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Strife Series on British Security Post-Brexit, Part I - Brexit, Empire and British Security

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By: Dr Samir Puri

The end of its Empire was Britain’s last seismic rearrangement of its alignments and alliances. Today, Britain is slowly and painfully disentangling itself from the European Union. Of course, the two processes are incomparable in all but the most analogical, journalistic terms. Or are they?

“As I look out upon the future of our country in the changing scene of human destiny, I feel the existence of three great circles among the free nations and democracies”, said Winston Churchill in 1948. “The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire… Then there is also the United States… And finally, there is United Europe.”

Britain’s defence and security has been underpinned by positioning itself at the centre of these three overlapping circles. Doing so has conferred to this Sceptred Isle a uniquely advantageous geopolitical position throughout the tumult of the Cold War and beyond.

While Britain has continued to provide a lynchpin between the USA, Europe and many parts of the wider world, what this means has changed a lot in the last 70 years. Britain’s relationship with the United States has experienced its peaks and troughs but has remained constant. Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1972 led to economic interdependence but stalled any notion of a common currency or political union. But it is the last of the three circles that merit attention here.

In anticipating Brexit’s unfolding, it is the end of Empire that is instructive. There is, as The Economist wrote, an art to leaving in evidence after decolonization, of “breaking up and staying friends”. The Empire was dismantled “as haphazardly as it began, with different territories gaining independence in different ways,” wrote Piers Brendon in The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997. The piecemeal manner of its dismantling is striking. Britain’s hold in the New World was diminished by the independence of the United States in 1776. A later iteration of Empire, with its focus on Asia, was eroded by World War Two. The wartime loss of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 presaged India’s independence five years later. The Suez Crisis of 1956 dealt a blow to British influence in the Middle East. There was, for a time, an aspiration to relocate the Empire’s centre of gravity to Africa, but these colonies became independent throughout the 1960s.

Today, it feels almost otherworldly to conjure up any sense of what the Empire meant. It can also seem immoral, given how out of step much of imperial ideology was in relation to contemporary norms. But to reflect on the defence and security implications of the breakup of the Empire is fruitful. The dismantling of a globe-spanning Empire that had existed in one form or another for centuries was transformative. There was a horrific amount of violence in some theatres of decolonization. But in others, relatively amicable arrangements were made, with security networks underpinning relations between Britain and these former colonies.

The transition from Empire to Commonwealth reminds us that a realignment does not necessarily mean severance. Brexit does not mean the end of Britain’s role in Europe. Rather, it reimagines a relationship that will not suddenly vanish, no matter the dramas of the rupture yet to come.

In a RAND Europe report on ‘Defence and security after Brexit’, the authors observe that “the decision to leave the EU arguably looks likely to have minimal impact on Britain’s conventional defence apparatus in the near term”. In other words, the upheaval for Britain’s military will be moderated by the fact that the EU has never offered a major platform for cooperative military action, and because NATO will remain Britain’s preeminent multilateral military ‘club’. But, RAND opines, “Brexit may pose more immediate practical challenges for security than defence.”

Security, rather than defence, is indeed where Brexit’s impacts will be intricate. The transnational nature of criminality and terrorism and the security implications arising from huge migration flows are for Britain inherently European-facing issues. The Brexit in-tray of UK-EU cooperative policing arrangements is considerable. Policing, serious crime investigations and intelligence work simply cannot be done in the vacuum of a nation-state, given the informational revolution and the relative ease and speed of international travel. The myriad of treaties to be renegotiated will make Brexit akin to uprooting a tree that has had several decades to lay its roots.

The biggest imperial connotation of all, however, is the mindset that led to Brexit in the first place. The essence of British exceptionalism has its roots in the fact that Britain was for so long a globe-straddling superpower. It is perilously hard to argue about the often subconscious impact of the Empire on current British foreign and security policy thinking. Generationally, the impact of the Empire is now much less direct than before. However, a grandiose sense of destiny and purpose – which need not be negative qualities if harnessed in the name of order – still pervade Britain’s sense of global identity.

All national histories are exercises in selective amnesia. The myths that parts of Britain hold of itself – as a plucky nation able to survive on its own wits – are part of the Brexit story. And they spring from the defensive conundrums of bygone ages. Even in its darkest days, such as after the fall of France in 1940, Britain was able to stand alone and survive a horrific onslaught, while Churchill began ensuring Britain’s survival and longevity as a global player through a realignment with the USA. David Reynolds has called 1940 “the Fulcrum of the twentieth century”. It is not difficult to see why the fall of France began a turn towards the Atlantic – and why this still matters today. The release of Christopher Nolan’s film Dunkirk has almost too much significance to bear.

