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Strife Feature – Political leaders with military backgrounds: a comparison of India and the US

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by Saawani Raje

George Washington at the Battle of Monmouth

The US and India are similar nations in many respects. They have both had fairly stable trajectories of progress in the course of their democratic histories. Covering large areas of geographical territory, they are both nationalistic territorial nations with a colonial past. Significantly, they both have a history of successful civilian rule uninterrupted by military coups or takeovers. However, they appear to differ in one important aspect— in America, civilian leaders having military experience is common and politically advantageous. Multiple Presidents were serving Generals prior to ascending to the Presidency. In India by contrast, it is rare for political leaders at any level to have come from a military background.

This difference is interesting because it speaks to the civil-military ‘problematique’, which has been a central concern of civil-military relations theorists for the past several decades. This problematique is the challenge of reconciling a military strong enough to do anything civilians ask them to, with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorise them to do.[1] A key question in this civil-military debate is the role of the military in the polity of a nation, especially in its decision-making process. A brief survey of military involvement in political decision-making in two of the world’s biggest democracies— India and the US — brings forth an interesting distinction. The difference in American and Indian attitudes towards military participation in politics, I argue, stems from the role conflict has played in the creation of both these nations.

 

Military involvement in the United States

In a TIME article of April 2016, Mark Thompson discusses why Americans wanted a military general in the White House. Looking back at American history, the trend of military leaders eventually becoming civilian leaders is fairly typical. George Washington was the first general who went on to serve as the President of the United States, and twelve Generals have won American Presidential elections since. Significantly, only twelve out of the forty-three American presidents have never served in the military. In the 2017-2018 Congress, 102 members (18.8% of the leadership) had served or were serving in the military.

A 2017 Gallup poll shows that American society’s confidence in the military remains high, at 72%. Additionally, public endorsement of presidential candidates by retired Generals and military officers has become a mainstay of the presidential race. In the 2004 Bush-Kerry presidential race, twelve retired generals and admirals endorsed Kerry, himself a military veteran. Kerry’s Vietnam war record became a matter of controversy, and General Merrill McPeak eventually appeared in television advertisements defending Kerry and his service in Vietnam. On the other side, retired General Tommy Franks who had the distinguished military record of being the architect of the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, endorsed George Bush and went on to speak in support of his candidacy at the Republican National Convention. In 2008, Colin Powell , a retired four-star general and the National Security Advisor under George Bush (2001-2005) famously crossed party lines to endorse Obama on national television. Political endorsements from military leaders reached a fever pitch during the Clinton-Trump race. In September 2016, Clinton touted 100 endorsements from former military leaders after Trump displayed 88 retired military figures who backed his campaign. The involvement of military officials in American politics, whether as leaders or leader-makers continues unabated.

 

Civil-military gap in India

The situation in India could not be more dissimilar. The civil-military dissonance is so pronounced that there seems to be no evidence of polls, policy briefs or literature that even engage with the notion of a civilian leader with military experience taking office. This lack of any evidence points to how deeply entrenched the civil-military separation is in the minds of the Indian populace and political and military elites alike. Since 1947 (when India became independent), there has not been a single Prime Minister with military experience. Defence analyst Nitin Gokhale opines that the ‘havoc’ wrought by ‘an indifferent polity and insensitive bureaucracy’ to India’s armed forces ‘has hit the ordinary soldier hard….The Indian soldier today stands at the crossroads, confused about his status in the society and unsure about his own role in a nation led by “faux peaceniks”’. Retired military men make rare appearances on news channels— never the campaign trail— and restrict themselves to talking about military matters. In recent years, the military has shown an increased willingness to get involved in the polity. In 2007, for example, the Indian army opposed the demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier. The Army chief General J J Singh publicly expressed his views more than once in a country where it is extremely unusual for military leadership to vocalise their disagreement with civilian leaders. These instances are, however, not a mainstay of political debates around policymaking and certainly never crossing the border into civilian leadership, in sharp contrast to the US.

 

Role of military conflict as influencing factor

This poses an interesting question: What could be the factors that influence this significant difference in the way military involvement in politics is perceived in the US as opposed to India? I would argue that the role military conflict played in the formation of a nation and national identity is a significant factor in influencing attitudes to military involvement in politics. Military conflict played a significant role in the development of the US as a nation. The US has been in a state of either declared war or conflict for 79 of the 179 years, from just before the founding of Jamestown until 1785, nominally known as the end of the Revolution. It thus had a predominantly military experience of colonialism. The military also played a crucial role in the War of Revolution marking the end of colonial rule. The War was an event with mass participation— according to some historical estimates, two out of every five white American men who could serve did so either in the state militias or the Continental Army.

