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Beyond Beijing: Russia in the Indo-Pacific

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Russian Missile Cruiser Varyag. Photo Credit: Phil King, licensed via Creative Commons.

Russia’s military power in the Indo-Pacific is often confined analytically to the Sino-Russian relationship vis-a-vis the U.S. While the extent of that relationship remains heavily debated, Russia’s larger role as a security actor in the Indo-Pacific is ignored, despite possessing military relationships with states in the region, particularly with India and Vietnam. These relationships are underpinned by arms deals, joint exercises, and cooperation on policy, indicating a more complex and fluid position for Russia in the Indo-Pacific than the Sino-Russian relationship alone explains. Russia is a multi-dimensional security actor in the Indo-Pacific region and policy to the end of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” should take this into account.

Russia has always had security interests in the East. The 19th century competition between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain for Afghanistan, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Soviet Union’s defeat of Japan’s Kwantung Army in World War II demonstrate a long history of Russian interest in the Indo-Pacific.[1] Russia has demonstrated interest in the Indo-Pacific when the region has been of geopolitical importance. Though Russia officially rejects the concept of the Indo-Pacific as an artificial American construct, its policy suggests a de facto recognition of the theater. As such, the focus on the region in international politics has influenced the Kremlin’s strategic calculus.

The contested southern Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan serve as one locus of Russian interest in the region.[2] Russia deployed Bal and Bastion anti-ship missile systems and drones to the southern Kuril Islands in 2016 and began plans to construct military facilities on the islands.[3] In August 2021, Defence Minister Shoigu announced that Russia would build “51 more pieces of military infrastructure”[4] on the Kuril Islands. Then, in early October 2021, the Russian and Chinese navies held their first-ever joint patrols in the Sea of Japan.[5] Four days later, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet’s Submarine Force Command, Rear Admiral Arkady Navarsky, told the Russian News Agency (TASS) that Russia’s Pacific Fleet would be receiving four new submarines.[6] Moscow’s increased investments in its Pacific assets are indicative of its desire to be a proactive and influential player in the region.

During his tenure as Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov laid the groundwork for Russia’s “pivot to Asia” in the mid-1990s by initiating stronger relations with China and India.[7] These two remain the only countries named as security partners in Russia’s 2021 National Security Strategy. Russia seeks with China a “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction” (всеобъемлющее партнерство и стратегический взаимодействие) and with India, a “particularly privileged strategic partnership” (особо привилегированное стратегическое партнерство). Such specifications suggest Russia’s relationship with these two Asian countries are different in nature, though it remains ambiguous, which ultimately Russia favours.[8] In the Asia-Pacific, Russia aims to contribute to stability and security on a non-aligned basis (на внеблоковой основе).[9]

Russia and India have had a strong but imperfect relationship since the Cold War era, the foundation of which is arms sales.[10] In 2019 India purchased two Admiral Grigorovich class guided-missile frigates for the Indian Navy[11] and in early 2021 India agreed to spend $5.5 billion on the Russian S-400 air defence system, against U.S. wishes.[12] Between 2013-2017 35 percent of Russian arms exports went to India, with only 12 percent going to China.[13] Nor was the relationship limited to arms sales. In September 2021 India participated in the Russian-led ZAPAD 2021 military exercise,[14] a month after the 12th annual Indo-Russian joint military exercise Indra-21 was held in Volgograd.[15] Bala Venkatesh Varma, outgoing Ambassador to Russia, told TASS that the Joint Commission on Technology and Science, and agreements on military technical cooperation and reciprocal defence logistical support are anticipated to be announced later this year.[16]

Much like the Indo-Russian relationship, the Russo-Vietnamese defence relationship dates back to the Cold War and is grounded predominantly in arms sales. Vietnam alone is responsible for 61 percent of Russian arms sales to Southeast Asia over the past two decades.[17] However, like the Indian relationship, more is afoot than simple weapons deals. Indeed, the first ever joint Russian-Vietnamese military exercise was held in December 2019 in the port of Cam Ranh.[18] Prior to said exercise, in June 2021, Shoigu and his Vietnamese counterpart Colonel General Phan Van Giang held a video conference on deepening military and military-technical cooperation.[19] Later that month, Deputy Minister of National Defence Senior Lieutenant Le Huy Vinh hosted Anatoly Chuprynov, the resident representative of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation in Hanoi.[20]

Both India and Vietnam value their security relationships with Russia. The Russia-India bilateral summit in December 2021 is preceded by Russia and India’s first ministerial 2+2 dialogue, a format India previously only used with the U.S., Japan, and Australia. Moreover, India has opted to not only purchase Russian arms but invest in joint military technological development. The BrahMos cruise missile joint production venture[21] and the Joint Commission on Technology and Science are investments that suggest New Delhi views Russia as a serious contributor to India’s long-term defence capabilities. Much like India, Vietnam initiated the June 2021 Shoigu-Van Giang conference and has made its desire to purchase the BrahMos cruise missile well-known.[22] New Delhi and Hanoi are making efforts to sell cooperation with Russia to its domestic audiences, as well. Indian media outlets made note of China’s status as a mere observer to ZAPAD 2021, while India and Russia demonstrated joint operability.[23] Equally, the Vietnamese Communist Party’s party website described strategic cooperation with Russia as the “top priority”[24] of the party and state after Vietnamese Defence Minister Ngo Xuan Lich’s February 2020 Moscow trip.

