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Plan Colombia’s Security Legacy and the Need to Consolidate Gains

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By Matthew A. Hughes

picture-alliance/dpa/EFE/C. Escobar Mora

The Colombian government has been engaged in a low-intensity asymmetric war since the 1960s, mainly against two leftist insurgent/terrorist groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Colombia ‘seemed on the brink of collapse’ in the 1990s when these groups controlled large swaths of rural territory, homicide rates reached regional highs, and the economy struggled. In 2000, the Colombian government (with considerable financial support from the United States) implemented a six-year strategy known as ‘Plan Colombia’ to (1) reduce illicit drug production (mainly cocaine) by 50 per cent in six years and (2) improve security conditions by reclaiming control of territories occupied by illegal armed groups. Plan Colombia rendered considerable improvements to Colombian security, but U.S. policy is misaligned to sustain these successes because it is overly focused on counternarcotics. Instead, a more comprehensive policy with greater emphasis on security can (1) consolidate security gains from Plan Colombia to ensure the 2016 Peace Accord endures and (2) weaken the ELN to its breaking point and participation in a formal peace agreement.

After failing to achieve benchmarks by the time horizon, the U.S. and Colombia extended Plan Colombia and adjusted strategies to reduce coca production, reclaim territories controlled by insurgent groups, and strengthen institutions. By 2016, the U.S. had contributed $10 billion to Plan Colombia and its associated programs. Despite climbing eradication statistics, Colombia’s coca cultivation did not subside. Security efforts, however, weakened insurgent groups to the point of negotiations. The Colombian government successfully reached a peace agreement with the FARC in the 2016 Peace Accord, wherein FARC leaders committed to laying down weapons. The government failed to reach a peace agreement with the ELN.

A resurgence of terrorism and violence threatens the longevity of Plan Colombia’s security successes. Plan Colombia improved security, as annual kidnappings decreased from 2,882 in 2002 to 687 in 2006, and then to 207 in 2016. Similarly, homicide rates decreased, dropping from 23,523 in 2003 to 12,402 in 2016. Immediately following the 2016 Peace Accord, these figures continued to decrease, as did the frequency and severity of terrorist incidents, which dropped from 224 in 2016 to 123 the following year. Meanwhile, coca cultivation and cocaine production did not experience any lasting decline. This led the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission to declare in its December 2020 Report that Plan Colombia was ‘a counterinsurgency success, [but] a counternarcotics failure.’

Citizens and authorities remain sceptical of long-term security improvements, however, given the lack of a peace agreement with the ELN and continued violence perpetrated by FARC dissidents and the ELN, which has fostered the resurgence of terrorism and homicides, threatening the longevity of Plan Colombia’s security successes. Since the 2016 Peace Accord, FARC dissidents and ELN members have moved into territories formerly controlled by the FARC to fill the power void, which has fostered violence.

Current U.S. policy has a singular counterdrug focus that repeats Plan Colombia’s failures, pulls resources away from security, and weakens public support. According to the Transnational Institute, Plan Colombia’s ineffectiveness in reducing coca cultivation was evident as early as 2003, when Colombian forces eradicated increasing crop areas compared to previous years, indicating that Colombians were using more and more land to cultivate coca despite the government’s 25 years of manual eradication and aerial spraying. The U.S. and Colombia strengthened their commitment to this faulty, high-cost/low-yield strategy throughout Plan Colombia and since 2016, pulling resources away from security efforts with no lasting benefit.

In 2017, as cocaine cultivation and production soared, President Trump threatened to decertify Colombia and cut funding if the country failed to correct course. Months later, the March 2018 U.S.-Colombia High Level Dialogue included the bilateral commitment to halve coca cultivation and cocaine production by the end of 2023, reminiscent of ineffective eradication strategies and benchmarks since 2000. A year later, coca eradication increased, but cocaine cultivation hit record highs. Despite the inefficacy of eradication efforts, the Colombian government has pulled an increasing number of armed forces away from security missions to conduct labour-intensive manual eradication of coca fields. This pressure has also driven the new Defence Minister to confirm Colombia will restart aerial fumigation with the dangerous chemical glyphosate in April 2021, after it was outlawed for use against coca cultivation in 2016 due to fierce opposition from Colombians and the international community for its health risks.

