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British Foreign Policy towards China: Short-sightedness Disguised as ‘Pragmatism’?

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Britain’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson during the celebrations for Chinese New Year in London, 2020 (Image credit: AFP)

When COVID-19 is the product of a breach of human rights within China itself, ignoring human rights in a post-COVID world order is frankly naïve and hardly “pragmatic”.

In his 1941 State of Union address, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt outlined the Four Fundamental Freedoms that every person in the world is entitled to enjoy: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. These four principles would later serve as the foundation upon which the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was formed, ushering in a new era in which the human rights violations of states became a matter of concern that permeates far beyond its own sovereign territories. Contemporary human rights were borne out of a pragmatic concern that our ideals and principles at a certain level become a personal matter; since without human rights, there can be no human security.

The end of the Cold War would put an end to ideological conflict over the value of fundamental freedoms. Today, our post-Cold War world order lacks such kind of predictability and, thus, more uncertainty with regards to the international order can be expected. Moreover, in a post-COVID-19 world and amid a crumbling Pax Americana under Trump, the traditional state advocates of human rights are now MIA. This is an erosion of the liberal world order which is eating itself from within, with President Trump projecting an image of the USA is quite the opposite of most of its traditional ideals. Across the Atlantic, Brexit has further distorted unity both in the Anglosphere and within Europe.

Indeed, some seem more concerned about the economic damage that COVID-19 will bring if we do not appease Xi Jinping’s China, citing Realpolitik as a justification. In this regard, Professor Kerry Brown argues that given Brexit, the UK should reconsider its stance towards the Hong Kong crisis, given the country’s weak economic relations with China. One can disagree with this assertion since the notion of China as a ‘successful capitalist nation’ leaves the causes and consequences behind this success undefined. That is not to say that relations with Australia and New Zealand are not anything positive, but we have to consider fostering free trade relations across the D-10 member states, as well as with the EU. As for China, the scrapping of the Green GDP Initiative in 2007 is an example. The initiative would have reduced the data on China’s real GDP growth to zero. Indeed, Green GDP took into account environmental degradation, socioeconomic inequalities, and loss of biodiversity in China’s real GDP growth. The environment being hardly a significant concern for the cold realism of the status quo international relations and diplomacy is of course no surprise to anyone.

But that clearly misses the point of what we are faced with during the COVID-19 crisis. Ideally, this pandemic will serve as a tipping point and a shift away from business-as-usual in dealings with China. Arguably, it was the country’s repression of the fundamental freedoms (primarily freedom of speech) of its own scientists and academics that lays at the root of the current crisis. Never has there been a more urgent time to stress the significance of human rights than in this time of Corona. Indeed, our quality of life can only flourish when our fundamental freedoms are respected.

To do so, we ought to do away with this perception that our idealist concerns can never overlap with our pragmatic ones. That is not to disregard China’s ability to be one of the most powerful economies in the world without civil and political liberation as illegitimate. But the staggering boom of China’s economy over the past couple of decades simultaneously led to the accumulation of enormous amounts of inequalities, on top of excessive environmental pollution and abuse. This abuse of nature also notably contributed to the ongoing pandemic. Even with these factors aside, the political economies of our free societies are not designed to compete with state capitalism.

British foreign policy is becoming more inconsistent by the day, whilst China’s policies remain consistently expansionist.

The formation of a Democratic 10 (D-10) and the potential intake of British National (Overseas), or BN(O), passport holders from Hong Kong (combined with potential ‘burden-sharing’ agreement amongst the Five-Eyes) is of course considerably an improvement from its initial blasé stance. But the latter fails to address the rights of the remaining Hong Kongers, and most importantly, should not be a panacea to the growing Chinese aggression in its blatant disregard for international norms. That is not to argue that this development has not been provoked by the Trump Administration, but my point is that this can be a recurring theme not just for Hong Kong but in any part of the world. If so, should our response be the same? The recent decision to merge the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign Office is another example of how not to respond. Though a little premature to say, this could lessen the UK’s room of maneuverability and upset future British diplomacy. In so doing, it could also render the idea of “Global Britain” an oxymoron, given China’s usage of COVID to increase its influence in Africa, for instance. British foreign policy is becoming more inconsistent by the day, whilst China’s policies remain consistently expansionist.

However, China’s new National Security Legislation (NSL) for Hong Kong is more of a distraction from Xi Jinping’s party-state’s own mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak in China itself, which has evidently hurt his standing amongst the elites of his own party. Those pragmatists who justify the incentive for us to appease President Xi in order to safeguard the financial repercussions of Brexit and of COVID-19 are too short-sighted. Those who are truly pragmatic will consider the long-term implications of our free societies and our very own public health and economic welfare; spurring our foreign policies towards China on to become more sophisticated and paying more close attention to human rights.

Over the past year, we have seen the relentless resistance of the people of Hong Kong against the Chinese state’s incursions. The more active approach that has now been taken towards creating a D-10 should extend to Hong Kong as well. If not, the crisis there is bound to produce refugee flows and further destabilise an already volatile region. This would be miscalculation at a time when Western influence in Southeast Asia is still lagging behind that of China. At the same time, a Cold War with China must remain off the table. The real pragmatic solutions should lie somewhere in between. There should be more craftsmanship put into our foreign policies. China’s declaration of its NSL in Hong Kong is clearly against the Basic Law that governs the city. Insofar as China lacks territorial legitimacy (at least until 2047) and the British by a supermajority in Hong Kong hold political legitimacy, there is little reason why this cannot be an advantage to British foreign policy. Commercial interests count too in the picture.

