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ECOWAS, EAC, and the comparative efficacies of free movement protocols across the African continent

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By Moses Onyango and Jean-Marc Trouille

ECOWAS_Bank_for_Investment_and_Development_headquarters_in_Lomé.jpg
Source: Wikimedia

Africa, traditionally the poorest continent, has been undergoing profound changes, illustrated by higher growth rates for over a decade. This has brought a sense among African policymakers that trade facilitation measures and tighter cooperation around joint regional markets are crucial to make this burgeoning prosperity sustainable. Whilst a vast free trade zone potentially at the scale of the entire continent, organised around the recently agreed Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA)[i], will take some time to materialize, can results be achieved more rapidly at regional level?

There are currently eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa whose aim it is to promote intra-regional trade and investment. And yet, intra-African trade only amounts to 11.7%[ii] of overall African trade with the world, compared with 70% for intra-EU and 55% for intra-Asian trades respectively. This paper takes stock of the respective protocols on free movement of goods, services, capital and people of two of these preferential trade regimes: the long-established Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the more recent East African Community (EAC).

Both areas face comparable challenges and opportunities. Both have drawn ambitious free movement protocols that potentially offer excellent opportunities for their citizens and businesses. However it appears that, at the implementation stage, a lot remains to be done. Both the ECOWAS and EAC protocols offer a wealth of proposals that seem to lack a clear evaluation process and a proper implementation strategy. In both cases, new ideas are generated too promptly, initiatives are launched without waiting for previous ones to have been properly implemented and tested. This emerging rather than prescriptive strategy often leads to confusion and generates unnecessarily additional hurdles in an already rather complex process.

ECOWAS: Ambitious projects but difficult implementation

ECOWAS, the oldest of today’s eight African RECs, was launched in May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. The Treaty Preamble and Article 27 outlined the key objective of removing obstacles to the ‘Four Freedoms’[iii] among its members. The first phase of the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, of May 1979, guaranteeing the free entry of citizens of the member states without visa for 90 days, was ratified by member states in 1980 and became effective with immediate effect. Visa and entry permit requirements within ECOWAS were abolished in the implementation of this first phase.

As a result, citizens of member states possessing travel documents and a health certificate were, in principle, able to travel freely within ECOWAS. However, any member state could still refuse entry into its territory to persons it deemed inadmissible under its national laws. In 1983 and in mid 1985, Nigeria used this clause to revoke articles 4 and 27 to expel immigrants mainly of Ghanaian origin from its territory.[iv] At that time, Nigeria was overwhelmed by a large number of immigrants from Ghana, and was also undergoing an economic crisis due to the implementation of structural adjustment programmes.

ECOWAS subsequently revised its treaty to reaffirm in 1992 the right of citizens of its participating states to entry, residence and settlement. Later, in January 2008, ECOWAS redefined its common approach to migration, which is linked to the principle of free movement within the region. In its effort to strengthen free movement, ECOWAS developed ‘Vision 2020’ which shifts emphasis from an ECOWAS of states to become by 2020 an ECOWAS of people living within a single borderless economic space.

The ECOWAS Vision project envisages the introduction of a Schengen-type visa, the abolition of permit requirements, the removal of road blocks and security checks, the exchange of information by security operatives at the border, and an introduction of a single ECOWAS passport. There is however, still lack of general information on these initiatives at the national level as various member states have either enacted or retained a series of national laws that still restrict free movement of persons, capital and services. Furthermore, implementing free circulation in West Africa has frequently been thwarted by random shocks such as local military conflicts, political repression, not to forget the Ebola outbreak and its tragic consequences.

A similar situation within EAC

With a level of intra-regional trade at 12% of overall trade, EAC is at first glance more integrated than ECOWAS, whose internal trade between members only reaches 9.4%. [v] However, this difference is due to the impact in ECOWAS of the Nigerian oil sales outside the zone.