The U.S. should re-evaluate coca eradication benchmarks and conditionality for continued funding. U.S. policy has pressured Colombia to reassign military forces conducting security missions to manual eradication of coca crops, which ultimately threatens the longevity of Plan Colombia’s counterinsurgency successes due to resulting security gaps. The trajectory of current policies will carry Colombia to a more violent state that threatens the 2016 peace deal, continuing a trend of more terrorism incidents. The U.S. should encourage Colombia to redirect forces from eradication to providing security in areas reclaimed from the FARC.

The U.S. Department of Defence should also liaise with Colombia’s new Counter Drug Trafficking and Transnational Threats Command to facilitate information-sharing and foster planning nested with strategic objectives. The Colombian armed forces should delegate counternarcotics tasks to this new unit so that others can focus on security. The U.S. should also encourage this new unit to prioritise the destruction of cocaine labs and selective manual eradication of large-scale producers in areas where the government can retain control, rather than perpetuate a faulty widespread manual eradication strategy. U.S. intelligence support can cue manoeuvre assets for effective targeting that incorporates lessons learned from Plan Colombia’s counternarcotics strategy and grants this unit legitimacy through counternarcotics achievements.

FARC dissidents also threaten the longevity of Plan Colombia’s security successes associated with the 2016 Peace Accord. Around 13,000 FARC ex-combatants are still participating in the reintegration process outlined in that agreement, while dissidents and their recruits still fighting the state total around 2,200-2,600 across 23 groups. These dissidents have filtered into areas formerly controlled by the FARC and applied violence to reclaim territory and fill the power void, contributing to an increase of terrorism in Colombia from 152 incidents in 2018 to 403 in 2020.

The ELN is the other lingering variable threatening Plan Colombia’s security legacy. Initiatives in Plan Colombia and external factors weakened the ELN in the last two decades, but not to its breaking point. Aviation initiatives in Plan Colombia enhanced the Colombian Army’s ability to penetrate FARC and ELN strongholds in Colombia’s rural areas, but security initiatives fell short with regard to the porous border with Venezuela. Crossing points are key terrain for FARC dissidents and the ELN, providing passage to support zones where they can recruit and engage in illegal financing operations without the danger posed by Colombia’s armed forces or Venezuela’s military. The ELN contains around 3,000 members, but 1,400 operate in Venezuela among 36 ELN camps. ELN membership has only slightly decreased, as ELN recruiting has managed to generally make up for those captured or killed in military operations. Multiple sources have also reported that FARC dissidents and the ELN formed an alliance in 2018 which has reduced violence between the two groups and fostered cooperation.

Colombia should increase police presence along the Colombia-Venezuela Border to deny FARC dissidents and ELN members access to support zones in Venezuela. Unless there is a black swan event wherein a political or military leader supplants Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela will continue to be a safe harbour for FARC dissidents and ELN members. In addition to continued military operations targeting insurgent bases and support zones, Colombia must sever supply lines from Venezuela to sufficiently weaken the ELN and compel its members to participate in a lasting peace agreement.

Military operations under Plan Colombia and other factors contributed to a cohesion crisis currently affecting the ELN. An intercepted ELN communique published in February 2021 reveals that the ELN struggles with internal division due to geographic dispersion and ideological rifts between those favouring demobilisation and those continuing armed conflict. FARC disarmament is harming ELN morale and weakening the group’s solidarity. The ELN lost 700 members through Colombian military actions in 2020 and several members are abandoning the ELN due to this internal division, but the group is not sufficiently weakened to the point of an enduring peace agreement.