Despite our current obsession not to exacerbate the status quo, it is clear that we would not have arrived here in the first place if we had been standing up against Beijing’s disrespect for fundamental human rights. The country’s blatant disrespect for these rights emanates far beyond its sovereign territory. Previously, we in the West have considered that the effects of China’s unique form of governance (which is firmly opposed to human rights) was confined to its national borders. Yet, this pandemic has aptly demonstrated the far-reaching impact of China’s illiberalism at home. As such, Western policies ought to revise their hitherto assumptions and economic relationship vis-à-vis the CCP regime. So too must we reconsider our assumption that China’s diplomacy will be more scrupulous given Deng Xiaoping’s guiding philosophy of ‘hide your strength and bide your time’. Clearly, this time has now passed. China’s new position in the world order means that it can afford more knee-jerk reactions such as what we have in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and now COVID-19.

This is significant despite the facts that while Donald Trump may not be re-elected in November and that Asia’s future will still considerably depend on Western financial institutions and trade relations. The lack of a cohesive strategy in the European and Anglosphere will mean that our intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations will be more vulnerable to be dictated by China and Russia. How can we, coming from free, liberal societies, protect our own fundamental freedoms if we are not taking proactive steps in maintaining a world order that is now presenting to be getting less liberal and orderly?

Surely bargaining our fundamental freedoms for the sake of what is likely to end up as imbalanced trade relations with authoritarian regimes clearly is not what our forefathers have lost their lives for. At present, the ball remains in Britain’s court and we still get to call much of the shots even without the leverage of the EU. Through the D-10, one can be hopeful that the EU can still continue to render a force of unity and perhaps learn that referendums can seriously backfire. It is not to say that illiberalism anywhere will always affect us - it really depends on the power and reach of the country we are dealing with. While human rights may not be at the forefront of foreign policy-making, what we have now with COVID-19 is already a net financial loss. Realpolitik should seek to include human rights in its approach given the reciprocal implications on our fundamental freedoms, national security, and economic prosperity. It is unclear whether the British government realises this.

Does the History of Britain’s Relationship with Europe mean that Brexit was Inevitable?

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by Ryan Chan

The European flag, a contentious issue in Brexiting Britain (Image credit: Flickr)

 

In most analyses regarding the 2016 Referendum, Britain’s legacy of Exceptionalism and Empire is commonly cited as a crucial reason for the 2016 Referendum by critics and proponents alike. Yet this article will problematise the claim that Brexit was historically inevitable as it dismisses crucial explanations on the historical development of British Euroscepticism and marginalises the plethora of reasons as to why ordinary Britons voted as they did in the referendum.

The French saying ‘l’Angleterre est insulaire’ summarises the idea that Britain is an ‘island nation’, geographically and geopolitically detached from Europe, able to choose between the ‘continent or the open seas’. In his veto against British membership in what was then the European Economic Community, Charles de Gaulle asserted in 1963 that Britain is unfit to join: “She is unlike other European countries […] linked by her markets […] to the most diverse and farthest-flung nations.’ This view of an ‘insular Britain’ was not limited to De Gaulle’s time: Stephen George’s An Awkward Partner, for instance, argues that Britain had always preferred a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and given Britain’s legacy of empire and ‘rehearsal of historical anti-French and German attitudes,’ it led to a ‘disdainful’ relationship between Britain and the EU, seeking for a ‘looser relationship based on free-trade’ rather than a political union.

Critically, the idea of Britain as an ‘island nation’ was a phenomenon that preceded a united Europe or the existence of Great Britain. After the loss of her French possessions following the Hundred Years War, Britain (then England) was more concerned with empire-building overseas rather than within Europe unlike the continental European powers. When Britain did engage with Europe however, her role as a ‘balancer’ coerced her into ‘difficult relationships’ and rivalries with most of her neighbours. Allusions to this history were prevalent in the rhetoric of the Leave Campaign. Many referenced the re-establishing of a Britain formulated on the ‘island nation’ concept: a Britain that once ruled the waves and through its Parliament opposed the evil continental European powers. For Eurosceptics, the EU is a German-led ‘fourth Reich’ and Brexit is a return to ‘global Britain’ and British sovereignty.

Over the centuries, there was little change to what ‘Britain’ was, and as a consequence, Britain placed less importance on being ‘European’ than her counterparts on the continent who experienced devastation from war and tyrannical rule. However, one does not need to look too far into British history in order to substantiate De Gaulle’s view. The inevitability of Brexit is also reflected in how Britain ‘tumbled’ into the European Community in 1973. Unlike founding members of the Community (like France, Germany and the Benelux Countries) who stress the importance of the European Union as a ‘historic success’ that brought a lasting peace to a region embroiled in centuries of conflict, Britain entered the Community during a decade of economic turmoil and the decline of empire, keen to re-establish her influence within Europe: She viewed the Community (and Europe) in economic, transactional and intergovernmental terms. Because of this history, Britain was a peripheral member within the Union, unwilling to compromise on sovereignty, strongly detested integration initiatives and only desired access to the single market. Britain’s historical legacy therefore does De Gaulle’s claim justice: Britain never belonged in Europe – she sought to redefine the Union in her own terms and was therefore first and foremost incompatible with EU values. Along with staggeringly low participation rates in European Elections, the decision to leave in 2016 seemed inevitable.

Yet, if Britain was too ‘insular’ and did not belong in the European Union, surely the decision to join the Community in 1973, the ratification of Maastricht in 1992 which founded a politically united Europe, or British support for EU expansion in the early 2000s would logically not have occurred? Could these instances dispute the claim that Brexit was historically inevitable? Such a claim overlooks Britain’s ‘Europhilic’ history, as Tim Oliver and Daddow highlight, Britain championed many European causes such as advocating for EU enlargement to central European states and was closer to EU policy decisions than generally ‘pro-European’ states like France, Holland or Ireland.

