration and their impact on the ethnic division of the island

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“Refugee Camps in Cyprus” by sarah.ahmadia is licensed with CC BY-NC 2.0

Almost 20,000 asylum applications are currently pending in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). According to the Ministry of Interior, asylum seekers on the island now account for 4% of the country’s population. This has an inevitable impact on the ethnic makeup of the island and on the future of the Cyprus Problem negotiations. The RoC has thus far followed a pushbacks policy and installed a razor wire to prevent irregular migration. “Pushbacks” refer to the practice of turning people away without giving them the opportunity to request asylum.. Under International Human Rights Law, however, states must respect the rights of all people moving across borders regardless of their migration status. As a result, the policies followed by the RoC have been in violation of the International Human Rights Law. This article explains the violations by the RoC in its attempt to control irregular migration and what implications this has on the Cyprus Problem.

In March 2020, Cypriot authorities carried out, for the first time, a number of pushbacks of boats carrying mainly Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian asylum seekers who departed from Turkish and Lebanese coastlines. Between March and September 2020, a total of 9 pushbacks were carried out according to Human Rights Watch. These incidents have drawn the attention of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatovic, who called the expulsion of the boats illegal and requested additional investigations on how Cyprus treats asylum seekers currently on the island. Mijatovic wrote a letter to Nicos Nouris, the Minister of Interior of the RoC, calling for a constructive dialogue with Cyprus regarding the treatment of asylum seekers on the island and the illegal pushbacks that have taken place. In the letter, Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Refugee Conventions and notes of the violations that Cyprus has conducted were cited numerous times.

Nouris responded to Mijatovic with a letter that notably did not address any of the legal references to the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Refugee Convention made by Mijatovic.. Nouris’ response instead forefronted only that ‘Cyprus is facing a new trend of irregular arrivals of migrants on the island’, and no justification was given for the pushback policies that followed. In a statement he gave to the Guardian, he said: ‘Cyprus simply has no more space’. In addition, the RoC has accused Turkey of deliberately seeking to create a new migration route in the eastern Mediterranean to alter the demographics of Cyprus. Turkey still does not recognise the RoC, explaining the lack of cooperation between the two countries on the migration issue.

Turkey and the European Council signed an agreement in 2016, to stop irregular migration and monitor the arrival of asylum seekers to EU states. Turkey, however, has been warning that it may send asylum seekers and refugees to the EU despite their previous agreement – a threat that it eventually followed through on in February 2020. As a result, hundreds of asylum seekers and migrants have been arriving on Greek islands and Cyprus from February and March 2020. Cyprus has received hundreds of asylum seekers as a result of Turkey’s policy, but this cannot be used by the RoC as a justification for violating International Law. As stated by UNHCR Cyprus representative, Katja Saha, any pushbacks policy constitutes a violation of International Law and, before any policy response is implemented, the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘asylum seeker’ must be clearly distinguished. Saha has also stated that Cyprus has the legal right to control its borders as long as its policies respect International Law.

The implementation of the pushbacks policy and the refusal by the government to respond to the accusations made by the European Commission for Human Rights, has led to the mobilization of Cypriot humanitarian NGOs against the government. KISA, a Migrant and Refugee Centre, has said that that the living conditions at the refugee camps in Cyprus ‘constitute blatant violations of the Refugee Law’ and that they are ‘extremely dangerous for the health of asylum seekers and public health in general’. KISA has also stated that it has brought legal proceedings against the Cypriot Ministry of Interior before the European Court of Human Rights.

Following the pushbacks’ scandal, the Ministry of Interior of the RoC installed a 11km razor wire along the ‘green line’ to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering the RoC from North Cyprus. According to the Asylum Information Database Report on Cyprus, created by the Cyprus Refugee Council, the wire will not solve the issue of migration because most people enter the RoC directly from the sea and not from border crossings on the island. In addition, it should be noted that many of the people crossing from Northern Cyprus are not illegal migrants as the RoC argues, but people with valid asylum and refugee claims. A group of political activists, known as ‘Os Dame’ (translated as “we’ve had enough”) have cut a piece of the wire and placed it in front of the Ministry of Interior to show their opposition to the government’s new approach to migration. The decision by the RoC to place a wire along the ‘green line’ has led, once again, to the opposition of the European Commission because it violates Article 10 of the Green Line Regulation which states that any change in the policy of the RoC on the crossing of persons should be approved by the Commission before being applied. The European Commission spokesperson, Vivian Loonela, said that the Commission did not receive any notification about the construction of a new fencing from the RoC. In addition, this decision has also been criticised by Cypriot opposition parties for legitimising the division of Cyprus. According to AKEL, the main opposition party, the razor wire is entrenching the ethnic division of the island and it is implying the official acceptance of borders between the RoC and Northern Cyprus.

