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U Thant’s Preventive Diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis

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by Cho Zin Than

Secretary-General U Thant, here pictured shaking hands with US President John F. Kennedy in 1961, played a crucial role in de-escalating the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Image credit: Wikimedia)

Much like his predecessor Dag Hammarskjöld before him, Burmese statesman and third Secretary-General of the UN U Thant lived for the principle of ‘Preventive Diplomacy’. It was his actions that prevented the Cuban Missile Crisis from escalating. This 1962 crisis was an intense thirteen-day military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The installation of Soviet nuclear missiles in Fidel Castro’s Cuba pitted the two superpowers against each other in the USA’s backyard. Fortunately, U Thant emerged as the mediator who de-escalated the crisis from the brink of nuclear destruction.

Hailing from Southeast Asia, the figure of U Thant was initially selected as a compromise, thereby becoming the acting Secretary-General after the member states of the UN failed to decide on a permanent candidate for the role following Hammarskjöld’s untimely passing in 1961. Despite these less than auspicious beginnings, U Thant’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis is what granted him the permanent appointment. The vitality of his role can be gleaned from the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union relied significantly on his directions to de-escalate to a situation in which both powers felt reasonably safe. In particular, three phases can be observed: de-escalation, resolution, and implementation.

Following the Kennedy government’s imposition of ‘naval quarantine’ to all shipments to Cuba, previously existing tensions in the US-USSR relationship escalated swiftly. Khrushchev responded in kind, threatening with the potential escalation of a naval war to come to the defence of Cuban sovereignty. In turn, U Thant, in his bid of conflict resolution, proposed for both sides to respectively lift the naval blockade and halt shipments to Cuba. To the surprise of the international community, Khrushchev responded affirmatively to the Secretary-General’s proposal; thereby marking the first phase of the crisis’ de-escalation.

By contrast, the American response was notably harsh. President Kennedy even went as far as condemning U Thant for not mentioning their firm claim against the placement of missiles in Cuba. During this time, the United States found itself in an increasingly hostile environment with the Soviet Union, especially after Khrushchev demonstrated his unwillingness to interfere with the decisions of his captains at sea, should they have to counter a US blockade of Cuba. Such assertions convinced the United States that the Soviet Union’s aggressive behaviour was not ending at any time soon. Nevertheless, and with the relations between both countries worsening rapidly, the Americans drew up a concrete plan. U Thant was to signal to the Soviet Union this American proposal for a temporary halt in shipments; the US would in return host negotiations in the city of New York. In so doing, the US provided an opportunity to the Soviet Union to back down from the bid of aggression while preserving the government’s face and dignity. U Thant accepted the suggested proposal and transmitted it to Krushchev, who once again accepted. For the sake of reciprocity, the United States also accepted U Thant’s earlier proposal not to invade Cuba by military force. The result was clear: U Thant had successfully de-escalated the tensions.

The second phase of U Thant’s involvement in this crisis took on a prominent position by the end of October 1962 as negotiations between the two countries both bilaterally and at the United Nations Security Council became increasingly tense. As the United States and the Soviet Union entered into more heated negotiations, the United States began to put more pressure on U Thant. Ultimately, the main objective of the USA was to co-opt U Thant into confirming a United Nations inspector group in Cuba. This investigative team would analyse the operational status of Soviet missiles in the country. However, Americans expressed concerns with the Secretary-General’s political ability in implementing such a request, keeping in mind potential resistance from the Soviet and Cuba.

The American side clarified their desire to reach an agreement on the halt of shipments to Cuba and the abolishment of operational missile sites there, with those already operational set back to default. Despite U Thant’s view that there was little chance of Soviet acceptance of such demands, he concluded that such a promise of non-invasion would have to be reciprocated by the Soviet Union’s dismantling of all offensive weaponry in Cuba. Discussions were seemingly agreeable until a Khrushchev cable stated that the dismantling of missile sites in Cuba could only come about if the US took down its own missile installations in Turkey. Prior to the outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States had placed its nuclear weapons in Turkey to ensure their offensive reach in Europe in case of an attack, to ease the security concerns of its allies, and, most importantly, to warn its enemies of the United State’s military capacities, particularly the Soviet Union.