An information operations campaign can expose ELN ties to narcotrafficking to further divide and discredit the ELN. A central facet of ELN policy is opposition to drug trafficking and coca cultivation, which includes severe punishments for ELN members guilty of ties to illicit drug production or trafficking. The U.S. and Colombia can capitalise on this ideological commitment by exposing ELN factions and members guilty of violating this ELN policy. Doing so can further widen the group’s cohesion crisis and foster infighting or encourage more members to abandon the cause and lay down their arms.

Successful fulfilment of government and FARC commitments outlined in the 2016 Peace Accord can foster conditions for a successful peace agreement involving the ELN, but violence perpetrated by FARC dissidents threatens the agreement’s legacy of a safer state. This resurgence of terrorism necessitates a greater focus on security as opposed to counternarcotics. These policy reforms can help the U.S. and Colombia exploit the ELN’s current cohesion crisis and eventually reach a peace agreement that has the potential to endure.

 

Matthew A. Hughes is a graduate student attending Johns Hopkins University. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Also, the appearance of hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the U.S. Army, the DoD, or the U.S. Government of the referenced sites or the information, products, or services contained therein.

Why Colombia’s Referendum Result Poses an Opportunity for Peace

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By: Charlotte Manson

The ‘No’ vote in Colombia should be viewed as an opportunity to secure an inclusive agreement for a durable peace.

Results from Sunday’s referendum in Colombia have been described as astonishing and disappointing that will potentially throw the country into tumultuous uncertainty. Many journalists leapt to compare Brexit and recent referendums in Hungary and Thailand with Colombia denouncing the use of referendums as “messy, dangerous and not as democratic as they may seem” and as political tools for leaders. Other commentators pointed out that despite their rising popularity, referendums are continuously producing an unexpected and unintended result due to the problematic nature of reducing complex issues to a binary choice.

Yes, there are risks with referendums but there is one essential difference in the Colombian conflict as El Pais points out, “there are weapons involved.” In other words, the rejection of the referendum in Colombia should not necessarily lead to a rejection of using referendums to make peace.

The result of the vote on Colombia’s peace process by 50.2% - 49.8% with a voter turnout of 37.4% on Sunday 2nd October is therefore a wake-up call. This outcome was a declination of the particular deal that emerged from the peace process. Mass demonstrations have taken place across the country since the vote results were announced, demanding that the peace be salvaged, preventing any return to war. Both the Government and FARC have repeatedly vowed to maintain the ceasefire and press on with negotiations. Yet Colombia’s former President and leader of the ‘No’ camp, Alvaro Uribe has made clear that he wishes to amend the existing deal but he has ruled out any direct participation in talks with FARC rebels. A large number of Colombians remain sceptical of the current terms in the existing peace deal, hoping that Uribe will push for a tougher stance on prosecution and punishment of FARC members. The guerrilla group’s leader Rodrigo Lodono - better known under his alias as Timochenko - has the added pressure of having to sell the peace accord to all FARC members in order to avoid dissident activity. However, can the setback of the ‘No’ vote thus pose an opportunity for peace?

First, if peace negotiations are not inclusive, they will not produce a positive result. As negotiations in Northern Ireland prior to 1998 proved, excluded voices will find alternative ways to espouse their opinion. Uribe has thus far been exempt from all peace negotiations despite leading the “No” camp with support from millions of Colombians. His voice, along with his supporters who reject the current peace process, came to the fore through the referendum result.

Within days of the ‘no’ vote, President Santos and the FARC rebels announced that Uribe needs to be at the negotiation table. Speaking in the Senate, Uribe said his party “has the will for dialogue”, while President Santos has selected three negotiators for bilateral talks with Uribe’s Democratic Centre party. Going forward with the peace process, the inclusion of members of Uribe’s party will allow for more hard-line opinions, much of which the charismatic Uribe represents, to be represented in the negotiations. Still it remains to be seen whether Uribe sustains the willingness to enter talks with FARC.

