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The rule of law or rule of politics? Narratives from Timor-Leste on tip-toeing the “law”

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By Sapna Reheem Shaila*

May 20th- Restoration of Independence day in Timor Leste, when the Constitution came into force in 2002, and Timor-Leste was given its sovereignty (credit image: Sapna Reheem Shaila)

 

Eighteen years ago, Timor-Leste was on the tip of the tongue of every international law enthusiast along with Kosovo, when the UN set its transitional administration in the country. After Timor-Leste restored its independence, international partners, especially the UN, assisted the country in adopting new laws and institutions as part of the ‘state-building’ initiatives.[1]Similar to other ‘state-building’ exercises in transitional states, it also emphasised on institutional building, and introducing laws to establish a society based on rule of law. These initiatives funded by bilateral and multilateral aid donors often set out to create a secure environment, build a society that respect the rule of law and restore stability within the state.[2] There are already various indices that exist globally to measure and assess how far these rule of law reforms have been consolidated in transitional states.[3] Often these global indicators measure a society’s commitment to rule of law, by analysing the extent formal institutions or legal frameworks are adopted within the state .This approach of analysing the success of rule of law interventions is what this article problematizes. The article argues that such an approach fails to capture the local realities in assessing how institutions or the individuals within the institutions pursue the true ends of ‘law’. In this article, the author takes a position that in order to truly capture to what extent a transitional society has embraced the goals of its rule of law reforms, one needs to pose different questions. Questions like what legal frameworks or institutions have been adopted?; or whether the legal processes were followed within the state?; do not give a clear picture as to how ‘laws’ can be manipulated or used as a tool by powerful individuals[4] who want to pursue their interests. Rather one needs to probe further as to the contexts wherein decisions were made within the confines of the legal provisions. This approach is particularly required in societies where law and its legality are still fluid.

As any other transitional state which is rebuilding its institutions with the assistance of the international community, Timor-Leste also commits to the rule of law. There is an emphasis on separation of powers, and how the different organs of the state are to co-operate yet respect the independence of each institution. It follows with a comprehensive constitutional text that lays the foundation for the constitutional identity of the State. [5] The presence of the international community has guaranteed a way for legal ideas and terminologies in international conventions to percolate into the local legal structures. However, laws do not create the certainty that they propound. The structures of law that are adopted as part of state-building exercises within the country are extensively based on the socio-political structures in Western democracies. As a result, law as an instrument that is transplanted in transitional societies attempts to rearrange power structures and re-order hierarchies of institutions (and along with it individuals), often overlooking how power is already vested locally.

Using the recent example of the political (rather constitutional) impasse evidenced after the opposition of the President against the Change for Progress Alliance (AMP)[6] nominees for the cabinet, this article highlights the double edged narratives on law and its institutions within Timor-Leste. Similar to other transitional societies, Timor-Leste also has its ‘heroes’[7]- individuals who played a significant role within and outside the country during the resistance struggle between 1975 and 1999. Many of these high-profile resistance ‘heroes’ have taken top political positions within the country post-independence,[8] and their differences are often fought out politically. But the presence of the international community and civil society has ensured that any controversial decision, which is made politically is neatly placed within the confines of the law.[9] What is not captured within the text, is how the law can be construed and used in different ways to compete by the revered figures in the society. In this reality, there is no absolute right as prescribed by the law, but just varying positions that receive legitimacy before the eyes of the ordinary citizens, who will follow the version of law as dictated by their favourite leaders. This dichotomy of the law or the fluidity of legal norms indicate the perceived legality of the political actions and decisions within the country are achieved by tip-toeing the true essence of rule of law. And from the interviews with the local stakeholders this became apparent that the ends of the law is dependent on the individual espousing it -leading to varying explanations as to how the law is ‘applied, conceived and lived rather than as universal truths’. [10]

 

Billboard congratulating the newly elected constitutional government after the elections in May. Xanana Gusmao ( left ) and Taur Matan Ruak ( right) played significant roles as resistance leaders during the struggle for Independence (Credit Image: Sapna Reheem Shaila)