After careful considerations, the United States decided to accept the Soviet’s offer of 27 October 1962 on the sole condition that such a withdrawal of the missiles from Turkey be kept a secret. The Soviet Union in turn accepted the US’ proposal based on their rising concern on a possible US invasion of Cuba. From here onwards, U Thant clearly acted as the referee between both parties, both to prevent a catastrophe from taking place, as well as to save the global reputation of both the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, U Thant’s mediation made it possible for the two superpowers to save themselves of a nuclear entanglement that was becoming more constricting as time passed by until finally releasing both.

Of course, as Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant’s mediating role was not confined to the conflict between the Soviet Union and the US. He also had to consider Cuban interests. Another challenge for U Thant came after Fidel Castro refused to accept the proposed investigative measures by the UN. On top of the violation of Cuban sovereignty, the imposition of such measures was exacerbated by the Cuban leadership not being informed of such a decision by the Soviet Union beforehand. It took several bitter and extensive discussions to get Castro to agree on a direct UN liaison, the return of the body of the American pilot back to the US, and the removal of the last-standing IL-28 bomber aircraft from Cuba. Informal as well as public declarations, all channeled through the person of U Thant once again de-escalated the tensions.

The Cuban Missile Crisis and U Thant’s successful role therein contributed to the renewal of his mandate as Secretary-General of the UN. His mediating role suggests the significance of third-party diplomacy at the time of a largely bipolar international order during the Cold War. At the time, the lack of such efforts almost certainly would have led the world into a nuclear disaster. Nevertheless, it was not an easy feat to have the world’s most powerful countries to acknowledge, let alone rely on, the refereeing role of the UN in conflict resolution. This successful avoidance of nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union over Cuba continues to be a remarkable historical triumph of international diplomacy. To this day, it is clear that the UN as an institution, and its diplomats as the referees, continue to play a crucial role in retaining the peace, however fragile it may be.

Bibliography

Dorn, W. A. (2009 ). Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis . Diplomatic History , 33.

Fuhrmann, M., & Sechser, S. T. (2019, October 18). Can the U.S. protect its nuclear weapons in Turkey? Retrieved from The Washington Post : https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/18/can-us-protect-its-nuclear-weapons-turkey/

History.com Editors . (2010, January 4th ). Cuban Missile Crisis . Retrieved from History : https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis

Office of the Historian . (N.d.). The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962. Retrieved from Office of the Historian : https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis

Ramcharan, B. G. (N.d.). Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations . Retrieved from UN Chronicle : https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/preventive-diplomacy-united-nations

Your Dictionary. (N.d.). U Thant Facts. Retrieved from Your Dictionary : https://biography.yourdictionary.com/u-thant

Cho Zin Than is a recent graduate in International Relations from the University of Yangon (Myanmar) who has a great interest in political biographies. Cho also shares a keen interest in exploring the bilateral relations between countries and/or international organisations, focusing on the projections of their relations from a diplomatic perspective. For her final undergraduate research paper, she has written a piece on the topic ‘The European Union and Myanmar on Democratic Transition: A Challenging Chapter in Their Bilateral Relations.’ Cho regularly volunteers in organisations that strive for greater empowerment in the educational development of the following generation in Myanmar such as BridgeBurma, the Youth Society for Education, and the Civic Society Initiative.

Why do so few Scholars Study the Intersection of Climate and Security?

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by Matthew Ader

Climate change or security, a question of the one or the other? (Image credit: Lisa Benson)

I have had two and a half hours of teaching on climate change and security in two years, and I am unlikely to get any more. BA and MA courses at the King’s Department of War Studies do not offer any modules about climate change. Neither do security studies courses at Exeter, St Andrews, Oxford, or Cambridge. The US has equally slim pickings. Where tuition does exist, it tends to focus on human security and development; not strategy and operations.

And yet climate change is reshaping the world in unpredictable ways. Multiple governments even named it as a major security threat. Academics correlate climate change, if a little tentatively, with increased rates of conflict. However, scholars of strategy and war do not seem to focus on it. I surveyed thirty-four International Relations and Security Studies journals – all those with an H-Index above 30. As a matter of contrast, just one of those journals, International Organization, published 4356 total articles in the same period.