But what changed by 2016? It is important to acknowledge that British Euroscepticism was not given by virtue of history, but a ‘development’ against a perceived encroachment on British sovereignty and can be clearly demonstrated through Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s legacy. In her Bruges Speech of 1988, although she questioned the direction of European integration, she clearly states that ‘Britain’s future is in Europe’ and campaigned for Community policy reforms. This tone is unrecognisable after the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. In response to the prospects of a monetary union, Thatcher declared in 1992 that she could not support the ratification of Maastricht as it ‘conflicted with British democratic institutions and the accountability of Parliament’. British Euroscepticism was a development against an increasingly integrated Europe, as it was no longer, as Thatcher stated, in Britain’s interest to remain in a ‘federal Europe.’

Indeed, many Britons felt so as well – subsequent European policies that pushed Britain into a direction without the consent of the British electorate did much to exacerbate public opinion about Integration. A prominent case would be Prime Minister Blair’s premature push for free movement expansion to ‘A8’ EU countries in 2004, compromising support for core EU values. This would have serious repercussions in the following decade, where areas in which immigration drastically increased between 2001 and 2014 would experience a ‘94% chance of voting leave.’ These considerations therefore compromise the claim that the Referendum’s outcome was inevitable by virtue of history: the vote to leave was instead dealing with recent developments in European Integration, rather than premises of nationalistic nostalgia.

Yet, if we are to discern the core reasons for the vote to leave, we must acknowledge one fundamental truth: the ‘identity of Britain’ in relation to Europe is socially constructed and decided by the British people. Given that the vote to leave won by a mere margin of four percent and not a unanimous consensus, it is inaccurate to claim that ‘Leave’ was a product of historical nostalgia and a rejection of Integration. While some may have voted on grounds of nostalgia, it is equally probable that there are those who have voted for mundane reasons, such as immigration or political detachment from Brussels. It is also probable that many voted on pro-European issues, where some, although not a majority, voted on the premise of a shared ‘European Identity’. How British people perceive the Union could change within the near future, potentially altering the result of another Referendum as evidenced by the ever-changing opinions of Brexit polls, thus rendering the Brexit vote anything but historically inevitable or a universally shared sentiment.

Crucially, the vote to leave was not determined by Britain’s historical relationship with Europe, but more so by the attitudes of ordinary Britons towards the European Project which could significantly change in the near future given that the ‘remain’ vote was heavily concentrated among younger generations. Although it is established that Brexit was not historically inevitable, European policymakers cannot ignore that increasing retaliation against the process/direction of integration that won the vote to leave. This is an issue not exclusive to Britain, but also elsewhere in Europe like France, where the perceived loss of ‘sovereignty’ has given credence to Hard-Eurosceptic parties. Perhaps Macron’s proposal of a European Renaissance to stress the importance of Europeanism, or the creation of a European Constitution and greater representation of National Parliaments within the EU may be necessary solutions in order to quell sentiments of Euroscepticism or prevent future ‘exits’. These solutions to the problems of the EU can only be appreciated if it is established that Brexit was not historically inevitable, but a reaction.

Ryan Chan is a third year History and International Relations student at King’s College London and an opinion writer at King’s College London’s award-winning tabloid Roar News. He is interested in Modern 20th Century World History, particularly the Global Cold War, European Integration and Communist Chinese history. This article is the first of two winning essays of a writing competition jointly organised by the convenors of the module “Contemporary Issues in International History” and the Strife Blog.

Feature — Beyond the Strife and Rhetoric: Have the lights gone out for Theresa May’s Brexit Deal?

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By Amber Boothe and Tasneem Ghazi

30 November 2018

Anti-Brexit groups protested the draft Brexit deal agreement outside the Houses of Parliament. (Image credit: AFP/Getty)

 

The Shock of a Finalised Deal

On the 14th November, in a moment of triumphant relief, Prime Minister Theresa May announced that the cabinet and the European Council had finally agreed to a ‘realistic Brexit Deal’. In her somber and resolute speech, May emphasised the primacy of such a deal to Britain’s national interests. Whilst this deal is dense and lengthy (some 585 pages), it may have been a victory for May — had it not been undermined by fellow Tories, beginning with her former ally, ex-Brexit secretary Dominic Raab. Raab’s damning statement following his resignation painted the deal as a pro-European attempt at appeasement. Likewise, rumour has it that Eurosceptic Conservative rebellion is amassing its ranks, as five cabinet colleagues, including Michael Gove and Andrea Leadsom, announced their commitment to changing the Prime Minister’s mind. Yet, it is worth considering the implications of this long-sought agreement, for inter-party strife may butcher Britain’s last chance before a ‘No-Deal’.

A Reality Check on Britain’s Bargaining Power

Following the deal’s vilification by Brexiteers, German Chancellor Angela Merkel steadfastly announced Britain will not receive a better — or even another — deal from the European Council. This damning fact of the matter ought to ground the British public’s expectations. For the surge of nationalism — from both the left and right — in the UK is to blame for the 2016 referendum’s outcome. Brexit is and has always been a non-partisan matter of extremes. When examining this deal then, one must consider not just its contents; but the implications of its failure; as well as Labour’s divided state and, crucially, Jeremy Corbyn’s stringent position of Pro-leave and Anti-People’s vote.

The Terms of the Brexit Agreement

The deal’s two major weaknesses are, first, that the British taxpayer must pay a ‘divorce’ fee, estimated to be between £35-39 billion to cover existing financial obligations; and second, that Britain must abide by the majority of EU law during the transition period whereby both parties hope to secure a trade deal.

The agreement is, however, not without merit. First, the skillful concessions made in Protocol 1 pertaining to the Northern Irish backstop is a minor victory. The very phrasing of the article solves the issue of a ‘hard border’, while respecting the integrity of the Good Friday agreement and the Irish Republic’s sovereignty.

The deal also grants Britain the flexibility and time (until 2020) to negotiate a separate trade deal with the European Union. Under this arrangement, Britain is granted free trade cooperation with the EU on goods, as well as a zero tariffs quota and the ability to strike other trade deals with other British partners. Short of remaining within the single market and the ‘Norway option, (rejected by Brexiteers), this is the best alternative Britain has.

