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The British Security Service: Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Brexit Order

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by Gemma MacIntyre

The SIS Building in London features as the headquarters of the British Secret Intelligence Service (Image credit: Wikimedia)

British security services traditionally played a leading role in protecting both international and national security interests. In so doing, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), since it was first established in 1909, has benefitted from unrivalled access to issues of a covert nature. In turn, this has allowed the SIS to gain vast amounts of intelligence, that have enriched the conduct of both British and European foreign policy. Most notably, access to international data has enabled the SIS to be both preventative as well as proactive in tackling foreign threats, matters that are increasingly paramount in the current information age.

However, the British security environment in 2020 is very different to that of the early 1900s. In addition to a variety of emerging security issues - such as the ubiquity of hostile non-state actors, tensions with an increasingly clandestine Russia, and the threat of cyber-attacks - the impact of Brexit on security relations with the EU remains unclear. Nonetheless, by considering to what extent the UK has allied with the EU on security matters, particularly those most prominent today - one could speculate the challenges, and potential opportunities, that leaving the EU may serve.

In 2018, the National Security Capability Review (2018: 5) underscored the impact of security threats in the twentieth century on the ‘rules-based’ international system. The threat of cyber-attacks to British public services (as evidenced by the 2017 WannaCry attack on the NHS); instability in Middle Eastern and African areas that could give rise to Islamic-extremists; threats posed by Russia (underscored by the 2018 Salisbury nerve-agent poisoning); and, of course, the speed and access to telecommunications worldwide - all convey the increasingly transnational nature of security threats to twenty-first century Britain. This, coupled with uncertainties of Brexit, will inevitably impact the conduct of British security.

On paper, British policy-makers recognise the importance of adapting British security services to respond to evolving needs in an increasingly globalised order. In 2018, the British Government conceptualised the term ‘Global Britain’, to convey Britain’s commitment to multilateral cooperation (UK Parliament, 2018). The UK Government stressed that, despite leaving the EU, Britain continued to share mutual security interests with EU states; so cooperation would continue. Pro-Brexit advocates, such as British Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, have made clear that by leaving the EU, the British intelligence service would benefit from increased levels of funding, and the capacity to be more flexible in foreign policy security (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2019: 6). Scholars such as Hadfield (2018: 181) have also suggested that by leaving the EU, the UK may have greater freedom to enrich its bilateral security-relationships with EU states.

On the other hand, many remain dubious about the impact of Brexit on security. Neil Basu, Head of Counter-Terrorism in the UK, reported that, in the case of a no-deal Brexit, ‘The UK’s safety and security would suffer’ (The Guardian, 2019). Furthermore, it remains unclear to what extent the UK will continue to benefit from European security initiatives. The Schegen Information System II (SIS II) and the European Arrest Warrant are two European databases, which have helped to provide intelligence to the SIS on a range of security threats. Most critically, the SIS II has, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2019), enriched the UK’s counter-terrorism policy - by enabling Britain to track terrorists from Europe more easily. The IISS also highlighted the benefit of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which enables EU convicts to be extradited in their home country. In the case of the Spivrak attack, the EAW enabled Russian perpetrators to be extradited outside of the UK. British intelligence also benefits from the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which significantly widens Britain’s security database. As a result, a no-deal Brexit, according to IISS (2019) would delay this process, making Brits more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Coupled with this uncertainty, there is a lack of political-security leadership. Jeremy Corbyn has been criticised for not taking security seriously enough, with representatives from MI5 having to brief him on the current severity of issues (The Sunday Times, 2019). Jonson, on the other hand, faces a different - though, still concerning - sort of criticism. His crass comments about Islam not only underline his lack of sensitivity; they also risk exacerbating security issues further - by isolating minority groups. The proliferation of terrorist attacks in the UK by home-grown jihadists underline the saliency of this threat, as well as the need to understand and integrate minority groups - rather than ostracising them further.

While the impact of Brexit on UK security capabilities remains unclear; it is nonetheless important for the UK to consider potential measures, to strengthen its security capabilities. If the FCO does experience cuts, this may limit its previous capacity and access abroad. Dr. Champa Patel, Head of the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, argued that in order for the UK to remain a leader in international security, the British government has to improve its cross-departmental cooperation (Chatham House, 2018). Sir John Sawers, former head of MI6, reinforced this argument, by stating that in the current security environment, intelligence data is vital to protect British interests (Financial Times, 2018). In other words, there is perhaps now, more than ever, a greater need for the intelligence service and policy-makers to work collaboratively in the interest of British security.