The seriousness with which New Delhi and Hanoi address their relationships with Moscow is telling—Russia is considered as a possible restraint on growing Chinese military power in the region and as a “third-way” in the U.S.-China competition more generally. Vietnam explicitly pursues a multi-pronged foreign policy that does not give one external power too much influence over the country’s security and like Russia, India favours multipolarity.[25] Both view it as beneficial to keep Russia invested in the region.

The West’s efforts to estrange Moscow and Beijing may be futile if not counterproductive, but there are reasons why the former may choose to distance itself from the latter to the end of its own interests. Both Russian and Chinese authorities reject bipolarity as the present or coming world architecture, though China’s status may no longer be “for China to choose.”[26] An international structure in which China levels with or passes the U.S. in national power is unsatisfactory to Russia because Moscow aims for multipolarity and great power status. It is difficult to imagine China ceding influence to other states if this is achieved. Russia’s ambitions would then be frustrated by Beijing’s power, prompting antagonistic behavior towards China from Moscow.

The Sino-Russian relationship may otherwise weaken gradually as the economic relationship becomes more lopsided, with China eventually halting its purchase of Russian military hardware – in favour of domestically procured items -and climate change reducing the attractiveness of Russia’s fossil fuel reserves.[27] Such conditions incentivise Russia to keep China at arms-length. India and Vietnam are unlikely to cut security ties with Russia, despite pressure from the U.S. to do so, because they view Russia as a counterweight to both China and the U.S., a role it served for these states during the Cold War.[28] Moreover, Russia’s relationships with India and Vietnam do not threaten Russia’s great power ambitions, implying a certain level of durability.

When estimating the extent to which Russia may support China in competition or open conflict with the U.S., Russia’s assorted interests in the Indo-Pacific must be considered. The Sino-Russian relationship is worthy of attention, but there should be greater analytical curiosity regarding Russia’s other Indo-Pacific relationships and how they may affect Moscow’s decision-making, especially if China obfuscates Russia’s strategic end-goal of multipolarity. A scenario in which Russia restrains rather than emboldens China is a very real possibility. Stranger things have happened.

[1] “A Soviet Push Helped Force Japan to Surrender,” The Moscow Times (The Moscow Times, August 8, 2005), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/a-soviet-push-helped-force-japan-to-surrender/210764.html.

[2] Tom Holcombe, “Ending a 60 Year Stalemate: Japan’s Push to Get a Peace Treaty with Russia,” The Interpreter (The Interpreter, January 16, 2018), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ending-60-year-stalemate-japans-push-get-peace-treaty-russia.

[3] “Russia to Beef up Military, Recession Be Damned,” CBS News (CBS Interactive, March 25, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-to-beef-up-military-recession-be-damned/.

[4] Olzhas Auyezov, “Russia Expands Military Construction Plans on Kuril Islands - Report,” Reuters (Reuters, August 9, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-expands-military-construction-plans-kuril-islands-report-2021-08-09/.

[5] Polina Devitt, “Russian, Chinese Warships Hold First Joint Patrols in the Pacific,” Reuters (Reuters, October 24, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-chinese-warships-hold-first-joint-patrols-pacific-2021-10-23/.

[6] “Russia’s Pacific Fleet to Receive Four Nuclear Subs in Coming Years, Says Rear Admiral,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, October 27, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1354851.

[7] Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Asia Strategy: Bolstering the Eagle’s Eastern Wing,” Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 94 (2016). https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/russias-asia-strategy-bolstering-eagles-eastern-wing. 17.

[8] It is important to note that Russia rejected the reframing of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean as one region, the Indo-Pacific, as a U.S.-made artificial construct. Nevertheless, its balancing act of its relationships to other actors suggests that it seeks to expand its power in the regional framework and not through separate campaigns.

[9] President of the Russian Federation, On the National Security of the Russian Federation, 2021, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107030001, 44.

[10] Sameer Lalwani et al., “The Influence of Arms: Explaining the Durability of India–Russia Alignment,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, January 15, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2473328/the-influence-of-arms-explaining-the-durability-of-indiarussia-alignment/#sdendnote169anc.

[11] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Kicks off Work on 2 Guided Missile Frigates for Indian Navy,” The Diplomat (The Diplomat, July 15, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/russia-kicks-off-work-on-2-guided-missile-frigates-for-indian-navy/.

[12] Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Russian Arms Sale Clouds U.S.-India Ties,” Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy, March 19, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/19/russia-india-defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-s-400-china-arms-sales/.

[13] Leon Aron, “Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance?” Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-04/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance.

[14] “Indian Army to Participate in Multi-Nation Exercise ‘Zapad 2021’ in Russia,” Mint (Mint, September 1, 2021), https://www.livemint.com/news/india/indian-army-to-participate-in-multi-nation-military-exercise-zapad-2021-in-russia-11630511720499.html.

