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Does Malaysia have concrete counterterrorism strategies to mitigate potential terrorist attacks?

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By: Munira Mustaffa

Unit_Tindak_Khas_of_PGK_on_CT's_drill
The Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) Special Operations Command unit undergoing a tactical counterterrorism training. Source: Wikimedia

While Indonesia successfully demonstrated remarkable resilience with her defiant cry of “Kami tidak takut” (“We are not intimidated”) on social media after the January 2016 attack,[1] there are some uncertainties that the same level of fortitude can be witnessed in Malaysia should a Daesh-inspired attack happen.[2] This raises some pressing debates about Malaysia’s existing counterterrorism policies and resilience strategies.

It is already known that Daesh has issued warnings that they had planned attacks on Westerners in Kuala Lumpur.[3] To date, there has been one attempt by local Daesh’s sympathisers which was successfully disrupted by members of the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) in January.[4] Last month, in the latest government crackdown on local terror cells, over 100 individuals were detained for suspected involvement with the core Daesh militancy.[5] In previous arrests since 2013, many of them were reportedly first-time offenders who were radicalised online.[6]

However, capturing ringleaders or copycats do not guarantee our safety or guarantees against terrorist attacks. If anything, as demonstrated by open source media, the fact that Daesh as an organisation is weakening does not mean that it will not influence groups abroad.[7] Daesh supporters may be even more determined to intensify their overseas strategies.[8]

The probability that Kuala Lumpur could be the next target is rather sobering.[9] Filled with complex and multi-ethnic communities, along with abundant international visitors, countless international corporates and multi-national companies centred around an urban hub, one could argue that these factors make Kuala Lumpur a high-value target. Moreover, Putrajaya is currently being encumbered by grand corruption controversies involving the country’s sovereign wealth that could erode its “moderate Islam” image and status as the custodian of Malaysia Muslims’ religious interests.[10] The fact that Kuala Lumpur is highly populated by a large percentage of Muslims who Daesh sympathisers might consider as takfiri could be a potential concern.[11]

The Malaysia experience

Malaysia is no stranger to asymmetric warfare. Much of Malaysia’s experience and formation of current antiterrorism laws and legislation are legacies of the days of Malayan insurgencies. Post-insurgency, homegrown radical militant groups began to surface in the late 1960s, slowly evolving into today’s mujahideen extremists who are enjoying a revival and enthusiastically responding to the rallying call for global Muslim solidarity.[12] Although not all of them agree with Daesh’s brand of violence, one thing is clear: Daesh does make a convenient vehicle for them to realise their Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) ambitions in this region that imposes stricter Islamic interpretation of the law and way of life.[13]

Malaysia’s current counterterrorism (CT) measures

On the morning of November 26, 2014, Prime Minister Najib Razak tabled a white paper in Parliament entitled, “Towards countering threats posed by Islamic State Militant Group”.[14] Delivered entirely in Malay, Najib condemned the violence propagated by Daesh, encouraged support from the public to reject extremist ideas, and promised to increase efforts in reducing the threat of terrorism.[15]

It has been a little over a year since the submission of the white paper, which is available only in scanned copy online (and difficult to find).[16] Upon review, what was striking about the concluding remarks in the document was that the only solution proposed was to further stiffen existing anti-terror laws. These included the Security Offences (Special Measures Act) (SOSMA), Prevention of Crime Act (POCA) and the Penal Code. No other policy recommendations were provided to substantially elevate the current threat. This is worrying, considering the questionable way Malaysia’s anti-terror laws and legislation could be enforced and regulated.