 

On 21st June,2018 President, Lu Olo opposed eleven names on the list of nominees submitted by the newly elected AMP coalition for its cabinet[11] on the grounds of corruption and pending legal action.[12] The President invoked his opposition under Art. 106 (2) and Art. 86 (h) of the Constitution stating that members’ with impending charges and investigations cannot take public office. The President’s letter was opposed by Mr. Xanana Gusmao[13] - one of the most revered political figures in the country and one of the significant faces of the AMP coalition. Gusmao questioned the constitutional validity of the President’s opposition, on the grounds that the President had arbitrarily exercised his powers.[14] He argued that the President’s reasons for opposing the names were weak under the law. Xanana highlighted that there were no pending investigations or cases against the opposed nominees, and those who were convicted for various charges had already served their punishment under the law. [15] Therefore , he observed this an injustice and abrogation to the principle of presumption of innocence and double jeopardy.[16] He made a televised statement, with an official letter from the District Court in Dili to substantiate his claims as to how there are no ongoing charges against the proposed members, as suggested by the President.[17] Recent political discussions by legal scholars within the country identify this as a legal impasse and have appealed for political resolution on the issue.[18] Ordinarily, when there is a constitutional question similar to this, it is resolved legally by the Constitutional court- in Timor’s case the jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeal. But in the absence of a precedent, or clarity as to how the President’s power should be interpreted, this situation has been left with no legal solution.

It is true, any law student or practising lawyer will expound the importance of the principles to ensure that the innocence of an individual is not questioned until convicted by a court of law or to guarantee that no one is tried twice on the same fact. Gusmao’s discontents seem to stem primarily from the fact that the President did not exercise his opposition earlier when the VIIth Government led by FRETILIN’s Mari Alkatiri nominated individuals with questionable integrity. A sentiment resonated by many of his supporters as well.[19] This allegation on the President’s impartiality and legality of his action becomes even more problematic when he has a conflict of interest as the President of the opposition party FRETILIN, since 2001.[20] Earlier, questions were raised on the impartiality of the President when he did not dissolve the minority FRETLIN government for failing to pass their budget in the Parliament for 10 months after the 2017 elections.[21] Despite these allegations, the civil society organisations(CSOs) have supported the President heralding his move as inspiring, and guidance for the future.[22] Finally, they find someone who is ready to stand against corruption. This impasse between the two charismatic resistance leaders (three- depending on where one would place PM Taur Matan Ruak), highlights the concerns expressed by one of the interviewees in an earlier discussion-“until all the ‘ema boot’[23] are in power, there will be no rule of law within the country.” [24] In July, the Parliament had retaliated legally by rejecting the travel plans of the President to Portugal under Art. 95 3 (h) of the Constitution, until a settlement was made on the issue. Almost three months after the swearing in of the new government, no resolution has been found on the matter. Even though this is the case, the Prime Minister has been successful in presenting his budget on 30th August 2018, with 53 votes supporting the motion. The President has approved the budget on 7 September 2018[25] albeit with an incomplete cabinet-[26] the implications of which are highlighted by the CSOs.[27] For the government staff and the local citizens this comes as a relief as many of them expressed how the budget is the most crucial part and that they are not concerned about anything else.[28] It looks like the recent success with the budget will bury the discontents of the June decision, with no substantial discussions on how such constitutional impasse should be resolved for the future. As of now, it has established an “unclear” precedent at best, within the country, wherein the President can oppose nominations for the cabinet from the PM. In a young democracy like Timor-Leste, it is essential to debate and negotiate how constitutional provisions should be interpreted and powers should be divided so that the value of democracy is strengthened for years to come. But this concern has definitely taken a back seat. And this will also provide a precedent to make controversial political moves under the veil of legal provisions, which are vague and which assume legality without any substantive deliberations from the judicial institutions. Thus in a way resulting in a paradox of the rule of law paradigm of establishing societies where application of laws are predictable.