Royster proposes that military service was the source of an ‘American’ character.[2] The Revolutionary War created a ‘dual army’ tradition that combined a citizen-soldier reserve (which was the militia) with a small professional force ‘that provided military expertise and staying power’.[3] This democratised and nationalised military service has lasting legacies on the psyche of American society regarding attitudes to military service. Furthermore, Congress in 1775 created the Continental Army commanded by George Washington. This Continental Army was built on ideological motivation and a sense of loyalty that surprised most foreign observers. Baron von Closen of the French army exclaimed: ‘It is incredible that soldiers composed of men of every age, even children of fifteen, of whites and blacks, almost naked, unpaid, and rather poorly fed, can march so well and withstand fire so steadfastly!’[4]

This and Washington’s appointment as General of the Continental Army despite the ‘hypersensitive fear of military ascendancy’ are significant.[5] Washington remained deferential to Congress even when its inefficiency threatened the army’s survival. Despite the prominent position held by the military, Washington set forth an example of civil supremacy while commanding the army. This attitude and his later Presidency could have contributed to erasing civilian suspicion of ex-military men becoming civilian leaders. In sum, it can be argued that armed conflict and the military experience— whether for independence or for individual rights as Englishmen within the empire played an intrinsic role in shaping the American identity as a society and nation.

 

Transfer of Power from the British to Indian government on 15 August 1947

 

Indian independence and the military

The Indian experience of the handover of power was very different. First, unlike in America, the Transfer of Power from the British to the Indian government was a predominantly administrative procedure that did not involve physical military confrontation. The army was seen as a tool by the British and Indian civilian leaders who used it for their own political ends. Second, the British recruitment policy for the colonial Indian army focused on drawing recruits from select communities, alienating the armed forces from the rest of the population involved in the nationalist movement. This was in contrast to the experience of the US militias, which democratised and nationalised military service and experience. This also built a deep-rooted suspicion between the civilian leaders of India and the military (which was headed by British commanders-in-chief for a few years even after India became independent). This suspicion led to institutional arrangements separating civilian and military spheres. The position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was abolished, soon after independence in 1947, and the President of India (a nominal civilian head) was made the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.[6] Significantly, a Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs occupied the top tier of higher defence management in India. This was a purely civilian committee and included senior ministers from the Prime Minister’s Cabinet.[7]

Additionally, lasting attitudes of civilian and military leaders also did not allow the overlapping of military and civilian leadership to the extent that was prevalent in America. In September 1946, a year before India became independent, Jawaharlal Nehru (the first Prime Minister of India) wrote to the Indian Commander-in-Chief Sir Auchinleck. As a ‘coup-proofing’ strategy, Nehru felt ‘the need to make the army firmly responsible to India’s elected representatives in the future’. This resulted in Indian institution-building regarding defence and military matters that continuously evaluates the army to prevent it from getting ‘out of control’. For example, the Commander-in-Chief was removed from the Cabinet in 1946— a privilege he had enjoyed thus far— to keep him out of political decision-making. Additionally, all significant communications and decisions have to go through civilian officials and politicians at the Ministry of Defence little or no military experience. Thus, decision-making in India with regard to military matters was firmly established as the preserve of the civilian bureaucrats.

 

Conclusions

It can be proposed that the stake of military conflict in the creation of an independent nation is a factor influencing social and political attitudes towards the mixing of civilian and military spheres. This is not to argue that this is the only factor. The time periods in which India and the US secured independence are drastically different. Furthermore, India follows the Westminster parliamentary system and not the Presidential system, which influences public opinion on political leadership in general. Additionally, while India has been involved in a protracted conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir since independence, it has not had the direct experience of experiencing the World Wars or Cold War as an independent state or major party. These factors contribute to civilian perceptions of military involvement in political spheres.

Lawrence Freedman in his recent work ‘The Future of War: A History’ emphasises the need to keep context central to the study of war and conflict.[8] Differences such as the one identified in this article raise pertinent questions about the applicability of seemingly generalisable civil-military relations theories. This post makes a case for viewing these theories through specific historical contexts.

 

Saawani Raje is a Doctoral Candidate in the King’s India Institute. Her work focuses on civil-military relations in India and decision-making during military crises. She holds an MA in South Asia and Global Security from King’s College London and a BA from the University of Cambridge. Her other areas of research interest include security studies, strategy, diplomatic history and South Asian politics. You can follow her @saawaniraje

Notes:

[1] Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (January 1996): 149- 78.

[2] Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People At War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1979).

[3] Alan Millet, Peter Maslowski and William Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012), 165.

[4] Millet, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 175.

[5] Millet, Maslowski and Feis, For the Common Defense, 179.

[6] Ayesha Ray. The Soldier and the State in India. (California: Sage Publications, 2013), 37.

[7] Ayesha Ray in Harsh Pant (ed.) The Handbook of Indian Defence Policy (New Delhi: Routledge India 2015).

[8] Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (London: Allen Lane, 2017).

 

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Insurgency Scenario in Arunachal Pradesh

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By Athul Menath

 

Arunachal Pradesh, located in north east of India (Credit Image: The Tribune India)

The North Eastern states of India - often referred to as ‘the Seven Sister’ states - have been affected by insurgency in varying proportions since the 1950’s. Although the root causes of insurgencies can be traced back to India’s chaotic partition and colonial history, these violent movements arguably have been sustained due to failures of the Indian state, including a lack of transparent governance and employment opportunities, as well as the support provided to militants by hostile neighbours .