The Empire and the wars that were fought in its name are essential components of Britain’s sense of global identity. History tells the story that explains Britain’s geopolitical positioning today. Looking historically, and thinking self-reflectively, will be the only way to navigate the humbling that Brexit is sure to spell in relation to British influence in Europe. To imperil British security during the coming realignment is a fate that must be avoided.


Dr Samir Puri is a Lecturer in War Studies where he teaches the MA module on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. He is also serving as a strategy adviser to the Commonwealth Secretariat in the establishment of its Countering Violent Extremism unit. Before joining King’s, Dr Puri worked for the Foreign Office (2009-2015) and for RAND (2006-2009). In 2016 his book, ‘Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups’, was released by the IISS; and he has extended this analysis to the war in Syria for the Telegraph and Observer newspapers.

This Strife series focuses on British Security Post-Brexit and will have contributions by Dr Samir Puri; Felix Manig on the security implications of post-Brexit asylum laws; Christina on the UK-USA relationship; and Alfonc Rakaj on British defence commitments.

Being English/ British/ European and the politics of difference

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By: Henry Redwood

Source: https://i.guim.co.uk/
Source: https://i.guim.co.uk/

To say that it has been a bad couple of weeks to be English (or is it British, or European? I’m not sure anymore…) is an understatement. Violent and racist football supporters in France; racist abuse at home; intolerant and divisive politics in all political parties; “Brexit”; and lastly, losing a football match to a team with more volcanoes than professional footballers. Each of these events has left in its wake a series of finger-pointing and questions over who’s to blame: Roy Hodgson? The working class? The Tories? The press? A complacent left? (Im)migrants and/or refugees? This need for someone, or a collective, to be blamed within society seems to run deep. It was certainly key in the angry protest vote that saw Britain leave the EU. The primary concern within each of these allegations seems to be to find the ‘Other’, upon whom we can unburden our own responsibilities and troubles - the immigrant; the elite; the European bureaucrat; the English -and draw, perhaps, clear lines that strongly delineate what “we are” - and more often what we are not.

However, the ‘blame game’ rests on an unsustainable model, which assumes that clear lines can be drawn which delineate what “we” are - and more often what we are not. The most obvious example here is the notion of “Great Britain”, which has been variously deployed in, often contradicting, ways by different parts of the argument. Underneath each, though, is a conception of a nation – a collective – that remains unchanging; of a set of morals, values, culture etcetera, that is transcendental, frequently constructed by relational difference (we are not European; we are not fascist).

The arbitrariness of this (of course, being arbitrary makes it no less violent) is seen with the difficulty we have in deciding at which point a particular “Great Britain” began. The pretence of unity and solidity of these categories, which was pumped out throughout the referendum ‘debate’, and the confidence that we could ever know what it means to be English, British or European (or all three at once), meant that the debate was conducted from a perspective where we could decide what it meant to be ‘British’ (or even democratic). This decision was made through exclusionary identity politics, rather than considerations on how we might reconfigure these understandings of difference to try to remove the harm caused by arbitrarily signifying Self against the ‘Other’.[1] This is not only directed at those who voted in favour of Brexit; this issue has come up repeatedly in the anti-Brexist arguments since, where Brexiters are labelled as racists, ignorant, idiots, and are consequently de-politicised in the process as their voices are considered irrelevant. This ignores both our (here meaning Remain voters) responsibility, and in these cases our dependency on this ‘Other’ to define us (I am not a Brexiter, I am not racist or fascist), which was perhaps most clearly seen in the celebratory pro-European protest in London on Saturday.[2] This protest summed up this forms of identity politics, and worryingly seemed to recreate the boundaries that de-politicised the voices of Brexiters, reproducing the same political relationships that led to the ostracisation of large sections of the population in the first place; hardly a basis upon which to rebuild the shattered community.

The accusatory, and often angry, politics of the blame game seems to have occupied us elsewhere over the past decades, and perhaps it marks a trend in the new-millennium’s political landscape. At University, and elsewhere, the response to the impact of austerity has frequently been about blame and the fragmenting of larger political ideologies and structures and issues into “bite size” issues. Students are angry at the staff for not providing more contact times; the academic staff resent students for wanting a corporate-inspired ‘transferable skills’ format of education that the University was not designed to deliver, and that they are not trained to deliver.[3] It feels as though something similar has happened in the political realm, where there seems to have been a turn to (possibly thanks to, or as a result of, the digital age) a politics based on fragmented and seemingly isolated issues. A trend most evident in the rise of pressure group politics and organisations like 38 degrees.