However, President Santos has managed to make strides in re-engaging with the country’s second largest left-wing, rebel group the National Liberation Army (ELN). Earlier this week, he announced that the Government-ELN formal talks will begin on 3 November 2016 in Quito, Ecuador after three years of stalemate. Earlier negotiations with the 2000-strong ELN were markedly different to talks with FARC as high-profile ELN-kidnapping activities forced the Government to cut off all discussions in May of this year. Although the rebel-group still hold a number of prisoners captive, recent prisoner releases - including Spanish journalist Salud Hernandez Mora - are viewed as a signal of the ELN’s desire to be involved in the peace negotiations. Thus it is the inclusivity of all future negotiations that is the deal-breaker. The referendum result provides the chance to correct this mistake.

Second, peace is not automatic even if overwhelming support is secured. Imagine the result of the vote had been different and the majority (50.2% based on the results of the recent referendum) of people voted ‘Yes’ - would it be fair for the peace agreement to be ratified despite 49.8% of voters rejecting the terms of peace plus more than 50% abstained voters?

In Northern Ireland, 71.1% of people voted ‘Yes’ in the Good Friday referendum of 1998. Despite significant changes that have occurred since, the power-sharing government in Belfast still faces serious challenges and 98 physical peace walls exist in Belfast today. In South Sudan an overwhelming majority of 98.8% voted for independence in 2011 ending Africa’s longest running civil war. Yet five years on, the euphoria of peace has perished as the country is embroiled in civil war, with millions of internally displaced persons and chaotic power-sharing governance

Remarkably, a minimum of 13% of the 4.4 million registered voters was required for the accord to be ratified. For such a decision after 52-years of conflict, the people need to have their say on a peace accord negotiated by the few. But the task of securing peace in any post-conflict society is formidable, even when majority support for peace is secured.

Third, finding out why people voted as they did is very important going forward, besides cumbersome weather conditions. Abstention in Colombia’s elections is usually higher than 50% - recent presidential elections saw 59.9% turnout - and the 37.4% turnout on Sunday is lower than was widely expected.

As Annette Idler correctly pointed out a substantial part of the Colombian population demonstrated with their votes they are ready to join ‘Pact of Reconciliation’ - it was just not enough to constitute a peace deal for all Colombians. But what about those who abstained, and did not put forward their opinion on the peace deal?

Civil society should organise, promote open dialogue and establish an equitable presence in the media. Uribe has the advantage of securing consistent media coverage due to his political machine and negotiations between the Government and FARC are rigorously followed by both Colombian and international media. There are diverse opinions in Colombia and as the high-level negotiators discuss the most contentious points, so too should civil society take part in the conversation.

Fourth, when analysing the geographic distribution of the vote, there is a large rural-urban divide in Colombia. Those further away from the zones of FARC activity, and those residing in urban areas voted ‘No’, with the exception of voters in Bogotá. In stark contrast, the country’s peripheries include many of the hardest hit provinces hardest hit by the ongoing FARC violence – for example those whom experienced bombings, hostage-taking and murders. Colombian newspaper La Silla Vacia reported that 67 of the 81 municipalities most affected by the conflict voted Yes in the referendum. In the town of Bojayá, where one of the FARC worst massacres was carried out in 2002 - after a rocket hit a church where more than 117 people sought refuge, all of whom were killed - the Yes vote won by 96%.

Colombia is highly divided on the issue of negotiating the conditions for peace, and it’s no wonder. The scale of the task towards reaching peace is immense: demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration, options of transitional justice, acceptance of FARC in everyday society including holding elected public office, scaling down the lucrative $30bn cocaine trade and the vast criminal networks associated with FARC.

No peace process allows for winners and losers, it is a compromise. Therefore all Colombians, particularly those at the negotiating table, are being tested on their commitment to ending the violence. So the setback from the referendum can be turned into an advantage. Reconciliation does not occur overnight and this referendum setback is part of the long process.