Although EAC is, in comparison to ECOWAS, considerably smaller in terms of economic size[vi], population[vii], and infrastructure development, it displays a number of similarities. For instance, the two sub-regions seem equally quick to formulate and launch new protocols without awaiting successful implementation of previous ones. Furthermore, both sub-regions are facing huge discrepancies in the levels of development among their member states, and poor infrastructure development. Whereas Nigeria, Ghana and also Ivory Coast act as immigration magnets among the fifteen ECOWAS member states, this imbalance between rich and poor is less pronounced within the five EAC member states, where citizens of troubled Burundi, and previously from Rwanda, have taken refuge in neighbouring countries. Kenya has also had to cater for an influx of refugees from neighbouring Somalia.

Despite being a more recent experiment than ECOWAS, EAC members have been keen to speed up the process of increasing regional economic cooperation through ambitious proposals, regardless of substantial challenges in developing the region’s infrastructures. In November 2009, thirty years after ECOWAS took this step, the EAC partner countries established a Common Market which became official on 1 July 2010. Arguably, this was not a first attempt to set up a joint enlarged market in East Africa, since an initial experiment, initiated as early as 1967 by three of the EAC founding states[viii], collapsed ten years later. But it was the first successful one, even though numerous hurdles remained for it to be effective.

The 2009 Common Market Protocol comprises key provisions including free movement of persons, workers, goods, services and capital, the right of establishment and of residence, a schedule of commitments on the progressive liberalisation of services, and on reducing restrictions to the free movement of capital. But this document, as ambitious as the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement, faces similar challenges that slow down its implementation. Indeed, the 2014 scorecard released by the World Bank at the request of the EAC Secretariat identified no less than 63 non-conforming measures in the trade of services and 51 non-tariff barriers affecting trade in goods. The assessment further found out that only 2 of the 20 operations covered by the Common Market Protocol were free of restrictions.[ix]

West and East Africa have both formulated ambitious protocols which constitute in each case a reliable framework for establishing an integrated economic region. The problem lies not so much in the ambitions displayed, but rather in a lack of political will to implement them, as reflected for instance by national clauses. Member states within both RECs still retain national laws that impede successful implementation of their own, mutually agreed protocols. Considerable efforts will continue to be needed in the implementation phase which, in any project, tends to be the most demanding one. The two RECs still face considerable challenges in terms of infrastructure development, economic inequalities among member states, alongside local political conflicts and health and security issues, and more generally a persisting lack of information on the advantages of regional economic integration. All these factors combined continue to hinder the successful implementation of free movement.

The example of the more advanced Single European Market illustrates that achieving free circulation within a sub-region takes time and effort. Recent developments in the Schengen area are a reminder that such achievements can easily be questioned.[x] In comparison, ECOWAS and EAC are still in the early stages of the process. Both sub-regions are distinct from each other in many respects. But in their endeavour to create a subnational framework favourable to local economic expansion, they face similar challenges. As is often the case in matters of regional economic integration, the gap between good intentions and proper action is substantial. Implementing measures to integrate neighbouring economies within a regional sub-set requires changing scale by sharing national prerogatives, which itself requires strong political will and leadership. This is a learning process which may take more time than the current speed of development in both East and West Africa would require in order for it to match the needs of their populations in the near future. A pan-African initiative on the model of the newly launched TFTA to coordinate trade policies between all eight African RECs could be the way forward towards economic integration on a continental scale.

 

Moses Onyango is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, and Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya.

Jean-Marc Trouille is Jean Monnet Professor of European Economic Integration and European Business Management at the University of Bradford School of Management, UK.

 

 

Notes:

[i] The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) was officially launched on 10 June 2015 in Cairo. It brings together three of Africa’s major economic communities.

[ii] Africa Report 2013, UNCTAD.

[iii] Free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour.

[iv] Adepoju, A. 2009. Migration management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects. In M. Tremolieres (ed.) Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives. Paris: EOCD

[v] Africa Report 2013, UNCTAD.