Last— but most importantly for Brexiteers — the deal ends Britain’s adherence to the European system of ‘Free Movement’ and long-vilified system of immigration. Appeasing the primary complaint of those who voted ‘Leave’, Britain may then transition to another, individual highly specialised, skill-based immigration system. In short, May’s Brexit deal is a flexible trade arrangement that allows Britain to pay its way through Brexit and abandon its most contentious commitment to the EU: Freedom of Movement. Put simply, it will deliver what many Brexiteers rallied for without wrecking a future relationship with the EU.

Yet, even though this draft agreement was unilaterally approved by EU27 as swiftly as 25th November, its future cannot be predicted without the arithmetic of parliamentary votes.

The Turbulent Passage of the Deal

The turning point now is the deal’s passage through parliament. Until it receives a simple majority, it is neither legally nor politically binding. Whether or not May will be able to obtain the necessary votes is uncertain. To secure Parliamentary backing, May needs 320 votes (discounting Sein Fein’s abstentionists, the Speaker and his deputies). Losing the Conservative Parliamentary majority in 2017 left May short of her majority. But in theory, the ‘confidence and supply’ deal with the Democratic Unionist Party should give her a 13-vote lead.

Nevertheless, recent events tell another story. In light of Arlene Foster’s fiery denunciation of the agreement and the DUP’s abstention from voting on the budget, many argue that the DUP will revolt. But this assumption greatly overstates the DUP’s autonomy. The DUP has entered into billion-pound investment with the Conservatives that has afforded them more power than ever before. Bearing this in mind, it would be unlikely for the DUP to risk their future by standing against May’s proposal; thus, an abstention on their part is (realistically) the worst case possible.

These calculations indicate May might have a theoretical majority. But, unfortunately for the Prime Minister, strife within the Tory party risks crippling her deal. Realistically, around 80 hardline Tory Brexiteer are liable to vote against the party line. Add this figure to the eight or so Remainers in her party, May could have a deficit of nearly 90 votes. According to this, one could easily presume this deal shall not make it through Parliament.

However, another caveat remains forgotten: votes in the Conservative camp are half the story.

Labour: A Crippled Camp

The focus has been on whether May can obtain enough votes, and most calculations assume that the opposition will be united against the deal. In reality though, Labour’s poor choice of leader has left the party divided and ineffectual. Whilst some hope that calling a general election will be the opportunity Labour needs to take control, deep cracks exist within the party. ‘We can’t stop Brexit,’ said Corbyn. ‘We can stop Brexit,’ countered Sir Keir Starmer, the party’s Brexit spokesman. On one hand, polls suggest that 49 percent of the country are in favour of a public vote, but Corbyn maintains that a second referendum is ‘not an option for today’. Ironically, Corbyn’s refusal to back a People’s Vote has undermined Starmer’s meaningful efforts to ensure that ‘we will vote down a blind Brexit‘. This ongoing inter-party strife prevents Labour from unifying into a force to be reckoned with.

Considering the conflict within the opposition, one may wonder how Corbyn will ensure that abstentions in the Labour party don’t make up the votes Mays lacking. One cannot and must not forget that if Labour were to come into power (unless there is a change in leadership), reversing Brexit would not be an option. Beyond Corbyn’s Euroscepticism, many Labour Remainers represent constituencies that voted Leave and would be unlikely to vote against a deal.

A recent Opinium poll found that Leave voters are defecting from the Conservative party, evidenced by a drop-in points by 10 to 49 percent of the proportion of Leavers backing the Tories. Meanwhile, Labour has seen a 4-point increase to 24 percent. A further 22 percent of Labour supporters felt the party should back the deal. This tension between the will of the people and the widespread hostility towards May’s deal crucially incentivises neutrality on the part of Labour MPs. As diverging opinions fracture the political landscape, it is in their best interest not to pick a side. So widespread abstentions could be a reality that would benefit the Government.

Predicting the Deal’s Parliamentary Passage

Doing the arithmetic demonstrates that this agreement might survive, albeit narrowly. The question then ought to be why this agreement should survive. It is hardly an ‘easy Brexit’. Although it negates Britain’s unpopular obligation to ‘free movement’, it is inevitably shaped by the EU’s interests, particularly because of Britain’s lack of bargaining power. The European Council will not, for its own sake, give Britain another deal. If it did, Britain would be setting a precedent for rising right-wing parties in Europe to painlessly withdraw their membership of the European Union. [1]

Thus, a ‘No-Deal’ is Britain’s most likely alternative. Labour, under Corbyn, has refused otherwise. While a second referendum with the outcome of ‘Remain’, would undoubtedly be a better option for Britain, the likelihood of this is very uncertain. This outcome of another ‘People’s Vote’ is the hope of brilliant optimists like Keir Starmer, alongside a string of former prime ministers and prominent politicians, including Brown, Blair, Clegg, Cable, Major, McDonnel, Hague and Heseltine.

As their statements imply, the support a second referendum commands is rooted in the realisation that by leaving the EU in the current socio-economic climate, Britain stands to lose more sovereignty than ever before. Likewise, optimists emphasise that the Prime Minister did not rule out reversing Brexit in her speech. But, realistically, until a united front of prominent politicians working together against Brexit appears, another referendum is both constitutionally dubious and uncharted territory.

To this Deal or to ‘No-Deal’?

As it stands, Britain’s position is best realised by considering the implications of a ‘No-Deal’. An economic catastrophe for Britain is the first ailment, and tellingly, the pound has already begun to drop. Exacerbating matters, a recent UN report revealed an appallingly rife level of poverty and homelessness across the United Kingdom. With the current disastrous cuts on welfare, the decapitated NHS and almost non-existent legal aid, Britain will suffer further. Wages will inevitably drop, and taxes will increase. Reports have shown that a ‘No-Deal’ would cost young people up to 3,000 pounds per year. Such a dire state of economic affairs will undoubtedly compel Britain to look for cooperation and aid abroad.