This initial survey reveals a worrying gap in the literature. Security courses that rely on this research are the incubator for future policymakers and analysts, while academics are often called upon to advise governments. A failure to address climate change risks depriving the next generation of security leaders and thinkers of a solid grounding in an important subject. At best, this may leave governments scrambling to cope with unforeseen challenges. At worst, it could lead to the creation of bad policy – or even open the door for malign actors who take advantage of climate change to push other agendas.

Why has security academia not fully engaged in this subject? Partially, it is because academics are very busy and have many existing commitments. Undertaking novel research or designing new courses, especially when the literature is so sparse, is time-consuming. It is also risky; work on climate change may not be valued in the same way as more conventional topics when hunting for jobs. Worse still, there is little research funding in climate change and security. Ministries and Departments of Defence have declared climate change to be a threat but have yet to put their money where their mouth is. These challenges, combined with the broader structural precarity of academic careers, militate against researchers investigating climate change and security.

These generally applicable concerns are worsened by personnel policy. Security studies departments are not hiring climate change experts. For example, of the eighty academics in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, only two mention climate as a research interest. This makes cross-sectoral research more difficult. Even more concerning still is that such a deficit reduces opportunities for students interested in climate and security to study the issue. This, in turn, perpetuates the existing scarcity, creating a negative feedback loop. Of course, it would be unfair and inaccurate to blame this purely on hiring practices. A department cannot hire scholars who do not exist. However, it is at least partially a chicken-and-egg problem. The lack of cross-sectoral research and limited tuition opportunities addressing climate and security make it harder to attract additional academic talent to the field.

A related challenge is that climate change does not fit within traditional models of security analysis. It is not a human actor, it does not deploy discrete methods, and it is difficult to analyse through the conventional lenses of IR theory or grand strategy. Grappling with the climate requires scientific and geographical knowledge which falls outside the specialisms of most security scholars. For example, the fierce debate among geographers over the linkage between climate and conflict depends on comparing rainfall data against incidences of violence. Unless an academic is trained to a high level in meteorological modelling, they are unlikely to be able to engage with the discussion in depth. The one partial exception to this is the Human Security field. Human security, with its focus on different issues impacting ordinary people, has covered climate change in more detail. However, its perspective has more to do with development and local interventions than big-picture decision-making. While there are absolutely insights to be gained from that discipline for national policymakers, it does not answer the broader questions required to inform strategic decision-making.

Lastly, while we are seeing the impacts of climate change now, its most dramatic impacts lie in the future. Mass climate migration, unprecedented littoral urbanization, and irreversible water scarcity are not science fiction but their true implications are only just emerging. Scholars are understandably reticent to engage in speculation – it is risky and can lead to poor quality research. This is especially true for security studies and international politics, which are wildly unpredictable. As General McMaster noted, “we have a perfect record of predicting future wars…and that record is 0%.”

This is compounded by the creeping nature of climate change. On 12 September 2001, nearly every security scholar turned their attention to terrorism and the Middle East. I’m sure that a similar statistical analysis of journals from 1985 to 2000 would show relatively few articles about Salafi jihadism, but academics were able to apply their existing knowledge to the new problem. It is not clear that this will happen with climate change, because there will probably not be a single dramatic event which changes conversations and research priorities. Rather, it will incrementally alter global conditions over the span of decades, shaping a new normal.

Such a slow-moving emergency is unlikely to attract enough research to effectively inform policy – especially given that great power competition, terrorism, and biosecurity will, among other issues, remain pressing concerns throughout the period. This is worsened, as noted, by the requirement for expert scientific knowledge to properly study climate change. In short, there is unlikely to be a catalyst for the study of climate change, and if there is, security scholars may struggle to obtain the necessary scientific knowledge to properly engage with the issue in a timely fashion.

There is no single policy prescription that can magically fix this deficit. However, it is a problem – and it must be rectified. Climate change is actively reshaping the world. If security academics do not provide perspectives on it, the security implications may be ignored. Worse, they might be dishonestly weaponised to achieve a larger agenda. We have seen this already with alt-right groups using fear of climate migration as a recruiting tactic. The past four years have clearly shown that radical ideologies can find purchase at the highest levels of government. In the absence of informed views from authoritative sources, decisionmakers may turn to confident ideologues for answers.