For instance, in the past, opposition activists of the incumbent government have been arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) that was originally intended as a preventive measure against communist threats that no longer exist.[17] When the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2015 was introduced as a response to the emerging Daesh threats, there were serious and justifiable concerns that it was just “a reincarnation of the ISA”.[18] Furthermore, the Communications and Multimedia Ministry recently submitted a proposal to the Attorney General for legal amendments to be made on the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998. If passed, this new law will require the registration of political blogs and online news portals with the government as an effort to counter “defamatory news” and “inflammatory opinions”.[19] Antithetical to the current administration’s previous pledge in 2012 to repeal the Sedition Act for more freedom of expression,[20] this proposal is a grim reminder how freedom of speech and Internet freedom in the country are being tightly scrutinised and regulated.[21]

Absence of robust policy framework and lack of public engagement

If we are to believe that the Najib administration is serious about mitigating terror threats at domestic level, then some further research, serious reassessments and critical revisions should be carried out to improve current policies. Information should be available in an efficiently accessible form that can be promptly found and used to maintain public interest, and keep them in the loop. As it stands, apart from the crackdowns, arrests and promises to tighten the law, it is difficult for the rakyat to gauge if other preventive measures have been implemented.[22] This lack of transparency and accountability in leadership creates unnecessary political vulnerabilities and heightens anxiety.

Dissidents would argue that the current administration benefits from the rakyat’s ignorance because the dynamics of the power play here allows more room for manipulation of the general public. In reality, the inadequate effort in engaging the public signifies how much the Malaysian government undervalues public contribution. Key security strategies should always include engaging the public as part of a concerted state effort to mitigate terrorism. Support from the public is crucial in assisting local law enforcement agencies, be it for crime prevention or counterterrorism. Everyone should be encouraged to feel like they are part of the nation-building narrative and meaningful governing process. The desired outcome could motivate people to step up to be part of the solution. Increasing community capabilities in acknowledging legitimate social problems, dispelling disruptive views and identifying suspicious behaviour would be productive, as opposed to citizens relying on false assumptions on what terrorism is or looks like.[23]

At present, there is no document or policy paper that is readily available online (or otherwise) that could comprehensively explain to the Malaysian public the nature of threat we are currently facing and how the government plans to react to terrorist threats or emergencies. Officially-released notices bear no semblance of even a formal presentation that could help distinguish them easily from rumours, which further exacerbate fear-mongering. One such instance is the Federal Territories Minister Tengku Adnan Tengku Mansor (aka Ku Nan) who decided to “notify” the public of the “list of targets” in possession of the captured Daesh members. It was not even within his jurisdiction to release such statement, of which even the PDRM themselves were mystified as to where and how did he receive his intelligence.[24] Regardless of the motive behind the public disclosure of the list of targets, Ku Nan’s action was not viewed favourably by the public at all – in fact he was slammed for being an alarmist.[25]

This is why many Malaysians feel excluded, mishandled and abandoned by top-level officials. Unless they are full of praise (such as the recent PR disaster of the #RespectMyPM Twitter campaign) or they carry certain myopic viewpoints that are supported from within the government, critical debates and discussions are actively discouraged.[26] For example, a popular Malaysian news portal, The Malaysian Insider, which has been blocked several times for allegedly publishing “inflammatory content” finally shuttered to a close after persistently reporting on the PM’s alleged misuse of sovereign funds.[27] More significantly, foreign journalists were recently deported for asking uncomfortable questions about the corruption allegations directed at the PM.[28] So when it was revealed last month that there was a terror plot to kidnap PM Najib Razak, of course it was greeted with a great collective disbelief.[29]

Counterproductive Outcomes

These latest episodes serve as a stark reminder that the Malaysian public’s value, trust and well-being are not a priority for the incumbent government. If anything, their reluctance to acknowledge their hand in the growing problem at the domestic level, and their stubbornness to adopt a more sensible policy-building approach is greatly impacting the situation. Considering that the ruling party has shown a lack of accountability and failed at fulfilling their political pledges on more than just one occasion, it is no wonder that the public is becoming exceedingly distrustful of it.