[vi] The EAC’s combined GDP is two and a half times lower than ECOWAS. EAC counts five participating states and ECOWAS fifteen.

[vii] 156 million compared to 336 million in ECOWAS.

[viii] Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

[ix]http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80&Itemid=117. Accessed on 10/10/15

[x] https://strifeblog.org/2015/10/06/schengen-and-free-circulation-at-the-crossroads-lessons-for-the-east-african-community/. Accessed on 10/10/15

Schengen and free circulation at the crossroads: lessons for the East African Community?

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By Moses Onyango and Jean-Marc Trouille:

Refugees from Somalia wait to register at Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Kenya is a member of the EAC, which is on a path to closer integration reminiscent of the one taken by the EU in the lead up to the Schengen agreement. Photo: Internews Europe (CC 2.0)
Refugees from Somalia wait to register at Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Kenya is a member of the EAC, which is on a path to closer integration reminiscent of the one taken by the EU in the lead up to the Schengen agreement. Photo: Internews Europe (CC 2.0)

In many parts of the world, geopolitics is confronted with two contending trends. On the one hand, numerous countries are engaged in a process of regional economic integration, epitomised by the more advanced model of the European Union (EU), which requires ‘internal’ borders between participating states to become more fluid to facilitate the free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour. On the other, borders are regaining momentum. Inherited from colonisation, the post-war or post-cold war status quo, the validity of these borders is now a moot point. From Ukraine to Iraq, Syria, Mali, South Sudan or Nigeria, old borders are questioned, new demarcation lines appear. In Europe, the large influx of refugees has led to very different approaches across EU member states, with some overtly questioning the Schengen agreement on border-free travel.

Events currently taking place in Europe are of great significance to the East African Community (EAC) and Africa as a whole. Indeed, the EU is not only an important trade and development partner that can potentially provide an alternative to China, it is also a prosperous example of regional economic integration that can serve as an advanced model to African countries involved in a similar regional process. The five EAC member states, in particular, are currently on a path towards regional integration that bears striking resemblance with the process undergone by the EU.

In 1999 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania signed the EAC Treaty to enhance trade cooperation and political relations. In 2005 a Customs Union was launched, followed in 2010 by a common market with zero internal tariffs. Talks about setting up an East African Currency Union with an EAC-wide Shilling started in 2011. Furthermore, the EAC has its own Legislative Assembly and Court of Justice. Plans to create an East African Tourist Passport are on the way. Establishing a sustainable economic and political bloc in the form of an East African Federation is also high on the EAC agenda. What’s more, in October 2014, the EAC and the EU signed a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that supports the EAC’s ambitious integration project and gives EAC member states extensive access to the EU Single Market.

Among these many parallels between the European and East African contexts, it is also important to note that the EAC is considering measures to establish free circulation between its five members, at a time when it is facing the challenge of a growing influx of refugees, mainly from Somalia. Before thinking of the feasibility of setting up an East African ‘Schengen’, it is therefore worth looking into the European model of free circulation: its strengths, weaknesses and limitations.

Abolishing borders has been one of the utmost achievements of the European project, and free movement is one of the dynamics of European prosperity. The dismantling of internal borders among Schengen participating countries was backed up by a strengthening of external borders. Article 25 of the agreement allows national authorities to re-establish border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, for a period of time limited to ten days, which can be prolonged to two months. The current reintroduction of controls on several internal borders of the EU is therefore not the beginning of the end of the Schengen agreement, but rather a procedure faithful to the letter of the agreement.

It follows that Germany’s reintroduction of border controls in the aftermath of chaotic scenes at train stations and reports of bed shortages at refugee camps is more an attempt to process refugees in a more orderly fashion and better identify those deserving of help than an attack on European principles. This came after Germany reasserted important European values and Europe’s international commitments to host refugees, particularly those coming from war zones.