Geography is also a big factor. Arunachal Pradesh borders Myanmar in the east, China in the north, Bhutan in the west, as well as the two insurgency affected states of Nagaland and Assam. Despite the absence of sustained high level violence or indigenous insurgency, this state has been adversely affected by armed conflicts in adjacent areas and has become the life line of militant movement in the region. According to Assam Director General of Police (DGP), Assam was facing militant threat from groups’ based out of Arunachal and Nagaland.

On February 1, Indian Security Forces (SFs) killed two militants of the independent faction of the United Liberation Front (ULFA-I) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Shankapani in Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh. Only a week earlier, on January 24, 2018, an Indian Army trooper of the 11 Grenadiers regiment was killed in a joint ambush by Coordination Committee (CorCom) of Manipur and ULFA-I, at Namsai District along the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border. This was the first SF fatality in more than a year. The last in state SF fatality was recorded in December 3, 2016 when two SFs were killed and eight wounded in Nginu village in Tirap District in a joint operation by Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), ULFA-I and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).

The highest militancy-related fatality in Arunachal was recorded in 2001 with 63 fatalities, however between 2007-17 only three years recorded more than ten insurgency related fatalities.

Year Civilians Security Forces Terrorists Total
2000 7 3 24 34
2001 40 12 11 63
2002 7 4 21 32
2003 7 1 31 39
2004 6 2 35 43
2005 3 1 15 19
2006 0 0 4 4
2007 2 3 16 21
2008 0 0 2 2
2009 0 0 9 9
2010 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 41 41
2012 0 0 4 4
2013 0 0 4 4
2014 3 0 6 9
2015 2 4 4 10
2016 0 2 7 9
2017 0 0 6 6
2018 0 1 2 3
Total 77 33 242 352

* Militancy fatalities between 2000-18 (Source : SATP)

Significance and Spillover Threat

Arunachal Pradesh - which spreads over 83,743 square kilometres with a population of about 1.3 million - is a logistical hub for militants from adjacent states of Manipur, Assam and Nagaland. The militants use the state to cross over to the loosely governed Sagaing region of Naga Self-Administered Zone (NSAZ) in Myanmar, where at least 2,500 Indian militants are based.

The Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts of the state share 520 kilometers of the 1, 643 Kilometers long porous border with Myanmar. According to security agencies, these Districts along with Nagaland’s Mon and Tuesang Districts have become the nerve centre of militant activity in the region. As of January 31, 2018, in the last ten years these five Districts accounted for about 313 fatalities.

 

District Civilian Security Forces Terrorists Total
Mon 6 13 110 129
Tirap 1 11 73 85
Tuesang 18 0 43 61
Changlang 5 3 26 34
Longding 0 0 4 4
Total 30 27 256 313

Fatalities from five bordering districts of India (Source* SATP)

 

The three districts of Arunachal host militant groups such as NSCN-K, a reformation faction of NSCN (NSCN-R); the ULFA-I; the Saigora faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S); and CorCom. According to a Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) report, ‘several armed modules of ULFA-I either individually or jointly with CorCom are active in several locations….in Longding, Tirap and Changlang Districts.’ The notification also adds that the Assam-Arunachal interstate boundary continues to be used as hideouts and corridors for movement by militant groups.

NSCN-K, which abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Indian Government in 2015, has been the predominant organisation in Arunachal Pradesh. With a plethora of groups present in the region, the possibility of one militant group attempting to gain dominance in the area remains likely, which may result in a spike in factional clashes. According to an intelligence official, NSCN-IM, which currently conducts peace talks with Indian Government and is also a rival to NSCN-K, has attempted to gain dominance and destabilize NSCN-K by propping up local proxy militant groups such as the Eastern Naga National Government (ENNG).

Arunachal Pradesh Police records from 2016 indicate that there were at least 80 cases of extortion and about 103 incidents of abduction. In 2017, the number of abduction cases stood at 106 and extortion at 75. A majority of these incidents are perpetrated by militant groups as means to generate funds. Moreover, Arunachal Pradesh is located adjacent to the ‘golden triangle’, one of the primary opium producing regions in the world comprised of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. According to a 2016 report, NSCN-R has reportedly been recruiting drug addicts across the opium belt of Arunachal Pradesh to broaden its extortion racket. Apart from Longding, Tirap and Changlang, Lohit and Anjaw Districts are notorious for opium cultivation. According to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Arunachal topped the list of states in illegal poppy production for opium during 2014-15. NCB officials also claim that illegal poppy farms are guarded by armed militia who are known to work with insurgents.

 

Shift in Centre of Gravity & Future of Violence

After Sheikh Hasina became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 2014, Dhaka cracked down on Indian insurgents based in the country, resulting in militant groups relocating to Myanmar’s Sagaing region. With this development, the ‘centre of gravity’ for the insurgent movement shifted to Myanmar. Union Minister for Home Hansraj Ahir stated that between 2015 and March 31, 2017, the Indo-Myanmar border witnessed a steady rise in insurgent activities, resulting in the death of 18 security personnel and 32 insurgents, as well as the arrest of 337 militants .