[15] Press Trust of India, “India, Russia to Hold 13-Day Mega Joint Military Exercise from August 1,” NDTV.com (NDTV, July 29, 2021), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indra-2021-india-russia-to-hold-13-day-mega-military-exercise-in-volgograd-from-august-1-2498159.

[16] “India’s Envoy to Russia Looks Forward to Inking Defense Deals at December Summit,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, November 1, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1356659.

[17] Ian Storey, “Russia’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: A Tenuous Lead in Arms Sales but Lagging in Other Areas,” ISEAS (Yusof Ishak Institute, April 8, 2021), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-33-russias-defence-diplomacy-in-southeast-asia-a-tenuous-lead-in-arms-sales-but-lagging-in-other-areas-by-ian-storey/.

[18] “The joint Russian-Vietnamese exercise to assist a submarine will be held in the port of Cam Ranh,” Press Service of the Eastern Military District (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, December 5, 2019), https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12265198@egNews.

[19] “Russia’s Defense Chief Vows to Strengthen Military Interaction with Vietnam,” TASS (TASS Russian News Agency, June 11, 2021), https://tass.com/defense/1301681.

[20] “Vietnam, Russia Forge Stronger Military-Technical Ties,” Thông tấn xã Việt Nam (TTXVN) (Vietnam News Agency (VNA), June 23, 2021), https://vnanet.vn/en/anh/vna-photos-1027/vietnam-russia-forge-stronger-military-technical-ties-5514850.html.

[21] “Russian-Indian Joint Venture Brahmos,” NPO Mashinostroyenia, http://www.npomash.ru/cooperation/en/brahmos.htm.

[22] Snehesh Alex Philip, “Rajnath Singh Assures ‘Friend’ Vietnam of Help Modernising Its Armed Forces,” ThePrint (ThePrint, November 27, 2020), https://theprint.in/defence/rajnath-singh-assures-friend-vietnam-of-help-modernising-its-armed-forces/553405/.

[23] Divyanshu Jindal, “India at Zapad-2021: What It Means for Our Ties with Russia & China,” The Quint (The Quint, September 20, 2021), https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-russia-military-exercise-zapad-2021-geopolitical-implications#read-more.

[24] Ralph Jennings, “Vietnam Advancing Ties with Russia to Hedge against China, US,” VOA (Voice of America News, February 21, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_vietnam-advancing-ties-russia-hedge-against-china-us/6184625.html.

[25] Elizabeth Roche, “India Supports Multipolar World Order: Shringla,” Mint (Mint, June 23, 2021), https://www.livemint.com/news/world/india-supports-multipolar-world-order-shringla-11624450754028.html.

[26] Zhao Huasheng and Andrey Kortunov, “The Coming Bipolarity and Its Implications: Views from China and Russia,” Russian International Affairs Council (Russian International Affairs Council, November 23, 2020), https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-coming-bipolarity-and-its-implications-views-from-china-and-russia/.

[27] Jonathan E. Hillman, “China and Russia: Economic Unequals,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (July 15, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-russia-economic-unequals; Interview with Paul Haenle, Dmitri Trenin, Eugene Rumer, Alexander Gabuev, Are China-Russia Relations Getting Too Close for Comfort?, podcast audio, Carnegie Endowment, October 30, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/30/are-china-russia-relations-getting-too-close-for-comfort-pub-80238.

[28] Embassy New Delhi to Department of State, Telegram 026315, October 28, 1985, “Gandhi’s Visit to Moscow,” Carter Presidential Library (accessed November 12, 2021), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18128-document-02-ambassador-dean-cable-subject-gandhi.; Stephen J. Morris, “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970s: The View from Moscow,” Working Paper No. 25, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (April 1999).

Chinese Patriotic War Cinema and the Rise of China’s National Consciousness

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Photo Credit: Fay Lee on Unsplash

China’s growing assertiveness has become increasingly visible in recent years. These developments were most recently demonstrated by the success of the Chinese Korean War epic, The Battle at Lake Changjin (长津湖). Released on China’s National Day holiday on the 1st of October, the film recounts the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir in 1950, where the 9th People’s Volunteer Army under Peng Dehuai and Song Shilun drove the American-led United Nations forces out of North Korea, contributing to the stalemate that the war would become [[1]]. The film grossed U.S. $750 million at the Chinese box office, muscling out the latest James Bond outing, No Time to Die, as the highest grossing film of the year so far. It is the success of the film that is indicative of the political, social and economic shifts in China in recent years.

The Battle at Lake Changjin follows on the heels of a wave of patriotic war films that have been notable successes at the Chinese box office. Possibly the most notable example of this was 2017’s Wolf Warrior 2 (战狼2), where a former Chinese soldier, Leng Feng (Wu Jing), battles American and European foes in a fictional African nation as he hunts for the killers of his former commanding officer and lover.

The success of these films has demonstrated a notable break from the previous, more stilted state of Chinese military cinema, which had largely relied upon more professional younger actors and appealed more to older audiences. One of these is the greater quality of the action sequences, stunts and acting, with the directors of these new forms of Chinese war films seeking to thrill their audiences, in contrast to the staid fair that characterized previous films. This stands in direct contrast to previous efforts, such as 2017’s Founding of an Army (建军大业), which relied heavily on the photogenetic appearance and star power of its cast and drew criticism from Chinese netizens on the social media platform, Weibo, as well as the families of those covered in the film, such as Ye Daying, the grandson of the renowned general, Ye Ting, who called Founding of an Army “a reproach and distortion of revolutionary history” [[2]].