At the end of that lecture on climate change, I asked the lecturer what the strategic plan was for dealing with the mass migrations, droughts, and water wars he predicted. He said that there was not a single one. The gap in the research is no one’s fault. But catastrophe does not care about intention. Policymakers will require effective advice to navigate the new challenges of this century. The academic community should mobilise to provide it – and security academics should lead the charge.

[1] This was achieved by searching their archives for all articles from 1995-2020 with “climate change” in the title and manually sorting through. This method is necessarily vulnerable to personal judgement and can exclude work on topics adjacent to climate change & security i.e. food scarcity.

Matthew Ader is a second-year student doing War Studies. He has worked as an intern in a number of security consultancy firms. His academic interests gravitate loosely towards understanding challenges and opportunities for Anglo-American strategy in the 21st century (and also being snide about Captain America’s command ability). He is also an editor for Roar News, and has written for a number of security publications – most especially Wavell Room. You can follow him on Twitter: @AderMatthew.

The Lasting Relevance of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Case of Syria

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by Etfa Khurshid Mirza

Unexploded barrel bombs allegedly dropped by government helicopters are pictured here in Idlib, Syria in 2015 (Image credit: Getty Images)

 

A history of conventions, agreements, and treaties runs throughout human civilisation. The 19th and 20th Centuries witnessed a rise in such conventions, thereby paving the way to cap burgeoning conflicts globally. Yet, despite such mechanisms being implemented, the world still witnesses many of the deadliest wars, with toxic chemicals being a primary weapon of choice. The poison gasses of the Great War and the atomic bomb that settled the Second World War left many casualties in its wake; with the former compelling world leaders to negotiate a new convention that sought to prohibit the deployment of Chemical Weapons (CW).


Being largely non-binding, an ongoing effort to ban the use of CW can be discerned since at least the 17th Century. It is only starting from the late 19th Century onwards that formal agreements were made between states. The Hague Declaration of 1899 banned the use of asphyxiating or deleterious gasses such as nitrogen or noble gases. Then, in 1907, the Hague Convention on Land Warfare banned the use of poisonous weapons. The Geneva Protocol signed of 1925 further prohibited the use of poisonous gases and bacterial methods of warfare. In so doing, these Hague conventions laid out the rule of war and the prohibition of CW in war; while the Geneva conventions sought to protect the victims of war. This was followed by the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in 1980 which prohibited conventional weapons that were deemed to be inhumane. Nonetheless, despite such efforts, chemical weapons (CW) were still used during conflicts.

Between the two World Wars, the use of CW was reported in many conflicts: Spain used chemical weapons in Morocco during the Rif War between 1923 to 1926 war. Italy, in turn, deployed chemical weapons to Libya in 1930 and again to Ethiopia in 1935, all resulting in heavy casualties. Since 1945, millions of casualties were caused by such means. After the Second World War, despite acquiring nuclear weapons, the US and the former Soviet Union continued the development of CW. The US used anti-plant agents in the Vietnam War of 1961-73, while Egypt used chemical weapons during the Yemen war of 1963-67. Iraq similarly aimed its CW capabilities towards the Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War of 1988.

Extensive use of CW in various conflicts despite the earlier agreements signed as part of the Hague and Geneva Conventions necessitated the formation of a comprehensive treaty that can cap the production, use, and stockpiling of such toxic weaponry. Therefore, negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) began in early 1968. While initially developing at a protracted pace, these talks eventually gathered momentum after the Iran-Iraq war of 1988. This war, however ironically, also generated interest among Middle Eastern countries for the acquisition of CW. This sentiment ultimately expedited the negotiations, leading to the conclusion of CWC in 1992. The CWC formally entered into force in 1997, with its implementation monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).


The CWC aims to ban chemical weapons in terms of their development, production, stockpiling, and use. It is the most comprehensive disarmament treaty to date having 193 member states. Since its formation, the most important cases of use of CW were reported in Syria. In 2012 and 2013, the Assad Regime used these weapons against opposition forces, killing around 1,400 civilians. The use of chlorine gas in attacks has also been documented during attacks in 2017 and 2018. Already in 2014, the OPCW sent its Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to the country to investigate whether CW were used in Syria and if so, to determine the type of weapons used.