Other Indian militants groups such as PLA and ULFA-I have shifted their bases to Shan State in Myanmar bordering China’s Yunnan province. Chinese intelligence has reportedly renewed relations with some militant leaders. ULFA has established links with Beijing’s proxy in Myanmar the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Additionally, Chinese intelligence officers arguably favoured the constitution of UNFLWESA, a conglomerate of various groups . In 2017, ULFA-I issued a statement against the visit of the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh.

 

Conclusion

Although the Indian Army has been able to keep violence contained in three Districts, rampant extortion, abduction and drug production highlight the inefficiency of the policing machinery of the state. The inefficient policing apparatus could also be an indicator of a possible deficiency in human intelligence, since the police is likely to have more local level contacts as they are indigenous to the area, unlike the Army. Consequently, intelligence-based targeted operations carried out at a grass root level also suffer.

The primary causality for the drop in insurgent violence can be attributed to the security cooperation extended by Dhaka, but the Indian counter insurgency strategy can only occupy a peripheral secondary position. With Myanmar becoming the primary base of operations for insurgent groups, the Arunachal Pradesh will play a vital role in strategy of Indian insurgent groups. In light of Beijing’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the supply of weapons to insurgents makes it a geopolitical issue rather than an internal security issue. The Indian government would do well to act accordingly.

 

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on Twitter @loner/56

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ULFA: A Persistent Threat

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By Athul Menath

Two ULFA cadres guarding a camp in Tinsukia district, in the northeast Indian state of Assam. (Source: AFP)

 

Since 1979, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has been at the forefront of insurgent violence in the Indian state of Assam. The group sprang up during the ‘anti-outsider’ agitation which demanded the expulsion of ethnic Bengalis whose large scale influx had impacted the local demography of Assam. Soon the movement started showing a secessionist character, resulting in the birth of ULFA, under the leadership of Paresh Baruah. The group has been demanding session from the Union of India, claiming that Assam has been ‘colonised by New Delhi’. Although created in 1979, the group became active in 1982, when it killed a well-known Bengali lawyer, Kalipada Sen.

An undivided ULFA was estimated to have a cadre strength of about 5,000. Following a split in 2012, two factions emerged. The first is the Pro-talk faction of ULFA (ULFA-PTF), which conducts peace talks with the Government of India. The second is the Independent faction of (ULFA-I), which is based in Myanmar and has a capacity of about three hundred cadres.

The article is an attempt to chronicle the renewed activity of ULFA-I and to identify the underlying reason for its longevity in the plethora of insurgent outfits in the often under-reported and misunderstood Northeast India.

 

Recent activities

On January 13, 2018 an ULFA-I cadre was arrested from Chabua in the Dibrugarh District. He was reportedly tasked by ULFA-I to collect information on aviation-carrying turbine fuel (ATF) tankers entering Chabua Air Force station. The alleged purpose was to place an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on ATF tankers entering the air base.

The month before, on the 8th December 2017, six militants of ULFA-I entered the Kunapathar Tea Estate in Bordumsa, Tinsukia District and opened fire at the estate manager, notably after the authorities refused to pay extortion money that the militants had previously demanded from the planters a couple of weeks prior. A few days later, on the 11th, the ULFA-I militants shot dead a Village Defense Party (VDP) President - identified as Anteswar Mahanta - and his son Karun at Dirak-Hunjan, Tinsukia District. The killing resulted in wide spread protests and demonstrations in the District, with civilians claiming that state Government had failed to provide security.

Additionally, reports in January 2018 indicate that ULFA-I and the Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) were planning attacks in India. For instance, it has been reported that ULFA-I leaders have found a location near the Namdapha National Park in Changlang of Arunachal Pradesh to set up a transit camp for about seventy cadres. Furthermore, the same report also claims that once the camp is ready, parts of Assam close to the south-east of Arunachal Pradesh will witness a rise in violence.

The insurgent group is also conducting ‘recruitment drive’ in Udalguri and Darrang, as well as Tinsukia, Shivsagar and Dibrugarh, the districts which have been their strongholds.

There is evidence to suggest that ULFA has revamped its abduction for ransom activities within the region. For example, they abducted the son of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) local leader of Tinsukia District, for INR 20 million. He was released on the 25th December, after ten days in captivity, although his family stated that they did not give any extortion money. However, Assam Police argues that ULFA-I could target more tea gardens and the business community in Upper Assam for extortion, given the area was facing a severe financial crisis.

 

Official statements- From Dismissive to cautious

The resurgence in ULFA-I activity follows briefly after the Assam Chief Minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, stated that the strength of ULFA was “no more” and there is “no law and order problem” in Assam. Although the state only witnessed twenty-six insurgency-related fatalities (five civilians, three Special Forces and eighteen militants) in 2017, compared to eighty-six in 2016 (thirty-three civilians, four SFs and forty-nine militants), the threat of armed outfits are persistent in the state.

Despite the Chief Minister’s statement, Assam Director General of Police (DGP) was more cautious about dismissing the group as a spent force. He stated that ULFA-I “was down but not out”. He also added that the militants were using neighboring states of Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh to enter Assam from Myanmar. The recent dormancy of ULFA-I, although interpreted by governing authorities as a sign of weakness, suggest that the organisation has been lying low to recover the losses it had incurred, and realign its strategy according to the evolving context in Assam.