In Timor-Leste as these events indicate, the excess of executive or political power is exercised within the ambit of law, and its legality argued under the veil of legal provisions. In these situations where the law is vague, and its legality fluid – it’s final stance is often determined by those who wield power socially within the country. In order to shift this power, a re- evaluation of social norms of what is acceptable and unacceptable has to be carried out. Until then, it is essential that ‘contexts’ are read along with the actions undertaken which are otherwise legal, and conform to the legislative texts.

 

Sapna is a Ph. D researcher in Law at King’s College, University of London. Her research focuses on the role of international actors in strengthening judiciaries in transitional states. Sapna worked as a research assistant to Centre for Small States, Queen Mary University of London, as well as with Bingham Centre for Rule of Law in London. She completed her B.A/ LLB Hons. from NALSAR (India) and LLM in Law, Development and Governance from SOAS, University of London.

Notes:

*The author wishes to express her gratitude to Mr. Bertanizo Ghuro da Costa, her research assistant who helped immensely with translations during the interviews, as well as collecting information from popular media in Timor-Leste.

[1] There is an extensive literature on democratic state building that looks at the importance of building legal structures and laws to lay the foundation for democracy within a transitional state, see for instance [1] Office of Democracy and Governance- USAID ‘Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality’ (2002) Washington; Legal Vice Presidency- World Bank, ‘Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform’ (2002), World Bank, Washington; Asian Development Bank, ‘Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank (2003) ADB, Philippines, .Timor- Leste’s initiatives on gaining assistance through UNDP for justice sector for instance dates back to 1999, see here http://www.tl.undp.org/content/timor_leste/en/home/governance.html is since the beginning, see

[2] Paris, Roland (2004), At Wars End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

Connolly, William E. (2000), “The Liberal Image of the Nation,” in Ducan Ivison; Paul Patton; Will Sanders (eds.), Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 183-198

 

[3] See World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, here https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2017%E2%80%932018; Fund for Peace- Fragile State Index here http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/- see indicator P3 (Justice).

[4] For more discussion, see academic scholarship on Critical Legal Studies, for a brief introduction see here https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/critical2.htm

[5] Art. 1, Art. 69, Art. 2. Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor- Leste, available here http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Constitution_RDTL_ENG.pdf

[6] AMP is the continuation of the coalition party formed by the three opposition parties CNRT, PLP and Khunto after the July elections in 2017 when FRETLIN formed a weak minority government. See details here https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/a-new-era-of-political-coalitions-in-timor-leste/.

[7] See a discussion on the Timor-Leste’s veterans here: Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea and Pacific Islands Country Management Unit East Asia and Pacific Region, ‘ Defining Heroes: Key Lessons from the Creation of Veterans Policy in Timor-Leste’, September 30, 2008, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTIMORLESTE/Resources/DefiningHeroes.pdf

[8] Timor-Leste presidential election: revolutionary hero v new generation https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/20/timor-leste-presidential-election-revolutionary-hero-v-a-new-generation

[9] Within the legal literature, there is a distinction that is made between Rule of Law and Rule by law. The latter representing how law and legal structures are used to create a legality.

[10] For a more detailed discussion see Nelken, David ‘Using the concept of legal culture’, available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Nelken_-_Using_the_Concept_of_Legal_Culture.pdf

[11] Michael Sainsbury and Jose Belo, ‘ Turmoil for new Timor-leste PM as 11 ministerial nominations nixed’, available at https://www.ucanews.com/news/turmoil-for-new-timor-leste-pm-as-11-ministerial-nominations-nixed/82638

[12] Names of 11 cabinet nominees were initially opposed and at the time of writing this piece in August, this was reduced to 9.

[13] Xanana is often referred as ‘Maun Boot’ ( colloquially meaning Big brother) by the locals. He is often mentioned as the Father of the nation, for leading the armed resistance group against the Indonesians especially after the death of Nicolau Lobato. See details about his activities here https://www.xananagusmao.org/#raising

[14] A sentiment expressed by Ms. Carmelita Moniz in her interview with GMN on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6I8VrmsyIpY&t=2206s on 27 August 2018.