Since then, the OPCW’s FFM has investigated over eighty suspected attacks and collected evidence in sixteen of those attacks. Still, it is important to note that the FFM does not carry the mandate to investigate which party holds the responsibility. To determine which party is to be held accountable the OPCW-UN Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM) was established in 2015. This mechanism concluded that the Syrian government was responsible for four CW attacks, while the Islamic State (IS) was responsible for two. Despite such useful insights, however, the JIM findings were unfortunately challenged by Russia; and after its veto in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding its extension, the JIM ceased to exist.


In March 2019, another Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) was finalised after repeated attempts by the U.S and other states to carry out investigations based on shreds of evidence and to determine responsibility for CW use by the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT initiated its investigation in June 2019 and focused on the events for which FFM had ascertained the use or likely use of CW by the Syrian government but had not yet reached a final conclusion. The IIT published its first report: ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use’ on 8 April 2020, acknowledging that the Syrian government has used CW against its people.


The three key events specified in the report occurred after the Syrian accession to the CWC. Before, in 2016, the OPCW confirmed the destruction of all CW declared by Syria. The incident of 24 March 2017 was the first such event that established the use of sarin gas in Syria after it had acceded to the CWC. On the Syrian city of Ltamenah, three different attacks were carried out, on 24 and 30 March, a fighter jet of the Syrian Arab Air Force dropped M-4000 aerial bombs containing sarin and on 25 March a Syrian military helicopter flying from Hama airbase dropped cylinders containing chlorine gas.


Sarin is a nerve agent, whereas chlorine is a legal industrial gas; yet both their usage as CW is a war crime. The IIT based its conclusions from the information gathered through interviews, analyses of samples obtained from attacked sites, remnants of ammunition, and other relevant material. The team also expressed its concern that the Syrian government did not cooperate in its investigation and denied access to several sites. As such, the IIT concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian government had used CW on its citizens in the attacks carried out in March 2017.


Following the findings of this report, the Executive Council of OPCW, which consists of forty-one members from five regional groups, decided the use of CW in Syria through voting on 9 July 2020. The Council condemned the use of CW by the Syrian government in 2017 and as per paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the CWC, the Syrian government is required to declare all the relevant details of the used CW mentioned in the report and all other CW that it possesses with details of production facilities, as well as resolve all of the remaining issues regarding the previous declaration within ninety days. If it fails to comply, the Council will take appropriate action against the Syrian government as per paragraph 2 of Article X11 of the Convention.


Considering its activities towards destroying chemical weapons and as the overseeing body for the CWC, which is considered the most successful disarmament treaty to date; the OPCW is playing a significant role as a watchdog. In recognition of its efforts; it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013. The role of the OPCW is becoming more pertinent with the growing chemical industry and its use in both civil and military applications and, therefore, can play an active role in assisting the state parties for the legislation and effective enforcement in its implementation. Decisions in respect of CWC implementation for long-term governance are also needed. However, technological developments and political interests are increasingly pressuring the treaty. Timely measures and special efforts are presently required to counter these challenges and to prevent the future use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world taking lessons from the use of CW in the past and, most recently, in Syria.

Etfa Khurshid Mirza is a Research Fellow at Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Pakistan. Her area of specialisation is Nuclear and Strategic Affairs. She can be found on Twitter @sky_limiter.

 

COVID-19, Immigration, and the Media in Britain

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by Harry Sanders

A long history of immigration runs through Britain’s healthcare sector (Image credit: Meager/Fox Photos/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

The coronavirus pandemic’s global impact has left few unaffected. Perhaps the only silver lining of this pandemic is its highlighting of the essential work of migrants in the NHS and other healthcare services. While for years migrants have been the scapegoat of the UK’s many problems and have been the subject of immense prejudice and abuse; the positive impact of their contributions to society has finally started to come to light. Though the gushing affection and appreciation for our migrant healthcare staff are abundant on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media, it is important to consider if the same shift in tone has been present in our traditional media sources.

Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus, the British press was notoriously - and at times unashamedly - opposed to immigration in its general stance. Following the election of David Cameron’s Conservative government in 2010, the number of news articles mentioning ‘migration’ or ‘immigration’ has been growing at a steady rate year-on-year, coinciding with Conservative immigration policy which aimed to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands. Throughout all of these articles written between 2006 and 2015, the most common modifier used to describe immigration was ‘mass’, followed closely by ‘net’, ‘illegal’, and ‘European’. The vast majority of these articles have been crafted with the specific aim of colouring all migration with the brush of illegal immigration, thereby characterising entire nationalities as criminals and aliens.