Another variation has come in the form of government involvement in these productions. While the state-owned China Film Group Corporation continues to be involved with the production of these new form of films, what has been notable is the involvement of private companies, most notably the social media giant, Tencent. This even extends to the cast, most notably in the case of 1921, which drew upon participants from online talent shows and influencers from the social media platform, Douyin, to play the role of key figures in the founding of the Communist Party of China. It is this development that illustrates the involvement of private firms in what had previously been a largely state run endeavor as well as the changing nature of star power, which has changed as a result of social media.

In addition, the box office success of these films has also illustrated the rise of nationalist sentiment in China as well as pointing to wider developments in China’s foreign relations, with the release of Wolf Warrior 2 coinciding with the modernisation and expansion of the People’s Liberation Army. All point to a China that is willing to stand up to its foes at home and abroad. However, the relationship between cinema and foreign policy has not been without precedent as Hollywood has demonstrated.

From Humiliation to Pride

The success of these films have been illustrative of the role of historical legacies in Chinese politics. This has been reflective in the choice of historical experiences invoked by Chinese cinema as well as Chinese officials. Previously, these typically focused on the period of China’s humiliation, as demonstrated by the glut of films covering China’s struggles with Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945.

Within this context, the setting of The Battle at Lake Changjin is a departure from this in recounting the Battle at the Chosin Reservoir. In doing so, the film’s directors have invoked a time where China was able to go toe-to-toe with the United States and emerge triumphant. Such a message has resonated with Chinese audiences against the backdrop of an increasingly contentious Sino-American relationship, which explains the film’s success.

This is also invocative of the famous words often attributed to Mao Zedong that “the Chinese people have stood up”, with China’s intervention in the Korean War being an action representative of Mao’s bold claim. In keeping with Mao’s words, the film’s release has also coincided with a wider sense of pride in China’s identity, as illustrated by the popularity of the Hanfu (汉服) among Chinese millennials as well as the use of China’s past glories as a source of national pride [[3]]. It is these wider trends that are reflective of how the Chinese perceive China’s role today.

Domestically, these films demonstrate the continued importance of historical legacies in the governance of China. This comes at a time where the Central Committee of the CPC has been tasked with reviewing a draft of a resolution that defines the party’s ‘major achievements and historical experiences.’ In doing so, the CPC’s actions further illustrates the role of historical legacies in cementing political legitimacy. Such a move was further demonstrated at the premiere of 1921, where footage of China’s most recent achievements, such as China’s ventures into space, were shown in a not so subtle way to link the CPC to China’s recent success. This in turn presents the CPC’s discourse of an ubroken lineage between the founding of the party and China’s growth as a Great Power.

However, this narrative has not been without its’ issues, as the reception of 1921 among other films have demonstrated. This was demonstrated by a hotline set up to report comments of ‘historical nihilism’ online being bombarded with complaints about 1921. These run the gamut from complaints over the casting of ‘immoral’ individuals to play key figures in the party’s history to the accusation that the film breached party values. This was further expressed by the hashtag #boycott1921 which gained 3.6 million views before being removed. Even seemingly safe subjects have been subject to controversy as demonstrated by audience reactions to The Eight Hundred, which drew criticism for seemingly glorifying the nationalist Guomindang while ignoring its’ class oppression and misdeeds. It is these aspects that illustrate how China’s nationalist fervour is not only the preserve of the CPC.

The Power of the Chinese Market

The success of films such as Battle at Lake Changjin and 1921 are not so much testaments to the power of the Communist Party but rather to that of the Chinese consumer. This was most notably demonstrated by the role of Chinese millennials in the success of these films, whose economic and consumer clout has led to them being labelled as the ‘new baby boomers’. In addition, these films have also been demonstrative of the consumer habits of this generation as well as the Chinese market as a whole, which is turning away from foreign brands in favour of domestic ones.

It is this shift that raises questions for Hollywood and other Western brands. Previously it had long been believed that brand recognition along with a few token casting choices and gestures towards China was enough to capture the wallets of Chinese consumers, who had become integral to the global success of several major pictures, most notably the Marvel series. However, the success of Battle at Lake Changjin has questioned the feasibility of this, with a local production muscling out one of the biggest and most widely recognized franchises in Hollywood to become the highest grossing film of 2021. As a result, this requires a rethink of how to recapture the Chinese consumer.

The success of patriotic war films in China has indicated a growing national consciousness in Chinese society, which has manifested itself in China’s growing confidence and sense of national pride. All these point to a poised and assertive nation that is willing to flex its economic and military muscle as demonstrated by the more combative stances taken by Chinese diplomats who engage in the aptly named ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’, which also shows a case of the silver screen influencing present geopolitics. It is of the success of these films that illustrates how Chinese nationalism has been a concerning but lucrative force. In addition, while these films demonstrate the necessity of controlling the past for political legitimacy, it is the control of China’s future that is the bigger question, the answer for which can be found in these.