The aforementioned contradictory statements may well be an indicator of the way by which inter-departmental coordination function at the state level. On the one hand, the political class may be attempting to convert the brief lull in to political gain as well as to claim the break in violence as a governmental achievement. On the other hand, however, the security establishment calls for a more cautious approach.

 

Secret of Longevity- Alliances

As Winston Churchill once said, there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.

The armed group has been able to keep itself alive over the years by developing a nexus with other militant groups in the region. Given that ULFA is a part of the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWSEA), a conglomerate of militant groups in north east India provides further credence that the group is yet to be defeated. UNLFWSEA was responsible for the June 2015 Paralon ambush in Manipur, where eighteen Army soldiers were killed. Also, the group was more recently involved in a joint insurgency attack in the same region, with another conglomerate group from a neighboring state and Coordination Committee (CorCom) – on the 22nd January 2017, it killed two SFs and two militants. It is also reportedly supported by Inter service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.

The connection takes place with other militant groups active in India such as the aforementioned NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K, as well as with Myanmar based militant groups such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which was instrumental in imparting insurgent tactics to ULFA cadres. Such an endeavour has helped the secessionist militant group to sustain itself for more than three decades, by securing safe havens and bases outside of India. The connection it had with Bangladesh’s Directorate of Field Intelligence (DGFI) also helped not only about safe havens but also to set up income generating projects. ULFA reportedly had number of firms including media consultancies and soft drink manufacturing units. Moreover, it was reported to own three hotels, a private clinic, and two motor driving schools in Dhaka. Paresh Barua was reported to personally own or has controlling interests in several businesses in Bangladesh, including a tannery, a chain of departmental stores, garment factories, travel agencies, shrimp trawlers and transport and investment companies.

 

Indian security forces with the suspected ULFA member arrested in Chabua (Credit: Avik Chakraborty)

 

Significance of the recent reinvigoration

The latest reinvigoration by ULFA-I comes at a politically sensitive time for Assam, after the first draft of National Register of Citizens (NRC) was published. The NRC aims to identify the ‘illegal migrants’ in the state, an issue which ignited the armed separatist movement in Assam in the first place. The second draft will be published following the Supreme Court’s order later in 2018. Additionally, Assam is scheduled to host a Global Investors’ summit from the 3rd-4th February 2018, in an attempt to seduce investors. The summit is expected to attract both major domestic and international investors. Moreover, the reported plan to attack the air base might indicate an attempt from ULFA to significantly escalate the level of violence. Targets would no longer be limited to SF patrols or perceived ‘outsiders’, but would also include defence and infrastructural installations.

 

Conclusion

In light of the aforementioned events, the possibility of a high impact militant attack resulting in mass fatalities cannot be ruled out. Also, such an attack would send a message to the business community that the law and order in the state remains unstable and insurgent groups cannot be written off completely.

Additionally, it is important not to rule out how ULFA uses the NRC to indulge in ethnic violence against those perceived to be ‘non-Assamese’. Any ethnic violence would act as a huge boost for ULFA and simultaneously increase the amount of cadres in its ranks. This surge could result in the revival of militancy in Assam. Hitherto, the highest number of deaths occurred in 1998 and 2000, with 783 and 758 fatalities respectively.

This festering rebellion also highlights the limits of the Indian Government’s security-centric approach towards internal insurgencies. Indeed, it heavily relies on armed forces to bring about a military solution to the crisis. Whilst this strategy may help in reducing or containing militant violence, it is incapable of addressing the political motivations that initially fuel insurgents. As a result, while militant groups are tactically defeated, the underlying political grievances (real or perceived) pave the way for insurgents to revive themselves periodically.

 

Athul Menath is a security analyst at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). His focus is the Insurgency in Northeast India. You can follow him on Twitter @loner/56.

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India’s eye in the sky: combat drones in the Kashmiri equation

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By: Gen Kawasaki and Chu Kah Leong

A Predator C Avenger Unmanned Aircraft System (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Lawlor/Released)
A Predator-C Avenger Unmanned Aircraft System (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Lawlor/Released)

The use of drones as a sophisticated means of deterrence and tactical precision has constituted one of the most prominent features of counterinsurgency in the twenty-first century. Represented in this instance by India’s ongoing negotiations for a drone partnership with the U.S., this newfound interest sheds important light on the changing means and ends of counterinsurgency and political violence within the already tenuous cords of Kashmiri security.[1]

Historically, India has proven itself as a seasoned practitioner of conventional force to achieve strategic goals in Kashmir. Military responses to Kashmiri insurgent movements since the 1980s - culminating in tens of thousands of casualties thus far - testify to the readiness to absorb the attendant repercussions of unrestrained political violence.[2] Viewed in unison with the newly formulated Cold Start doctrine, with its emphasis on tactical flexibility, the time remains early for the introduction of an attack medium that is both ubiquitous and efficient.[3] The role of drones as a selective yet no less brutal means of violence thus gains fresh relevance particularly in the wake of the devastating Uri attacks.[4]