This is even more unjust when one considers that many of the articles emphasising illegality are covering the plight of refugees; individuals whose right to be in the UK is enshrined in both national and international law. If the last decade of British politics is anything to go by, this narrative has been highly effective in influencing the opinions of their readership.

Anti-immigrant sentiment can still be seen in articles written immediately before the outbreak of coronavirus. This article from the Daily Mail, for example, reported on the Prime Minister’s pledge to restrict EU migrants earning less than £23,000 from entering the country and to move to an ‘Australian-style points-based immigration system’. The article’s discussion of ‘slashing’ the number of low skilled workers, and its quotation of a Downing Street spokesman as having heralded the ‘return [of] democratic control of immigration to the British people’, evokes a sense of pride and achievement at the prospect of losing half of Britain’s migrant workforce. ‘Slashing’ has a rhetorical effect here; its emphatic quality is designed to trigger an emotional response in the reader by highlighting the government’s merciless approach to cutting immigration. One must presume that the critical eye has wandered far from the details of this announcement, as little consideration is given to the economic implications of restricting any workers earning less than £23,000 – a salary far in excess of the national minimum wage.

Whilst it is important to recognise the clear ideological stance embedded into the article, it is perhaps unsurprising given the political affiliation of the publication. The Daily Mail is well-known as a right-wing newspaper, and as a result, an anti-immigration narrative can be seen as them simply catering to the views of their readership. By the same token, it would be unsurprising to see The Guardian taking a more tolerant view of immigration, in light of its left-leaning readership and left-wing editorial stance. The article discussed above is very much typical of the right-wing press’ pre-pandemic approach to migration; as a result, the key question concerns the extent to which the coronavirus has reconfigured the discourse. Has the public’s positive outlook on migrant healthcare staff influenced reportage, or is the enmity still very much present?

A ‘mixed bag’ would perhaps be the aptest description. Reporting on an asylum seeker’s ‘stabbing spree’ in Glasgow in June, the Daily Mail exhibited a surprising change in tone. Citing the asylum seeker’s mental state and the negative impact of lockdown in triggering post-traumatic stress, the Mail in this instance considered the socio-economic and psychological stresses which he faced and how they may have contributed to the incident. Remarkably the most noticeable used pejorative in the article, ‘hordes’ – so often reserved especially for immigrants – was instead used to describe the emergency services which responded to the incident. Rather than mindlessly painting a black and white picture of a man with a knife, a victim, and the heroic response of the police, fair consideration is given to the causes which led to the incident and – perhaps most importantly of all – it is framed as a wholly preventable event which was allowed to happen due to a lack of sufficient resources for social services.

A further immigration story to emerge during the coronavirus pandemic was the route to British citizenship offered to British National Overseas citizens in Hong Kong due to China’s imposition of a new security law. This prompted uncharacteristic coverage from a number of typically right-wing publications; the Daily Telegraph, for example, ran the headline ‘Giving British citizenship to 300,000 Hong Kongers will boost the economy’, a reversal of the cliched trope peddled in right-wing media that immigration leads to economic demise. Published in the midst of lockdown (29 May), it may be that this more balanced approach was borne out of the wider uptick in appreciation for what migrants contribute to the UK.

Immigration also entered the discourse when eastern Europeans were flown into the UK to help save the June harvest. This triggered media coverage verging on the satirical, with the Daily Mail- a publication with an entrenched opposition to Romanian migrants - running the headline ‘Romanians to the Rescue’. Given the travel restrictions that were in place at the time, a demonstration of support for immigration of any kind- let alone that of Romanian economic migrants- is hugely noteworthy; it communicates an awareness of how indispensably important immigration is to the UK.

Has the UK media U-turned on its deep-rooted prejudice against migrants and immigration? Not quite, though it is nevertheless important to note the positive impact which our migrant healthcare workers have had on public opinion and on the press. The Daily Mail is not the only publication guilty of such reporting as has been exhibited pre-lockdown, and sure enough in recent articles, the Daily Express has persisted in the trope of reporting the scale of immigration rather than its legality. It is also key to consider that many will see headlines such as ‘Gangs using coronavirus crisis to send migrants to the UK’ and share that information irrespective of the article’s content. Whether this article highlights the perceived threat of immigrants to the UK or the plight of the trafficked migrants is a moot point to anyone who will form an opinion before opening the link and preach their opinion on the issues as unchallenged gospel.