Underlying both of these points is a sense that we can distil responsibility - and perhaps importantly with this, a sense of belonging and being - to different individuals and collectives, without considering our shared responsibility and co-dependence. As such, we are failing to explore the culpability of much larger systems that produce these harms and us as recognisable subjects we are not looking at the shared responsibility that we consequently have for the reproduction of that system and the violence that relates to it. Without this understanding, the “immigrant” remains an external entity that we have no obligation to; a burden, rather than an always-already member of our community that we are responsible for.[4] Without this understanding, the Brexit voter remains an ignorant racist, rather than someone who has been subjectivised through the same system that produces others’ (my) privilege; someone silenced for decades whilst a politics was practised that was blind to its violence, and complicit in aggravating inequality. In both, it is the gap and relation between the Self and the ‘Other’ that needs to be addressed. Not by blaming the ‘Other’, but by reconfiguring the system as a whole. The same system that currently produces the Self and ‘Other’ as different, and as opposing polarities. In a time of rising extremism – islamophobic; homophobic; transphobic; take your pick – such reframing is more important than ever.

 

 

Henry Redwood is a third year PhD student in the War Studies department and senior editor at strife. His work engages with critical theory to explore how international courts construct truths and the normative underpinnings these project. Alongside his research Henry has previously worked at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and a number of (I)NGOs working in Rwanda. Twitter: @hred44

 

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] See Martha Minow, Making all the difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American law (Cornell University Press, 1991)

[2] For an excellent insight into Brexiters see here

[3] http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/transferable-people/

[4] For an wonderful article on migrant identities and borders see, Francis Saunders, ‘Where on Earth Are You?’, 38:5 (2016), pages 7-12

 

A Whiff of Brass: The Churchill Factor by Boris Johnson

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By Bradley Lineker:

Boris Johnson

Boris Johnson, Hodder and Stoughton., 2014. Pages: 416. £25.00 (hardback). ISBN 9781444783025

When young Tories are about to make their maiden speeches in the House of Commons, they can often be found – or so Johnson tells us – in the Member’s Lobby underneath the imposing statue of Churchill, as if trying to channel the great man’s spirit. [1] Indeed, Churchill’s left foot has been rubbed to a brassy-shine with all the attempted thaumaturgy; and while there is more than a whiff of left-footed-brassiness about the book, it is also quite a bit more than this.

Much like Boris himself, the book is an entertaining – if at times buffoonish – introduction to Churchill’s character and achievements that, alongside some very obvious flaws, achieves Johnson’s stated aim: of providing an insight into the life and times of the Greatest Briton to a generation now twice-removed from when he lived.

The structure of the book, similar to Johnson’s other writings, reflects this aim; particularly as the small news-article-style chapters – each thematically dealing with specific parts of Churchill’s character and achievements – emphasise accessibility. While this compliments the breezy conversational prose, there are moments where it can appear lazy – his Jeremy Kyle treatment of Churchill’s fiascos[2] for instance – or grate on the reader – see, in particular, his clunky use of ending paragraphs to introduce new chapters. Furthermore, much like his hero, it seems Johnson has dictated much of the book, and for those expectant of substantive prose, in places it unfortunately shows.

Johnson begins the book by outlining events of 1940, before steadily, and with a rough sort of chronology, moving through Churchill’s life using his character-traits as a sort of guide to base his chapters. Johnson’s chapters arc over Churchill’s courage,[3] risk-taking,[4] use of language,[5] as well as his general character,[6] and personal relationships – to name but a few. This method, while perhaps illustrating how the work cannot really be treated as a work of pure-history (something that Johnson himself admits[7]), is nonetheless effective at offering an accessible kaleidoscope to the man.

The Churchill Factor isn’t a history in the proper sense, nor even is it really a biography, it is more an informal personal appraisal; and it therefore cannot be compared to nor extend the work of Churchill’s other biographers. This is reinforced by Johnson’s constant referral to professional historians, such as Max Hastings’ assessment of the paucity of the British officer class,[8] or Lamb’s account of the destruction of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir[9], as well as his cartoonish metaphors – such as comparing Britain’s war reputation to that of Manchester United and its actual record to Tunstall Town F.C.[10] However, Johnson’s playful cavalierness with people and events leads to gross over-simplifications of history that at times mar the text. For instance, “Germany … and German militarism and expansion”[11] are narrowly blamed for the First World War (an argument that has significantly more problems than that for 1939-1945), which, when situated alongside blithe comments about the effects of the reforms of the 1920s (“[Churchill] helped save Britain from fascism not once, but twice”[12]), among many other examples, betrays a dangerously simplistic retelling of history. Moreover, scattered here and there, there is a faint knee-slapping jingoism, demonstrated by Johnson’s account of British national identity[13] and Churchill’s “foreign names … [are] made for Englishmen, not Englishmen for foreign names” telegram[14], which together seem to embellish and glorify imperial Britishness, while dimming its excesses.

