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Is “war” in Mali “inevitable”?

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By Melisa Tezcan

A military coup earlier this year saw the northern region of Mali fall into the hands of Islamic and separatist rebels. Eight months on and the rebels have maintained their hold, causing thousands of citizens to flee their homes and sparking an international humanitarian crisis.

Taking back the northern region of Mali from the rebels looks set to result in bloodshed. With the U.N. backing a military intervention and the rebels prepared to retaliate at all costs, commentators have argued that “war” in Mali is now “inevitable”. The assumption here is that the intervention will lead to prolonged and intense violence amongst the rebels.

Arguably, were E.U. and U.N. countries willing to deploy troops, and Algeria willing to offer military assistance, the intervention would be considerably more effective and the risk of sustained conflict significantly reduced. Increased military presence in the region may provoke settlement negotiations with some rebel groups, whilst bolstering the chance of success against others. According to Gregory Mann, Mali commentator and professor at Columbia University, “If the military skill set and political willpower is there… it would not be enormously difficult to remove the[se] Islamist fighters”.

At this stage however, policy makers are limited in both these regards. Mali itself is politically fragile. The government infrastructure rests upon a tentative coalition between the military and the executive. Both factions are relatively unpopular and lack political clout. Given this, the U.N deemed that strategic responsibility for the intervention should lie with the wider regional group ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States).

This in itself has proved problematic and reaching a consensus has not been easy. According to ECOWAS director for external relations, Abdel Fatau Musah, there are a number of “stakeholders” whose values need to be reflected in the policy, namely those of neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, the former of which is particularly opposed to any form of military intervention.

Furthermore, even if a policy is devised within ECOWAS, it may be met with scepticism on the grounds that the organisation does not have a sound human rights record when it comes to the deployment of troops. If it is to gather the support of the international community, and thereby swift implementation, accountability must be built into the proposal.

Looking to the military component, there are additional limitations that need to be considered. As previously mentioned, Western nations including France and U.S will not be offering support in the form of military personnel. These constituents will come directly from Mali and its regional allies in ECOWAS; around 6000 troops in total. When we consider the vast terrain of northern Mali, around the size of Texas, together with thousands of miles of borderland – this military provision is relatively underwhelming. Looking at these figures in relation to the number of rebel recruits thought to be in the region, there is certainly cause for concern.

Furthermore, the military infrastructure itself is flawed. There are deep fissures between military ranks that need to be reformed before deployment can take place. Many troops remain disillusioned with the central government, and the possibility of their defection remains high. Policy makers need to be wary of the dangers that heavily armed, yet unprincipled, personnel may pose, as there is a risk that these individuals will disperse and leave their weapons in the hands of the rebels.

At this stage, we can be relatively certain that a military intervention in northern Mali is on the cards. What is still up for debate is whether or not this will lead to an outright conflict. Certainly, according to some rebel leaders, intervention means war. Hamaha, head of security for rebel group MUJAO, has threatened retaliation: “If an international or Malian military force attacks us, we will take Bamako in 24 hours…the international community is slow to strike because it knows that if it does, it will spark a worldwide jihad”.

In order to minimise the likelihood and potency of these threats, the intervention itself would need to be swift, well managed and properly equipped. As it stands, with Algeria withholding its resources, the West withholding its troops and the Malian military in tatters, the intervention may serve only to ignite a spark that it is unable to put out.

Runaway train: Can developing countries catch up with the modern world?

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By Justyna Maciejczak

Have you ever wondered what the magical threshold that a developing country has to cross is if it aspires to become a part of the industrialised world? Is it possible that one day the majority of today’s developing countries will eventually be recognised by industrialised nations as their equals? Dear idealists and believers in social progress, sorry to burst your bubble, but this might never happen. The reasons for this are as follows.

The problem with development is that we concentrate our attention on the underdeveloped regions, forgetting that the process of development takes place in the industrialised world as well. What is more, if you compare the rates of development of the Third World countries and the West, you will see that the industrialised nations, being able to capitalise on previous discoveries in the area of science and technology, are moving forward at a much faster pace than the rest of the world.

To illustrate this dilemma of development, imagine two trains heading the same direction but following two separate tracks. Western civilisation is moving forward at breakneck speed, reaping the fruits of progress that had its origin in the Industrial Revolution and, relatively unhindered, continues today. Developing countries occupy the second train, which is moving forward, but, being burdened with colonial baggage, can’t accelerate its pace and stays behind.

This image is additionally complicated by the fact that there is no specific destination that both trains are trying to reach. If there was one, it would be called “the ultimate state of development”, but we all know that such thing does not exist.