Meanwhile, despite assertions in news reports of the “success” of Malaysia’s de-radicalisation programmes which have been boasted as “the best in the world”, there is no official indication how these government programmes were planned or assessed for implementation.[30] Additionally, there is no clear definition for what “success” means in the programme’s introduction either.[31] Even more worrying, one of the agencies involved in the process is the controversial Islamic Development Department (JAKIM), well-known for their invasive and boundary-violating “moral-policing” activities which aimed to “preserve the chastity of Muslims” everywhere in the country.[32] In short, the question whether or not Malaysia is capable of coping with the growing terrorist threat remains unanswered.

Conclusion: rethinking security policies

It is true that Daesh’s brand of extremism has limited appeal in the Southeast Asia.[33] The Jakarta attack itself was poorly executed and, at best, amateurish. The probability of a Daesh attack to occur in Kuala Lumpur is still considerably low and and its threats should not be overestimated. However, the growing indoctrination, radicalisation and rising extremist views amongst Malay-Muslims continue to be worrying security conundrums and should be seen as a major counterterrorism challenge.[34]

There is also a disconcerting number of high-level people who are only too quick to shift the blame to external factors such as liberal values and pluralism, Jewish conspiracies, and Wahhabism/Salafism, of which local religious authorities are only too eager to distance themselves from.[35] Compound these all together, they build a grave picture that shows how far removed and complacent the Malaysian government can be from the reality of the current global threat.

While there is no doubt that the PDRM have been successful in their anti-terror sting operations, nevertheless tactical operations alone are not sufficient without robust counterterrorism policies and resilience strategies in place. More conscious efforts should also be made to improve cohesiveness amongst the diverse communities in Malaysia as part of a nation-wide strategy of building resilience against terrorism. The government would significantly benefit from public confidence in their capabilities. In turn, a mutually rewarding collaborative relationship could be forged.

Nonetheless, with the Prime Minister’s loss of legitimacy in the storm of his corruption scandal, fractured inter-community relations, and growing demands from the conservatives for a more Islamic and divisive Malaysia, one thing is certain, however: the country’s security landscape will become increasingly turbulent should things stay the way they are.

 

 

Munira Mustaffa is a strategic intelligence analyst and due diligence consultant for a private London-based firm. She earned her Master’s degree in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism from the University College of London. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1][1] Rishi Iyengar, ‘Indonesians display defiance toward Jakarta attackers through rallies and social media’, Time, January 15, 2016, http://time.com/4182106/jakarta-rally-attacks-kami-tidak-takut/

[2] Zachary Abuza, ‘Terror attack could rip apart Malaysian society’, Southeast Asia Globe, March 7, 2016, http://sea-globe.com/terrorism-in-malaysia-zachary-abuza/

[3] Tom Batchelor, ‘ISIS targets Malaysia: terror group ‘very real’ threat after jihadis warn of reprisals’, Express, January 26, 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/638163/Islamic-State-Malaysia-terror-attacks-Jakarta-bombing

[4] Eileen Ng, ‘Malaysian police foil suicide blast hours before planned attack in Kuala Lumpur’, Stuff, January 17, 2016, http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/asia/75970763/Malaysian-police-foil-suicide-blast-hours-before-planned-attack-in-Kuala-Lumpur

[5] Victoria Ho, ‘Malaysia detains 13 suspected ISIS militants’, Mashable, March 24, 2016, http://mashable.com/2016/03/24/13-arrests-isis-malaysia/

[6] Elina Noor, ‘Identifying the root causes of terrorism’, New Straits Times, March 22, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/03/134311/identifying-root-causes-terrorism

[7] Henry Johnson, ‘Mapped: the Islamic State is losing its territory – and fast’, Foreign Policy, 16 March, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/

[8] Joshua Holland, ‘Here’s what a man who studied every suicide attack in the world says about ISIS’ motives’, The Nation, December 2, 2015, http://www.thenation.com/article/heres-what-a-man-who-studied-every-suicide-attack-in-the-world-says-about-isiss-motives/

[9] James Chin, ‘Malaysia: clear and present danger from the Islamic State’, Brookings, 16 December, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/12/16-malaysia-danger-from-islamic-state-chin

[10] Daniel Woker, ‘In Malaysia and Turkey, are we witnessing the end of moderate Islam?’, The Interpreter, 5 August, 2015, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/05/In-Malaysia-and-Turkey-the-end-of-moderate-Islam.aspx

[11] Hayat Alvi, 2014, ‘The diffusion of intra-Islamic violence and terrorism’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 38-50.