Although, one is left to wonder how much of the book is actually about Winston Churchill, as, too often, it is stymied by Johnson’s attempts to work out the ambiguity in his own relationship with the former Prime Minister. While Johnson, much in the same way that a 12-year old Boris may have done,[15] lavishes praise upon the Greatest Briton[16] – even embarking on a pilgrimage, complete with can of “Stella” and cigar, to Churchill’s First World War billet in southern Belgium[17] – the truth seems more ambiguous: “[while] I love writing and thinking about Winston Churchill, the old boy can sometimes be faintly intimidating. I hasten to say that he is always brilliant fun – but as you try to do justice to his life you are acutely conscious of being chained to a genius, and a genius of unbelievable energy and fecundity.”[18] This is the most overt articulation of Johnson’s own presence in the book, where he continually – consciously or subconsciously – compares and at times attempts to match Churchill while recording his achievements.

Some of Johnson’s more welcome interventions are, in fact, when he gives us analysis on the nature of the politician,[19] journalist[20] or writing under the influence of alcohol. [21] Johnson’s deconstruction of Churchill’s speechmaking (“It’s all about the music of the speech, more than the logic. It’s the sizzle, not the sausage.”[22]), and the schmoozing of FDR and America[23] are unique in that they’re being made by an active politician. However his political point scoring can be tedious in places – such as when he says: “[Churchill] was radical precisely because he was conservative. He knew what all sensible Tories know – that the only way to keep things the same is to make sure you change them…” [24] These comments, offered here and there, are interesting in their own right (again, coming from an active politician) but they seem out of place in this book.

The Churchill Factor remains a light-hearted and accessible companion piece to other biographies, an altogether more detailed and distinguished Horrible History,[25] to both a man and his historical period, which remains stunted by its style, marred by wistful historical distortions, disengaged with other histories, and bogged-down with the vanity of its author. The book certainly has its flaws, but it is inescapably entertaining nonetheless – with the easy, conversational charm only broken at times by stylistic chunkiness and a few oddball absurdities that one has to accept as part of the Johnson package. However, in view of its dictated-style and its purposely patchy application of historical and biographical traditions, and especially in view of the excellent McKellen-narrated piece - which share many similarities to Johnson’s book - the question remains: why wasn’t this a documentary instead of a book?

Bradley Lineker is currently a fully-funded ESRC doctoral candidate in the War Studies Department, King’s College London. He has extensive experience working as a consulting research analyst with the UN and the private sector on contexts like Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Kenya, Somalia and Syria. Follow him @BradleyLineker.

NOTES

[1] Johnson, B. (2014), The Churchill Factor: How One Man Made History (London: Hodder and Stoughton), p. 31

2Ibid., p. 201-224

3 Ibid., p. 56-68 Chapter 5: No Act Too Daring or Too Noble

4 Ibid., p. 201-224 Chapter 15: Playing Roulette with History

5 Ibid., p. 84-101 Chapter 7: He Mobilised the English Language

6 Ibid., p. 134-147 ‘Chapter 10: The Making of John Bull’

7 Ibid., p. 4

8 Ibid., p. 266

9 Ibid., p. 233

10 Ibid., p. 265

11 Ibid., p. 173-4

12 Ibid., p. 162

13 Ibid., p. 136

14 Ibid., p. 199

15 see Ibid., p. 189 for a particular memorable quote

16 Ibid., p. 1

17 Ibid., p. 174

18 Ibid., p. 350

19 Ibid., p. 206

20 Ibid., p. 70

21 Ibid., p. 70

22 Ibid., p. 90

23 Ibid., p. 241-256

24 Ibid., p. 160

25 I have borrowed this likeness from: Coughlin, C. (2014). “The Churchill Factor by Boris Johnson, review: ‘a breathless romp’”. The Telegraph. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/bookreviews/11182335/the-churchill-factor-by-boris-johnson.html.

After Ukraine, Part I - Sleepwalking into crisis: Britain, Russia and the Ukraine

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By Michael Jones:

David Cameron meets Vladimir Putin in Moscow, September 2011. PA copyright (CC 2.0)
David Cameron meets Vladimir Putin in Moscow, September 2011. Photo: Number 10, PA copyright (CC 2.0)

Britain’s Defence secretary Michael Fallon said in February that the Russian Leader Vladimir Putin presented as much of a threat to Europe as ISIS[i]. It seems strange that to assert the seriousness of the threat from Russia – a major nuclear-armed power in Europe – Fallon had to compare it to a rebellion on another continent. Fallon was suggesting that people were seriously underestimating Russia’s power and misunderstanding its nature.

