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Gemma MacIntyre

Strife Series on Climate Change and Conflict – Introduction

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by Gemma MacIntyre

Studies show a direct correlation between climate and violent conflict (Image credit: Image: Reuters/Amit Dave)

In recent decades, climate change has been recognised as an important international concern. Scientists and leaders worldwide agree that the pressure of increased temperatures on crop yields, natural capital, and water availability - and subsequent demand for already dwindling resources - is undoubtedly of detriment to global populations. In a recent IPCC report, it was concluded that a predicted 1.5-degree celsius of global warming could significantly impede efforts to achieve sustainable development goals: pushing more people into poverty, exacerbating inter-group equalities, and wreaking global economic disruption. Such acute warnings from scientists, combined with mounting pressure from environmental activists worldwide, has prompted multilateral efforts to curb carbon emissions.

As states have become more aware of the impact of climate change, so too have they come to analyse it from different perspectives. In doing so, an important consensus has emerged: that climate change is not merely an environmental concern; it is a human security challenge too, with the potential to aggravate societal grievances. Further, the impact of increased temperatures on already scarce resources, migration movements, and food security may affect both intra- and inter-state relations: with the capacity to fuel further conflict.

Still, the direct impacts of climate on international conflict and security remain somewhat hazy; and policies to address it, scarce. This is partially due to the empirical difficulties of measuring climate’s impact on violence. Associating casualties with conflict is, at the best of times, challenging: let alone when those causal factors - including changing temperatures, rising sea levels, and depletion of resources - are intangible. Further, while drought and extreme temperatures have undoubtedly exacerbated poverty and forced displacement in regions such as Syria, Sudan, and Bangladesh; in a knotted web of additional political, social, and economic grievances, isolating climate as a cause of conflict is difficult to ascertain.

With that being said, while the empirical evidence remains uncertain, it is critical to treat climate change as not merely an environmental or economic concern, but as an international security issue, as well. To analyse this idea in greater depth, this series aims to form a discussion about the relationship between climate change and conflict. By outlining the impact of climate change on issues including terrorism, migration, and civil strife; this series aims to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of climate change as an international security challenge. It is hoped that, by doing so, it will emphasise the relevance of climate change to contemporary conflict studies, and national security policy more widely.

 

Publication schedule

Part I: Why Has Somalia Proved a Fertile Environment for the Rise of Al Shabaab? The Impacts of Climate Change on the Rise of Islamist Terror by Annabelle Green

Part II: Climate Change and Social Conflict by Professor Anatol Lieven

Part III: Slow Violence: Climate Refugees and the Legal Lacuna of Protection by Ellie Judd

Part IV: Water Conflicts: Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier in Sub-Saharan Africa by Musab Alnour

Gemma graduated from the University of St Andrews in International Relations and Management and is now studying an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. During her undergraduate degree, she studied a range of post-conflict cases, with a particular focus on intractable conflicts such as Israel-Palestine and Bosnia. Through her academic studies and voluntary experience with VSO in Nigeria, Gemma has developed a strong interest in the relationship between corruption and development. Her experience with VSO Nigeria furthered this interest, as she was made aware of the acute impacts of governance on public services, such as health and education. She hopes to pursue further research on the impact of conflict on health security.

 

 

 

 

 

Coronavirus and Intelligence Failures: Lessons Learned from a Global Pandemic

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by Gemma MacIntyre

An officer with U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations gestures with gloved hands as he speaks with an arriving international traveler at Dulles International Airport in Dulles, Va., March 18, 2020 (Image credit: CBP Photo/Glenn Fawcett)

The transformative effect of Covid-19 upon the world is becoming more clear by the day. Since the first recorded cases in China’s Wuhan starting in December 2019, the disease has transcended borders, thereby claiming 170,000 lives to date, affecting millions more, and forcing entire states into lockdown. The severity and pace of the virus so far have led many to ask the question: why were governments so slow to respond? This frustration is particularly salient given reports that multiple scientific, medical, and intelligence experts alerted authorities about this novel coronavirus months prior to politicians initiating our current states of emergency. This delay has led many to label Covid-19 as an intelligence failure, perhaps the most notable in history.

The American President Donald J. Trump has come under significant attacks for delaying preventative measures - and prioritising economic interests over the advice of health and intelligence authorities. An article in the New York Times from mid-April 2020 stated that the US intelligence community ‘identified the threat, sounded the alarms and made clear the need for aggressive action’ in early January 2020. Yet, contrary to this urgency, Trump was reluctant to impose a lockdown. This hesitance came primarily for economic reasons but was similarly influenced by his well-documented tendency to overlook the guidance of expert authorities. Similarly, in Britain, Prime Minister Boris Johnson has been chastised for skipping up to five Covid-19 related meetings, having a detrimental impact on the UK’s rate of response (The Sunday Times 2020). It has been reported that while Britain was initially well-prepared for a pandemic outbreak; austerity cuts and fears of a no-deal Brexit distracted the government from its health-focused objectives. Crucially, had the British Government taken earlier action, it would have been able to respond much more effectively.