[12] Mohd. Mizan Aslam, 2009, ‘The thirteen radical groups: Preliminary research in understanding the evolution of militancy in Malaysia’, Jati, 14, p.145-161

[13] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Counterterrorism conundrum: rethinking security policy in Australia and Southeast Asia’, Foreign Affairs, 17 December, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2014-12-17/counterterrorism-conundrum

[14] NajibRazak.com, ‘Ucapan pembentangan kertas putih ke arah menangani ancaman kumpulan Islamic State’, 26 November, 2014, https://najibrazak.com/bm/blog/ucapanpembentangan-kertas-putih-ke-arah-menangani-ancaman-kumpulan-islamic-state/

[15] Razak is the patronymic and refers to the Prime Minister’s father’s administration. In this essay, we will use Najib to denote this current administration.

[16] Malaysia, ‘Ke Arah Menanangani Ancaman Kumpulan Islamic State’, Dewan Rakyat/Dewan Negara, 2014, http://www.airforce.gov.my/images/PENERBITAN/kertasputihislamicstate.compressed.pdf

[17] Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/malaysia-bck-0513.htm

[18] Munira Mustaffa, 2015, ‘Can POTA counter the ISIL threat in Malaysia?’, Strife, 9 May, 2015, https://strifeblog.org/2015/05/09/can-pota-counter-the-isil-threat-in-malaysia/

[19] Shazwan Mustafa Kamal, ‘Putrajaya weighing new leash for news portals, blogs’, The Malay Mail Online 16 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-weighing-new-leash-for-news-portals-blogs

[20] Centre for Independent Journalism – CIJ Malaysia, ‘[Malaysia] Disappointments and promises in freedom of expression’, Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 6 May, 2015, https://www.seapa.org/disappointments-and-promises-in-freedom-of-expression/

[21] Mong Palatino, ‘Malaysia will likely force “political blogs” and news websites to register with the government,’ Global Voices, 23 April, 2016, https://globalvoices.org/2016/04/23/malaysia-will-likely-force-political-blogs-and-news-websites-to-register-with-the-government/

[22] Malay word for “ordinary citizens”.

[23] Munira Mustaffa, ‘Dismantling terrorism myths’, The Malay Mail Online, 22 February, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/dismantling-terrorism-myths-munira-mustaffa

[24] Eunice Au, ‘Top KL tourist areas cited as possible terror targets’, The Straits Times, 17 January, 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/top-kl-tourist-areas-cited-as-possible-terror-targets

[25] Sebastian Loh, ‘Malaysian minister under fire for naming IS targets in Kuala Lumpur’, Asian Correspondent, 18 January, 2016, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/01/malaysian-minister-under-fire-after-naming-is-targets-in-kuala-lumpur/

[26] BBC, ‘#RespectMyPM: Online war breaks out in Malaysia’, March 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35742118

[27] Jahabar Sadiq, ‘Eight proud years of being “The Malaysian Insider”’, The Bangkok Post, 22 March, 2016, http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/906004/eight-proud-years-of-being-the-malaysian-insider

[28] BBC, ‘Australian journalists leave Malaysia after avoiding charges’, March 15, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-35800172

[29] Amy Chew, ‘ISIS, Malaysia, and the risks of lost moral authority’, The Diplomat, March 22, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/isis-malaysia-and-the-risks-of-lost-moral-authority/

[30] The Star, ‘Zahid Hamidi: Malaysia’s deradicalisation programme “best in the world”’, 20 February, 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/02/20/zahid-hamidi-malaysia-deradicalisation-programme-best-in-the-world/