[1] Philip J. Greer, Chosin Reservoir: The Battle That Stalled a War, Sabre and Scroll, Vol.9 No.3, Winter 2020, p. 169

[2] Mimi Lau, Film about founding of China’s military slammed by grandson of one of its central characters, South China Morning Post, 28th July 2017 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2104519/film-about-founding-chinas-military-slammed-grandson-one-its)

[3] Pan Xiaodie, Zhang Haixia and Zhu Yongfei, An Analysis of the Current Situation of the Chinese Clothing Craze in the Context of the Rejuvenation of Chinese Culture, Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, Vol. 466, p.504

The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: a distorted reality

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2000 years ago, two great civilizations dominated each ends of the ancient Silk Road.

At its most Eastern point was China’s Han dynasty, which knew very little of the other mysterious empire that controlled the Silk Road’s Western tip. Chinese people referred to this empire as “Da Qin,” and they thought of it as a sort of “counter-China” which sat at the other end of the world. Today we know that what the Chinese people called “Da Qin” was in fact nothing but the mighty Roman Empire. The story goes that in the year 97 A.D., Chinese ambassador Kan Ying embarked on a journey through the arid steppes of Central Asia to pay a visit to Rome, carrying lavish gifts for its Roman rulers.

Today, that ancient Silk Road has been revived under the name of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his intention to build a modern-day adaptation of these trade routes, giving life to a network of railways, ports, pipelines, power grids and highways that will once again carry goods and ideas between East and West. In this vision, China and Italy could once again become the two powers sitting at the opposite ends of the Silk Road.

In March 2019, President Xi embarked on a three-day state visit to Italy, which today is less a Mediterranean spanning empire and more of a fatigued country saddled with massive debt. In addition, unlike Chinese ambassador Kan Ying, this time President Xi Jinping did not carry lavish gifts for the Roman rulers, but a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Italy to join the Belt and Road Initiative. This was officially signed on March 23.

Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo Credit: Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons

That Italy, a member of the G7 and a founding member of both the EU and NATO, embraced China’s Belt and Road Initiative was perceived as a major blow to its traditional Western allies. At a time when the US and China were locked in a bitter trade war which saw Washington and Beijing imposing tit-for-tat tariffs and EU leaders emphasizing the need for a common strategy towards China, Rome’s formal endorsement for the BRI raised concerns that Italy could become the entry point for Chinese influence in Europe.

Various media outlets claimed that Italy “was playing with fire”, and the US depicted the country as “the European weak link in the power struggle with China”. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also warned that Beijing would take advantage of Rome, recalling the common assumption that the BRI only plays in China’s favor, and that countries that will be unable to repay generous Chinese loans will eventually fall into the so-called “debt trap”. And, because the MoU would grant a Chinese state-owned company access to various Italian ports, including Genova and Trieste, in 2019 many claimed that Italy would eventually cede its national assets to Beijing.

An article from The New York Times quickly inflated this narrative and painted a stark picture of Trieste being “invaded” by an army of deep-pocketed Chinese people: “To walk through Trieste is to witness how the city has already opened to China” - the article reads in a prophetic tone - “Chinese tourists shop for the city’s trademark Illy coffee and take pictures with their Huawei phones of the elegant Caffé Degli Specchi”. As the article continues, “most significant, construction workers in scuba gear have been laying foundations near the site where a new pier is expected to become China’s home in the industrial port.” In the imaginary of the Times, the idea that China could soon control major Italian national assets loomed large. Yet, two years since the controversial signing of the MoU, the obvious question is: have these prophecies come about? The answer is no.

First, it should be noted that most of the agreements signed by Italy and China were largely expressions of intention, which never really came to reality.

After March 2019 Beijing had to learn a hard lesson: dealing with Italy’s schizophrenic, unpredictable, and unreliable political system is no easy task. When the MoU for the BRI was first signed, Italy was governed by the Five-Star Movement (5SM) and the far-right League, a dysfunctional and populist coalition that favored a new partnership with Beijing. This coalition also rejected Italy’s traditional Western alliances and was largely anti-EU and anti-establishment. However, this government was quickly replaced by a new coalition that re-positioned Italy back into its traditional alliance system. This approach was then reinforced by yet another change of government in 2021, when Prime Minister Mario Draghi emphasized that his new administration was “strongly pro-European and Atlanticist.” This political roller coaster essentially proved that Rome’s position towards the BRI can virtually change at any time.

In addition, the continuing US-China trade war and the growing tension around Italy’s endorsement for the BRI in 2019 might have eventually influenced Italy’s decision-makers, prompting them to choose different partners. In Trieste, where, according to the New York Times, to walk through the city is “to witness how the city has already opened to China,” the port infrastructure project was eventually contracted not by China Communication Construction Company (CCCC), but by Germany’s Hafen and Logistik.

It is also important to highlight that many concerns on Italy falling into a “debt trap” had little supporting evidence. Both Italian and European legal frameworks limit the ability of foreign companies to acquire assets in country’s vital sectors. In particular, the Italian government can also appeal to the so-called “Golden Power” regulation, a special rule introduced in 2012 and reviewed in 2020 by which the Italian government can decide to stop foreign direct investment when it goes against the national interest. This means that there was virtually no possibility to cede control of Italian ports to a Chinese organisation.