[15] Letter by Xanana Gusmao to the Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak on 22 June 2018 (Portuguese), in file with the author.

[16] Ibid.

[17] See GMN discussion with Xanana Gusmao here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oRs7fEGxLPU on 12 July 2018.

[18] Interview with local lawyer Manuel Tilman with GMN on 12 July 2018, see here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7xqpitAo0Y; Discussion with Carmelita Moniz and Dr. Aniceto Guterres in GMN, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6I8VrmsyIpY

[19] Interview with local citizen on 27th June; interview with a civil society representative 10th July, 2018.

[20] Informal conversation with local citizens on 26th June, 2018, 4th July 2018, 9th July 2018.See Michael Leach’s post to understand how the two major political parties are surviving to keep up their interests- ‘ A First Test for Timor-Leste’s Cohabitants’, available here https://insidestory.org.au/a-first-test-for-timor-lestes-cohabitants/

[21] Jose Sarito Amaral, ‘ Xanana Calls for Lu Olo to End Fretlin Influence’, 18th May 2018, Available at https://www.independente.tl/en/national/xanana-calls-for-lu-olo-to-end-fretilin-influence

[22] Meeting with CSO participant working on Anti- Corruption on 18th July, 2018; GMN Diario Nacional, ‘MERSAK encourages Lu Olo to keep his decision’, July 6, 2018; Interview with Joao Boavida on RTTL , available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=98krp_AMGc8 ( Tetun) on 1st June 2018.

[23] Tetum word for respect, which literally translates to ‘big people’ and here indicative of the political leaders who were active during the resistance period and who play a significant role in the daily politics within the country.

[24] Interview with CSO Participant working on Justice Sector on 09 April, 2018.

[25] See a detailed discussion on the recently passed budget here, http://www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE17/16OGE17.htm#OGE2018

[26] Including key positions like Minister of Finance and Minister of Health are vacant.

[27] https://suara-timor-lorosae.com/governu-lakompletu-implika-ba-ezekusaun-oje/

[28] Interview with a staff member at Legal Training Centre 24 April 2018; Interview with staff member from Ministry of Justice 25 April 2018, interview with local citizen on 9th July 2019.Meeting with civil society member 10th July, 2018, informal discussions with local citizens on 23th July, 3rd August 2018.

 

Image Source: The pictures used in this article were taken by the author and provided to Strife Blog.

Aid and Conflict: Britain's approach

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By Isobel Petersen:

UK aid bound for the Philipines after Typhoon Haiyan, November 2013. Photo: MoD, Sgt Ralph Merry (CC 2.0)
UK aid bound for the Philipines after Typhoon Haiyan, November 2013.
Photo: MoD, Sgt Ralph Merry (CC 2.0)

There is a trend across Western governments, and the UK is no exception, to consider the value of aid and conflict prevention as intertwined. The UK government has been a staunch supporter of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) framework since the 1990s (see Strife’s interview with Dylan Hendrickson). This concept advocates a holistic approach to human security that ties together the security and development sectors.

Prioritising reform and stabilising the security sector in a post-conflict situation to reduce the chances of repeated cycles is essential. But a country’s development is just as important when it comes to strengthening a government’s ability to provide for its people. Ultimately, SSR prioritises the individual’s sense of security in order to reduce the likelihood of future conflict. This framework is a good illustration of the wider plan for British overseas aid assistance and how it should be regarded.

It is normal for aid assistance, whether from states or Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), to be considered by governments and the authorities as interrelated with, and an underpinning motivation for, conflict prevention. However, in the public sphere aid assistance is usually understood to mean ‘poverty reduction’. This is a convenient portrayal, but there is more to aid commitments than the Robin Hood intentions of Western governments. Does it matter if the authorities and the public have different conceptions of the meaning of ‘aid’?