[31] New Straits Times Online, ‘Malaysia’s deradicalisation process a success’, 22 January, 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/01/123407/malaysias-deradicalisation-process-success

[32] Kamles Kumar, ‘Moral policing driving youths away from Islam, Ku Li tells Jakim’, Malay Mail Online, 5 December, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/moral-policing-driving-youths-away-from-islam-ku-li-tells-jakim

[33] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘ISIS reaches Indonesia’, Foreign Affairs, 8 February, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/2014-12-17/counterterrorism-conundrum

[34] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum’, Brookings, 21 April, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/04/21-malaysia-isis-conundrum-liow

[35] The Malay Mail Online, ‘Putrajaya in espionage, psychological warfare against “liberal” Islamic groups, minister says’, 18 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-in-espionage-psychological-warfare-against-liberal-islamic-groups;

Robert Fulford, ‘Malaysia: a hotbed of anti-Semitism’, National Post, 2 January, 2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/robert-fulford-malaysia-a-hotbed-of-anti-semitism;

The Malay Mail Online, ‘No place for Wahhabism in Malaysia, fatwa council says’, 1 March, 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/no-place-for-wahhabism-in-malaysia-fatwa-council-says

 

Turning technology from an asset into a liability: using big data to fight ISIS

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By: Sabina Ciofu

How-Big-Data-is-Aiding-in-the-Fight-Against-Terrorism
Source: www.datafloq.com

Unlike any other terrorist organisation, the so-called Islamic State has consistently and efficiently made use of social media tools for self-promotion and recruitment. With an estimated 200,000 tweets a day for at least the last couple of years, it is by far the most aggressive social media offensive we have ever seen from a radical group. Western powers, often focused on traditional military and political responses to conflict and aggression, have initially reacted in a weak and fragmented manner to the wave of social media activity. It is only recently that concerted action has been taken by national and regional counter-terrorism authorities to respond to the threat of online radicalisation and recruitment. This has led to some decrease in the number and activity of English-speaking ISIS accounts, but it is still far from achieving the dismantling of their online networks.

That there is no coordinated military and political solution to the crisis in Syria and Iraq is getting more and more obvious by the day. The Western powers cooperate with the Arab countries and Sunni groups on one side, while Russia is closely working with Iran and the Shia militias on the other. With such a complex landscape of strategic interests, it is no surprise that coming up with a coherent approach to ending the war in Syria is proving a big mountain to climb. However, the latency to counteract ISIS’ charm offensive on social media - even when it targets Western citizens who have in significant numbers fallen for the Islamist rhetoric - is far more problematic.

Public-private cooperation

Following a slow initial response, in recent times several meetings have taken place between Western governments and the largest American internet platforms in an attempt to cooperate in fighting ISIS propaganda online. The US government has, upon a number of occasions, asked the private sector for assistance, most recently enlisting Facebook, Instagram and Twitter to assist in the fight against terrorism. The French government has also contacted the US companies for support in removing online propaganda material, following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, while the UK Parliament had previously put blame on internet platforms, claiming that they are instrumental in spreading terrorist ideology. Far from a synchronized effort to find a common strategy to combat terrorism online, it oftentimes looks like a desperate cry for help from some governments, when they realise that what goes on online is strongly linked to national security threats. And this picture is further twisted by the complexity of the international law system, where tech companies are left with the decision of balancing out questions of freedom of expression, censorship and the difference between dissemination and promotion of online propaganda.

Using Big Data to draw patterns

What if one could turn one of the mightiest ISIS weapons into a liability? What if, by using big data analytics, one can look into the huge amount of content provided by ISIS-related websites, traditional media and social media accounts, to be able to draw relevant patterns? This may already be underway in highly classified intelligence programmes, where advanced algorithms may be used to track and determine potential terrorist activity. For example, in domestic law-enforcement domains, this is a model already being explored in some parts of the United States. By making use of mathematical and analytical techniques, police authorities are able to determine patterns that could lead to predicting criminal activity.