Of course, the arguments for cross-departmental cooperation are not new. Former intelligence officer-turned-academic, Michael Herman (1988), conceptualised the analogy of policy-makers as ‘consumers’ and intelligence agents as ‘producers’ over thirty years ago, to evoke the benefits of intelligence to British foreign policy-makers. Moreover, scholars have underscored the dangers of tensions between intelligence and diplomacy for years Bjola, 2014; Gookins, 2008; Pinkus, 2014). Blair’s fabrication of intelligence to justify Iraqi intervention (2003), is a case in point of the potential dangers of politicised intelligence, as well as the need for greater cooperation.

While advocacy for greater cross-departmental cooperation is hardly novel, what is relatively unprecedented is the use of intelligence in British foreign policy conduct - particularly in an increasingly uncertain security environment. This, coupled with the impact of Brexit on FCO funds and access to European security initiatives, underscores the increased need for cross-departmental cooperation. If security ties with the EU weaken; the UK must search for alternatives. Its domestic intelligence service serves the greatest beacon of hope to remain an influential leader in both national and international security policy.

References:

Bjola, C. (2014). The Ethics of Secret Diplomacy: A Contextual Approach. Journal of Global Ethics, 10(1): 85-100

Chatham House. (2018). The UK Needs to Speak with One Voice to Prevent Mass Atrocities. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/uk-needs-speak-one-voice-prevent-mass-atrocities

Gookins, A. J. (2008). The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making. Review of International Affairs, 28(1): 65-73

Hadfield, A. (2018). ‘Britain against the World? Foreign and Security Policy in the ‘Age of Brexit’’. In: B. Martill and U. Staiger. Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe. London: UCL Press

Herman, M. (1998). Diplomacy and Intelligence. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9(2): 1-22

Pinkus, J. (2014). ‘Intelligence and Public Diplomacy: The Changing Tide.’ Journal of Strategic Security, 7(4): 33-46

The Financial Times. (2018). 5 Concerns for UK-EU Defence After Brexit. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5c9898e0-124a-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277

The Guardian. (2019). Brexit: No Deal Would Harm UK Security, Senior Officer Warns. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/07/no-deal-brexit-would-harm-uk-security-senior-officer-warns

The International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2019). Brexit and Security. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2018/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-december2018january2019/606-04-inkster-cm

The Times. (2019). Spy Chiefs Sit Corbyn Down for Chat About Russia and Jihadist Terror Threat. Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spy-chiefs-sit-corbyn-down-for-chat-about-russia-and-jihadist-terror-threat-9mzf8wczd

UK Parliament. (2017). Brexit: Implications for National Security. Available at: https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7798

UK Parliament. (2018). Appendix: Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/780/78008.htm

UK Parliament. (2018). National Security Capability Review: A Changing Security Environment. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtnatsec/756/75602.htm

Gemma recently graduated from the University of St Andrews in International Relations and Management, and is now studying an MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s. Through her academic studies and voluntary experience with VSO in Nigeria, she has developed a strong interest in the relationship between corruption and development. During her undergraduate degree, she studied a range of post-conflict cases, with a particular focus on intractable conflicts such as Israel-Palestine and Bosnia. Her experience with VSO Nigeria furthered her interest, as she was made aware of the acute impacts of governance on public services, such as health and education. She hopes to pursue further research on the impact of conflict on health security.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Strife Series on Cyberwarfare and State Perspectives, Part III – The argument for a more critical analysis on the United States

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By Shivali Bhatt

Military Operation in Action, Soldiers Using Military Grade Laptop Targeting Enemy with Satellite (Credit Image: Gorodenkoff / Stock Image)

A critical line of argument regarding cyber warfare today is how it has supposedly brought about contextual changes that challenge the balance of power in the international system. The broad consensus is that large, powerful states, like the United States, are losing leverage against those - traditionally - deemed small and weak. According to an article published earlier this year by the World Economic Forum Global Platform, the rising domain of cyber warfare can be somewhat seen to be causing a levelling effect in the world today. Any state or non-state entity with access to the Internet and digital technology can develop powerful cyber weapons. At the same time, some news sources have claimed how the much-anticipated cyberwar is already underway, and how the United States is not ready or will most likely lose. The simplistic nature of such discourse fails to allow for a more critical understanding of what factors influence the nature and reality of cyber warfare. This article shall critique these narratives by analysing the factors that influence the strategic efficacy of cyberwarfare. Bearing the current state of cyberwarfare in the United States in mind, it shall contextualise these factors.

The United States is the most powerful state in the world, particularly regarding its military and intelligence capacity. President Trump elevated the original Cyber Command to a Unified Combatant Command earlier this year.