At the beginning of March parliament passed a bill committing 0.7% of Britain’s Gross National Income to international aid spending. This makes the UK one of the leading nations in global development assistance. As well as bolstering the UK’s international reputation, it also ensures that the UK as a donor country is involved in the domestic affairs of the recipient country. This is a particularly powerful side-effect when it comes to post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention. The consequences of the actions taken by the World Bank in developing nations’ affairs are infamously divisive; nonetheless, their explicit declaration of a positive correlation between poverty and recurrent conflict is a persuasive one.

Contributing to effective conflict prevention by improving human security requires resources, time, expertise and financing, and it is worth this investment. Combating conflict recurrence should be considered a key objective of the UK government’s foreign policy, if only because security threats are far more likely than ever to arise as a result of overseas conflicts and fragile states.

The UK government has a commitment to spending 30% of UK aid in fragile states, which means that a large proportion of the new aid budget will be going directly to states in the midst of conflict and instability. This does not take into account countries at the focus of democratisation efforts after conflict or countries with counter-terrorism operations, which are usually afflicted by conflict to some extent.

Giving aid in an ethical, cost-effective and sustainable fashion consistently throws up challenges, particularly when aid is so often required in conflict-affected areas; but this is not a good enough reason to suspend aid programmes and commitments.

There is a mainstream approach within Western policy-making views a conflict as consisting of two opposing sides who are either ‘allies’ or ‘spoilers’. International involvement typically follows the same path: first the military presence, then the post-conflict reconstruction phase, where an influx of aid will be directed at the ‘allied’ forces.[i] The choice recipient is based upon a certain interpretation of the conflict by the donor country or organisation that is difficult to avoid. This is one serious difficulty when faced with the task of giving aid in a conflict environment.

Another challenge is counter-terrorism. This issue can confuse the conventional association of aid with poverty-alleviation. Pakistan was the highest recipient of UK aid in 2014, and yet between 2009-2013 they were rated the 47th poorest nation by GDP. Pakistan clearly faces numerous challenges worthy of assistance, but this comparison demonstrates what happens when UK national interest takes precedence over genuine human need. It has even been argued that giving aid to states which are the focus of counter-terrorism operations can alienate the population because it is likely to be diverted away from the people.[ii]

In the same vein, aid coming into a conflict area can alter the power balance and distribution of resources within a divided society. This may lead to a worsening of inter-group tensions, the proliferation in arms acquisition, and a reinforcement of inequalities. It therefore runs the risk of worsening the existing conflict rather than succeeding with conflict prevention.

Sri Lanka is a good example of this. After the tsunami there was such vast pressure to give large amounts of aid to the country as quickly as possible that time was not spent considering facts other than the tsunami. The aid was undoubtedly life-saving but it did not take into account the concurrent conflict; there was a failure to ensure even distribution between government-controlled areas and those of the opposition Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebel movement. This only exacerbated political tensions and the ongoing conflict.

It is not just the practical hurdles that the UK faces when giving aid assistance, it also faces the criticism from the public and media at home. This is just as damaging to aid assistance as errors on the ground. Conservative MP Philip Davies declared the recent legislation as pandering to do-gooders with a “mis-guided guilt complex”. This is shockingly patronising and selfish. It is all too easy to argue that our lives in the UK would be simpler and better by keeping all we have for ourselves, but that is willfully ignorant of the difficult reality for so many beyond our borders. Furthermore, is it not contrary to the universal value of sharing with and caring for others that is taught to us all as children growing up?

There are a few key flaws in the criticism of the bill protecting the size of the UK aid budget. First, the announcement in early March simply enshrined in law a commitment that every UN member state made in 1970, so really this should have happened years ago. Second, the target was reached for the first time in 2013 with 0.72% of national income given,[iii] meaning that no extra spending would be required and it is compatible with the continued functioning of the UK. Finally, for those concerned that the wellbeing of British citizens would be excessively jeopardised, welfare spending was at 23.8% of GDP in 2013, leagues ahead of other EU member states, and vastly overshadows the aid commitment. The urgency of financial assistance and conflict prevention is higher than ever and as Justine Greening, the UK International Development Secretary, said last year to the World Bank spring meetings in Washington, “the humanitarian system is already stretched to breaking point”.