Apply that same technique for counter-terrorism and the value of big data analytics increases substantially. Having the technical ability to follow the data patterns, the footprints and the online records, looking into location, travel, profiles and messages of potential terrorists is a gold mine for national security authorities. It is easy to estimate that advanced big data analytics will outpace the computational ability of ISIS users to fake their identity and hide their location, as there are already a significant number of failings, even when instructed to hide their GPS location. There are situations where ISIS buildings and hotspots have been targeted by Western military forces, after users had accidentally pinpointed their location on social media. Ultimately, there is very little ISIS propagandists can do to completely hide online, if the organisation’s aim is to use the internet to spread the ideology, promote the mission and recruit new fighters.

As a general rule, recent research shows that social media analytics can be used for creating detailed profiles of potential terrorists and then looking for places where a high percentage of the local population matches the profile. Although this would seem a pretty straightforward approach, it has been shown that looking into the motivations and backgrounds of confirmed terrorists doesn’t necessarily lead to one single profile. However, sketching using big data analytics can define some widely-valid characteristics. For instance, ISIS recruits tend to be predominantly young and male and the ones originating in the EU and the US tend to come from a middle class background, with a high level of education. Drawing patterns out of huge amounts of available data has, however, obvious downsides, as it would only be a perfect profiling system if both the data and the algorithm were perfect. Therefore, privacy concerns are ultimately justified and any such governmental initiatives should duly take them into account.

Existing Big Data analytics projects

A massive data mining project by Qatar Computing Research Institute in Doha looked at social media data to figure out the origins of support for the Islamic State. Over a three month period, scientists looked into more than three million tweets, highlighting common patterns and attributes between pro and anti-ISIS messages. The algorithm was successful in “guessing” the sentiment in 87% of the cases, which is amazingly high for any big data project.

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) - the high-tech research arm of the U.S. intelligence community - is also focusing several programmes on using big data analytics to tackle some of the challenges ISIS has created online. For instance, they are currently focusing efforts on a facial recognition programme, based on imagery collected from available sources, be they high resolution cameras, or mobile phones, and even devices with less reliable resolution or lighting. Of course, the process is proving to be a difficult one, especially when algorithms are in charge of creating one face and recognising it from imagery in various angles, with varying lighting and quality.

Aside from its facial recognition programme, IARPA is also focusing on analytics results based on online video searching, through its code-named Aladdin programme. This implies designing new big data search methods for video content, that does not simply target tag words or user-generated content, but scans the video itself for elements that can describe what the movie is about. While terrorists may be clever enough not to tag videos where, for instance, they explain how to make explosives in view of a potential terrorist attack, their videos would be easily inspected and tracked down if a search method non-reliant on tags would be developed. Thus, while YouTube has been doing a great job in taking down such content almost in real time and while ISIS has moved these activities to the dark web to be less visible and thus less searchable, these movie samples may provide very valuable insight to national security experts, using advanced big data analytics to extract information from video material.

Moreover, the bigger the data, the better the big data analytics will be. Shared information for national security purposes has been something friendly governments have been focused on doing ever since 9/11. The precision and quality of information coming out of a big data project will always rely on the amount of data analysed, thus making it obviously necessary that countries cooperate in exchanging the information they have. The Dfuze system, for instance, is a database that allows such information exchange across multiple countries. National security experts can use the platform to access large amount of data shared by various actors and thus draw possible trends and patterns that can assist with prevention and preparation in view of potential terrorist attacks. There are already 40 countries using this product, which is an indication that such big data application can be very powerful tool in terrorism prevention and control.