Foreign policy-wise, a vacuum must be filled. Britain will be left with no choice but to rely upon less dependable foreign partners, many of whom are notorious for blatantly disregarding human rights, such as Saudi Arabia. By giving in to such an arrangement, Britain would abandon European allies and re-align British interest with those who, like Saudi Arabia, trample on dearly-held national values: democracy, freedom of speech, and human rights.

In sum, a ‘No-Deal’ does not just entail betraying steadfast European allies with shared values; it shall prolong the age of austerity, poverty, and an ailing economy, all of which are painful consequences that Britain should not endure. Looking closely at May’s deal demonstrates that it is a compromise protecting the EU’s interests (as well as an Anglo-European relationship) while delivering the promise of Brexiteers. So, if one does not support resurrecting Britain’s membership of the EU — and the gamble of another referendum — one should hope that this agreement survives. The fact of the matter is that this deal is the uncomfortable medicine prescribed to Britain by Europe to cure a bitter bout of nationalism. Only now can we genuinely see the dark irony behind the Brexiteer mantra of ‘restoring sovereignty’, for as Britain leaves the EU, we stand on the brink of losing more sovereignty than ever before.

Amber Boothe and Tasneem Ghazi are fourth year students reading Politics, Philosophy and Law (joint honours LLB) at King’s College London. They serve as Communications Director and Manager Editor (respectively) of the Dickson Poon School of Law’s postgraduate Law Journal: The King’s Student Law Review. Amber and Tasneem are also passionately involved in a number of public law projects. Their research specialises in UK constitutional law and legal theory.

The authors would also like to thank Dr. Elin Weston for her advice.

Notes:

[1] Since the beginning of the Brexit campaign, Le Front Nationale’s Marine Le Pen (amongst others) proudly announced a plan to follow the UK’s example.

 

 

Image source: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-interview-labour-momentum-2022-general-election-leader-theresa-amy-dup-local-council-a8124766.html

Strife Feature - Nationalism and Lessons from Russia

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By Christopher Morton

In 2008 Russia invaded South Ossetia and in 2014 Russia invaded Crimea - both secessionist provinces of Georgia and Ukraine respectively. On the one hand, these interventions can be viewed as a justified defense of the rights of minority populations in these provinces. On the other hand, both interventions were deemed to be disproportionate acts of aggression towards sovereign states, in contravention of international law, reflecting a policy shift from cooperation with the international community to unilateral action in defiance of it. In this post, I shall consider the understandings that lay behind these actions: in particular, Russia’s shift from imitation of Western norms during the nineties, to increasingly strong opposition to these norms. Fanning this hostility towards the West was a nationalist consensus which was rehabilitated and consolidated under Putin, enhanced by NATO expansion which was deemed unacceptable by the Kremlin. Indeed, the events of 2008 and 2014 in part represented the failures of the West to make collective agreements, particularly on security, which could have allowed co-operation between Russia and the West rather than distrust to become the norm.[1] In the final part of this post, I shall consider some lessons that Britain can take from the development of nationalism in Russia as a stronger nationalist consensus emerges and the notion of British identity is reconstructed post-Brexit.

Levan Gabechava/Reuters/Landov. A column of Russian troops prepares to leave the checkpoint at a bridge over the Inguri River in Western Georgia, in October 2008, after securing the secession of Georgia’s breakaway South Ossetia region. Russia went to war in Georgia over the breakaway province of South Ossetia in a move justified by an increasingly nationalist tone from the Kremlin.

Since his election in 1998, Putin has been able to build a political consensus around a single idea of the Russian nation by emphasising the notion of Russia’s messianic purpose[2] and rehabilitating the myths and symbolism of former glories.[3] By placing the idea of Russia as a great power at the centre of his politics, Putin at once appeased hardline nationalists and co-opted those disenchanted by the failures of the nineties and searching for a grander narrative in which to root their identity. In this way, Putin won the support of the very people whose liberty he would curtail in pursuit of soglasie (stability) and a more managed form of democracy. This same rhetoric was also used to alienate opponents. With Russia now portrayed as defending traditional values against the West, opponents were criticised not only as being against Putin, but as being against Russia itself.

In 2005 Putin was still talking about Russia as “above all, a major European power”, progressing “together with European nations” and in 2006 he stressed the importance of relations with the United States and a willingness “to take new steps to expand the areas and framework of our cooperation”[4]. However, such comments seemed increasingly insincere. In 2006, Dimitri Trenin offered a typical assessment of Russia’s attitude towards America and its Western allies. Essentially, Trenin argued that Russia had stopped caring about how the West perceived its actions. This was confirmed, for example, by Russian cooperation with Iran in opposition to Western sanctions against its uranium enrichment.[5] Putin’s apathy towards Western judgment culminated in the invasion of South Ossetia and has become markedly more hostile since. In 2013, Putin described Western norms as “infertile and genderless” and as overseeing “a destruction of values from above”.[6] Similarly, in a speech after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin lambasted the West for their part in inciting and supporting first the Orange revolution of 2004 and then the Maidan protests which led to the overthrow of Ukraine’s Russian-leaning president Viktor Yanukovich.[7] If Russia of the nineties was content to show deference to the West, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy from 2008 confirmed what Putin’s rhetoric suggested: that Russia now identified itself as a leader of the opposition to the U.S-led unipolar world order.

The end of the end of history

It is easily forgotten that in the nineties, Fukuyama’s argument that a convergence towards Western norms was inevitable encapsulated the prevailing mood.[8] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin, had been sympathetic to the so-called Western idea of liberal democracy. However, subservience to the Western model did not do the good that many had hoped. The economic plan implemented by Russia’s “young reformers” under the guiding hand of Western, neoliberal text books and the IMF, had catastrophic consequences for the lives of normal Russians, with poverty increasing from 2% in 1991 to over 40% of the population by 1998. Furthermore, the “privatisation at any costs” attitude of the Western capitalists and their Russian protégés allowed a business elite, now known as the “oligarchs”, to effectively steal national assets. Through the rigged “loans for shares” scheme, the Oligarchs were able to elevate themselves into the stratosphere of extreme wealth, while all around them, normal Russians struggled.