Therefore trust is key right now. Trust in the process, in the negotiators, in FARC sticking to their word, and in Santos and Uribe placing their personal and political differences aside and instilling confidence in the public, so that all parties are committed to moving forward. The potential for the peace process to ultimately result in an agreement that all sides can adhere to remains, despite the setback in the recent referendum. Indeed, when the Nobel Peace Prize Committee handed out the Prize to President Santos on Friday 7th October the Committee stressed “the fact that a majority of the voters said No to the peace accord does not necessarily mean that the peace process is dead”.

Colombia held a peaceful referendum ending in a disappointing result. Yet there are so many opportunities for Santos, Timochenko, Uribe, civil society and all other stakeholders to get a better deal in which the majority of Colombians can accept. The ‘No’ vote should be viewed as an opportunity to secure an inclusive agreement for a durable peace.

 

 

Charlotte Manson is a conflict resolution specialist having worked on peace-building and reconciliation projects in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Bahrain, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories. She obtained a MA War Studies from KCL and is a Graduate of Sciences Po Paris and the University of Glasgow. Charlotte is currently a Policy Advisor in the European Parliament working on the Brexit negotiations following the UK’s referendum on the EU. You can follow her on Twitter @cemanson27.

Notes:

[1] ‘Why Referendums Aren’t as Democratic as They Seem’ New York Times October 4 2016; http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/world/americas/colombia-brexit-referendum-farc-cameron-santos.html

[2] ‘Colombia, like the UK, just sabotaged itself through a referendum The Independent, October 4 2016; http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/colombia-farc-brexit-referendum-sabotaged-itself-a7344866.html

[3] ‘Why Referendums are problematic yet more popular than ever’ The Guardian, October 6 2016; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/political-science/2016/oct/06/why-referendums-are-problematic-yet-more-popular-than-ever

[4] ‘Embattled Colombian government fights to save FARC peace deal’ El Pais, October 4 2016; http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/10/04/inenglish/1475582361_630819.html?rel=mas

[5] ‘Why the Colombian peace agreement failed, and what we can expect now’ The Washington Post, October 4 2016; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/04/why-the-colombia-peace-agreement-failed-and-what-we-can-expect-now/

[6] ‘Thousands march for peace in Bogotá and throughout Colombia’ The City Paper Bogotá, October 6 2016; https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/massive-peace-march-takes-over-bogota/14834

[7] ‘Colombia’s peace deal in limbo after shock referendum’ Reuters, October 3 2016; http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1230BH

[8] Colombia’s Santos rival Uribe willing to work on peace deal’ Reuters October 6 2016; http://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-idUSKCN1251MX

[9] ‘Colombie: la paix, les FARC et la <<théorie du genre>>’ Le Monde October 6 2016; http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2016/10/06/colombie-la-paix-les-farc-et-la-theorie-du-genre_5009083_3222.html

[10] ‘Defeat of FARC pact puts focus on Alvaro Uribe’s next step’ The Financial Times October 5 2016; https://www.ft.com/content/26149bda-8ac8-11e6-8cb7-e7ada1d123b1

[11] ‘Colombie: Santos et Uribe tentent de sauver l’accord de paix avec les FARC’ France 24 October 6 2016; http://www.france24.com/fr/20161006-juan-manuel-santos-alvaro-uribe-accord-paix-farc-guerilla-referendum

[12] ‘Colombia to begin formal peace talks with ELN in November while salvaging deal with FARC’ The City Paper Bogotá October 11 2016; https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/colombia-to-begin-formal-talks-with-eln-in-november/14912

[13] Colombia ELN rebels free Spanish journalist Hernandez Mora BBC News May 28 2016; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36403957

[14] Results of the Referenda in Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland, Friday 22 May 1998, Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) Ulster University; http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ref1998.html

[15] Official Southern Sudan Referendum 2011 Results, ; http://southernsudan2011.com/

[16] ‘Colombia’s president rushing vote on deal with rebels’ The Washington Post August 25 2016; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombia-farc-rebels-reach-deal-to-end-half-century-war/2016/08/24/3d15425e-6a5b-11e6-91cb-ecb5418830e9_story.html