Despite the opposition within Cyprus and from the European Commission, the President of the RoC, Nicos Anastasiades, has defended the installation of the razor wire along the UN controlled ‘green line’. The ‘green line’ which is also known as the UN Buffer Zone, is not an external border for the EU, although it separates Cyprus into two parts. It is monitored by the UN and, since the RoC entered the EU, the Green Line Regulation was also established setting the terms under which persons and goods can cross the line from the TRNC to the RoC. According to President Anastasiades the wire is a response to Turkey’s strategy on Cyprus, which is to alter Cyprus’ demographics through increased migratory flows. In response to the opposition that this policy has received from many Cypriots, the President said: ‘I am not aware as to how many residents have reacted but if any problems whatsoever are being caused then they will be resolved’. It is worth noting that in addition to the restriction of movement that the wire imposes to migrants and asylum seekers attempting to cross into the RoC, it also restricts access to local farmers who work land near the ‘green line’. The RoC’s spokesman, Kyriakos Koushos, has stated that this policy does not imply any ‘political or other message’ regarding the Cyprus Problem and that it has been made in accordance with Article 10 of the Green Line Regulation. Koushos insisted that the European Union and the UN were informed about the razor wire beforehand, despite the statements of the European Commission claiming the opposite.

The RoC has faced numerous criticisms over the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers on the island. Turkey’s strategy against the island cannot serve as a justification for the human rights violations that the RoC has conducted. The European Union and the UN have criticised Turkey’s treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, but they have nonetheless urged the RoC to stop its current policy of pushbacks. At the same time, the installation of a razor wire along the ‘green line’ has a negative impact on asylum seekers currently on Cyprus, who are unable to cross into the RoC and apply for asylum. The RoC should change its current policy on migration and asylum, stop committing human rights violations and follow the European Convention on Human Rights instead.

Legitimacy Crisis: scandals in the heart of the Cypriot Government

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By Rafaela Piyoti

Justice. By Paris Christophi.

 

A new round of UN-led negotiations on the Cyprus Problem is currently ongoing. Representatives from the UN have already held discussions with the leaders of both communities on the island, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot, as well as with the Prime Ministers of Greece and the United Kingdom. But, as the official government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) is taking part in the peace negotiations, its legitimacy on the island is at stake. This is the result of a series of scandals that have been revealed in the last six months, to which the government has failed to successfully respond.

The first scandal was revealed by Al Jazeera on the 12th of October 2020, wherein they uncovered that the Cypriot government was selling passports to foreigners who had been previously engaged in illegal activities. After this ‘Golden Passports’ scandal emerged, additional accusations were made against the President of the RoC regarding his approach to the Cyprus Problem. Finally, unprecedented police violence was used on the 13th of February 2021 at a protest against corruption and state authoritarianism. These scandals have challenged the current government and with the parliamentary elections taking place next month, a change might be coming. Al Jazeera’s investigation into the Cyprus Investment Programme revealed that a number of senior Cypriot officials, businessmen and lawyers were involved in discussions with convicted criminals regarding ways to acquire Cypriot passports illicitly. As part of the investigation Al Jazeera revealed a video recording and what they referred to as The Cyprus Papers, more than 1000 leaked documents related to the Cyprus Investment Programme. The controversy became known as the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal and it led to the resignation of Demetris Syllouris, the Cypriot parliament speaker, and Christakis Giovani, a Cypriot MP.

In addition, the President of the RoC, Nicos Anastasiadis, was also accused of profiting from the ‘Golden Passports’ with his law firm amongst those mentioned in Al Jazeera’s investigati. However, according to Anastasiadis, he is not currently involved in its operation, it is instead being run by his children. Anastasiadis is additionally alleged to have travelled to the Seychelles with the private jet of a Saudi Arabian prince who has since acquired a Cypriot passport. Andreas Paraschos, the Cypriot journalist who accused Anastasiadis of receiving economic benefits from the scheme was forced to resign from his job. His resignation has been criticised as a violation of freedom of expression, a basic human right for any democratic government. Furthermore, following the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal, the European Commission has opened formal legal action against the RoC to decide whether the Cyprus Investment Programme was lawful or not. According to the European Commission, ‘Golden Passports’ raise concerns over money laundering and corruption which are prohibited in EU member states.