In the nineties, “shock therapy” privatisation led to wealth being concentrated amongst a group now known as the Oligarchs. President Boris Yeltsin has a meeting with CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky in the Kremlin. c:Getty Images

All this created a vacuum in which a new sense of Russian identity could be created. Russians had been told that they were no longer allowed to feel pride in the once great Soviet Union. Nor could Russia find any pride in the adoption of a Western model which seemed to have left their country’s interests side-lined as the oligarchs increased their control over an emasculated state. It was into this vacuum that Vladimir Putin stepped as a relatively unknown figure and Yeltsin’s chosen one. Putin saw an opportunity to give the Russian people something to believe in: a proud Russia with a privileged role in international politics; a Russia that would not accept Western hegemony; a Russia that would reclaim its role as a great power by setting out its own vision for the world, rather than passively accepting the religion of the “end of history”. This is what Alfred Evans called Russia’s “strategy for identity management of social creativity”, as opposed to the strategy of “social mobility” which had been pursued under Yeltsin, whereby the norms of nations perceived as having a higher “social status” were adopted, with the aspiration of joining that group.[9]

May’s Britain

We have much to learn from the gradual embrace of nationalism in Russia. Of course, Theresa May is not Putin and Britain is not Russia, the notion that Britain is slipping slowly into a nationalist mentality is unmistakable - the perils of which are illuminated by the Russian experience. As in Russia, the failings of a system which puts the ideology of profit and privatisation before people has left many disenchanted, alienated in their communities and struggling for something meaningful in which to root their identity. As with Russia, British history, whilst not short of glory, cannot be separated from the legacy of colonial oppression, not to mention more recent catastrophic escapades in the Middle East. However, there is a sense of loss at Britain not being able to wield the influence it once did. Finally, Brexit suggests that Britain, like Russia, is rehabilitating a sense of its own historic purpose independent from international hegemony. In place of building a collective identity with its European neighbours and embracing the notion of a deeper union, Britain has chosen to emphasise its own distinct identity, to which pooling of sovereignty is seen as a threat.

Theresa May has adopted an increasingly nationalist tone and has revelled in the perception of her being a difficult opponent for the EU

Even before a snap election was called, Theresa May had sought not to stimulate debate but to shut it down. In one incident, she accused Caroline Lucas “and some Labour MPs” of being “the first to defend our country’s enemies”. Such divisive nationalist rhetoric is not so far removed from Putin’s reference to opponents as “a disparate bunch of traitors”. Theresa May, the Conservative strategists and the right-wing press are now continuing along this line, repeating ad infinitum that Jeremy Corbyn hates Britain and that he sympathises with terrorists. This discourse creates a stark division between those who considered patriots and those more prone to critique the role played by Britain within the international community. In Brexit negotiations, Theresa May revels in her depiction as a “bloody difficult woman”, appealing to the notion of the EU as a threat, or at least an opponent. Just as Putin gains popularity from depicting Russia’s resistance to the West, so too is Theresa May emphasising her resistance of the EU rather than the need to maintain a sense of collective identity and shared interests, even post-Brexit. The result of this strategy is implicit in Angela Merkel’s recent declaration that Britain, along with the U.S, can no longer be relied upon as partners of the EU.

Like the Russians, British people have good reason to be searching for something meaningful in which to root their identity. In a bid to appease the UK Independence Part (UKIP) wing of her party and mobilise those communities left behind by globalisation, the Conservatives under Theresa May have intensified their use of chauvinistic, nationalist rhetoric, whereby anybody who valorises Britain’s national legacy and makes a sharp distinction between “us” and the unworthy “other” is part of the patriotic in-crowd. However, in constructing a new national identity post-Brexit, there are false dichotomies which need to be fervently resisted. Firstly, the populist dichotomy between “patriots” who love their country and traitors who are quick to condemn it: it is possible to be critical of one’s country, its policies and its history without hating it or “supporting its enemies”. Indeed, critique is a necessary engine of progress. A second dichotomy, as described by Alfred Evans, is between the opposing strategies of “social creativity” and “social mobility”: of course we want to be bold and “creative” in the actions we choose, standing up for our beliefs and, where possible, taking the lead on matters of international importance. However, we also want to be socially mobile, joining groups which share our interests and our values and strengthening the links that facilitate a convergence of understandings and the formation of collective identities that transcend borders.

As MP Jo Cox put it before her brutal murder at the hands of a neo-Nazi extremist, “we have more in common than that which divides us”. By entering into relationships of cooperation and collective responsibility, rather than seeking to impose our will upon others, this is a truth that can be internalised. This is a model which the EU, with all of its flaws and imperfections, represents through its motto: “United in Diversity”. As the UK leaves the EU, it is all the more pressing that we remember the value of this aspiration, rather than collapsing into egoistic and suspicious nationalism. The breakdown of shared understandings and collective responsibility between Russia and the West serves as a warning as to the dangers that lie ahead for Britain as jingoistic nationalism in political discourse becomes normalised.

Christopher is pursuing his MA in International Relations at King’s College London. Previously, he studied French and Philosophy at the University of Nottingham before working as a teacher in Paris and London.