Finally, what is often ignored is that Chinese investment would have been limited to very specific projects: China’s collaboration would not be focused directly on the entire ports of Genova and Trieste - rather, in Genova, CCCC would have invested in the construction of a new breakwater dam, while in Trieste the company would have been involved in the construction of railway stations and rail connections. These considerations seem to suggest that fears over Chinese investments in Italian infrastructure have often been exaggerated by media outlets and political figures. Also, they stemmed from a general mistrust towards China’s BRI, rather than from any thorough analysis. Stating that “to walk through Trieste is to witness how the city has already opened to China” is a form of sensationalism that actively distorts reality.

Is China a security threat to the liberal international order?

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People’s Liberation Army’s parade in 2015. Licensed under Creative Commons.

China has enjoyed tremendous economic growth over the last thirty years and is on course to remain a key growth engine for the world’s economy. This economic success has enabled China to bolster its military and to take a more active role on the global stage. Leader of China’s Communist Party since 2012, Xi Jinping has envisioned a new “Chinese dream” that would restore China’s lost national greatness. This desire, coupled with global ambitions, has generated a large amount of anxiety in the Western world and Asia, where China’s neighbors are wary of its intentions. That anxiety has translated into several security issues, which can be critically assessed through the lens of realism.

Offensive realism and China’s intentions for regional hegemony

According to realists, the world is in a state of anarchy as there is no central authority. Furthermore, realism emphasizes that the main international actor is the state. Survival is a states’ primary goal, and it can rely only on its security posture as cooperation in the international system is not assumed. Thus, realist state behavior is sometimes referred to as ‘the security dilemma,’ which leads to the capacity building of defense and offensive capabilities within each state, leading to further insecurity. As a subset of realism, offensive realism seeks to maximize the amount of power. For offensive realists, security trumps prosperity as the only safe position is dominance.

As such, offensive realism is a relevant lens to use when assessing China as a security threat, as there are multiple signs that China is seeking to challenge the current international order by becoming the global super power. Indeed, China aims to maximize its military might by building capabilities that translate into insecurity for its regional neighbors and the U.S.

Conversely, Mearsheimer argues, “if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia.” By 2035, Bloomberg Economics stated “China will have overtaken the U.S. to become the world’s biggest economy“. Some others argue that China faces domestic pressures such as slower economic growth rate and an aging population. But given China’s demography, it is only a matter of time before China surpasses the U.S. both economically and militarily. Also, the U.S. is labeling China as the number one threat to its national security as China builds capabilities to dominate the U.S. and the rest of the world.

A key driver in China’s desire to challenge the international order is nationalism. Chinese nationalism emphasizes the ‘century humiliation’ – a period of Western interventionism in China between 1839 and 1949. China’s nationalist sentiment is seen especially through Xi Jingping’s ‘Chinese dream’ to restore its rightful place as the natural leading world power and contributes to China’s lingering anger and resentment toward Japan and the United States.

China’s Offensive Capacity Building

In the last thirty years, China’s defense spending has grown exponentially to reach $178 billion in 2020. This increase can be explained by the strong performance of its economy and its intention to expand its influence. However, the Chinese government has been inconsistent in reporting its defense budget and has been criticized for its lack of transparency. Some analysts estimate that an extra 33% should be added to get the right level of spending, raising the military expenditures to $230 billion. As the recent white paper about Japan’s Defense highlights, this exponential growth, coupled with a lack of transparency, creates greater concern for states neighboring China. Thus, those conditions create some uncertainties regarding China’s intentions and fuel an arms race as China’s military developments continue to destabilize the balance of power in the region.

China has been steadily investing in offensive capabilities that will allow China to project its power. China is bolstering its “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” (A2/AD) capabilities with additional amphibious helicopter dock ships, anti-ship missiles, and its latest DF-17 hypersonic missile – the first system of its kind to be operational in the world. It has also developed some indigenous capabilities such as fifth generation fighter aircraft (i.e., the J-20 and J-35), comparable with the U.S. F-35 stealth aircraft. Furthermore, China plans to double its stockpile of nuclear warheads in the next decade. While its reserve will remain way below the current U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile (200 versus 3,800), which shows China’s global power ambitions as it seeks to build the most extensive nuclear warhead stockpile in Asia.

Aligned with offensive realism, the development of a blue-water navy will allow China to globally project its power. While some may argue, this development is consistent with the rise of economic power, it is essential to note that the level of China’s blue-water navy capability is in line with its hegemonic ambitions. China has now completed two aircraft carriers with a third in construction. Furthermore, Captain James E. Fanell - former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet – estimates that China will almost double its submarine fleet to reach 110 units by 2030. To address its global ambitions, China is building blue water capabilities faster than Washington can, which demonstrates China’s determination to overtake the U.S. in that aspect. China’s ambitious space program is another area of concern as it seeks to dominate both access and presence in outer space.