Paraschos’ accusations about the RoC’s President, however, did not stop at the ‘Golden Passports’ scandal. He revealed that Anastasiadis was considering the possibility of a two-state solution to the Cyprus Problem in a conversation he held with Alexis Tsipras, the Greek Prime Minister at the time, in which Paraschos was present. In support of Paraschos’ claims, the Cypriot Archbishop made a public announcement claiming that in a private conversation he had with the President, Anastasiadis claimed that a two-state solution could be favourable for the Cypriot economy which could continue operating programs like the Cyprus Investment Programme. To make things even worse, in an interview with a Cypriot newspaper, the former UN special envoy for the Cyprus Problem, Espen Barth Eide, has also referred to Anastasiadis’ support for a two-state solution. The RoC’s President defended himself by arguing that Eide has always shown a preference to promote Turkish interests and that’s the reason he spreads such ’unfounded fiction’.

As for Paraschos’ and the Archbishop’s claims, Anastasiadis dismissed their claims as gossip and said that his words have been misinterpreted. Nevertheless, following recent developments on the peace negotiations, Anastasiadis sent a letter with his recommendations about the new peace talks to the UN – the letter has not been made public.

The lack of transparency and the refusal of Anastasiadis to state publicly his opinion on the Cyprus Problem has only further angered Cypriots. NGOs and independent journalists on the island describe the current government of the RoC as an authoritarian regime, rather than a democratic government, and they continue to call for Anastasiadis to resign.

To show their opposition to the government, NGOs and non-profit organisations joined forces, and organised a protest- attended by several hundred people, in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, against corruption and state authoritarianism. The covid-19 pandemic and the economic impact of the measures taken by the government to limit the spread of the virus were used as a trigger for the protest, but the more fundamental cause was the dissatisfaction of the people with the government, in light of recent scandals.

According to people who took part, the protest had a peaceful character but once the police got involved to break up the demonstration violence sparked. The police used a water cannon and teargas against the protestors which resulted in several people being injured. One woman was hit by the water cannon and underwent an emergency surgery to save her eyesight. A lawyer who took part in the protest argued this constituted an unprecedented use of police violence on the island. The official statement of the government was that the police were deployed to stop the demonstration as it was violating the rules in relation to Covid-19.

There was no official statement, however, on what the government’s exact orders were and why the police showed such force against the protestors, some of which were families with children. An independent investigation committee has been formed to look into the extreme police violence incident. The organisers of the protest argue that the police brutality is evidence of the oppression that endangers not only the legitimacy of the current government but it is also an attack on democratic values.

The main consequence of these scandals has been a severe damaging of people’s trust in the government of the RoC. Al Jazeera’s investigation uncovered its economic corruption, accusations made by Paraschos revealed President Anastasiadis support of a two-state solution, and unprecedented police brutality made apparent its increasingly desperate attempts to cling onto power. As such, the President of the RoC must either apologise and become more transparent towards the Cypriot citizens, or else resign from his position.

 

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy. She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. She also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys traveling and learning about new cultures in her free time.

The Other ‘Two-States’ solution: Cyprus and its Peace Process

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By Rafaela Piyoti

Road Block (Roman Robroek/ Urban Photographer)

The island of Cyprus has been divided since the 1974 Turkish Invasion. On one side, there is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which stands unrecognised by any nation-state but Turkey, and on the other, there is the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) which, by contrast, is internationally recognised and occupies a seat in the United Nations General Assembly. Since 1974, the UN has facilitated talks to attempt to reconcile the island’s bifurcation, but the two sides have resisted reconciliation, leading to the current status quo, or what is called, the Cyprus Problem.

Since the partition of the island the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities have grown further apart. The UN Peacekeeping force has established a Buffer Zone between the two communities and has been the mediator of all peace negotiations and political developments on the island since. The TRNC declared its independence in 1983 under the presidency of Rauf Denktas, although the UN deemed the declaration illegal. Crossing from the TRNC into the RoC and vice versa was not allowed until 2003, when the first borders opened marking a historic moment for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem.