Notes:

[1] Sauer: 88-89; Mearshimer: 79

[2] Kolst/Blakkisrud: p.277

[3] Laruelle: p.24

[4] Putin, 2005/2006

[5] Trenin: p.3

[6] Putin: 2013

[7] Putin: 2014

[8] 1989: 1

[9] Evans: 401

Bibliography

Trenin, Dimitri; Russia Leaves the West (2006)
http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/trenin4.pdf

Evans, Alfred; Ideological Change Under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory (2015)

Fukuyama, Francis; The End of History? (1989)

Kolsto, Pal and Blakkisrud Helge (2005), Nation Building and Common Values in Russia

Mearsheimer, J. (2014), Why the Ukranian Crisis is the West’s Fault: the Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin

Vladimir Putin Addresses of the Russian Federation (on Crimea), March 18 2014 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

Vladimir Putin’s Presidential address December 12, 2013
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19825

Sauer, T. (2017), The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the need for collective security between Russia and the West

Feature image credit: Wikimedia Commons

Strife Feature - Spying on Friends

by

By Anastasia Beck

In the aftermath of the allegations of the US National Security Agency (NSA) spying on allied states such as Germany, and accusations from the White House concerning alleged spying by Britain’s GCHQ on Donald Trump during his presidential campaign, moral questions have arisen regarding spying on one’s allies. The gravity of these incidents was further underlined by the moral outrage around such aspects by politicians in these countries. However, are such reactions disproportionate and should countries expect this sort of behaviour due to the tumultuous nature of the international stage?

This article will discern whether it is possible to legitimise the action of spying on one’s allies by first looking at the debate through a theoretical lens, using the Just Intelligence Theory. In the corresponding sections, I investigate the nature of ‘alliances’ and follow it up with an assessment of previous examples of friendly spying that underscores how spying on one’s allies is imperative in the current international system.

As part of the Snowden leaks, a presentation slide was released depicting NSA signals intelligence operations around the world which collect data from many countries, even allies.

The Just Intelligence Theory

From a theoretical perspective, states should not spy on each other. This view stems from the application of the Just Intelligence Theory to friendly espionage. ‘By using the Just War tradition as a base it is possible to establish a set of just intelligence principles that can limit the harm intelligence collection causes while outlining what circumstances would be required to justify the harm caused.’[1] The just intelligence principles include: having a just cause, a legitimate authority to sanction the activity, be conducted for the intended purpose, be proportionate, be used as a last resort, and discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets.[2]

The first principle, having a just cause to conduct intelligence, would require there to be a substantial threat to justify any harm caused through the collection of intelligence. As it is the security services’ duty to preserve and maintain national interests, a high-level threat would provide sufficient cause to conduct intelligence activities. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Britain’s secret intelligence service MI6 and USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) utilised a Soviet spy - Oleg Penkovsky - to relay vital information back to the West regarding Soviet intentions and capabilities. The near possibility of total war occurring between the two super powers justified the use of spying against the Soviet Union. However, when one examines intelligence collection on friendly states, it is hard to justify a similar action. Spying on your allies entails that there is no immediate threat, and is instead being conducted because of a general understanding of the targeted state’s nature and not because of an overt provocation. However, the just intelligence theory, much like the just war theory, ‘is blind to general information about states and information that does not amount to identifying a concrete threat’ can therefore not be used as a justification for intelligence collection against them.[3] To be clear, general information would surmount to a state’s religion and political position, so for example, if one were at odds with an allied state’s political system that alone does not justify spying on it. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, spying on one’s allies does not have a just cause, thereby making the whole activity unjust.

Another principle requires sticking to the stated purposes, and not diverge for political, economic or social objectives. And yet, spying on your allies often does not meet this condition. Once again, a government’s role is to safeguard the interests of the nation, and this would require knowledge around fiscal, foreign or defence policies of allied states. For example, one could argue that, due to rising tensions within the European Union on spending towards Greece, it would seem appropriate for Germany to keep abreast of any changes in Greek fiscal policy - which the Greeks may not wish to openly disclose.[4]

However, this theory is not a legal doctrine and few states would give up vital information on fellow states to follow such stringent rules. Furthermore, the international system is extremely competitive and anarchic, with state’s wishing to pursue strategies in consonance with their national interests.

What needs to be therefore examined is what it means to be an ally in the international system and whether the true nature of alliances justifies the use of spying on one another. Alliances and friendly relationships are merely ‘mutual-defence pacts’ between states that often share and adhere to particular norms and practices.[5] But states are in competition with one another, with allies pursuing their own national interests above that of others.[6] As a result, trust among states in the international system is fragile due to the uncertainty surrounding the possibility of opposing views of leaders of governments which may affect their positions abroad.[7] It is this uncertainty surrounding intentions, and the possibility of its translation into policy, that may motivate a state to conduct surveillance on the inner debates and workings of partner countries. It would be foolish to blindly trust their partners. As history has illustrated, allies often diverge and defect from previously agreed upon policies.

Examining transatlantic alliances

“A friend today can become an enemy tomorrow” is a phrase which can be applied quite successfully towards past and present-day alliances. Due to the competitive nature of the international system at large, allies’ interests may diverge, therefore an understanding of such change is required. A good example of this would be the alliance between Germany and the US. Many would agree that these two states - both NATO members - have a warm relationship. Spying on the Germans has had positive outcomes. In the 1970s, at the time of the Cold War, West Germany, a US ally, had discovered that the East Germans had planted a communist spy in West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s inner circle.[8] When the infiltration was revealed, the damage was NATO-wide, with Brandt having to resign after it was found that his letters to President Nixon had been compromised.[9] However, in modern times, Germany has diverged and disagreed with certain US policies, thus undermining US interests. In 2011, Obama expressed his desire to intervene militarily in Libya but faced opposition from German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Had the US intervened in Libya, Merkel could have used her influence to reduce NATO’s participation in the conflict.[10] Additionally, ‘Washington and Berlin have clashed over how to manage the eurozone crisis, the resolution of which have far-reaching implications for the German and US economies’.[11] The NSA wiretapping Merkel’s mobile phone may seem personal and invasive, but with the power that Germany has today and its ability to undermine its allies’ interests, it would seem logical to maintain a close eye on any developments within.