The MP who introduced the legislation, Michael Moore, argued that “the problems of other parts of the world do not stay local for long”.[iv] This has never been truer; conflict prevention and post-conflict assistance deserves attention, and one way of achieving this is through financial assistance. One aspect of financial assistance is the Government and Civil Society sector, which in 2013 received £835 million, 12.4% of the overall UK Bilateral aid spend. This sector includes activities carried out by the Conflict Pool, which is a cross-departmental UK team seeking to reduce the impact of conflict by holding rule of law projects and training peacekeepers for example.[v] The UK are in the luxurious position of being politically, socially and economically stable enough to contribute financially on a significant scale; it would be shameful not to do so.

Perhaps then, ‘aid’ is a term that can easily be misrepresented. It does not matter that UK aid is directed to conflict prevention as well as poverty assistance; but it does matter if their relationship is not widely understood by the British taxpayer. If the motivation for aid is to deliver reform, to protect national security, and to reduce the chances of recurrent conflict, then presenting the figures as solely to combat international poverty is misleading. The public perceive security and aid as separate entities, which means that those with the power of decision-making and implementation need to consider it their responsibility not to politicise an issue of international human security and well-being, but to express clearly how the aid commitment is relevant to both security and development, and furthermore how the two are related.

State failure and human insecurity as a result of conflict are both unacceptable. Responsible aid assistance is a start to building a country’s capacity to prevent future conflict. Providing funding and expertise to train the security forces in how to separate the roles of the police forces and military of a post-conflict state to increase their trustworthiness and efficiency is one example of how aid can increase capacity to prevent future conflict.

Conflict prevention and aid assistance are inextricably linked and the UK government legislation guaranteeing the nation’s role in this is a positive decision. However, there must be an awareness of the complexity of blindly trusting an aid package to solve everything. Monitoring, training, direct application to civilians, and accountability measures are all ways that such an aid commitment can reach its full potential. Importantly, raising awareness about the specificities about what UK aid assistance really means gives the British public the opportunity to ensure that whichever government comes next continues to live up these standards.

Isobel Petersen studied International Relations at the University of Exeter and is currently reading for an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Her particular interest is post-conflict resolution with a specific focus on the Arab-Israeli crisis.

References

[i] D.Keen with L.Attree Dilemmas of Counter-terror, Stabilisation and Statebuilding in Saferworld (January 2015)

[ii] ibid

[iii] L. Booth “The 0.7% aid target” House of Commons Library (28 July 2014)

[iv] R. Mason “MPs back law committing 0.7% of national income to foreign aid” in Guardian foreign policy (12 September 2014)

[v] Statistics on International Development by DFID (October 2014)

Call for papers: A world in flux? Analysis and prospects for the U.S. in global security

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A world in flux?
Analysis and prospects for the U.S. in global security

Call for papers
US Foreign Policy Research Group and Strife first annual conference
March 4, 2015 at King’s College London

The world is in an increasing state of flux. Growing concerns over the rise of Islamic State and international tensions over Ukraine have compounded with ongoing dilemmas over North Korea’s nuclear program and international terrorism more broadly. Wikileaks has demonstrated gaps in state’s information security, while the growing problem of foreign fighters has showed how global events are linked increasingly with domestic concerns. The tools engaged to manage security are changing, as are partnerships and allies. The concept of security has also widened and deepened over recent decades, expanding from security between states, to areas such as individual and environmental security. At the forefront of these challenges, the United States has remained the hegemon, but how has this position changed and what role will it play in the future?

This one-day conference will bring together a diverse range of practitioners and academics who will critically analyze the shifting state of security and investigate the diverse ways in which the United States, as the continuing dominant force in global affairs has responded, and continues to respond to, these challenges.

The first annual joint United States Foreign Policy Research Group and Strife conference will survey the expansive terrain of global insecurity and the US response across its many diverse aspects. Held in the renowned Department of War Studies, at King’s College London, this conference is interested in theoretical explorations and empirical case studies, with particular emphasis on new approaches and cross-disciplinary dialogue. A selection of excellent papers will be included in a special spring edition of Strife Journal.