This is suggestive of both how the crisis in Ukraine arose and why our reaction to it has been so muted. The House of Lords said as much in a new report, stating that Britain, NATO and the EU had “sleepwalked” into the crisis with Russia in the Ukraine. Britain (as well as NATO and the EU) has consistently misread Russia’s perceptions and actions, and even now they seem confused over how to react to the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and the subsequent confrontation.

Fallon’s comparison of Russia to ISIS reflects the relatively minor attention this war in Europe has received in Britain. With the exception of the downing of MH17, the Ukraine conflict has generally garnered less media or public attention than ISIS or the threat of terrorism at home. Parliament has debated the subject several times but action has been limited to sanctions in line with the US and EU, sending one company of non-combat troops and a large amount of high-flying but ultimately hollow rhetoric.

Why the lack of interest?

The reason for this seems to be that Britain has had more immediate problems. It is easy to forget that seven months ago Britain came close to splitting up, which would have thrown the government, economy and military of Britain into uncertainty and crisis. Thus, for most of 2014, while the Ukraine crisis blew up into civil war, Britain was not sure if it would make it to Christmas in one piece (it did, unlike Ukraine). Britain could hardly commit to radical sanctions or military pressure when it was not sure if its treasury and armed forces would be split with an independent Scotland.

The haunting figure of the Londoner “Jihadi John” personifying the “Islamic State” (IS) on our TV screens hooked our attention and dominated debate. Horror reminiscent of the dark ages in a country we recently invaded, with large numbers of our (erstwhile) countrymen running enthusiastically to join in was hard to ignore. IS has not only stolen the headlines with its sweeping conquests and brutal TV executions, but it has provoked a serious debate about the role of extremism within the West. Radical Islam seems to be a brutal and terrifying enemy that is hard to understand and is at work amongst us, an impression fuelled by the Charlie Hebdo and Copenhagen attacks.

Finally, in the face of economic crisis, potential dissolution and domestic terrorism, Britain’s public has become reluctant to sanction actions abroad and the government has been duly circumscribed. The 2013 defeat in Parliament of David Cameron’s proposed intervention in Syria has made government reluctant to commit forces abroad; indeed, we have fewer aircraft fighting IS than Denmark. This all suggests that Britain’s government is preoccupied and its people unwilling to act.

Britain is involved, whether we like it or not.

With all of these distractions and weaknesses, perhaps conflict in Ukraine is a troublesome irrelevance. But Britain is involved, whether we like it or not. Britain is an EU and NATO member state, both of which are being challenged by Russia. Even without NATO and the EU, we are one of the three guarantors of the Budapest Agreement of 1994, which promised Ukrainian sovereignty would be inviolate in return for abandoning the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR.

The UK supported NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, with seemingly little consideration of what the implications would be. NATO expansion brought with it Article V of the NATO treaty, meaning that an attack on one state is an attack on all. Britain is therefore bound by treaty to defend the states of Eastern Europe as much as it is bound to defend the Falklands. Russia’s consistent and vocal opposition to this expansion should not have left us under any illusions about what might happen. The states of Eastern Europe that joined NATO expected the protection of NATO’s Article V, because they did not want to be treated like Ukraine. Despite seeking and accepting these numerous responsibilities, we seem surprised that they should cost us anything. Sleepwalking is an apt description.

In terms of concrete action, Britain has joined EU sanctions against Russian banks, energy and defence companies, although the government policy states it has merely left its economic relations with Russia “under review”[ii]. British troops help form the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps, which has drilled in Poland and the Baltic states, while the RAF and the Royal Navy intercept Russian ships and jets near the UK.

Britain did unilaterally send 75 troops to Ukraine to help train the government forces, a move that no other EU states matched. But this was a gesture, nothing more, as it was too late to affect the training standards of troops already engaged in combat and the ceasefire of February has effectively created a frozen conflict already.

These lacklustre actions mean that at home and abroad we are perceived to lack the will to act. A growing chorus of generals, politicians and journalists are drawing attention to our underwhelming reaction. Generals are using the menace of Russia as an argument to stop or reverse defence cuts. So far in this election campaign, none of the UK’s main parties have pledged to maintain the commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence required of NATO states. This has drawn warnings from our American allies and will not have been missed in Moscow.

The Prime Minister was notably absent from the Minsk talks and has generally allowed Angela Merkel and Obama to lead the Western diplomatic efforts. Politicians have talked tough on Russia but musings about cutting Russia off from the SWIFT banking mechanism were quickly silenced by Medvedev’s claim that this would be an act of war. Russia has achieved escalation dominance and they are prepared to do more in Ukraine than we or our allies are prepared to do to prevent them.

The implications of sleepwalking.