It is true, that some countries are in a better situation than others. China, India and Brazil have made a huge progress towards development in recent decades. But let’s be honest, not every Asian, African or Latin American country has enough potential (be it human or natural resources, geographic location etc.) to enter the path of accelerated development. In fact, the perspective for developing world looks rather gloomy.

A paradox of development is this: as industrialised nations evolve, they also change their perception of what is “modern” and what is “obsolete”. Along with the change of perception, comes the change of standards applied in order to draw a distinction between “old” and “new”, “developed” and “backward”.

Today the common criteria used to evaluate a country’s stage of development are economic indicators and standard of living (HDI). But have you ever wondered how these criteria would look like in 20, 50 or 70 years? What if in 2050 the list of indicators of development will include criteria such as: quantity of notebooks owned by family, hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) used by nation or ability of the country to send their own satellite into space? How are today’s developing countries supposed to reach these standards? At this rate of development taking place in the industrialised countries, the South will never catch up with the North and will be always seen as a “backward” region.

This is one of the reasons why the friction between North and South continues. Many developing countries are struggling to enhance their economic and political performance, and as many indicators suggest, are quite successful in their attempts (for more information on African growth read “Africa’s hopeful economies: The sun shines bright”, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21541008). However, their success is overshadowed by a Western narrative, which, with its focus on country’s failures and unresolved problems, is predominantly negative.

In other words, no matter how much has been done to accelerate growth and stabilise situation in developing countries, it is never enough to match Western standards of development. Once country has been labeled as “developing”, it remains “developing” no matter its actual progress. This is a virtual “development trap”, an issue which should be given proper consideration if one wants to deal with the development gap.

Carrots or sticks? The future of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East

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By Lorena Fortuno

The role of the United States: Changes in Middle East Foreign Policy

Since the early stages of the Cold War, one of the main policy goals of the United States has been to promote and maintain its influence in the Middle East in order to gain access to a stable oil market. Another, as Nicholas Kitchen said, has been to respond to significant domestic pressures by forming an ideological commitment to the state of Israel.

These interests have for many years led to a foreign policy strategy to prevent any hegemonic power, regional or extra-regional, from gaining control of the area, betting on a regional balance kept in place by deterrence, alliances and occasional interventions.

After the Cold War, the world witnessed a strengthening of extremist Islamic factions, mainly as a rejection – often violent - of the sustained rule of U.S. sponsored or tolerated authoritarian regimes in Middle East.

Following 9/11, the U.S. Middle East strategy adjusted to include G.W. Bush’s “War on Terror” and “Freedom Agenda” as a more aggressive plan to guarantee stability in the region as well as domestic security. Nonetheless this strategy backfired, as it created a great contradiction between nation-building and the pursuit of domestic interests.

The Obama Administration – An emerging doctrine?

After a highly interventionist approach from the Republicans, President Obama brought a new approach to foreign policy that, in George Freidman’s words, can be read as a symbol of maturity: he argues that foreign policy is made by reality, not policy papers or presidents.

The “Arab Spring” presented a further challenge for the U.S. leadership, but the Obama administration’s approach remained focused on national interest priorities, while still seeking to maintain influence through diplomacy and soft power.

Being a hegemonic power, the U.S. faces diverse and complex threats, but nonetheless Washington’s priority has been to manage or mitigate emerging conflicts in the Middle East by searching for a regional balance through diplomatic means, addressing strongly only those that challenge its main interests and otherwise leaving events to take their own course.

This position may be perceived as weak by some American allies and by voters and some factions within Washington, but as Friedman argues, this might be “less a form of isolationism than a recognition of the limits of power and interest”.

2012 Elections: Effects on Middle East Foreign Policy

Assuming there is an emerging doctrine and a new approach to world leadership and foreign policy, how much could it be affected by this year’s presidential elections?

Mitt Romney, Republican presidential candidate, recently implied during a speech at the Virginia Military Institute that the current administration’s strategy has led to a loss of American leadership and influence throughout the world and he maintains that if elected, his approach would be more military-based and active.

Arguing that allowing the balance of power and events to take its course only delays American intervention, Romney proposes what Friedman describes as “active balancing” to maintain and defend American interests abroad and reinforce national security.

But is this approach realistic? According to Romney, global resentment and anti-American sentiment fuel terrorism and anti-American groups. Could he intervene actively in Middle Eastern conflicts without intensifying these sentiments?

Would he be able to take a tougher approach towards preventing the buildup of Iran’s nuclear capability without creating further instability in the region?

What do you think?