However, it is not enough to associate the spread of Covid-19 entirely with political personalities (albeit, they do play a role). Rather, one has to explore the various reasons why, despite warning signals, this deadly virus has been able to have such a dramatic impact, wreaking global havoc in its spread. Globally, it seems, few expected what was to come. Upon reflection of where global health ‘sits’ in the international security paradigm, it seems the reasons for intelligence failure are much more complex and deeply-rooted. On the one hand, global health has been perceived as the foundation of international prosperity. Without strong health infrastructure, the productivity of the international community’s labour market cannot function. Sub-Saharan Africa provides a case in point: many of the development challenges within the region stem from health problems. Yet, the mention of global health as an international security challenge is scarce.

Over the course of the twenty-first century, UK and US intelligence analysts have rightly emphasised important security challenges, such as international terrorism, cyber security, and inter-state war. Interestingly, despite its importance to global prosperity, health has rarely been perceived as an international security threat: more often, it is perceived as a by-product of, or contributing to, other security issues. Arguably, the reason for this is that, unlike other security challenges, pandemics lack the same sort of human capacity to be controlled. This characteristic has made viruses such as Covid-19 less apparent in international security studies; yet, paradoxically, more difficult to contain. Viruses cannot be tracked via policing or intercepting devices: nor can they be interrogated or detained.

Nevertheless, the health-focus of intelligence communities should not be minimised by these challenges. Rather, this new strain of coronavirus invites a new strain of security studies: one that, as the world becomes ever more interconnected, is paramount to global health. Since 9/11, academics and practitioners have affirmed the need to refine methods of intelligence-gathering. To track covert, international networks - including terrorist, drug, and cyber-related groups - intelligence communities have to, in the words of Charles Cogan (2010), take a ‘hunter-gatherer’ approach. This involves actively going out to monitor those suspected of posing any sort of legitimate security threat, and enacting sufficient preventative measures. But how does one ‘hunt down’ a virus? Its intangible, diffuse nature, coupled with the ease at which globalisation facilitates its spread, presents novel challenges to intelligence communities (Bruntland, 2003).

The main tactic used by states to contain Covid-19 has been to enforce lockdown measures on entire populations and economies. Short of proven vaccines, this strategy is essential; but it does not address the root issue: that of preventing contaminated animals, particularly bats, from spreading the disease (The Guardian, 2020). The challenges associated with tracking viruses, at the very least, underscores its importance in international security. Even more so, it presents new lessons and opportunities.

A key lesson provided by Covid-19 is that without medical expertise or predictions; policy-makers will be left in the dark. Unlike other security issues which rely namely on intelligence communities and policy-makers to contain them; assailants like Covid-19 require the inclusion of scientists and medical experts, to not only appreciate but act upon the severity of the threat. This requires a shift in the understanding of intelligence in an epidemiological context, both within intelligence communities, and external to them (RUSI, 2020).

Another lesson has been the benefit of digital surveillance. In authoritarian regimes such as South Korea, Israel, and China, their governments have utilised technology and data to track the spread of the virus and monitor citizens in lockdown. Yet, while China and South Korea have maximised this digital surveillance opportunity; Western democracies remain indebted to the value of transparency. A UK NHS app used to monitor people’s activities has been considered; however, controversy remains over the potential exposure of personal data. Ulrich Kelber (Germany’s Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information) has condoned stringent surveillance measures as ‘encroaching’ and ‘totally inappropriate’ (Foreign Policy, 2020). Ultimately, although transparency remains critical, states may have to overcome this initial unease to make the most of technology opportunities - so long as they are used appropriately, in line with democratic values.

Lastly, the insight provided by intelligence is critical to ensure states are prepared. Historically, intelligence has been used to alert leaders of the appropriate level of investment into national security. Yet, it seems in spite of intelligence warnings, many of those on the front line have been left without the equipment to fight. This idea was referenced by Bill Gates during a 2015 TED Talk, when he affirmed that states had to be prepared to tackle a pandemic just as they would a military emergency. Gates stressed the need for investment in research and development, health infrastructure, and medical reserves, all well in advance of a global outbreak.

Nonetheless, while Gates’ predictions ring eerily true - changing the way states prepare for global pandemics requires not only a shift in intelligence-gathering methods, but in understandings of international security as we know it. Re-defining the priorities of the intelligence community, and conceptions of international security, is essential to combat this pandemic, and the inevitable future ones as well.