Amongst solutions to this problem, the most widely discussed proposal is a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Whilst another, and increasingly possible, alternative is the recognition of two states, one that is Greek Cypriot and another that is Turkish Cypriot. So far, the two-states solution has never been discussed in the UN-led peace talks. However, the election of Ersin Tatar, a known hardliner and supporter of a two-states solution, as the President of the TRNC, has marked the first time a political figure has proposed the consideration of the two-states solution as part of the UN-led negotiations.

For 47 years, bi-communal discussions have failed to solve the Cyprus Problem despite the numerous UN calls for the two Cypriot communities to negotiate a solution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom serve as guarantor powers responsible, under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the island. The Declaration of Independence of Cyprus signed in 1960, proposed a federation with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot PM. The Cypriot federation collapsed in 1963, following the first bi-communal tensions in the wake of the islands independence.

Major discussions on the unification of the island and the establishment of a new federation were made between 1989 and 1992 with the Boutros-Ghali Plan, and in 2004 with the Annan Plan. The failure of the plans to lead to the unification of the island is attributed to domestic disagreements between the two Cypriot communities.

The Boutros-Ghali Plan failed, as, according to each sides leaders at the time, there was a lack of ‘confidence-building’ measures between the two communities. When the Annan Plan was proposed by the UN the two Cypriot communities had already grown politically distinct. According the Greek Cypriots, the Annan Plan was an indirect partition of the island as it imposed restrictions on the resettlement of Greek Cypriots in cities under the control of the TRNC. Thus, in a referendum held in the RoC a majority of 75,83% voted against the plan.

In addition to the domestic differences between the two Cypriot Communities, the role of foreign powers was also crucial in the failure to reach a solution. The Greek and Turkish governments, as guarantor powers, have supported the RoC and the TRNC respectively. Greece and the RoC, although closely allied, act as two independent states, maintaining independent foreign policies on the Cyprus Problem and on foreign affairs. Greece, like the UK, does not actively participate in the discussions, other than what is obliged through its role as guarantor power. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot government relies on Turkey in order to form its foreign policies. For Northern Cyprus, Turkey is the main economic contributor and their only foreign ally. Turkey in turn views the TRNC as a geopolitical advantage which gives them access to the Eastern Mediterranean natural resources.

Political disagreements between the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish government have also contributed towards the previous collapse of the peace talks. Recent tensions over the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis and Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the region could potentially have a negative impact on the next round of negotiations as well.

Since the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus, representatives from neither of the two Cypriot Communities have met to discuss the two-states solution. The election of Tatar as the president of the TRNC could mark the first time that the two-states solution will enter official peace negotiations. President Tatar, backed by Turkey, has stated that although he is willing to attend a new round of discussions on the Cyprus Problem, he refuses to discuss any other proposal than the two-states solution – which would entail the official recognition of the TRNC as an independent state. This would inevitably mark a political defeat not only for the Cypriot government but also for Greece and the UN, which have repeatedly called for the unification of the island.

The UN called the two Cypriot governments to a five-party meeting, to discuss the future of Cyprus peace talks. A five-party meeting format will include the presence of the two Cypriot leaders, representative from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom – as the island’s guarantor powers – and the UN as the moderator of the talks. Jane Holl Lute, the UN special envoy, was sent to Cyprus on the 11th of January 2021 to meet the two leaders separately in advance of discussions beginning in February. The Cypriot President, Nicos Anastasiades, welcomed the UN initiative to resume the negotiation process and restated that a bi-communal federation is the most favourable solution to the Cyprus Problem. Tatar, on the other hand, expressed his willingness to participate in the five-party meeting but stated that a federation is no longer a realistic solution for the island. The UN did not make any official statements for either of the meetings, but the next round of negotiations is expected to take place in late February, in New York.

February 2021 will mark the first official negotiations between Ersin Tatar and Nicos Anastasiadis, the Cypriot president, under the supervision of the UN. It is yet unclear whether the two presidents will discuss the two-states solution or if the Greek Cypriot government would veto such a proposal. So far, the official Greek Cypriot stance is against such a solution.

The Cyprus Problem has remained unresolved for 47 years despite the numerous bi-communal talks held by the UN to find a solution. So far, the two Cypriot communities have discussed several variations of a federation that would unify the island. Disagreements between the two Cypriot communities, and the extensive involvement of the Turkish government in the affairs of the TRNC have led to the collapse of all the negotiations that took place since 1974. Greece is a close ally of the RoC but does not have an active role in the negotiation process. Turkey supports the split of the island into two states and has repeatedly called for the international recognition of the TRNC. The newly elected president of the TRNC, Ersin Tatar, has been the first leader of the Turkish Cypriot community who has officially proposed the two-states solution. With the next round of talks taking place in February, the RoC has two options; either to comply with Tatar’s request, meaning a political defeat, or to refuse his proposal, leading, once again, to the collapse of the negotiation process.