Despite this, tensions between member states, overwhelmed by the scale of refugees in search of a safe haven, have put Schengen‘s principle of free movement under strain. This has revealed a lack of solidarity towards member states more exposed geographically to the refugee crisis, as well as showing the generosity on the part of Germany, Sweden and a few others. Crucially, the tensions have also revealed very different attitudes from the East and the West towards traditional European values.

The reason why Schengen is questioned today is not Schengen per se, but rather the weakness - or lack - of policies that should have been adopted or consolidated to accompany Schengen and make it work better. Does Europe have a coherent EU asylum policy? No. Does Europe have a European police? No. Is the EU agency Frontex sufficient to guarantee European border management? Clearly not, in view of the human tragedies in the Mediterranean and of the Hungarian reaction to the influx of refugees, to cite only two examples.

By the end of the year the EU Commission will at last propose measures to set up a European corps of border guards to consolidate Frontex, which coordinates cooperation between national border guards on external borders to prevent illegal immigration, terrorist infiltration and human trafficking. But does Europe have a real foreign security and defence policy capable of stabilizing its close neighbourhood? No. Its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood Policy is a shambles.

Europeans assumed that they would be able to enjoy a common area of freedom, in which people, goods, and labour would circulate freely, whilst keeping most features of their national systems. Today, Schengen is the victim of member states’ lack of a coherent vision. The so-called four freedoms (free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour) can only work efficiently with a set of rules and policies at the supranational level. Inward-looking attitudes will not solve the challenges Europe faces in view of the extent of Africa’s migration potential. In areas where European integration is more advanced, where Europeans share the currency, the market, the freedom to trade, work and travel across this market, full sovereignty belongs in the past. Without sharing more sovereignty, all these envied attributes are threatened by crises such as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the migrant crisis, none of which, surprisingly, Europeans anticipated.

As is often the case in Europe when populists spot imperfections in the way that a new European framework has been designed, Schengen has been presented as a threat to internal security. And yet, to make up for the abolition of internal controls, member states are expected to cooperate in order to maintain a high level of security. First, by exchanging information to fight borderless organised crime and terrorism. Second, by intensifying policy cooperation. Finally, by using the Schengen Information System (SI).

Schengen is by no means a ‘wide open door’ to illegal migrants. Indeed, the Dublin agreements require the country of arrival to register migrants, take fingerprints, and consider their asylum application. But in the wake of vast flows of refugees, this rule has reached its limits. Nonetheless, it is not in the Europeans’ interest to dismantle the Schengen area and the freedom that it provides to EU citizens. Rather, this joint public area has to be managed by joint public action.

What lessons can be drawn by the EAC in the light of European developments? First, that free circulation leads to more wealth and not the opposite. All economists agree on these great advantages, which is in itself exceptional. Second, that an agreement on free circulation implies not only benefits, albeit significant ones, but also constraints in terms of sharing sovereignty in areas hitherto regarded as national prerogatives. Third, that any weakness in the design of the free circulation agreement will, one day, be subject to a random shock that tests its resilience. This happened with the Eurozone. This is now the case with Schengen.

Schengen is currently being challenged, though primarily by populist misrepresentations. It continues to work. But it faces some reluctance among certain member states and is not sufficiently backed up by effective policies. Its long-term survival will depend on EU member states’ ability to consolidate its design and back it up with more integrated policies in the fields of asylum, police and border management, foreign security and defence, particularly with regard to stabilizing the EU’s neighbourhood.

More generally, any step towards integration, whichever area is concerned, requires sharing sovereignty. This will be a substantial challenge. EAC member states would clearly benefit from a system like Schengen, it would potentially bring the shared reward of increased prosperity for each member state and for the region as a whole. But such a system must be accompanied by effective policies, joint public action, and greater integration in terms of shared sovereignty. Otherwise it may end up finding itself in a similar crisis to that faced by the EU today.

Moses Onyango is a Fellow of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, and Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the United States International University-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. Jean-Marc Trouille is Jean Monnet Professor of European Economic Integration and European Business Management at the University of Bradford School of Management, UK.