Reference List

Arbuthnott, G., Calvert, J., and Leake, J. (2020). ’38 Days: When Britain Sleepwalked into Disaster’. The Sunday Times

Barnes, J. E., Haberman, M., Lipton, E., Mazzetti, M., and Sanger, D. E. (2020). ‘He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the Virus’. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-response.html

Bruntland. G. H. (2003). ‘Global Health and International Security’. Global Governance., 9(4): 417-423

Bury, P., Chertoff, M. and Hatlebrekke, K. (2020). ‘National Intelligence and the Coronavirus Pandemic’. RUSI. Available at: https://rusi.org/commentary/national-intelligence-and-coronavirus-pandemic

Coats, D. R. (2019). ‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community’. Available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—SSCI.pdf

Cogan., C. (2010). ‘Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century’. Intelligence and National Security, 19(2): 304-321

Gates, B. (2015). ‘The Next Outbreak? We’re Not Ready’. TED, 2015

Maceas, B. (2020). ‘Only Surveillance Can Save Us From Coronavirus’. Foreign Policy

McKie, R. (2020). ‘Coronavirus: Five Months On, What Scientists Know About Covid-19’. The Guardian

UK Government. (2010). ‘A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy’. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf

Worldometer. (2020). Available at: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/

Upon graduating from the University of St Andrews in International Relations and Management in 2019, Gemma MacIntyre is now studying an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London. Through her academic studies and voluntary experience with VSO UK in Nigeria, she has developed a strong interest in the impact of governance on development. Throughout her MA, Gemma has had the opportunity to explore a variety of security and development areas: including peace-building; humanitarian diplomacy; intelligence in war and peace; and the impact of conflict on global health. Gemma hopes to pursue a career in humanitarian or security policy-making.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The British Security Service: Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Brexit Order

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by Gemma MacIntyre

The SIS Building in London features as the headquarters of the British Secret Intelligence Service (Image credit: Wikimedia)

British security services traditionally played a leading role in protecting both international and national security interests. In so doing, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), since it was first established in 1909, has benefitted from unrivalled access to issues of a covert nature. In turn, this has allowed the SIS to gain vast amounts of intelligence, that have enriched the conduct of both British and European foreign policy. Most notably, access to international data has enabled the SIS to be both preventative as well as proactive in tackling foreign threats, matters that are increasingly paramount in the current information age.

However, the British security environment in 2020 is very different to that of the early 1900s. In addition to a variety of emerging security issues - such as the ubiquity of hostile non-state actors, tensions with an increasingly clandestine Russia, and the threat of cyber-attacks - the impact of Brexit on security relations with the EU remains unclear. Nonetheless, by considering to what extent the UK has allied with the EU on security matters, particularly those most prominent today - one could speculate the challenges, and potential opportunities, that leaving the EU may serve.

In 2018, the National Security Capability Review (2018: 5) underscored the impact of security threats in the twentieth century on the ‘rules-based’ international system. The threat of cyber-attacks to British public services (as evidenced by the 2017 WannaCry attack on the NHS); instability in Middle Eastern and African areas that could give rise to Islamic-extremists; threats posed by Russia (underscored by the 2018 Salisbury nerve-agent poisoning); and, of course, the speed and access to telecommunications worldwide - all convey the increasingly transnational nature of security threats to twenty-first century Britain. This, coupled with uncertainties of Brexit, will inevitably impact the conduct of British security.

On paper, British policy-makers recognise the importance of adapting British security services to respond to evolving needs in an increasingly globalised order. In 2018, the British Government conceptualised the term ‘Global Britain’, to convey Britain’s commitment to multilateral cooperation (UK Parliament, 2018). The UK Government stressed that, despite leaving the EU, Britain continued to share mutual security interests with EU states; so cooperation would continue. Pro-Brexit advocates, such as British Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, have made clear that by leaving the EU, the British intelligence service would benefit from increased levels of funding, and the capacity to be more flexible in foreign policy security (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2019: 6). Scholars such as Hadfield (2018: 181) have also suggested that by leaving the EU, the UK may have greater freedom to enrich its bilateral security-relationships with EU states.