Whilst it is encouraging to see flickers of journalistic integrity return to the British press, our media, and the way in which we consume it, must change a great deal to begin reporting on political issues such as this in an unbiased and factual manner. Recent weeks have made it impossible to dispute the fact that migrants do in fact contribute massively to the UK, and rather than inflicting harm upon public services, are actually a key cornerstone upon which our public services stand. Going forward, it should be facts, not polarised opinions, that form the basis of immigration coverage.

Harry Sanders is a content writer for the Immigration Advice Service, an organisation of immigration solicitors.

Yemen: A Failure of Human Security

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by Philip Mayne

The enduring conflict in Yemen has driven many into refugee camps (Image credit: UNICEF/Alessio Romenzi)

Since its reunification in 1990, Yemen has been ravaged by economic failure and internal conflict. In 2015, a civil war erupted between the government and the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia Muslim minority. In 2018, when the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) began fighting the government for control of the southern city of Aden, the STC announced self-rule on 26 April 2020 for the areas under its control. At the time of writing the Yemeni government continues to be embroiled in a civil war against the Houthis in the North, the STC in the South, and other rebel groups elsewhere in the country. Yemen is witnessing some of the worst human security failings in recent years.

What is Human Security?

Following the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts became prominent across the globe. Traditional international relations theories, blinkered at the state level of analysis, failed to examine these sub-state conflicts. Human security was introduced in 1994 with the publication of the United Nations Development (UNDP) report. Human security makes the individual the referent object of security. Human security focuses on establishing ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ for every individual. However, threats to human security remain numerous. The 1994 report lists seven main categories of threat, including food security, health security and personal security. Yemen is one example of a state failing to meet human security in these aspects.

Food (In)security

As a result of the conflict, poverty is rife within Yemen. Almost half of the population is living on less than US$3.10 a day, and over five million people live on less than $1.90 a day. Even more people are at risk of falling into poverty. Without income, buying necessities becomes almost impossible. The economic situation in Yemen, in terms of wages, employment, and the Yemeni currency itself, is worsening, yet food prices continue rising.

However, there is more to food security than the ability to buy food. Food security is also the ability to always have physical, social, and economic access to safe and nutrient-rich food. In Yemen, even for those who can afford it, access to food and water is minimal at best. Much of the basic infrastructure has been decimated by the war. It is estimated that 3.5 million people have lost access to piped water, due to conflict. Access to food is also limited.

Yemen is heavily dependent on imports to satisfy domestic consumption. Yet successive governments failed to establish an effective infrastructure to allow the feeding of the nation. Moreover, the conflict has restricted the ability to access this imported food. At least 5.1 million people in seventy-five districts have been cut off from access to imports and humanitarian assistance due to restrictions imposed by authorities during the conflict. The situation has worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic; as supply routes were closed due to international lockdowns, thereby slowing down trade. In addition to Yemen’s woes, a locust swarm sweeping over the country has begun to affect agricultural production. The results of food insecurity in the country could be devastating.

The multifaceted issues that have caused food insecurity in Yemen have resulted in a situation that is beyond dire. Yemen now faces the worst food security crisis in decades. Over twenty million Yemenis are food insecure, and ten million are at the brink of famine and starvation. 65,000 people are already in the advanced stages of hunger and extreme food deprivation. Over two million children, under the age of five, are also suffering from chronic malnutrition. In 2019, it was reported that extreme hunger and disease had directly killed up to 85,000 children. It is clear that Yemen is clearly failing in terms of food security, and keeping the people of Yemen fed poses one of the greatest international challenges on the world stage.

Health (In)security

In addition to inadequate economic and food insecurity, Yemen faces a severe health crisis. Health facilities have been depleted due to the conflict, as shelling and airstrikes have damaged hospitals, healthcare workers have been assaulted and medical facilities have been occupied. The lack of access to clean water and sanitation resulted in a major cholera outbreak in 2016. Since 2018, there have been nearly one million suspected cholera cases. As it stands, cholera, dengue, malaria, and poor sanitation are still prevalent, and the health services are already overstretched.