The implications of this are considerable. Our actions here will affect our interests globally. First, Russia has redrawn European borders at gunpoint, a move that we have not prevented (although NATO also did this in Kosovo in 2008). The fact that the UK was unable to prevent the violation of the Budapest Agreement means that our ability to uphold our obligations will be called into doubt. This will mean our enemies show less respect for our interests or those of our allies. Our allies will view the UK as a less credible ally and think twice before admitting us to the negotiating table. If Russia feels emboldened by our weakness and NATO is indeed undermined by Russian actions, the security of the UK will be undermined because the reliability of NATO as a pillar of UK security will vanish.

The second issue is nuclear weapons. As Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons based on the promise of the protection of its sovereignty in 1994, what message does that send to Iran, North Korea and other would-be nuclear powers? Arguably it shows them that a nuclear weapon is more necessary than ever, that their sovereignty can be violated without it. This impression was exacerbated by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Powers like Israel and Pakistan are nuclear states that, despite many threats, remain intact; while non-nuclear Ukraine and Iraq have both suffered invasion. The logic behind nuclear non-proliferation will be irrevocably damaged.

What can the UK do?

It is easy to highlight problems and not proffer solutions, and clearly the UK has made some efforts in Ukraine which other states have not. It is extremely unlikely the UK would ever fight a war over Ukraine, whatever its treaty obligations. But what can the UK do?

First, the crisis in the Ukraine has taught us that we need to think carefully about taking on burdens we cannot support, specifically in terms of the implications of signing up to treaties and expanding alliances. Renewing our commitment to spending 2% of GDP on Defence would improve the means to act and signal to the rest of the world that we are not shirking our responsibilities.

Second, we should play Russia at its own game. Since Russia has violated the Budapest accords by invading Ukraine, we could, in turn, stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. This Act stated that there would be no permanent NATO bases in Eastern Europe, only temporary deployments. Estonia’s president has called for NATO troops to remain in Eastern Europe on more long term deployments in violation of the act. By stationing troops in Eastern Europe for as long as Russia is in Ukraine, the UK and NATO would show that they are prepared to support and honour their obligations to their allies and that Russia would not be able to hide behind treaties if it was itself reluctant to honour them.

Whatever the wisdom or morality of NATO and EU expansion, and whether or not we have provoked Russia, the damage to UK-Russia relations is done and Russia cannot be appeased. We are now bound to support our allies. We cannot salvage our failure to keep to the terms of the Budapest Agreement by withdrawing from Eastern Europe, acknowledging a Russian sphere of influence and thereby forsaking our NATO responsibilities.

The world is shaped by powers that act. If we don’t, it will be shaped by someone else, quite probably to our detriment.

Michael Jones has a BA in History from the University of Oxford. He is currently reading for an MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His particular areas of interest include modern Russia and great power rivalry.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. Over the next couple of weeks Strife will feature three more articles about the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. Next, Conradin Weindl will look into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. Then Andrzej Kozłowski will analyse Poland’s approach to the crisis and the implications for Polish security. Finally, Sebastian Åsberg, will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine.

NOTES

[i] I Magazine pp.4 20/02/2015

[ii] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/doing-business-in-russia-and-ukraine-sanctions-latest

Defending the Falklands: A role for nuclear weapons?

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By Alex Calvo and Olivia Olsen:

LOND20110750551a

Deep conventional cuts have put a question mark over the British defence posture in the South Atlantic. Although the steep deterioration in Argentine military capabilities means that the balance of power has not necessarily moved against London, the deterioration in expeditionary and amphibious capability has led to what some voices consider to be an excessive reliance on static defence. In other words: in Royal Air Force Mount Pleasant’s ability to resist while airborne reinforcements arrive. Since the UK retains her nuclear deterrent, it is only logical to ask ourselves whether it may also contribute to the successful defence of the Falklands. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether current nuclear doctrine allows for this.

The strategic and the tactical levels

There are two basic ways in which nuclear weapons may be employed in defence of the Falklands. First of all, at the strategic level, deterring Argentina by threatening her population centres in the event of an invasion. Second of all, at the tactical level, by attacking air and naval bases with low-yield warheads in such a case or right before it, pre-emptively.

The 2006 White Paper: a door open?

We shall begin our examination of British nuclear doctrine with the 2006 white paper titled ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’[i]. This document makes it clear that ‘we deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities. Hence, we will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons’. It is thus clear that there is no need to be attacked with atomic weapons first, in order to respond in kind. Needless to say, Argentina is not a nuclear-weapons state, although it has a certain ‘latent’ nuclear and missile capacity, and therefore a ‘no first use’ declaration by London would make any further discussion unnecessary.