Power Competition? China’s Power in the Asia Pacific

According to John Mearsheimer, China is devising its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, much as the U.S. did in the Caribbean and the Gulf, as well as Imperial Japan in the 1930s. To achieve global hegemony, China will seek to push the U.S. out of the Asia-Pacific region. This policy is in line with the offensive realism’s school of thought and the type of military capabilities China is currently building. Indeed, a blue water navy would be instrumental in pushing China’s territories’ boundaries and transforming the South China Sea into a “Chinese lake.”

One of the most strident security threats that China represents is its assertive and revisionist behavior in the South China Sea. In 2009, China claimed an area called the “nine-dash line,” which extends way beyond China’s territorial waters and overlaps with territories belonging to Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. This area, where transits 80% of China’s oil imports through the Strait of Malacca, bears strategic and geopolitical importance. Besides hosting significant oil and gas resources, it is an area of deep water where Chinese nuclear-powered attack and strategic submarines can navigate with stealth. Furthermore, China has been building airstrips and military bases in the South China Sea to strengthen its ability to project power, raising security tensions with its ASEAN neighbors.

Another severe security issue in the region is China’s claim over Taiwan’s sovereignty. China has launched a “gray zone” warfare, which entails a reunification with Taiwan without firing a single shot. China has been threatening Taiwan with almost daily multiple aircraft sorties toward Taiwan’s airspace, amphibious landing exercises, naval patrols, cyber-attacks, and diplomatic isolation. China has been employing a similar strategy regarding its territorial dispute with Japan in the East China sea, prompting Tokyo to strengthen its Self-Defense Forces.

In addition to its regional revisionism, China has global ambitions with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its sphere of influence in the world. For example, China is gaining more influence at the United Nations, strengthening its ambition to challenge the international status quo. For example, China is leveraging the UN system to support its BRI under the guise of UN Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs). In addition of leading four UN specialized agencies, China was seeking to gain control of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The move sparked some concerns amid multiple violations of property rights through a state-led campaign of cyber exploitation attacks.

In line with offensive realism, the U.S. has been engaged in a containment policy (i.e., Obama’s pivot to Asia, 2012) and is building a coalition with their partners to check Beijing, as the U.S. does not tolerate a peer competitor. However, this containment policy could increase security competition between the U.S. and China, leading to further insecurity: the more the U.S. try to contain China, the more assertive China could become.

To conclude, offensive realism demonstrates that China is a significant security threat to the U.S. and its neighbors in Asia to the extent that it seeks to challenge the status quo by becoming a regional hegemon. While offensive realism shows a pessimistic view of China’s rise, it is also a realistic one. Despite China’s growth recent slowdown, it remains on track to become the leading power globally.

China’s Defense budget’s exponential growth, coupled with a lack of transparency, creates high-level anxiety about its real intentions: does China seek to preserve its survival or desire to become a hegemon? All signs point at the latter, generating significant levels of insecurity with the U.S. and its Asian neighbors.

Chinese cyber coercion in the Asia-Pacific? Recent cyber operations in South Korea, Hong Kong, and India.

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Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

Writings on Chinese cyber operations tend to focus on cyber espionage and the stealing of state secrets for China’s military modernisation. Comparatively in discussions of cyber operations, cyber coercion and Chinese cyber coercion are infrequently mentioned. This has to do with the ambiguity surrounding the definition of cyber coercion and the challenges of attribution.

Chinese cyber coercion is understood as a subset of what is known as weishe. Weishe is, in direct English translation, understood as “deterrence”, but is conceptually understood as a combination of compellence and deterrence. In theory, cyber coercion thus operates by compelling actors through cyber operations to produce an effect called deterrence wherein actors are deterred from decisions that are harmful to China’s interest. This role of compellence in cyber deterrence is made clearer when contrasted to the cyber deterrence strategies discussed so far in the United States and the United Kingdom. The use of cyber deterrence in the respective countries appears mostly in reference to a retaliation to a cyber-attack or in building domestic resilience to make an attack costly. In contrast, in the Chinese context, compellence and deterrence are one, the role of compellence is encouraged, and a cyber-attack does not seem to be a prerequisite to the use of cyber deterrence.

The theoretical understanding of weishe, however, is imperfect in practice. Whether deterrence is truly a component of weishe is subject to disagreement and is debated amongst Chinese analysts. If this is the case, then what lens should be used to analyse potential Chinese cyber coercion?

Observed practice of cyber coercion may be a more helpful lens than its theoretical counterpart. Observed practice can include the combination of vague threats, an implied actor, and an implicit desired behaviour. In a greater layer of complexity, consistency across the elements’ contents is not necessary. For instance, cyber coercion may include explicit threats, an implied actor, and an explicit desired behaviour. Therefore, observed practice captures a more detailed variation of what is understood as cyber coercion—something which is illustrated in the following three cases.

The cyberattacks against South Korea in 2017 illustrate one of the clearer cases of Chinese cyber-coercion, specifically cyber-enabled economic coercion. It also demonstrates the use of cyber deterrence to deter a country from choosing a political decision that is judged as harmful to China’s security. On February 7, 2016, officials from the United States and South Korea announced discussions on deploying Terminal High Altitude Area Defence missile defence system (THAAD). Beijing, however, disapproved of the X-band AN/TYP-2 band radar system which would allow for approximately a 3,000 miles detection range. This would mean potential US military monitoring of activity in China and the undermining of China’s nuclear deterrence.