[17] ‘Colombia’s Referendum: Low Turnout and Activist Minorities’ Security Praxis October 3 2016; http://www.security-praxis.eu/article/colombia-referenda-low-turnout-activist-minorities/

[18] ‘Colombia Referendum: Voters reject FARC peace deal’ BBC News October 3 2016; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252

[19] ‘Así es el país que votó No’ La Silla Vacía October 5 2016; http://lasillavacia.com/hagame-el-cruce/asi-es-el-pais-que-voto-no-58201

[20] ‘Colombia War Brings Carnage to Village Altar’ New York Times May 9 2002; http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/09/world/colombia-war-brings-carnage-to-village-altar.html?pagewanted=all

[21] ‘Colombia’s proof that democracy doesn’t work’ New York Times, October 7 2016;http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/opinion/sunday/colombias-proof-that-democracy-doesnt-work.html

[22] ‘The lessons of Colombia’s extraordinary peace process’ BBC News, September 29 2016; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37498940

[23] ‘Nobel Peace Prize for Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos’ BBC News, October 7 2016 ; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37585188

[24] Image Source: http://topsy.fr/hashtag.php?q=%23PazColombia

Book Review: ‘A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict and Convergence’

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Reviewed By: Kate Dinnison

D. Davis, D. Kilcullen, G. Mills and D. Spencer, A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict and Convergence, (London, UK: Hurst&Co. Publishing), 2016; ISBN-13: 978-1849046282

Colombia Book

Since its liberation from Spain by Simon Bolivar in 1819, la Republica de Colombia has been perpetually at war, almost 150 of its 195 years. Colombia, for a long time, was synonymous with weak institutions, crime, terrorism, and, above all, the cocaine that perpetuated the conflict. This country, however, is now one of the greatest success stories of countering insurgency in the 21st century, and A Great Perhaps sets out to investigate both the efforts made by the Colombian government and the international community, as well as analyse the adaptive nature of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s left-wing guerrillas.

The authors, Dickie Davis, David Kilcullen Greg Mills and David Spencer, have crafted a comprehensive and holistic account of the long effort by the government to beat back the guerrillas, reduce the dependency on the illicit economy, and improve perennial issues like social exclusion. More than this, A Great Perhaps is a book that asks one of the most fundamental and puzzling questions in the study of conflict and counterinsurgency (COIN): What, in effect, is victory?

The historical background in Chapter 1 divides the conflict into six phases, from La Violencia in 1949 to the official establishment of FARC, then following the ebbs and flows of insurgency through the latter half of the 20th century, up to the groundwork for today’s bilateral ceasefire. Each author then delves into different components of Colombia’s protracted struggle – guerrilla warfare, the security-economy nexus, FARC’s transformation, concluding by putting the conflict up against other modern day insurgencies and outlining Colombia’s ‘prospects for peace.’[1] While there are small noticeable differences in writing style between the four authors, there is a consistent organisation throughout that allows for readers to take away a laundry list of issues as well as remedies.

The efforts in previous and ongoing COIN operations such as Malaya and Afghanistan, while helpful in contrasting to the more civil situation in Colombia, provide limited insight into defining victory for the Colombian government and for their people. As the authors establish, the interplay of narcotics and insurgency, international and domestic actors, and civilians and the military are entirely unique to Colombia but can be useful for drawing parallels to those African nations undergoing similar security challenges, which they address in the final chapter.[2]

This incredibly detailed account of Colombia’s ‘long war’ goes far beyond much of journalism about the conflict, providing insight into the grievances that gave birth to the insurgency, the influence of ‘conflict entrepreneurs,’ the complex role of narcotics in the economy, and how war serves as a means for a higher end – credible peace.[3] Even without any background knowledge on this often side-lined current affairs topic, any reader will come out with a clear understanding of the military campaign on the wider political and strategic levels, down to the tactical and operational details from both the government and guerrilla perspectives.