 

The importance of intelligence and collaboration

While it takes a lot of skill and effort to appropriately develop a powerful cyber weapon, the most complicated part of this process is application or deployment. It is this stage that determines the extent to which a cyber operation will yield strategic leverage for a state; one that relies on intelligence agencies and international alliances. In other words, cyber weapons are generally part of an extensive collection of capabilities.

Theoretically, the state with the most resourced and well-connected intelligence community will likely reel in greater strategic benefits from the domain of cyberwarfare, on the basis they are active political players in global affairs. The more in-depth and holistic the collecting and analysing of intelligence data, the smarter the cyber offensive strategy. In this context, the United States has notable leverage. The U.S. spends approximately $1 trillion on establishments and organisations that serve a national security purpose; in which its intelligence community spans across seventeen federal agencies. Moreover, these bureaus have strictly woven relationships with a large number of agencies operating in other states, with bases and ground-level operatives in over forty countries, including Israel and the United Kingdom. As NATO’s Operation Locked Shields demonstrates, cyberwarfare is a multi-dimensional domain that is determined by the nature of cooperation and collaboration between states. The Stuxnet virus, for instance, was planted with the assistance of the CIA’s regional partners in Israel; assets that were crucial to such a clandestine and sensitive operation. These practical steps to implementing cyberwarfare strategies explain why the U.S. is still and will always technically be a dominant player in the field.

 

The broader political context

Given that cyberwarfare is an aspect of broader political strategy, states that are regularly engaged in international affairs are more likely to determine the context for cyber-attacks. The United States is considered extremely influential, while North Korea - regardless of how large, fast-growing or highly skilled its ‘cyber army’ appears - a back-seat driver. Narratives that present North Korea as a case study to exemplify the ‘levelling effect’ in the world today, often present highly fragmented arguments outside of context.

It is useful to consider how economics and politics are woven together into the strategic context of cyber warfare, given that a prime part of developing cyber warfare strategy involves gathering in-depth knowledge on a person or situation. Similar to how former President Obama’s administration exploited the weaknesses of Russia’s economy by imposing heavy sanctions against Moscow in 2014, Washington can gain a notable edge by targeting Putin’s private affairs offshore; the consequences of which would be determined by the extent to which Putin’s private affairs affect Russia’s domestic political context. According to a National Bureau of Economic Research paper, the total accumulation of Russian offshore holdings amounts to approximately between $800 billion and $1.3 trillion; most of which belongs to President Putin and associates. This wealth power has been a contributing factor to his political power and ability to maintain authority in Russia, enabling him to govern and preside over state institutions and the secret police. Targeting his foreign assets would be a strategic application of U.S. cyber power.

 

Underlying factors

In this discussion, it is useful to recognise the longer-term damage traditional military weapons can have on both intellectual and physical infrastructures, and how those induced by cyberspace have not yet demonstrated such ability. At the same time, the Stuxnet weapon and newer versions inspired from its technological layering, such as the relatively recent Triton bug, can act as catalysts to broader military strategy. However, the accurate deployment of such a weapon not only requires a significant amount of skill and resource, both of which are usually available to higher-earning economies but also can go wrong. In the case of Stuxnet, several sources confirmed that the Americans and Israelis ‘lost control’ of their act.

It goes without a doubt saying that the United States is a powerful influencer in the world today, and especially so in a context of increasing globalisation and digital technology. There are a lot of concepts, processes and cultural embedding that would also need to be in the firing line for this argument to hold any traction in the longer term.

 

Conclusion

Today, it is really popular to consider cyberwarfare as this rising domain that challenges all other pre-existing tenets of global politics, with the narrative being how weaker states such as North Korea are on the rise and those powerful ones such as the United States should watch their back. However, the authors of such arguments seem also to disregard any more in-depth aspects of warfare analysis, such as the power of alliance, broader context, and particularly the underlying factors found within societal construct and culture that have existed before the advent of the digital age. While cyber warfare has proven to be a powerful mechanism, its scope of threatening powerful actors like the United States needs to be assessed through a more critical lens. Further, doing so will help better conceptualise its strategic worth in comparison to more conventional methods of warfare strategy.