Unfortunately, COVID-19 has exacerbated Yemen’s struggles. As of 14 July, the number of cases in Yemen is 1502, with 425 deaths. This figure, is likely lower than the reality, as they are from government reports, and insurgent groups have been accused of concealing the outbreak. Nonetheless, the virus is rapidly spreading in Yemen; and the fatality rate is four times the global average.

The focus on COVID-19 has resulted in other services being reduced, resulting in other negative implications for health security. Yemen currently has a maternal mortality rate that is 47 times that of the UK. However, The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has been forced to suspend reproductive health care in 140 out of 180 health facilities. Only 40 facilities now provide these facilities across the entire country. This reduction in funding risks the lives of 2 million women and girls of childbearing age. The UNFPA states “Some 320,000 pregnant women will be cut off from lifesaving reproductive health services, while 48,000 women could die from complications of pregnancy and childbirth”. Prior to COVID-19, Yemen failed to provide sufficient health services and provide care for the population. In the current crisis, the future looks even bleaker.

Personal (In)security

In the last five years, over 112,000 people have died as a direct result of the conflict in Yemen. 25,000 of these casualties were in 2019 alone. In February of this year the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), confirmed that since March 2015, 7,734 civilians have been killed directly because of the war, including 2,103 children. In the first quarter of 2020, 270 civilians were killed as a result of the conflict.

Intrastate conflicts often include high levels of civilian casualties as local populations get caught up in the conflict. However, in Yemen, there is evidence that points to the deliberate targeting of civilians. In June 2020, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reported that between January and December 2019, there were thirty-five targeted attacks against schools and hospitals. These attacks were carried out by all sides of the conflict. One report states that in 2019, the conflict was responsible for killing one child younger than 5 every twelve minutes. It is clear that personal security is not being met in Yemen, with indiscriminate force being used by the Saudi-led coalition, and indiscriminate weapons, such as banned mines, by rebels.

Indirectly, the conflict has created another personal security issue, as the number of displaced people in the country stands at over 3.6 million. Displaced people are at higher risk of exploitation, harassment, and violence. Women and girls, who make up half of all displaced people, are particularly at risk. Some girls have been forced into child marriages, and other women have been subjected to domestic abuse, yet there has been a reluctance to report such crimes.

In addition to women, displaced children are at risk of threats to their personal security. Currently, it is estimated that there are two million displaced children in Yemen; many without their families. These children are especially vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse, exploitation, and recruitment into armed groups. Again, as with other human security issues, personal security is far from being realised in Yemen.

What Solution?

Efforts by the United Nations and several international NGOs have alleviated some of the suffering through providing humanitarian aid and assistance in Yemen. But with the combination of continued conflict and a global pandemic, the outlook for Yemen continues to be a human security disaster, unless one of these issues can be alleviated.

Conflict has been central to the human security crisis in Yemen. If there is any chance of alleviating the suffering in Yemen, then the first and most important step is to bring an end to the on-going conflict. After five years of conflict and with no end in sight, outright military victory seems highly unlikely. Therefore, international actors need to continue to convince all parties to open discussions and negotiate an end to the conflict.

Negotiations between the parties are not unprecedented. Regional actors have had some success in bringing the parties to the table. In November 2019 the, albeit short-lived, power-sharing Riyadh Agreement was signed after negotiations between the Yemeni government and STC were brokered by Saudi Arabia. International organisations too have had some success. In December 2018 the UN-brokered the Stockholm Agreement, which implemented a ceasefire in the city of Hudaydah, allowing aid to enter the city and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. Therefore, the UN, and other actors, must continue their efforts calling all parties to seek a negotiated peace. Without peace, there is little hope that the suffering in Yemen can be alleviated, and Yemen will continue to be one of the greatest human security failures of recent times.

Philip Mayne is a final year PhD candidate at the University of Hull. He has a special interest in strategy, counterinsurgency, military ethics, military history, international security and relations. His thesis examines the relationship between military ethics and military effectiveness. Specifically, his work focuses on adherence to the Just War Tradition, and success in counterinsurgencies; through analysing the case studies of the Malayan Emergency, the Kenyan Emergency, the Algerian War and the Vietnam War. Philip has contributed to the Huffington Post and is an active member of the Hull University War Studies Research Group. Find him on Twitter @phil_mayne.