In correspondence to the announcement of THAAD, there were reported increases in cyber intrusions. In the first half of 2017, there were over 6,000 cyber intrusions from China against the South Korean Foreign Ministry’s servers which was an increase from the 4,600 in 2016. Furthermore, Lotte Group, a South Korean-Japanese conglomerate was also attacked. Chinese internet protocol addresses took parts of Lotte Group’s storefront offline for several days, and Chinese e-commerce sites stopped co-operation with Lotte. This has been connected to Lotte Group permitting the South Korean government to use its golf course to deploy THAAD. South Korea did end up agreeing to limitations on THAAD, but it is difficult to say whether this was uniquely due to the cyber impacts because of the presence of other coercive levers. For instance, the Chinese government shut nearly all of Lotte’s physical stores in China. Cyber coercion, however, does signal great displeasure, and the intentions can be perceived as the use of compellence to deter further plans regarding THAAD.

Whilst the THAAD case outlines more clearly what happened and who the suspect is, other potential cases do not. Cyber operations in Hong Kong and India demonstrate cases of an explicit threat, an implied desire, and an implied actor.

Over the course of Xi Jinping’s rule, a tighter grip has been imposed on Hong Kong and protests have become more dangerous to participate in. Joshua Wong and Agnes Chow, who were the faces of Hong Kong’s protests against the Chinese Communist Party’s grip, are now imprisoned. The 2019-2020 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement, which was a series of movements against the Extradition Bill, coincided with the emergence of HKLeaks—a doxing website which appeared in late August 2019. The website doxes anti-government protestors, revealing people’s personal identifiable information (PII) such as headshot, social media handles, phone numbers and their misdeeds. The threat is explicit in that it threatens an individual’s privacy and makes the struggle for a freer Hong Kong even more costly. There have even been instances of malicious targeting. In one case, a doxed female reporter from Apple Daily, a Hong Kong tabloid known to criticise the Chinese Communist Party, started receiving threatening calls.

The argument that China is behind this is difficult to build, although there are very subtle implications behind HKLeaks that tie it to state-sponsored actors and potentially to the Chinese state. Aside from China’s interest in Hong Kong, looking at who or what HKLeaks is connected to is informative. HKLeaks has been linked to social media accounts similar to those taken down for being fake accounts linked to state-backed actors, which were also used as a tactic in disinformation campaigns against Taiwan. Some information of who the state could be is found in anecdotal evidence. According to an alleged victim of HKLeaks, they gave a “fake address I’ve never given to anyone” to Chinese police at the Hong-Kong and China border when returning from a business trip from mainland China. His address afterwards appeared on HKLeaks. Whilst the link between cause and effect is unclear, these disparate points of evidence could arguably form a weakly implied Chinese state as actor.

HKLeaks is also positively viewed and engaged by the Chinese state. For instance, the official Weibo account of China’s state-owned TV network, “published a video showcasing the HKLeaks website, and urged followers to ‘act together’ and ‘tear off the masks of the rioters’”. This post was then shared by “the Weibo accounts of local Chinese police, local media outlets, branches of Chinese Communist Youth League, and others.” Again, the actor cannot be established, but there is certainly a perception of an implied actor, an implied (or explicit, depending on one’s perception) desire to stop the protests and the threat of the violation of privacy and potential harm to the individual. This arguably forms a cyber coercion, rendered perhaps more threatening by the ambiguity on how members are being doxed and by not knowing the exact actor.

The case of the Mumbai power outage in October 2020 is a similar case where there is implied Chinese involvement. However, connections to the Chinese state around this topic is slightly clearer and less speculative. Speculation of China’s involvement is found across Foreign Affairs, NY Times, and The Diplomat, and domestically amongst Indian officials. The main source of information, however, is from a report by Recorded Future, a private cybersecurity company. On February 28 2021, Recorded Future published a report which demonstrated a connection between Red Echo, a Chinese state-sponsored group, and the installation of malware into civilian infrastructure such as “electric power organisations, seaports, and railways.” This cyber intrusion is thought to connect with the border conflict occurring at the time and has led to speculation about the connection to the Mumbai power outage. According to retired cyber expert Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda, the power outage has acted as a signal from China to indicate “that we can and we have the capability to do this in times of a crisis.” Such a signal draws parallel to the cyber intrusions concerning South Korea and THAAD.

All three cases demonstrate the inherent limitations in analysing cyber coercion (as deterrence through compellence.) Even if China is implied from political context and from malware, building a case to clearly identify the Chinese State’s direct involvement is difficult to build without clear attribution. Nevertheless, if China is definitively involved, the utility of being an implied actor may be helpful with information operations elsewhere wherein appearing benign is used to gather support of the country. The case of Mumbai and South Korea also bring up interesting questions for compellence and deterrence, with China potentially being seen to blur the two. Cyber coercion overall remains somewhat enigmatic. The ambiguity is likely advantageous for the actor(s) behind the acts of cyber coercion. Ambiguity helps reduce chances of liability, which permits for a more peaceful (less conflict inducing) approach to manipulating and shaping another state to one’s desires.