 

Shivali is currently pursuing her MA Intelligence and International Security at Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She is also a Series Editor at Strife, as well as a Creative Writer at cybersecurity startup PixelPin, where she contributes articles on ‘Thought Leadership’, encouraging readers to approach security issues through innovative means. Prior to that, she spent some time in Hong Kong under the InvestHK and EntrepreneurHK organisations, engaging with the cybersecurity and tech scene on the East Coast. Her core research interests include modern warfare and contemporary challenges, cybersecurity, and strategic policy analysis. You can follow her on @shivalixb

Image Source: https://www.istockphoto.com/gb/photo/military-operation-in-action-soldiers-using-military-grade-laptop-targeting-enemy-gm879913090-245205517

Book Review: ‘Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11’

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Reviewed by Ioana Ilie

 

Michael Allen, Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11. USA, University of Nebraska Press, Potomac Books, Inc., 2013. ISBN: 978-1-61234-823-0. Pp. 280. Paperback. £13.99.

 

Michael Allen’s book Blinking Red attempts to be the authoritative legislative history of the U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. Following the shock of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent public demand to ‘do something’, a reorganisation of the intelligence community was overdue. Having been considered, debated, and researched for a long time beforehand, a reform was finally in the works. The reform resulted in the creation of two institutions – the National Intelligence Director (DNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Blinking Red is an account of the legislative process surrounding IRTPA while also depicting the great sense of urgency to make the U.S. safer post-9/11, that was bestowed upon the U.S. government. More striking, perhaps, is Allen’s focus on the personalities and interpersonal relationships that shaped this bill. Individuals such as Scott Palmer (the House Speaker’s chief of staff), for example, who made significant efforts to revive the legislation even after the 2004 re-election because he truly believed in it and its importance. Or, then Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet who made the position he held more powerful due to his charismatic personality. The book also gives the reader a real taste of the internal and external pressures under which policymakers had to work. Pressures from the President, especially before the re-election campaign, and from groups such as The 9/11 Families for a Secure America are just a couple of the many examples put forward in Blinking Red.

Allen’s position as the legislative affairs officer for the Homeland Security Council in the White House gave him access to many high-level officials and meetings. The book brims with information, that Allan either acquired himself as an eyewitness; or through interviews. In this context Blinking Red is an invaluable resource for students of government and intelligence studies, as the reader develops a good understanding of the working relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government. The book is also very readable despite its handling of complex legislative procedures and the many actors involved. Chapters like ‘Dirty Bombs’ are true page-turners due to their vivid description of political intrigue.

The 9/11 Commission Report was put together by the 9/11 Commission, formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which comprised of ten members, five Republicans and five Democrats. While Allen does not address this point specifically in his book, the even split between Democrats and Republicans is an important display of unity and compromise at a time of great partisan division. It can perhaps also be interpreted as an attempt at objective reporting on a divisive and controversial topic. Its main recommendations, put forward in the Executive Summary, fall into two categories - ‘what to do’ and ‘how to do it’. The ‘what’ can be summarised as a strategy, one that aims to match the means to the ends. The Commissioners proposed a three-pronged approach: ‘attack terrorists and their organizations, prevent the continued growth of Islamic terrorism, and protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.’ In terms of ‘how’, the report calls for a better organised government and the need ‘to build unity of effort across the U.S. government.’ The Commissioners gave five suggestions towards achieving that. The first, to bridge the foreign-domestic divide by establishing a NCTC. The second, to work towards ‘unifying the intelligence community’ under a DNI. The third, to create a ‘network-based information sharing system’ in order to improve the inter-agency counterterrorism effort. The fourth, to spare no effort in ‘unifying and strengthening congressional oversight’. Finally, the fifth, to ensure the ‘strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.’[1]

However, theory did not translate into practice, as Allen clearly argues towards the end of the book. What ended up being implemented was rather disappointing for many who expected a reform of the intelligence community. Instead of having a DNI who could easily and quickly move money and people across the intelligence community in order to meet the new threats of the post-Cold War world, the DNI was given a vague job description and limited powers. In fact, Allen gives an illuminating account of how differently officials - from the President, to the Senate, and the DNIs themselves - saw the job of the DNI.

The law gave the DNI some authority over budget and personnel but not enough to be the unifying leader of the intelligence community. Indeed, one cannot help but wonder how effective an intelligence director can be without being involved on a strategic and operational level. Allan argues, that in the end, the DNI is only as strong as the President allows him or her to be, a situation which does not inspire continuity or stability. While President Bush believed in a strong DNI, President Obama was not sold on the idea and was against the strengthening of the DNI role. Ever-hostile towards the intelligence community, President Trump also doubts the need for a DNI.[2]

At the centre of the book lies the discussion about the DNI, what he or she should be able to do and how. The reader gets real insight into many different opinions and demands that needed to be considered and managed when formulating the bill. Chapters such as ‘The Devil in the Details’ and ‘Attackers’ describe the difficult task of reaching a compromise, and the clash of ideas between three main groups: the group that was interested in a strong DNI, which was mainly the White House; the group that was interested in strengthening the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) instead, opinion voiced by the CIA and many of its former DCIs; and finally a third group, which was not interested in creating either a DNI position or a NCTC. This was the view of the Department of Defence, as well as Rumsfeld’s, arguing that such a drastic reform would only hurt the military in the field in the middle of two raging wars. Such big differences settled in a short amount of time (about four months from the time The 9/11 Commission Report was published until IRTPA was passed) resulted in a weak law. In order to get enough votes and to please all conflicting sides, the language of the bill was left intentionally vague.