Under the conference theme, we welcome submissions of proposals for panels and papers, which address a number of the following cognate (though not exclusive) topics:

1. Military-to-military relations

  • Changing tactics of warfare (i.e. COIN and drones)
  • Counter-terrorism
  • Security sector and military reforms

2. Responses to recent and continuing conflicts

  • Middle East (Palestine-Israel, Iraq, Syria)
  • Europe (Ukraine)
  • Asia (South China Sea disputes, Afghanistan, Pakistan)

3. Emerging security concerns

  • Environment
  • Health care/epidemics
  • Cyber security

4. Homeland security

  • Detainees/Guantanamo/extraordinary rendition
  • Information security (i.e Wikileaks, the Bradley Manning case)
  • Impacts of the global on the domestic (i.e. civil liberties)

We welcome abstract submissions of 300 words and brief biographies from postgraduate research students. Consideration will also be made for exceptional graduate applications. Please submit to [email protected] by November 1, 2014 with the subject line “USFPRG-Strife Conference.”

The conference will take place on March 4, 2015 at King’s College London, Strand Campus. Attendance at the conference will be free and open to all.

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Downloadable version: Strife-USFP First Annual Conference - Call for Papers

Failed, failing, failure - Is Africa disgracing our family?

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By Tim Glawion

All five of the most failed states in the world lie in Africa, calculates the Fund for Peace in its 2012 Index. Mali, as a case in point, has been failing for months now, the army even went as far as fleeing when the Islamist insurgency attacked them. Only mother France’s troops have turned the tables and are leading the recapture of the country’s North with astonishing swiftness and ease. After all we have done for you Africa, why do you prove us a failure time and time again? At least so the popular narrative reads.

Unlike the recent events in Mali suggest, however, Africa has not disappointed us. We have disappointed Africa. In light of the apparent failure of our imposed mode of order in form of a state system we persist and refuse to change our ways. In fact, most African countries never had a state system, at most borders and institutions left behind by colonialism. Africa’s political order, therefore, has neither failed, nor is it failing. Africa’s political orders are evolving and we might see states emerging from this evolution. But if we opened our minds and our international system, we might just witness new forms of political order different from what we know. While we condemn colonialism for the slavery and abuses it brought about, we still silently praise it for bringing order to a continent of anarchy. State systems with clear boundaries, infrastructure, and powerful governments. However, when independence movements kicked out European imperialists, indigenous rulers seemed incapable of containing their abusive and extractive measures to an economically viable level, as the former colonizers had been able to. The economy and the state quickly collapsed. It seems as though the circle began closing itself, when Mali called upon its old masters to bring about the stability they were unable to provide for themselves.

But does this patronizing viewpoint stand the test of reality?

To begin with, can we speak of states, in the European sense, in Africa? While the 1884 Berlin Conference painted lines on the ‘blank’ African drawing board, which have stayed surprisingly untouched for almost 150 years, is this enough to become a state? Were infrastructure developments, coercive rulers and ideological indoctrination, which came about as by-products of colonialism, enough to fill these borders with a common people? Unlikely. Colonial institutions did not create unifying causes and processes for the emergence of states, instead they were meant to increase the efficiency of exploitation. If any moment in time can be seen as a possible spark for state building during the twentieth century, it was not when Europeans entered the continent. It was rather when Africans in each country collectively decided to kick them out.

Along with the common enemy, disappeared the common cause. Identities and institutions other than the state persisted, such as tribes, kin-groups, clans and kingdoms. But the centralizing apparatus left behind by the imperialists and international incentives to uphold the central state empowered exclusive groups to exploit the rest of the population. Somalia’s dictator Siyyad Barre, propped up first by the Soviets, then by the Americans, went as far as starting massacres against north-eastern tribes simply to boost his grip on power. The same region declared independence in 1991 as Somaliland, and who could blame them after a history of violent discrimination under the pretence of a centralized state? Well, we are blaming them, as no state so far has recognized Somaliland’s independence.