 

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy. She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. She also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys traveling and learning about new cultures in her free time.

Libya strikes historic ceasefire but prospects for peace remain limited

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by Rafaella Piyioti

Libya Map with Flag Pin. Source: iStockPhoto

At present, Libya’s two governments, each with their own parliament and central bank system, are competing for power. The situation is further complicated by the overlapping and intersecting involvement of regional and international actors. On the 23 October 2020 an UN-mediated ceasefire was signed to establish the foundations for peace in the country. This agreement is the result of a series of UN-led talks between Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, leader of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and General Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA). To ensure a successful peace settlement in Libya, the disarmament of domestic militia organisations and the withdrawal of foreign forces is of paramount importance. Moreover, to understand the complexities of the civil war in Libya and the fragility of the UN ceasefire agreement, it is essential to focus on the role of foreign actors in Libya.

Since the toppling of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, civil war has raged across Libya. While the Colonel’s pan-Arabist leanings granted the country strong regional influence, his financing of terrorism led to frequent confrontations with the West. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya entered a new era of instability and insecurity. From this General Haftar has emerged as a self-proclaimed new Libyan leader, aiming to establish his own military rule over the nation with the support of various regional and international actors. The UN, in a bid to establish stable civilian governance and prevent domestic militias from gaining control of the country, instead supported the formation the GNA in 2016.

Failing thus far to unify Libya, the GNA has only managed to establish its authority in Tripoli and has been engaged in long-term fighting with Haftar’s LNA. Libyan domestic militias are divided between those who support the GNA and those who support Haftar. Haftar promised his supporters military control of the country based on the Egyptian model of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his campaign against political Islam has led many regional actors to form alliances with him. Egypt, the UAE and Israel provided political support and funding to Haftar, in an attempt to prevent radical Islamist groups from gaining control of Libya and advancing their regional influence.

In the past year, the conflict between the GNA and the LNA has intensified, piquing when Haftar’s troops invaded Tripoli on the 4th April 2019. Since then, foreign actors have played an increasingly decisive role in how events have unfolded.

In January 2020, Turkey signed an agreement with the GNA to provide military support and send mercenaries to al-Sarraj’s army. Turkey’s alliance with the GNA is an extension of its current foreign policy, to advance its regional influence, using a politically pro-Islam rhetoric. Al -Sarraj, is accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation known for its Pan-Islam ideology, that calls for the unity of all Muslims worldwide, and its alliance with Turkey. Erdogan’s support to the GNA led Israel, Egypt and the UAE to increase their support to General Haftar to counter the rise of political Islam.

Russia, although one of the ‘Permanent Five’ members on the UN Security Council, supports Haftar’s LNA, offering military aid in an attempt to advance its own geopolitical influence in the region. Post-Soviet Russia has struggled to establish itself as a recognised global power and Libya’s strategic position offers Russia options for both naval and air bases which could support its activities in the region. Haftar’s troops, establishing a number of defence contracts with Russia, have also served as an economic boon. Nonetheless, following the escalation of violence in Libya, President Putin has joined the German Chancellor Merkel and the British Prime Minister Johnson, in calling the two Libyan leaders to negotiate a ceasefire agreement.

France, another member of the ‘Permanent Five’, has also supported Haftar, though this has not always been the case, with its overarching foreign policy on Libya being more ambiguous. While initially a neutral actor, Turkey’s involvement in Libya pushed France towards Haftar’s LNA as the two countries are experiencing increased tensions over their conflicted interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Macron’s opposition to radical Islam, is yet another contributing factor in France’s alliance with Haftar, who has established an anti-Islamist political campaign in Libya to counter the rise of Islamist militias.

In the absence of a holistic European Union policy towards Libya, France pledged an alliance with Haftar, joined by Greece and Cyprus. This is mainly due to their political dispute with Turkey on the Eastern Mediterranean oil crisis. Other EU states have formed their own policies on Libya. Italy has long established historic and strategic interests in Libya and is one of the only EU member states that supports the GNA over the LNA. Not only does Italy depend on Libyan hydrocarbons, but it has also reached a deal with the GNA to cooperate in countering illegal migration and human trafficking. Libya thus serves as an opportunity for Italy to maintain its interests and advance its own influence in the region.