‘Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists’[3], warned the Commissioners. However, four months later the U.S. settled exactly for that.

 

Ioana Ilie is a recent War Studies and History graduate from King’s College London. She is passionate about Anglo-American foreign policy and grand strategy as well as geopolitics and intellectual history.You can follow her on Twitter @ioana_a_ilie

Notes:

[1] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Executive Summary. [Washington, DC] :[National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States], 2004.

[2] NPR, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/16/515590646/wheres-the-director-of-national-intelligence. Accessed 30th of October 2017.

[3] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Executive Summary. [Washington, DC] :[National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States], 2004.

Image Source

Banner: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aerial_view_of_the_Pentagon_during_rescue_operations_post-September_11_attack.JPEG

 

Bibliography:

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Executive Summary. [Washington, DC] :[National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States], 2004.

NPR, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/16/515590646/wheres-the-director-of-national-intelligence. Accessed 30th of October 2017.

 

 

Strife Feature - Spying on Friends

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By Anastasia Beck

In the aftermath of the allegations of the US National Security Agency (NSA) spying on allied states such as Germany, and accusations from the White House concerning alleged spying by Britain’s GCHQ on Donald Trump during his presidential campaign, moral questions have arisen regarding spying on one’s allies. The gravity of these incidents was further underlined by the moral outrage around such aspects by politicians in these countries. However, are such reactions disproportionate and should countries expect this sort of behaviour due to the tumultuous nature of the international stage?

This article will discern whether it is possible to legitimise the action of spying on one’s allies by first looking at the debate through a theoretical lens, using the Just Intelligence Theory. In the corresponding sections, I investigate the nature of ‘alliances’ and follow it up with an assessment of previous examples of friendly spying that underscores how spying on one’s allies is imperative in the current international system.

As part of the Snowden leaks, a presentation slide was released depicting NSA signals intelligence operations around the world which collect data from many countries, even allies.

The Just Intelligence Theory

From a theoretical perspective, states should not spy on each other. This view stems from the application of the Just Intelligence Theory to friendly espionage. ‘By using the Just War tradition as a base it is possible to establish a set of just intelligence principles that can limit the harm intelligence collection causes while outlining what circumstances would be required to justify the harm caused.’[1] The just intelligence principles include: having a just cause, a legitimate authority to sanction the activity, be conducted for the intended purpose, be proportionate, be used as a last resort, and discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets.[2]

The first principle, having a just cause to conduct intelligence, would require there to be a substantial threat to justify any harm caused through the collection of intelligence. As it is the security services’ duty to preserve and maintain national interests, a high-level threat would provide sufficient cause to conduct intelligence activities. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Britain’s secret intelligence service MI6 and USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) utilised a Soviet spy - Oleg Penkovsky - to relay vital information back to the West regarding Soviet intentions and capabilities. The near possibility of total war occurring between the two super powers justified the use of spying against the Soviet Union. However, when one examines intelligence collection on friendly states, it is hard to justify a similar action. Spying on your allies entails that there is no immediate threat, and is instead being conducted because of a general understanding of the targeted state’s nature and not because of an overt provocation. However, the just intelligence theory, much like the just war theory, ‘is blind to general information about states and information that does not amount to identifying a concrete threat’ can therefore not be used as a justification for intelligence collection against them.[3] To be clear, general information would surmount to a state’s religion and political position, so for example, if one were at odds with an allied state’s political system that alone does not justify spying on it. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, spying on one’s allies does not have a just cause, thereby making the whole activity unjust.

Another principle requires sticking to the stated purposes, and not diverge for political, economic or social objectives. And yet, spying on your allies often does not meet this condition. Once again, a government’s role is to safeguard the interests of the nation, and this would require knowledge around fiscal, foreign or defence policies of allied states. For example, one could argue that, due to rising tensions within the European Union on spending towards Greece, it would seem appropriate for Germany to keep abreast of any changes in Greek fiscal policy - which the Greeks may not wish to openly disclose.[4]

However, this theory is not a legal doctrine and few states would give up vital information on fellow states to follow such stringent rules. Furthermore, the international system is extremely competitive and anarchic, with state’s wishing to pursue strategies in consonance with their national interests.