Anglo-European powers did not bring about statehood, but these same powers upheld a ‘quasi-state’ system as a pretext to justify violent repression and avoid the emergence of an organic political order. How, then, can we believe that Western intervention is the key for peace and stability? When recognising a central Somali government for the first time in 20 years the United States took credit for supporting the transition to a central state. What kind of support did the US mean exactly? Propping up Barre’s regime for 12 years? Leading a failed attempt at pacification in 1993, and retreating in haste after the infamous Black Hawk Down incident? Supporting warlords against Islamist groups during the civil war? Encouraging the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 that toppled the only stable Somali regime since 1991 because it was “Islamist”? Or does it indeed refer to the most recent move to acknowledge as the sole representative of Somalia a government that itself effectively controls no more than the capital city?

With the French forces reporting one military success after the next, and newspapers’ daily self-congratulatory headlines on what a great impact we Europeans have on our ailing little brother Africa, as a European I must disagree: Africa has not failed us, we have failed Africa.

Runaway train: Can developing countries catch up with the modern world?

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By Justyna Maciejczak

Have you ever wondered what the magical threshold that a developing country has to cross is if it aspires to become a part of the industrialised world? Is it possible that one day the majority of today’s developing countries will eventually be recognised by industrialised nations as their equals? Dear idealists and believers in social progress, sorry to burst your bubble, but this might never happen. The reasons for this are as follows.

The problem with development is that we concentrate our attention on the underdeveloped regions, forgetting that the process of development takes place in the industrialised world as well. What is more, if you compare the rates of development of the Third World countries and the West, you will see that the industrialised nations, being able to capitalise on previous discoveries in the area of science and technology, are moving forward at a much faster pace than the rest of the world.

To illustrate this dilemma of development, imagine two trains heading the same direction but following two separate tracks. Western civilisation is moving forward at breakneck speed, reaping the fruits of progress that had its origin in the Industrial Revolution and, relatively unhindered, continues today. Developing countries occupy the second train, which is moving forward, but, being burdened with colonial baggage, can’t accelerate its pace and stays behind.

This image is additionally complicated by the fact that there is no specific destination that both trains are trying to reach. If there was one, it would be called “the ultimate state of development”, but we all know that such thing does not exist.

It is true, that some countries are in a better situation than others. China, India and Brazil have made a huge progress towards development in recent decades. But let’s be honest, not every Asian, African or Latin American country has enough potential (be it human or natural resources, geographic location etc.) to enter the path of accelerated development. In fact, the perspective for developing world looks rather gloomy.

A paradox of development is this: as industrialised nations evolve, they also change their perception of what is “modern” and what is “obsolete”. Along with the change of perception, comes the change of standards applied in order to draw a distinction between “old” and “new”, “developed” and “backward”.

Today the common criteria used to evaluate a country’s stage of development are economic indicators and standard of living (HDI). But have you ever wondered how these criteria would look like in 20, 50 or 70 years? What if in 2050 the list of indicators of development will include criteria such as: quantity of notebooks owned by family, hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) used by nation or ability of the country to send their own satellite into space? How are today’s developing countries supposed to reach these standards? At this rate of development taking place in the industrialised countries, the South will never catch up with the North and will be always seen as a “backward” region.

This is one of the reasons why the friction between North and South continues. Many developing countries are struggling to enhance their economic and political performance, and as many indicators suggest, are quite successful in their attempts (for more information on African growth read “Africa’s hopeful economies: The sun shines bright”, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21541008). However, their success is overshadowed by a Western narrative, which, with its focus on country’s failures and unresolved problems, is predominantly negative.

In other words, no matter how much has been done to accelerate growth and stabilise situation in developing countries, it is never enough to match Western standards of development. Once country has been labeled as “developing”, it remains “developing” no matter its actual progress. This is a virtual “development trap”, an issue which should be given proper consideration if one wants to deal with the development gap.