Once this is understood, it is now necessary to examine under what conditions a conventional attack from a non-nuclear weapons state, either alone or in association with a nuclear weapons state, may be met with an atomic strike. The document is not that clear about this, since it contains no explicit statement saying whether the UK may employ nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state. However, its tone and some of its assertions seem to at least imply that the country’s nuclear-deterrent is basically, if not solely, aimed at other nuclear-weapons states, whether acting directly or by means of sponsored terrorist groups. We can see this in its section ‘The UK Approach to Nuclear Deterrence,’ listing ‘Five enduring principles’ underpinning ‘the UK’s approach to nuclear deterrence.’ These five principles clearly refer to other nuclear-weapons states, whether recognized or not by the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT).

For example, the first is titled, ‘our focus is on preventing nuclear attack’ and states that, ‘The UK’s nuclear weapons are not designed for military use during conflict but instead to deter and prevent nuclear blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests that cannot be countered by other means.’ Although this clearly points out in the direction of other nuclear-weapons states, we should note the following:

a) Not being ‘designed’ does not mean not being able to be employed. The word ‘designed’ is ambiguous, probably intentionally so. It is likely that this is no accident, but rather a deliberate attempt at not ruling out any option. Actually, such ambiguity is built in British nuclear doctrine, as clearly stated in the third principle, discussed below.

b) The provision ‘that cannot be countered by other means’ stresses the strong link between conventional military capabilities and nuclear doctrine, a connection often missing in the debate on defence cuts. Politicians and the public should understand that the lower British conventional capabilities are, the lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons must be, if we are to retain the same level of commitment to our national security. The comparative approach may come in handy here; Moscow is unable and unwilling to cut down her tactical nuclear arsenal because her conventional military capabilities are insufficient to deter potential enemies, above all China. Only a successful conclusion of the current Russian military reforms, resulting in a modern, agile, conventional force, able to defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the field, may pave the way to negotiations in this arena. Similarly, for the UK to rule out using tactical nuclear weapons against countries not possessing them (which, again, the 2006 paper does not do), would require a major upgrade in conventional military capabilities. The alternative, which we may call the ‘Russification of the Falklands’, that is just like Russia versus China resorting to non-conventional arms to cover one’s conventional weakness, would be to explicitly rely on tactical nuclear weapons in the defence of the Islands. This would entail a significant departure from the current British nuclear posture, going from ‘minimum’[ii] to ‘maximum deterrence’.

The third principle[iii] should also be read carefully and in its entirety: ‘we deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities. Hence, we will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons.’ This is quite self-explanatory, but we can perhaps look in some more detail at the last sentence. Not ruling out a first strike is an option which basically makes sense against non-nuclear-weapons states (or with a rudimentary, or solely tactical, nuclear capability).

Why? Because when faced with a country possessing a similar strategic nuclear capability, it does not really matter who is the first to employ it, since the end result is the same, the destruction of both powers, ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ or MAD. When does it then matter whether or not to be ready to use them? When at war with powers not having them, or where the possibility of striking them with nuclear weapons may serve as a deterrent, either preventing an outbreak of hostilities or, at least in theory, the escalation of the conflict (also called ‘intra-conflict deterrence’).

Thus, while the British nuclear deterrent was not originally designed to deal with conventional aggression, and the UK doctrine mainly refers to dealing with nuclear threats or attacks, its documents do not rule out a first strike and more to the point do not provide any explicit assurance to non-nuclear weapons states.

The 2003 Defence Ministry White Paper and the UK policy aims

This is made even clearer in another key document, the 2003 Defence Ministry White Paper on ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’,[iv] which, while noting that ‘The Government’s policy on nuclear weapons remains as set out in the SDR’, assigns a broad deterrent role to British nuclear forces and lists a number of ‘UK policy aims’ which include responsibility for overseas territories and economic and trade matters, ranging from the ‘free flow of natural resources’ to ‘overseas and foreign investment’. While not stating a direct link between each and every such aim and the nuclear forces, it provides a measure of ambiguity in not clearly defining which may merit the employment of the atomic deterrent. Some observers have noted that these very broad interests go beyond existential threats.[v]

The 2010 NSS and SDSR: confirming nuclear ambiguity

Two additional important documents appeared in 2010, partly dealing with nuclear weapons: the National Security Strategy (NSS)[vi] and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).[vii]

The NSS does not specifically refer to the criteria for their employment, but the SDSR discusses this in a number of passages. It explains that ‘to respond to the low probability but very high impact risk of a large-scale military attack by another state, we will maintain our capacity to deter, including through the nuclear deterrent.’ It must be noted that this is not qualified by the assertion that such an attack must be nuclear, or even that the state carrying out should have that capability. This is later compensated, however, with a reference to the ‘need for a minimum effective nuclear deterrent as the ultimate means to deter the most extreme threats’, although a list of such threats is not provided, and therefore a conventional attack on the Falklands is not explicitly ruled out.