What needs to be therefore examined is what it means to be an ally in the international system and whether the true nature of alliances justifies the use of spying on one another. Alliances and friendly relationships are merely ‘mutual-defence pacts’ between states that often share and adhere to particular norms and practices.[5] But states are in competition with one another, with allies pursuing their own national interests above that of others.[6] As a result, trust among states in the international system is fragile due to the uncertainty surrounding the possibility of opposing views of leaders of governments which may affect their positions abroad.[7] It is this uncertainty surrounding intentions, and the possibility of its translation into policy, that may motivate a state to conduct surveillance on the inner debates and workings of partner countries. It would be foolish to blindly trust their partners. As history has illustrated, allies often diverge and defect from previously agreed upon policies.

Examining transatlantic alliances

“A friend today can become an enemy tomorrow” is a phrase which can be applied quite successfully towards past and present-day alliances. Due to the competitive nature of the international system at large, allies’ interests may diverge, therefore an understanding of such change is required. A good example of this would be the alliance between Germany and the US. Many would agree that these two states - both NATO members - have a warm relationship. Spying on the Germans has had positive outcomes. In the 1970s, at the time of the Cold War, West Germany, a US ally, had discovered that the East Germans had planted a communist spy in West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s inner circle.[8] When the infiltration was revealed, the damage was NATO-wide, with Brandt having to resign after it was found that his letters to President Nixon had been compromised.[9] However, in modern times, Germany has diverged and disagreed with certain US policies, thus undermining US interests. In 2011, Obama expressed his desire to intervene militarily in Libya but faced opposition from German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Had the US intervened in Libya, Merkel could have used her influence to reduce NATO’s participation in the conflict.[10] Additionally, ‘Washington and Berlin have clashed over how to manage the eurozone crisis, the resolution of which have far-reaching implications for the German and US economies’.[11] The NSA wiretapping Merkel’s mobile phone may seem personal and invasive, but with the power that Germany has today and its ability to undermine its allies’ interests, it would seem logical to maintain a close eye on any developments within.

Close allies for many years, Germany and the US are arguably facing a particularly frosty relationship after allegations of NSA wiretapping of the Chancellor’s personal mobile.

Another close ally of the US who has expressed outrage of being targeted by NSA spying is France, but once again this European ally has also had a tendency to diverge from US policies. Under Charles de Gaulle, France continually turned its back on the US. De Gaulle announced a ‘national independence policy’ that contained a nuclear plan pertaining to ‘a strategy of defence in all directions’ - which also seemed to suggest that the US may one day become an enemy of France.[12] Also, the French vetoed Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community - that would later advance to become the European Union - thereby weakening its trans-Atlantic ties. ‘De Gaulle even tried to persuade the leader of Western Germany to loosen his ties with NATO, which would have undermined the US-led coalition and damaged the course of the Cold War.’[13] Thus, as a result of such history of divergence, it would appear logical for the US to spy on its French ally due to France’s history of divergence.

The US and Britain have long been considered the closest of allies, but even these two friends have been known to spy and conduct espionage against each other. In 1917, the British government wanted the US to join the fight during the First World War, and on Britain’s side. ‘The British used a whole range of overt and clandestine methods to gather intelligence and run influence operations’ including one example of ‘the surveillance of a US transatlantic cable’ in which Britain’s foreign intelligence service learned of a dubious German plot to win Mexico’s allegiance by promising the country a chunk of US territory.[14] Masking the source of the information, British foreign intelligence relayed this intelligence to Washington, thus influencing the US to join the war. During the Cold War, America’s Venona Project ‘revealed that sensitive documents were being sent to Moscow from the British Embassy in Washington.’[15] By spying on its closest ally, the US were able to discover that there were two British double agents, Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, working for the Soviets and had just defected. These agents were compromising American national security, of which its ally had not been able to detect. Another example of friendly spying was the Suez crisis in 1956. Former US President Eisenhower, having been left out of the strategic planning of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, decided that it was imperative to know what his allies were up to.[16] He utilised his imagery intelligence capabilities through the use of U-2 planes which were sent over British, French and Israeli military sites in the eastern-Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the reconnaisance through the U-2s gave Eisenhower important clues about his allies’ military operations for, and execution of, their invasion of Egypt.[17] From these examples, it is clear that even the closest of allies feel the need to spy on each other for the sake of preserving their own national interests. Maybe it isn’t so inconceivable that GCHQ wiretapped Trump Tower in the run-up to the presidential elections, considering that he would become the leader of one-half of the “special relationship”.