Conclusion

This is not to say that big data, alone, can prevent terrorist attacks. Lone wolves will always be a difficult category to track, hunt and make sense of. This is to say, however, that big data can have a very significant input in creating and tracking the kind of patterns needed for effective intelligence gathering. It can also have a very important part to play in prediction, especially when it comes to planned, organised and coordinated terror attacks. Significant human reasoning and expertise will have to be attached to this, to distinguishing between real attacks and online bluff, between facts and intentionally deceptive mass-upload of messages. But that is the case for any intelligence method - human reasoning will continue to be at the centre of decision-making. And while it will always be the case that intelligence failures will be blamed for terrorist attacks - and hence also the failure of the people involved and the tools used - we simply don’t know how many terror plots have already been foiled and how many anti-ISIS military operations have already been successful with input from big data analytics.

 

 

Sabina Maria Ciofu is a first year MPhil/PhD candidate in Defence Studies, at King’s College London, where she explores the relationship between big data and US foreign policy. She is also a policy advisor in the European Parliament, working on digital economy, foreign affairs and trade issues. Sabina holds a BA in Classics from Cambridge and a MA in War Studies from King’s College London. @SabinaCiofu

ISIS and the Flood: the hydro-politics behind the rise (and fall) of Daesh

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EDITORS NOTE: This is the fourth and final article in a four-part series which explores the role of water in human conflict and politics. The series marks (though is not affiliated with) World Water Day 2016, a UN initiative to promote awareness of water issues. More information on World Water Day can be found here. The first, second, and third, articles in the series can be found here, here, and here, respectively.

By: Harris Kuemmerle

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA
The Euphrates River edging against the desert. Source: Wikimedia

The average person can only survive 3-7 days without water before ultimately (and inevitably) succumbing to a painful death. Likewise, there is not a single nation-state on earth whose day-to-day existence is not entirely and utterly dependent upon the economic, agricultural, political, cultural, and fundamentally life giving qualities of that all-important molecule. Water is the lowest common denominator. There is no substitute, and there is no cure for its absence. In a very real sense, governments live by the tap, and die by the tap; and the so called Islamic State are no exception.

After all, their rise occurred against the backdrop of profound underlying hydrological factors and issues in the run-up to the destabilisation of Syria in 2011, namely one of the worst droughts in half a century. A drought which was primarily the result of a confluence of factors mainly including climate change, and ineffectual and short-sighted hydrological management and agricultural policies on the part of the Assad government. Make no mistake, droughts are very bad for business, and a recent report by UN-Water (the inter-agency UN organisation designed to assist states promote water quality and availability) suggested that as many as four-fifths, or about 78%, of all jobs globally are moderately or heavily dependent upon a stable supply of water.[1]

This is especially true in the rural Syrian north east where the traditional reliance on agriculture is made possible by the large areas of arable land, compared to the rest of Syria. Indeed, the area of Al-Hasakeh in particular is responsible for around 75% of Syria’s total wheat production.[2] This bounty, however, also makes the north east region heavily dependent upon reliable water supplies for life and living. Therefore, it seems likely that such a major drought would have hit Syrian employment hard as agricultural falters in its traditional regions. And indeed, the result of this drought was the large scale unemployment of around 800,000 people; which in turn resulted in thousands of young men moving from the rural areas to the cities in search of work.[3] This arguably both added to existing stresses and tensions and had the unintended consequence of creating a large and desperate pool of young men for groups like Daesh to exploit.[4] While it would be simplistic to claim that the drought caused the Syrian uprising and resultant civil war by itself, it was an undeniable stress multiplier which Daesh were deftly able to exploit. However, water issues have also been an integral factor in the rise of Daesh beyond just fuelling destabilisation and providing the environment for a large pool of willing recruits to join their state-building project.