Thus, the SDSR confirms, rather than dispels, the traditional ambiguity on the scope of the British nuclear deterrent, its possible targets, and the kind of attacks it could respond to. The text says that ‘The UK has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies, and we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use’.

The negative use assurance and countries acting in concert with nuclear powers

The SDSR also contains, however, a so-called negative use assurance, stating that ‘We are now able to give an assurance that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasise the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and note that this assurance would not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.’ The question thus emerges of whether this assurance covers Argentina, a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT. At first sight it seems it would, but similar guarantees are usually interpreted as not covering countries acting in concert with nuclear-weapons states.[viii]

Which confirmed that the use or threat of use, of nuclear weapons is subject to the laws of armed conflict, and rejected the argument that such use would necessarily be unlawful’. Although ‘the threshold for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons is clearly a high one’ and the UK ‘would only consider using nuclear weapons in self-defence (including the defence of our NATO allies), and even then only in extreme circumstances’, British doctrine is based on the principle that ‘The legality of any such use would depend upon the circumstances and the application of the general rules of international law, including those regulating the use of force and the conduct of hostilities’.

That is, British doctrine considers that international law does not in itself make illegal employing nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. Rejecting an invasion of British territory would clearly fall within the confines of ‘self-defence.’ Even more so thanks to the reference to ‘our NATO allies’, since it would not seem logical to employ atomic weapons to defend foreign lands and not a British Overseas Territory.

Possible changes to nuclear targeting policy and arsenal to enhance deterrence

British nuclear weapons are currently strategic and not targeted at any country in particular.[ix] While changing these two factors is not strictly speaking necessary to guarantee an effective deterrent against Argentine aggression, two amendments may be advisable. First, publicly announcing that the country had become the pre-planned target for some of the missiles on board the submarine on patrol at any given time could send a powerful message to Buenos Aires, reducing the scope for miscalculations. Second, given the high threshold use for strategic weapons, it may be advisable to recover an explicitly tactical capability. Although strategic devices may be employed in a tactical role, the risk for miscalculations by would-be aggressors may be higher if the UK’s arsenal contains no specific tactical devices.

Conclusions: a role for nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic

Deep defence cuts and the loss of a significant portion of the British expeditionary capability have made the defence of the Falklands heavily reliant on Mount Pleasant and aerial reinforcement. While the military balance in the South Atlantic remains favourable, a purely conventional posture may no longer be sustainable. By analogy with Russia, it could be termed the ‘Russification’ of the Falklands. An examination of British nuclear doctrine has shown that, while originally designed to mainly counter non-conventional threats, it does not rule out reacting to conventional attacks not threatening the very existence of the United Kingdom. However, in order to make the nuclear deterrent more credible in the South Atlantic, and reduce the scope for another miscalculation, it may be advisable to amend targeting policy and recover a specific tactical capability.

 

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Alex Calvo is a guest professor at the Law Department of Nagoya University (Japan). Olivia Olsen is a War Studies graduate from Wolverhampton University. You can follow Alex Calvo on Twitter @Alex_Calvo.

NOTES

1 The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, London, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, December 2006, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf
[ii] A concept confirmed in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, which refers to ‘a minimum effective nuclear deterrent’ Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, London, United Kingdom Government, October 2010, p. 12, available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=sdsr
[iii] The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, p. 18.
[iv] Delivering Security in a Changing World. Defence White Paper, London, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, December 2003, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-4550-99C0-4D87D7C95DED/0/cm6041I_whitepaper2003.pdf
[v] Nick Ritchie, UK nuclear weapons policy: deconstructing ‘minimum deterrence’, British International Studies Association, 2011, p. 6, available at http://www.bisa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_bisa&task=view_public_papers_author_char_search&char_search=R
[vi] A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, London, United Kingdom Government, October 2010, available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy
[vii] Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, London, United Kingdom Government, October 2010, available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=sdsr
[VIII] Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer and Stephen Young, Nuclear Futures. Western European options for nuclear risk reduction, BASIC-BITS Research Report 98.5, British-American Security Information Council and Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, December 1998, p. 13, available at http://www.bits.de/public/pdf/rr98-5.pdf
[ix] ‘In a posture known as Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD), one submarine, armed with up to 16 Trident missiles and up to 48 warheads, is always on deterrent patrol 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The notice to fire has been increased to several days since the Cold War ended and the missiles are not targeted at any country.’ ‘Fact Sheet 4: The Current System’ The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, London, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, December 2006, p. 1, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AE97B570-0E9A-48BC-9405-857F5E962507/0/Cm6994_Factsheet4.pdf