The relationship between Britain and America has long been considered a close one, but even these two allies have been known to spy on each other.

Spying among friends

If one is caught spying on allies, it is of course damaging. The revelations that the NSA were spying on allied leaders complicated efforts to negotiate a transatlantic trade and investment agreement and gave ‘ammunition to people who are worried about the globalization of information and who would like governments do more to protect privacy and limit governmental data-collection.’[18] And yet, one must note that when leaders such as the French President François Hollande and Merkel come out in anger against alleged spying, they are often doing so to appease their outraged publics.[19]. The above examples show how volatile and fluctuating alliances can be, thereby justifying why spying on each other is a necessity.

Allies spy on each other so as to know of other’s intentions and changes in policy. Whilst it may be immoral to conduct espionage on our friends, it would seem damaging not to do so. If spying has positive outcomes and the interests of a nation, then it is reasonable for a state to pursue such measures. In light of the above question, one can look to recent developments between Britain and Spain over the long-contested territory of Gibraltar following Britain’s decision to leave the EU. Spain’s illegal incursion into Gibraltar’s waters is yet another sign that alliances are fragile, with high chances of states undermining another’s sovereign interests, leading to the conclusion that spying can indeed take place amongst friends.

Anastasia Beck is a postgraduate student studying Intelligence and International Security in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London (KCL). Anastasia’s research areas include counter-radicalization, the role of intelligence in both peace and conflict, and open-source intelligence.

Notes:

[1] Walt, S. ‘News Flash: States Spy on Each Other’, Foreign Policy, Date accessed: 1st April 2017 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/01/news-flash-states-spy-on-each-other/

[2] Ibid.

[3] Fisher, Max. ‘Why America spies on its allies’, http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013–present)

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Sims, J. ‘I Spy…’, available here at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-11-06/i-spy

[7] Bucknam, M. ‘The Eisenhower Administration and the Suez Crisis: Spying on Allies and Friends’ National War College (2000) pg. 3

[8] Ibid pg. 5

[9] Bellaby, R. ‘What’s the Harm: The Ethics of Intelligence Collections’ Intelligence and National Security 27:1 (2012) pg. 108

[10] Ibid pg. 109

[11] Bitton, R. ‘The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations’ American University International Law Review 29:5 (2014) pg. 1020

[12] Stout, M. ‘Can Spying on Allies Be Right?’ War on the Rocks Date accessed 1st April 2017 https://warontherocks.com/2013/11/can-spying-on-allies-be-right/

[13] Colby, E. ‘Why We Must Spy on Our Allies’ The National Interest Date accessed: 29th March 2017 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-we-must-spy-our-allies-9493

[14] Ibid.

[15] Easley, L. ‘Spying on Allies’ Survival 56:4 (2014) pg. 143 DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.941545

[16] Fisher, M. ‘Why America spies on its allies (and probably should)’ The Washington Post Date accessed: 1st April 2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/10/29/why-america-spies-on-its-allies-and-probably-should/?utm_term=.90f50ccedacc

[17] Ibid.

[18] Sims, J. ‘I Spy…Why Allies Watch Each Other’ Foreign Affairs Date accessed: 20th March 2017 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-11-06/i-spy

[19] Ibid.

Image credits:

Image 3: https://www.pritzkermilitary.org/explore/museum/past-exhibits/american-icons-great-war/side-side-britannia/

Image 2 and Feature: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4325158/Trump-deflects-wiretap-questions-Merkel-news-conference.htm

Image 1: http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013–present)

Strife Series on Intelligence in the digital age, Part I - The Information Doppelgänger in Warfare

by

By: Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith

MOSCOW, RUSSIA. DECEMBER 23, 2014. Russia’s president Vladimir Putin (C) arrives at a session of the Collective Security Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) at Moscow’s Kremlin. Ilya Pitalev/TASS [Photo via Newscom]

“Why, what’s the meaning of it?” he thought with vexation.

“Why have I really gone out of my mind, or what?” – The Double

The Russian military’s conception of psychological operations is eerily similar to Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky’s 1866 novella, The Double. In fact, this story is an insightful teaching device for anyone who wishes to understand Reflexive Control.

Reflexive Control is a psychological warfare technique that was developed by the Soviet military to influence enemy commanders in their decision-making processes. To promote an understanding of this technique across the U.S. armed services, this article offers a creative approach. And why not? According to this Soviet military doctrine, “[c]ontrol of an opponent’s actions is a creative character.”