On the other hand, many remain dubious about the impact of Brexit on security. Neil Basu, Head of Counter-Terrorism in the UK, reported that, in the case of a no-deal Brexit, ‘The UK’s safety and security would suffer’ (The Guardian, 2019). Furthermore, it remains unclear to what extent the UK will continue to benefit from European security initiatives. The Schegen Information System II (SIS II) and the European Arrest Warrant are two European databases, which have helped to provide intelligence to the SIS on a range of security threats. Most critically, the SIS II has, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2019), enriched the UK’s counter-terrorism policy - by enabling Britain to track terrorists from Europe more easily. The IISS also highlighted the benefit of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which enables EU convicts to be extradited in their home country. In the case of the Spivrak attack, the EAW enabled Russian perpetrators to be extradited outside of the UK. British intelligence also benefits from the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which significantly widens Britain’s security database. As a result, a no-deal Brexit, according to IISS (2019) would delay this process, making Brits more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Coupled with this uncertainty, there is a lack of political-security leadership. Jeremy Corbyn has been criticised for not taking security seriously enough, with representatives from MI5 having to brief him on the current severity of issues (The Sunday Times, 2019). Jonson, on the other hand, faces a different - though, still concerning - sort of criticism. His crass comments about Islam not only underline his lack of sensitivity; they also risk exacerbating security issues further - by isolating minority groups. The proliferation of terrorist attacks in the UK by home-grown jihadists underline the saliency of this threat, as well as the need to understand and integrate minority groups - rather than ostracising them further.

While the impact of Brexit on UK security capabilities remains unclear; it is nonetheless important for the UK to consider potential measures, to strengthen its security capabilities. If the FCO does experience cuts, this may limit its previous capacity and access abroad. Dr. Champa Patel, Head of the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, argued that in order for the UK to remain a leader in international security, the British government has to improve its cross-departmental cooperation (Chatham House, 2018). Sir John Sawers, former head of MI6, reinforced this argument, by stating that in the current security environment, intelligence data is vital to protect British interests (Financial Times, 2018). In other words, there is perhaps now, more than ever, a greater need for the intelligence service and policy-makers to work collaboratively in the interest of British security.

Of course, the arguments for cross-departmental cooperation are not new. Former intelligence officer-turned-academic, Michael Herman (1988), conceptualised the analogy of policy-makers as ‘consumers’ and intelligence agents as ‘producers’ over thirty years ago, to evoke the benefits of intelligence to British foreign policy-makers. Moreover, scholars have underscored the dangers of tensions between intelligence and diplomacy for years Bjola, 2014; Gookins, 2008; Pinkus, 2014). Blair’s fabrication of intelligence to justify Iraqi intervention (2003), is a case in point of the potential dangers of politicised intelligence, as well as the need for greater cooperation.

While advocacy for greater cross-departmental cooperation is hardly novel, what is relatively unprecedented is the use of intelligence in British foreign policy conduct - particularly in an increasingly uncertain security environment. This, coupled with the impact of Brexit on FCO funds and access to European security initiatives, underscores the increased need for cross-departmental cooperation. If security ties with the EU weaken; the UK must search for alternatives. Its domestic intelligence service serves the greatest beacon of hope to remain an influential leader in both national and international security policy.

References:

Bjola, C. (2014). The Ethics of Secret Diplomacy: A Contextual Approach. Journal of Global Ethics, 10(1): 85-100

Chatham House. (2018). The UK Needs to Speak with One Voice to Prevent Mass Atrocities. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/uk-needs-speak-one-voice-prevent-mass-atrocities

Gookins, A. J. (2008). The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making. Review of International Affairs, 28(1): 65-73

Hadfield, A. (2018). ‘Britain against the World? Foreign and Security Policy in the ‘Age of Brexit’’. In: B. Martill and U. Staiger. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London: UCL Press

Herman, M. (1998). Diplomacy and Intelligence. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9(2): 1-22

Pinkus, J. (2014). ‘Intelligence and Public Diplomacy: The Changing Tide.’ Journal of Strategic Security, 7(4): 33-46

The Financial Times. (2018). 5 Concerns for UK-EU Defence After Brexit. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5c9898e0-124a-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277

The Guardian. (2019). Brexit: No Deal Would Harm UK Security, Senior Officer Warns. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/07/no-deal-brexit-would-harm-uk-security-senior-officer-warns

The International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2019). Brexit and Security. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2018/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-december2018january2019/606-04-inkster-cm

The Times. (2019). Spy Chiefs Sit Corbyn Down for Chat About Russia and Jihadist Terror Threat. Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spy-chiefs-sit-corbyn-down-for-chat-about-russia-and-jihadist-terror-threat-9mzf8wczd

UK Parliament. (2017). Brexit: Implications for National Security. Available at: https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7798

UK Parliament. (2018). Appendix: Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/780/78008.htm

UK Parliament. (2018). National Security Capability Review: A Changing Security Environment. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtnatsec/756/75602.htm

Gemma recently graduated from the University of St Andrews in International Relations and Management, and is now studying an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s. Through her academic studies and voluntary experience with VSO in Nigeria, she has developed a strong interest in the relationship between corruption and development. During her undergraduate degree, she studied a range of post-conflict cases, with a particular focus on intractable conflicts such as Israel-Palestine and Bosnia. Her experience with VSO Nigeria furthered her interest, as she was made aware of the acute impacts of governance on public services, such as health and education. She hopes to pursue further research on the impact of conflict on health security.