Close allies for many years, Germany and the US are arguably facing a particularly frosty relationship after allegations of NSA wiretapping of the Chancellor’s personal mobile.

Another close ally of the US who has expressed outrage of being targeted by NSA spying is France, but once again this European ally has also had a tendency to diverge from US policies. Under Charles de Gaulle, France continually turned its back on the US. De Gaulle announced a ‘national independence policy’ that contained a nuclear plan pertaining to ‘a strategy of defence in all directions’ - which also seemed to suggest that the US may one day become an enemy of France.[12] Also, the French vetoed Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community - that would later advance to become the European Union - thereby weakening its trans-Atlantic ties. ‘De Gaulle even tried to persuade the leader of Western Germany to loosen his ties with NATO, which would have undermined the US-led coalition and damaged the course of the Cold War.’[13] Thus, as a result of such history of divergence, it would appear logical for the US to spy on its French ally due to France’s history of divergence.

The US and Britain have long been considered the closest of allies, but even these two friends have been known to spy and conduct espionage against each other. In 1917, the British government wanted the US to join the fight during the First World War, and on Britain’s side. ‘The British used a whole range of overt and clandestine methods to gather intelligence and run influence operations’ including one example of ‘the surveillance of a US transatlantic cable’ in which Britain’s foreign intelligence service learned of a dubious German plot to win Mexico’s allegiance by promising the country a chunk of US territory.[14] Masking the source of the information, British foreign intelligence relayed this intelligence to Washington, thus influencing the US to join the war. During the Cold War, America’s Venona Project ‘revealed that sensitive documents were being sent to Moscow from the British Embassy in Washington.’[15] By spying on its closest ally, the US were able to discover that there were two British double agents, Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, working for the Soviets and had just defected. These agents were compromising American national security, of which its ally had not been able to detect. Another example of friendly spying was the Suez crisis in 1956. Former US President Eisenhower, having been left out of the strategic planning of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, decided that it was imperative to know what his allies were up to.[16] He utilised his imagery intelligence capabilities through the use of U-2 planes which were sent over British, French and Israeli military sites in the eastern-Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the reconnaisance through the U-2s gave Eisenhower important clues about his allies’ military operations for, and execution of, their invasion of Egypt.[17] From these examples, it is clear that even the closest of allies feel the need to spy on each other for the sake of preserving their own national interests. Maybe it isn’t so inconceivable that GCHQ wiretapped Trump Tower in the run-up to the presidential elections, considering that he would become the leader of one-half of the “special relationship”.

The relationship between Britain and America has long been considered a close one, but even these two allies have been known to spy on each other.

Spying among friends

If one is caught spying on allies, it is of course damaging. The revelations that the NSA were spying on allied leaders complicated efforts to negotiate a transatlantic trade and investment agreement and gave ‘ammunition to people who are worried about the globalization of information and who would like governments do more to protect privacy and limit governmental data-collection.’[18] And yet, one must note that when leaders such as the French President François Hollande and Merkel come out in anger against alleged spying, they are often doing so to appease their outraged publics.[19]. The above examples show how volatile and fluctuating alliances can be, thereby justifying why spying on each other is a necessity.

Allies spy on each other so as to know of other’s intentions and changes in policy. Whilst it may be immoral to conduct espionage on our friends, it would seem damaging not to do so. If spying has positive outcomes and the interests of a nation, then it is reasonable for a state to pursue such measures. In light of the above question, one can look to recent developments between Britain and Spain over the long-contested territory of Gibraltar following Britain’s decision to leave the EU. Spain’s illegal incursion into Gibraltar’s waters is yet another sign that alliances are fragile, with high chances of states undermining another’s sovereign interests, leading to the conclusion that spying can indeed take place amongst friends.

Anastasia Beck is a postgraduate student studying Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London (KCL). Anastasia’s research areas include counter-radicalization, the role of intelligence in both peace and conflict, and open-source intelligence.

Notes:

[1] Walt, S. ‘News Flash: States Spy on Each Other’, Foreign Policy, Date accessed: 1st April 2017 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/01/news-flash-states-spy-on-each-other/

[2] Ibid.

[3] Fisher, Max. ‘Why America spies on its allies’, http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013–present)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Sims, J. ‘I Spy…’, available here at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-11-06/i-spy

[7] Bucknam, M. ‘The Eisenhower Administration and the Suez Crisis: Spying on Allies and Friends’ National War College (2000) pg. 3

[8] Ibid pg. 5

[9] Bellaby, R. ‘What’s the Harm: The Ethics of Intelligence Collections’ Intelligence and National Security 27:1 (2012) pg. 108

[10] Ibid pg. 109

[11] Bitton, R. ‘The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations’ American University International Law Review 29:5 (2014) pg. 1020

[12] Stout, M. ‘Can Spying on Allies Be Right?’ War on the Rocks Date accessed 1st April 2017 https://warontherocks.com/2013/11/can-spying-on-allies-be-right/

[13] Colby, E. ‘Why We Must Spy on Our Allies’ The National Interest Date accessed: 29th March 2017 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-we-must-spy-our-allies-9493

[14] Ibid.

[15] Easley, L. ‘Spying on Allies’ Survival 56:4 (2014) pg. 143 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.941545

[16] Fisher, M. ‘Why America spies on its allies (and probably should)’ The Washington Post Date accessed: 1st April 2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/10/29/why-america-spies-on-its-allies-and-probably-should/?utm_term=.90f50ccedacc

[17] Ibid.

[18] Sims, J. ‘I Spy…Why Allies Watch Each Other’ Foreign Affairs Date accessed: 20th March 2017 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-11-06/i-spy

[19] Ibid.

Image credits:

Image 3: https://www.pritzkermilitary.org/explore/museum/past-exhibits/american-icons-great-war/side-side-britannia/

Image 2 and Feature: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4325158/Trump-deflects-wiretap-questions-Merkel-news-conference.htm

Image 1: http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013–present)