But first, let’s begin with the story

Dostoyevsky was a 19th-century Russian novelist who possessed a remarkable talent for probing the depths of human psychology. His novella, The Double, is about a government bureaucrat, Mr. Golyadkin, who one day encounters his sinister doppelgänger (“a ghostly double or counterpart of a living person”). Shortly after befriending his double, Mr. Golyadkin is incessantly plagued by him and has difficulty distinguishing between reality and his paranoid fantasies. In the end, he is overtaken by his madness. So how does this relate to psychological operations?

Similar to Mr. Golyadkin’s disorienting experiences, psychological operations also serve to mislead the adversary with false information, thereby impairing their cognition and objective decision-making process. Lest the reader think that a physical doppelgänger is coming for them like poor Mr. Golyadkin, this piece is about Reflexive Control in the guise of an ‘Information Doppelgänger.’

The concept is simple: Based on your adversary’s unique proclivities and implicit biases, the aim is to construct a tantalizingly misleading ‘Information Doppelgänger’, that will deceive them and hamper their efforts to discover your true strategic objectives.

Targeting Military Commanders – The Reflexive Control Method

Military commanders are prime targets of Reflexive Control. This method, as defined by Timothy Thomas is “a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.” This aspect of Soviet military doctrine is based on three pillars: (1) influencing the enemy commander’s perception of the situation, (2) shaping their mission objectives and planning procedures, and (3) impairing effective decision-making processes. The idea being, if one can indirectly control the enemy military commander’s decision-making process, then the aggregate effect is control over their troops and the combat environment. To influence an opponent, however, it first requires developing a comprehensive understanding of the target’s deductive decision making processes and constructing an Information Doppelgänger to mislead the target: “In warfare control of an opponent’s actions is achieved by deluding him as to one’s own intentions, capability, state, and actions of troops and concealment of their actual position[.]”

While intelligence has traditionally been divided into two basic categories of collection and analysis, perhaps it is time to augment this conventional framework with a third category – the propagation of intentionally false information. Intelligence, as Mark Lowenthal describes in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, encompasses not only military information, but also ‘political, economic, social, environmental, health, and cultural[.]’

Information Warfare

But has Russia applied Reflexive Control in recent years?

According to Maria Sngovaya of the Institute for the Study of War, Russia has used this technique in the ongoing Ukrainian conflict: “Moscow has used this technique skillfully to persuade the U.S. and its European allies to remain largely passive in the face of Russia’s efforts to disrupt and dismantle Ukraine through military and non-military means.”

As a subset of information warfare, the Russian military leverages psychological operations to misinform enemy military commanders. As the Russian Major General Art M. Ionov wrote, false information is thoughtfully constructed based on the adversary’s personal “skill and experience” the operator’s estimation of the “effectiveness of the device utilized,” and surrounding political and social factors. Such methods of psychological artifice help conceal the Russian military’s true strategic objectives. This is achieved by establishing a psychosis in the target to “shape the enemy’s initial situation estimate” and ultimately influence their objective-planning process.

Further, to achieve its strategic objective, Russia’s military will first employ information operations to paralyze the adversary and then, if necessary, apply tactical force to overwhelm and consume it. The rationale being, once information superiority is achieved, the path to attaining the strategic objective will be less perilous. For as Russian Colonel S.G. Chekinov and Lieutenant General S.A. Bogdanov explain in Military Thought “[n]o goal will be achieved in future wars unless one belligerent gains information superiority over the other.” Another benefit to this approach is that it allows one to maintain the key element of surprise. It also reduces the risk of physical harm to the warfighter by first disorienting the adversary and then striking at it from a relatively safe distance.

Overall, false information campaigns – to include the use of an Information Doppelgänger – are part and parcel of achieving information superiority over an adversary. And as the effects of psychological warfare become more pronounced in our digital Information Age, the concept of an Information Doppelgänger is an excellent teaching device for educating others about Reflexive Control. Thus, whether you are a civilian or member of the armed services, Dostoyevsky has much to teach us about ourselves; for as he sagely wrote, as “profound as psychology is, it’s a knife that cuts both ways.”

Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith is an M.A. candidate at King’s College London, Department of War Studies. Previously, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. This article was earlier published in RealClearDefense on 13 January 2017.

This Strife series focuses on intelligence in the digital age and will have contributions by Jessica Malekos Smith on Russian intelligence operations; on TOR and the challenges around anonymity by Charlie Campesinos; on Proprietary vs Open source encryption by Hemant S; on digital surveillance by Felix Manig and finally an interview with Prof David Omand of King’s College London on intelligence reforms in the UK.

Image source: http://dailysignal.com/2015/01/07/insiders-account-putin-uses-media-brainwash-russians/