Following a year of intensive fighting Haftar and al-Sarraj signed an UN-initiated ceasefire agreement on the 23 October 2020. The ceasefire, welcomed by the UN and the EU, is an important step towards the re-establishing peace in Libya. The UK and Germany offered to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, which has set a timeline of three months for the disarmament of domestic militias and for foreign actors to withdraw from Libya. Yet, there remains a feeling of mistrust between al-Sarraj and Haftar which could undermine the prospect of a long-lasting peace. The three months’ timeframe is almost over, and the LNA has already accused Turkey of continuing its presence in Libya. For peace and stability, it is necessary that foreign actors, whether regional or international, follow the rules of the ceasefire agreement and withdraw their troops from Libya.

The UN, as the body traditionally at the forefront of global conflict mediation, should therefore lead efforts to ensure that all parties are following the ceasefire rules. Still, even if Turkey exits Libya, important challenges will remain. A tenuous peace and real political unity are two completely different things. As long as the ideological and political differences between the GNA’s policy of promoting political Islam, and the LNA’s anti-Islamist campaign remain unaddressed, political unity cannot be achieved.

While the UN ceasefire agreement is an important step towards lasting peace, without the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to the pursuit of regional interests through Libya, the conflict will inevitably continue. A ceasefire shows that there is a willingness, or at least a possibility, for peace. What remains now is for the GNA and LNA to be given the space and impetus to seize the opportunity for a lasting peace.

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy.

She is a Staff Writer for the Shield and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking.

Rafaela is a Staff Writer at Strife.

Turkish Claims and the Oil Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean

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by Rafaella Piyioti

The RV MTA Oruç Reis, named after the Admiral in the Ottoman Navy and chief governor in the Western Mediterranean, near the coast of Antalya, Turkey (Image credit: AP)

Over the past decade, discoveries of large amounts of natural gas in the Levant Basin as well as in the territorial waters of Israel and Cyprus show that the area is rich in resources. Their successful exploitation potentially holds enormous economic benefits. For this reason, a strong alliance between Cyprus, Israel, Greece, and Egypt led to the signing of maritime boundary agreements, establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for each country. The presence of these resources, however, also presents a challenge for regional stability. Turkey, for example, is left excluded from this initiative. As a result, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are growing. The roots of this dispute over energy resources, nevertheless, is part of the conflictual histories of the actors involved, thus holding wider implications for the international community.

In January 2020, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan formed the EastMed Gas Forum to establish the basis for cooperation and exploration of the natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. France made an official membership request while the US asked to become a permanent observer of the forum. At the same time, Turkey officially criticised the forum as an organised attempt to exclude Ankara. Part of the reason why, however, is that Turkey did not sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the UNCLOS, the territorial waters of a nation extend up to 12 nautical miles from its shore and up to 200 nautical miles from the shore of its EEZ. Natural resources found within this territory belong exclusively to that country. Contrary to UNCLOS, Turkey formed its own continental shelf theory, which excludes islands, and states that a country’s EEZ extends underwater only to the very edge of its continental shelf. The absence of formal agreements between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus on their maritime borders, leads to competing claims on the extension of their territorial rights at sea made by Cyprus and Greece, and Turkey and Northern Cyprus.

(Image credit: FT)

With Northern Cyprus under Turkish control since the 1974 invasion, Turkey officially does not recognise the Cypriot Republic to the South. As such, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejects any Cypriot drilling activities in the region and refuses to recognise Cyprus’ agreements with Israel, Greece, and Egypt over the exploitation of natural resources found in the Eastern Mediterranean. Instead, Turkey considers the maritime territory of Northern Cyprus to be part of its EEZ and following its own continental shelf theory the exploitation of hydrocarbons found in the region is a Turkish legal right. Northern Cyprus, however, is not recognised by any country other than Turkey itself and Erdoğan’s actions are deemed illegal by the international community.

More recently, tensions over the ownership of the natural resources under the seabed of the Mediterranean between Turkey and Cyprus escalated, with Turkey holding military exercises in the Mediterranean. In May 2019, Turkey sent its first drilling ship to conduct exploratory drillings off the north coast of Cyprus. The European Union (EU), in response, imposed economic sanctions on Turkey. Erdoğan refused to de-escalate tensions stating that European sanctions will not affect Turkey’s determination to continue exercising what it sees as its legal rights in Cypriot waters. At present, two Turkish ships, Yavuz and Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa, are in territorial waters around Cyprus searching for natural resources.