Since the publication of this book, Colombia is one step closer to a peace agreement with FARC with the signing of a ‘A Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire, Cessation of Hostilities, and Laying Aside of Weapons.’ This is an important step defined as victory, toward ending the violence and criminality that has plagued Colombia for decades. Like any country enduring civil conflict, Colombia is skating on thin ice - the successes made since the turn of the century could easily be derailed by a round of failed peace talks, lack of popular support, a crippling economic recession, or budget cuts in defense, as the authors remind us.[4] Davis, Kilcullen, Mills and Spencer dissect the roots of Colombia’s protracted war in order to celebrate the successes of the campaign since 2002.

 

Kate Dinnison is an American undergraduate student of International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter: @katedinns

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Davis, Dickie, David Kilcullen, Greg Mills, and David E. Spencer. A Great Perhaps?: Colombia: Conflict and Convergence. London: Hurst, 2016. pp. 179.

[2] Ibid., pp. 68.

[3] Ibid., pp. 2.

[4] Ibid., pp. 80

Image Credit: https://www.amazon.com/Great-Perhaps-Colombia-Conflict-Divergence/dp/184904628X

Image Credit: http://doralnewsonline.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ejercito-colombiano.jpg

Colombia and the 'Small footprint' intervention illusion

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By Jorge E Delgado:

Photo: Juan Camilo Gomez (creative commons)
Photo: Juan Camilo Gomez (creative commons)

The challenge posed by ISIS has intensified debates in the West over the possibility of dispatching “boots on the ground” and has, yet again, brought to the forefront the search for alternative modes of military intervention following the recent disillusionment with “Big footprint” counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Recently practitioners have been advocating for “Small footprint” intervention – the dispatch of advisors and cash to bolster the efforts of indigenous forces. This is seen as a promising alternative in that it remedies two major shortcomings of “Big footprint” expeditions: the lack of cultural knowledge on the part of the invader, and opposition expressed in domestic public opinion with a small appetite for large expenditures and significant casualties in remote battle spaces. It is due to these weaknesses that Colombia is frequently invoked as a success story and model for “Small footprint” intervention. Take for instance the response offered by retired US Army Colonel Peter Mansoor, who served as General David Petraeus’ executive officer during the Iraq War, to the question of what victory in Afghanistan would look like:

“At this point the best the United States can hope for is to support an Afghan government that can keep the country together after 2014 and convince the Taliban that it cannot win the war in any conceivable time frame. […] For a view of what winning might look like, look at Colombia. A decade ago the country seemed on the verge of disaster with the FARC on the ascendancy,[…]. Good Colombian presidential leadership and U.S. support were the keys to victory.”[1]

While Mansoor rightfully points out the importance of good local political leadership and the assistance of allies in war in accounting for the alleged success of US intervention in Colombia, it is crucial to underline that how these two elements combined were peculiar to the country’s political context. In other words, key contingent factors make Colombia a poor case model of “Small footprint” intervention to inform Western policy options elsewhere. This article will argue for the unsuitability of making Colombia a case model.

According to supporters of the ‘Small footprint’ advising model, Plan Colombia - a US$6 billion program of US assistance to swell and restructure the Colombian military and police launched in 1999 - translated into an inter-agency effort that imposed exacting human rights standards, re-invigorated Bogotá’s relationship with its citizens, and received mutual endorsement from both the Colombian military and the government.[2] But beyond the quality and utility of the material support provided to enhance Colombian capabilities, the key to the Colombian military’s success against the rebel group FARC in the last decade has been legitimate and strong political leadership.

Alvaro Uribe was elected to the Presidency of an established functioning democracy – unlike most Middle Eastern and African countries – after a landslide victory in May 2002, and had sufficient legitimacy and political will to pursue an aggressive policy towards the insurgency. As a US Military Group officer recalled in 2010: ‘Uribe was the only president who realized that the FARC isn’t that competent. He kicked the military in the ass. It’s as if he said: “You’ve got popular backing, political support, and equipment – what are you waiting for?”’[3] Effectively, by imposing determined political control over his military, which had been historically absent in the country, President Uribe was able to strategically focus the operational and tactical enhancements enabled by the military support from the Bush administration, which had started to showcase Colombia as its ‘war on terror’ frontline in the Western Hemisphere.