On a broad note, a considerably strengthened Indian drone fleet is likely to contribute to stronger Pakistani responses in future disputes. While a surveillance drone deal will likely shift the India-Pakistan balance of power, New Delhi’s endgame is to obtain the Predator-C Avenger armed with Hellfire missiles - which would enable India to conduct pre-emptive, cross-border strikes along its porous borders against potential terrorist threats.[5] Acquiring such a capability would fit within the strategic boundaries established in the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1990 . The act legally justifies any ‘use of armed forces’, including that of drones, in territories explicitly classified as ‘disturbed areas’, which is the case of Kashmir.[6]

It is therefore not a stretch to conceptualize the deployment of drones – both lethal and nonlethal – to enforce Kashmiri security, albeit without the regulatory oversight of courts and legislative committees that actively work to define the parameters of drone activity. Coupled with evidence of Pakistani complicity in the Kashmiri insurgency movement,[7] what transpires is a drone platform that may exacerbate the already tenuous strains of low-intensity conflict in the region. Denoted by periodic exchanges of armed violence and border clashes, it remains an unsettling yet imperative task to ponder the dire consequence of an ill-informed drone strike mission – say, a missile that was launched on a location populated both by the suspected target as well as large numbers of civilians. Indian policymakers attracted to the tactical precision of drones will eventually have to be prepared to absorb the attendant strategic perils in an already confrontational atmosphere.

This drone push comes as President Obama wishes to finalize a key facet of US-Indian military cooperation before his successor assumes office. A key challenge, however, is that drones in the Line of Control - the de facto military control line between India and Pakistan - merely adds fuel to the fire. Operator proficiency, which is far from guaranteed, could result in collateral damage or even in-flight crashes. Such incidents, which would likely spark an overreaction from Pakistan, would test the resilience of U.S.-Indian military cooperation but would also open up further discussions for other possible bilateral defense programs.

Concurrently, whilst India’s recent entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has broadened existing avenues of military technology transfers, it still finds itself in a slight predicament.[8] New Delhi has long been reluctant to sign the accordant foundation agreements, consisting of the LSA (Logistical Support Agreement - currently LEMOA, a diluted version has been ratified), CISMOA (Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement) and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). While they are not prerequisites for bilateral cooperation with the U.S., they nevertheless expedite rates of interoperability and technology transfers, speeding up drone acquisitions in the process.

There remain a number of additional concerns regarding merits of signing these agreements. Firstly, the LSA requires India to provide access to its bases for U.S. Military Transporters - meaning that it would be compelled to forgo neutrality and strategic autonomy completely in the geopolitical frictions between the U.S. and China. Secondly, BECA would afford the U.S. unrestricted access to Indian intelligence reports and battlefield satellite data imagery whilst CISMOA forbids all Indian personnel from utilizing U.S. military communication devices. In the wake of such crucial diplomatic talks, many Indians have been increasingly concerned over how willing their government is to accept such lopsided and intrusive agreements.

With recently escalating tensions, the Indo-Pakistani dilemma remains crucial for both regional and international hegemons. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, which occurred weeks after the U.S. presidential elections, had dragged the international community into fierce multilateral negotiations to de-escalate the situation. With this in mind, India and its allies must carefully tread their bilateral drone programs as it is sure to have serious implications in the geopolitical future of the region.

Gen Kawasaki is a third year undergraduate at King’s College London. He is the researcher and coordinator for the King’s College London Crisis Simulation that will replicate tensions in the India-Pakistan region this year. LinkedIn: Gen Kawasaki

Chu Kah Leong is a third year undergraduate in the King’s War Studies Department. He recently concluded a year long exchange program in Tokyo, Japan and aspires towards graduate studies in the near future.

Notes:

[1] Sanjeev Miglani. “Update 1-India in talks to buy US Predator drones, has eye on China, Pakistan” Reuters, April 8, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/india-usa-drones-idUSL3N17B3YU

[2] Kaz De Jong, Nathan Ford, Saskia van de Kam, Kamalini Lokuge, Silke From, Renate van Galen, Brigg Reilley and Rolf Kleber, “Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley I: exposure to violence”, Conflict and Health 2:10 (2008), 2.

[3] Abishek Saksena, “Here’s Why the Indian Army’s New War Doctrine ‘Cold Start’ Is Giving Jitters to the World”, India Times (22 April 2015), accessed 6 October 2016. http://www.indiatimes.com/culture/who-we-are/heres-why-the-indian-army%E2%80%99s-new-war-doctrine- cold-start-is-giving-pakistan-the-jitters-232034.html

[4] Muhammad Daim Fazil, “Responding to Uri Attack: What Are India’s Options?”, The Diplomat (29 September 2016), accessed 8 October 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/responding-to-uri-attack-what-are-indias-options/

[5] Sanjeev Miglani. “India in talks to buy U.S. Predator drones, has eye on CHina, Pakistan” Reuters, April 11 2016. Accessed September 24, 2016. http://in.reuters.com/article/india-usa-predator-drones-china-pakistan-idINKCN0X51BW

[6] Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 (No. 21 of 1990), Sec. 3.