Tensions between Greece and Turkey are more complicated. The two countries find themselves in an ongoing dispute over Kastellorizo, a Greek island located to the east of the Aegean Sea close to Turkey’s Anatolian coast. Greece insists that, according to UNCLOS, the island enjoys a full EEZ of 200 miles leaving Turkey with a very small EEZ relative to its coastline. Turkey rejects Athens’ claims and has continued to conduct drilling south of the island. In response, Greece has attempted to push for additional sanctions against Turkey but there is little appetite for such a response at the European level. German attempts to mediate between Greece and Turkey called for official negotiations, which failed to reach a mutual agreement over the EEZ of Kastellorizo. A maritime-boundary agreement between Greece and Egypt, viewed by Turkey as a move of aggression violating its maritime territory, thereby ending the negotiation process.

Renewed illegal drillings by Turkey in August 2020, this time with the presence of Turkish Navy warships in the area. Greek warships often shadow them creating a tense and potentially escalating situation. As Erdoğan renews his aggressive rhetoric, the Greek PM, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, introduced a new defence plan, increasing the country’s military capabilities. But as Turkey and Greece are NATO allies a push towards a new phase of negotiations seems more appealing than a military confrontation. France condemns Erdoğan’s violations of Greek and Cypriot maritime rights offering military assistance to Greece. Germany attempts to mediate between Greece and Turkey and the rest of the EU is still indecisive.

(Image credit: FT)

Turkey’s behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of Erdoğan’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy, which aims at renewing Turkish influence in neighbouring countries, formerly part of the Ottoman empire. With the Turkish lira facing one of its lowest recorded values, the President is attempting to turn people’s attention away from the economic problems, by emphasising Turkish influence in the region. Turkey’s isolation from its NATO allies over their conflicting interests in the Eastern Mediterranean also pushed Erdoğan towards adopting a rather more Islamist tone, promoting himself domestically as the protector of all Muslims. After his long-lasting military presence in Syria since 2011, Erdoğan turned his attention to Libya. Turkey and Libya signed a maritime accord in November 2019 violating the Greek EEZ. To escalate things further Erdoğan sent military aid to the UN-recognised government (GNA) in Tripoli to help Fayez al-Sarraj defeat General Haftar’s Libyan National Army.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya could lead to further destabilisation in the region and draw the involvement of additional international actors. France, Greece, Egypt, Israel, and the UAE publicly backed Haftar, with the latter two signing a historic peace deal. Paradoxically, the U.S. did not take a clear position on Libyan tensions despite its’ close ties with General Haftar who holds U.S. citizenship. Turkey’s recent involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is another example of Erdoğan’s assertive foreign policy. Amid recent increases of violence in the region Erdoğan pledged his nation’s support for Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani forces are using Turkish-made drones in their fight against Armenians. Turkey is growing into a major drone player but the use of Turkish drones in Nagorno-Karabakh received international scrutiny.

Erdoğan envisions Turkey as a regional power and pursues an assertive foreign policy to extend its regional influence. Turkish claims at a sea, as well as its pursuits on land, fall within the scope of its neo-Ottoman vision, which sees Turkey advancing its influence in the region. The EU remains indecisive on how to approach Turkey; Germany acts as the mediator whilst France takes a tougher stance, pledging military support to Greece. Without the U.S. in its traditional, since the 1974 Turkish Invasion in Cyprus, mediating and stabilising role in the region, it is time for the EU to decide on a new approach to handle this crisis. The U.S. under President Donald Trump reduced its foreign involvement and distanced itself from its NATO allies. Under the future President Joe Biden, the USA might wish to think anew of taking up its traditional role in NATO and its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is a strategic partner of the EU but if Erdoğan continues his aggressive behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean, tensions could escalate further jeopardising the future of EU-Turkey cooperation.

Rafaela is a part-time MA student in the Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies programme at King’s College London. She received her BA in War Studies and Philosophy and is a Staff Writer for Strife Blog, Shield, and writes for a Cypriot newspaper. Currently, she is a Research Analyst for London Politica. Her main academic interest is on the role of intelligence in policymaking. Rafaella also has a passion for Human Rights and has interned at the Cyprus Refugee Council. Rafaella enjoys travelling and learning about new cultures in her free time.