The “Small footprint” approach is likely to be successful only when occurring along the host country’s “Big footprint”. Whereas the US army entered into a wide-ranging engagement with the Afghan national army, the US did not have to build up a new indigenous force in Colombia. The objective of US assistance in Colombia over the past 15 years was focused on improving clear-cut operational deficiencies of an established and strong military force capable of bearing the brunt of the responsibility. According to the US Southern Command, the assistance simply aimed for the Colombians to better shape ‘their operating environment to conduct decisive joint operations by virtue of improved training and modernization’.[4]

Moreover, in trying to understand the reasons why the Colombian military has been so receptive to US assistance more generally, it is necessary to take into account that the association between the countries goes far beyond Plan Colombia. In fact, the US Military Group has had an established presence in the country since 1942, when it actively assisted in the professionalization of the Colombian military to aid in the protection of the Panama Canal against a feared Axis - and later Soviet - attack. In addition, after having prepared the Colombian Army for its participation in the Korean War the US has been continuously promoting counterinsurgency practices up to the present day. This historical relationship has effectively influenced Colombia’s strategic outlook and its responsiveness to the latest package of assistance.

Two other final factors illustrate the unsuitability of the ‘Small footprint’ approach in Colombia to inform what is happening in the Middle East. First, there is a clear absence of ethnic or religious divisions in Colombia. As in most of Latin America, Colombia is in essence a Catholic/Christian state where the majority of the population subscribes to Western values, and thus the Colombian people were not patently resistant to Washington’s political goals when it extended Plan Colombia from a counternarcotics program to one of counterterrorism: ‘the overall goal of helping Colombia become a prosperous democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law, free from narcotrafficking and terrorism’.[5] Having said this, a final point to keep in mind is that the objectives of the US in Colombia have always been limited. Even at the height of the ‘drug war’ in the mid 1990s or in the wake of 9/11, the FARC has not been recognized by Washington as an existential national security threat.

Different US administrations through the decades have made it clear that Colombians are the ones who have to assume primary responsibility for the financing and maintenance of their own security. This was the basic assumption behind the formulation of Plan Colombia in 1999. So given the political context and the unique circumstances of the conflict, the only policy option for Washington in terms of Colombia has been ‘Small footprint’ advising. It is an illusion to consider it a model that can be used elsewhere.

Jorge is a PhD researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is currently in the ‘writing-up phase’ of his dissertation on the evolution of counterinsurgency thinking in Colombia.

[1]Quoted in: Paul Szoldra, ‘The Most-Fascinating Insights From The Man Closest To General Petraeus During The Iraq ‘Surge,’ Business Insider, 3 January 2014, < http://www.businessinsider.com/peter-mansoor-reddit-ama-2014-1#ixzz3HREoiChh>
[2] Examples include: Stephen Watts, et.al, The Uses and Limits of Small Scale Intervention, RAND Co: Santa Monica,2012; Linda Robinson, The Future of US Special Operation Forces, Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report No.66, April 2013, Dana Priest,“Covert Action in Colombia. U.S. Intelligence, GPS bomb Kits Help Latin American Nation Cripple Rebel Forces,”The Washington Post 21 December 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/12/21/covert-action-in-colombia/. >
[3] Quoted in: Douglas Porch and Jorge Delgado, “Masters of Today: military intelligence and counterinsurgency in Colombia, 1990-2010”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 21:2, June 2010, 277-302
[4] ‘USSOUTHCOM Operations Order for Plan Colombia’, Secret Cable, Excised Copy, 5 December 2000, Accessed via Digital National Security Archive. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/marketing/index.jsp>
[5] Department of State, ‘Developing a Colombian National Security Strategy’, Unclassified Cable, 4 July 2002. Accessed via Digital National Security Archive.