[7] PTI, “Pakistan Role Behind Violent Protests in Kashmir: MoS PMO”, The Times of India, 11 July 2016, accessed 6 October 2016. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-role-behind-violent-protests-in-Kashmir-MoS-PMO/articlesh ow/53157261.cms

[8] LDWO, Missile Technology Control Regime. “Report by the MTCR Chair: accession of India to the MTCR” MTCR, June 27, 2016. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://mtcr.info/report-by-the-mtcr-chair-accession-of-india-to-the-mtcr/

Image credit: Public domain photograph from defenseimagery.mil, available at http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imageRetrieve.action?guid=39eddc33aac4199784b181043137d0e6f2c9d301&t=2

Water: a wellspring of conflict?

by

EDITORS NOTE: This is the first article in a four-part series which explores the role of water in human conflict and politics. The series marks (though is not affiliated with) World Water Day 2016, a UN initiative to promote awareness of water issues. More information on World Water Day can be found here.

By: Paula Hanasz

Paula Hanasz - leaking tap in India
Dripping tap in India. South Asia is relatively abundant in water resources, but it is not always distributed efficiently or equitably. (Image by Paula Hanasz, 2014)

Water wars; they seem inevitable in an age of non-traditional security threats and problems such as climate change requiring collective action. But water is rarely a single cause of conflict. Certainly, water can be a stress multiplier in a conflict, but violent conflict can also affect the equitable distribution of water – and thus exacerbate tensions. In other words, it’s complicated. Conflict is never straightforward, and neither is water governance.

Nonetheless, the fear of water wars persists. The logic is obvious to the point of a truism: water scarcity combined with rapidly increasing populations and the consistent growth in demand for food and energy will lead to competition between states over freshwater resources. This competition, the thinking goes, is likely to culminate in violent clashes over control of this precious, finite and irreplaceable resource.

Commentators such as Brahma Chellaney have built careers making this very argument. He argues that Asia may be on the brink of water wars fuelled by China’s accelerating consumption of water, energy and food, and its powerful upstream position vis-à-vis weaker, already volatile states on the Mekong and Brahmaputra Rivers (i.e., India and Bangladesh on the former, and Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand on the latter).

Compelling though it is, the water wars thesis has been widely discredited by scholars. No war has ever been solely over water. Rather, hydropolitics – the geopolitics of water – is regarded by academics and policymakers to be complex. It is no longer possible to simply say that water causes conflict.

In recent years, water scholars, including many affiliated with the London Water Research Group based at King’s College, have shown that more often than not, there can be cooperation over a shared river and conflict over it at the same time. The Indus River is a prime example of this. The conflict between India and Pakistan following independence from the British Empire included disputes over the shared rivers of the Indus basin, and eventually resulted in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. Although the treaty still has its critics in both countries, it continued to function throughout the two wars between India and Pakistan.

Another important point is that water conflict is not always so bad, and water cooperation is not always what it seems. Disputes can force states to negotiate mutually agreeable outcomes, but at the same time, international treaties can cement an inequitable status quo. For example, India signed in 1996 an agreement with Bangladesh over the sharing of waters of the Ganges River, but this arrangement greatly favours India and continues to be a source of resentment within Bangladesh.

Just because water is not unequivocally a wellspring of conflict, that is no reason for complacency. Tensions over shared water resources are real and require our attention. The current conflict in Syria, for example, has been exacerbated by decades of weak governance in the water and agriculture sectors, and a lack of preparedness for severe drought. Water, in other words, is often one piece in a very complex puzzle of conflict.

The puzzle of water-related conflict does not necessarily reveal a picture of states contra states. Firstly, the notion of state’s priorities and approaches to water management as being homogenous is incorrect because subsets of national actors have different values and agendas. Secondly, most water-related violence happens at the sub-national level between tribes, sub-national governance units such as states or municipalities, rural and urban populations, water use sectors, etc.[1]

For example, the disputes between Indian states over shared rivers are arguably more heated and entrenched than water disputes that India has with neighbouring Nepal or Bangladesh. Similarly, disputes can arise between, for instance, industrial water users and agricultural water users, or between urban consumers and environmental conservationists. The Murray-Darling basin in Australia provides an illustration of tensions between water use sectors – farmers at odds with the city of Adelaide and the policymakers in Canberra wishing to reserve some river flow for environmental purposes and Aboriginal cultural rights.

An American water governance expert, Ken Conca, argues that while most conflicts over water occur at the local level – at the scale of a city, say, or the watershed –they are also often driven by powerful global forces. For example, Conca argues that, “[T]he growth of industrial fish farming is fuelled by changing consumer tastes in rich countries. Big hydroelectric projects in remote locations often power industrial processing facilities that plug into the global economy, while bypassing local economies and imposing a heavy burden on local communities”[2]

Another red herring in the puzzle of water conflicts is the issue of scarcity. Looking solely at factors such as the volume of water available per capita does not take into account spatial variability in water resources within countries and the technological or economic adaptation of nations at different levels of development.[3] Some states such as Israel are relatively arid but can still maximise their per capita allocation through technologies such as desalination plants; others, like India, have abundant water resources but lack apparatus and ability to distribute these resources efficiently or equitably.

In other words, water-related disputes do not arise out of a lack of water per se, but rather the misallocation or mismanagement of existing water resources. When the distribution of finite resources is perceived as unjust, that is when disputes begin.

More importantly, water is rarely, if ever, the single cause of conflict. It is, however, a stress multiplier. In the context of other socio-political disruptions, the lack of water or the inequitable distribution of water, can tip the often fragile socio-political stability off-kilter. Even the renowned scholar Aaron Wolf, who proposes the idea that water is largely a vector of cooperation, warns that “The lack of a clean freshwater supply clearly does lead to instability which, in turn, can create an environment more conducive to political or even military conflict.”[4] Wolf adds that “Water-related disputes can also engender civil disobedience, acts of sabotage, and violent protest.”[5]

Resentment about water allocation can combine with and exacerbate other existing tensions. The effects of climate change – another stress multiplier[6] – in conjunction with a population boom could, for example, lead to shortfalls in water supply in the Middle East and contribute to mounting discontent.[7] But environmental stresses alone are not enough to cause conflict.

Both Syria and California have faced severe drought in recent years. But only in Syria has the fabric of society almost completely disintegrated. Why? Mismanagement and lack of foresight have left the country ill prepared to cope with such a drought. In contrast, although the Californian drought is taking its toll too, the broader system of food production which is affected is more resilient to shocks: the USA is better equipped than Syria for dealing with natural disasters and the federal government structure is able to provide somewhat of an economic safety net. Resilience, then, is the factor that determines whether water stress can be contained or whether it will add to other stress multipliers and boil over into conflict.

The relationship between water and conflict flows in more than one direction. Water can be a stress multiplier in conflict, as we just saw, but violent conflict can also exacerbate the water situation. The effects of an existing or ongoing conflict can worsen the access to water for those who need it most, such as internally displaced persons. Water-dependent livelihoods, such as those in irrigated agriculture, could also be disrupted by conflicts that damage infrastructure or blocks access to water sources. This might set off a chain reaction across sectors, exacerbating the conflict further. After all, water security is inextricably linked with food security and, thus, human security.

Once conflict – no matter what its catalyst – encroaches on the availability of and access to environmental resources, it may become intractable. Grievances over control of natural resources may contribute to the onset of conflict, revenues from natural resources may finance conflict, and combatants often target or otherwise damage the environment.

In recent conflicts in Iraq, we have seen dams captured by militias; the threat of destroying the dam is used as a ‘stick’ against downstream population, while the promise of continuous water supply is a ‘carrot’. The ‘weaponisation’ of water and water infrastructure in this way is not a novel tactic; it has been employed by various groups in various parts of the world for centuries. But attacking water infrastructure in war time for military gain is no different from attacking or capturing other civil infrastructure and as such does not strictly fit into the understanding of water-related conflict.

Once violent conflict subsides, peace is often fragile: countries with past resource-related conflicts are, according to Environmental Peacebuilding, more likely to relapse, and to do so twice as quickly. Many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, have been ravaged by conflicts over natural resource extraction, and unable to rebuild social and economic stability through subsequent droughts and famines.

As discussed above, the availability of and access to natural resources such as water can exacerbate or be exacerbated by conflict. The complexity of such conflicts has led to the development of a new discipline – environmental peacebuilding – which “integrates natural resource management in conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and recovery to build resilience in communities affected by conflict”

Environmental peacebuilding is a growing field.

In conclusion, wars between nation-states over freshwater resources are unlikely, but sub-state conflicts are not. Moreover, the cause and effect between conflict and water availability are not always clear or unidirectional. The same water resources can simultaneously be a source of conflict and an instrument for cooperation. In the coming decades, we will see more complex disputes develop, not only between groups of people, but also water-use sectors and urban versus rural populations. These resentments over water allocation may function as stress multipliers in other socio-political conflicts, which in turn could worsen the access to water resources for those most vulnerable. The conflicts we do see will certainly be more complex and requiring nuanced approaches, such as those that can be applied based on research within the emerging academic field of environmental peacebuilding.

 

Paula Hanasz is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, Crawford School of Public Policy. Her thesis examines water security and conflict in the Ganges and Brahmaputra basins. She is interested in how international aid donors use Track II diplomacy to increase transboundary water cooperation. Paula is also an Associate with the Centre for International Water Law and Security at the London Centre of International Law Practice. @paulahanasz

 

Notes:

[1] Aaron Wolf et al, “Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation”, State of the World 2005 (The Worldwatch Institute, 2005), p. 87.

[2] Ken Conca, “The New Face of Water Conflict”, in Navigating Peace (No.3, November 2006), p. 3.

[3] Shira Yoffe et al, “Geography of international water conflict and cooperation: Data sets and applications” in Water Resources Research (Vol. 40, 2004), p. 2.

[4] Aaron Wolf, “Conflict and cooperation along international waterways”, in Water Policy (Vol. 1 #2, 1998), p. 9.

[5] Aaron Wolf et al, “Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation”, State of the World 2005 (The Worldwatch Institute, 2005), p. 88.

[6] National Research Council of the National Academies, Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, Water Resources, and Water Security (Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2012), p. 89.

[7] Kurt M. Campbell et al, The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Center for a New American Security, 2007), pp. 60-61.