Water as a weapon of war

The brutality and savagery of Daesh tactics are well documented, with their latest attack in Brussels sending shock waves around the world. However, probably their least well known (and arguably most effective) strategies have been their attempts to control the dams and waters of the Tigris and Euphrates; rivers which constitute the vast majority of habitable and arable land in Iraq and Syria. Since their inception Daesh have at one time or another taken control of five dams along the Tigris and Euphrates; the Samarra, Nuaimiyah, Haditha, Mosul, and Tishrin.[5] This has given them the capabilities to drown entire cities such as Baghdad or shutoff the water or electricity to whole communities as a means of instilling psychological terror or controlling populations. Capabilities which have been turned into actions on numerous occasions. For example, in April 2014 Daesh closed the gates of the Nuaymiyah Dam and the resulting flooding successfully unseated government forces in the area and caused water shortages for millions, and thousands to lose their homes.[6] Furthermore, in August 2014 Daesh successfully captured Mosul Dam, the control of which put Baghdad and almost half a million Iraqis in direct danger of flooding and electricity blackout. The danger was deemed to be so great that the Iraqi government committed considerable resources (including US assistance) to its successful recapture.[7]

However, Daesh is still in control of a number of other dams in Syria and Iraq and their control has given Daesh not only an effective means of combating government forces, it has also given them a powerful and coercive tool for both instilling dread and loyalty among populations.[8] In the words of Michael Stephen at RUSI, ‘the control of water supplies gives strategic control over both cities and countryside. We are seeing a battle for control of water. Water is now the major strategic objective of all groups in Iraq. It’s life or death. If you control water in Iraq you have a grip on Baghdad, and you can cause major problems. Water is essential in this conflict.’[9] Indeed, in a 2014 issue of Dabiq (Daeshs’ official magazine) the group claimed that ‘it’s either Islamic State or the flood’, making clear their willingness to use water as a weapon of war.[10]

Water as a tool of peace

However, when the guns fall quiet and the warriors go home the prevailing state must be able to provide for the basic services of its people, including its vanquished. That ability to provide basic services is one of the most common tests of a state, and Daesh is not exempt from this. Adding to that, in the case of arid Syria and Iraq, the supply of water is of particular importance and according to one intelligence official, ‘if ISIS has any hope of establishing itself on territory, it has to control some water.’[11] However, this control also comes with responsibilities; and crucially, costs.

If Daesh intends to survive as a state in the traditional sense then it must invest heavily in the building, upgrading, and management of new and current water works infrastructure and delivery projects while also ensuring that the supply is sustainable. This investment will likely require substantial financial and political costs in their newly conquered regions as their inherited infrastructure becomes unfit for purpose. While at the same time Daesh will also need to be able to evolve its institutional structure in order to have the organisational bodies necessary to oversee these developments and manage the system while also making sure they are well staffed with trained personnel.

Going hand in hand with this management and governance will be dealing with issues pertaining to the equal use of the waters and Daesh will have to have systems put in place to mediate disputes over fresh water use domestically in order to prevent tensions. While also having the diplomatic presence necessary to fight for the fresh water interests of their new state among their neighbours in one of the driest regions on earth. These realities will necessitate cooperation (particularly internationally), and while there are some limited examples of this occuring, it remains unclear if Daesh will be pragmatic enough to be able to put aside ideology and cooperate long-term with those they may deem their enemy in order to keep the taps flowing.

This is a daunting list of tasks for any state, especially a new one. So how well is the new so-called Islamic State getting on with functioning as a state? While it is hard to say for sure, all indications suggest that things are not going as well as hoped. A 2014 report suggested that Daesh seemed to be unable to provide even basic services, with water only available for 3-4 hours a day in Raqqa.[12] Likewise, a later report from August 2015 suggested that services had improved in some areas, however, that the conflict was also taking a heavy toll on the infrastructure and the medium to long-term sustainability of those services was in doubt.[13]

In response the group have taken steps to ensure they meet water and electricity demands, including paying for Syrian and Iraqi government water infrastructure staff to remain at their jobs in Daesh controlled territory, taxing water, and bringing in outside assistance.[14] However, these are short-term solutions and will likely not by itself be enough to provide for the basic needs of the people in the longer term and much more investment in infrastructure and cultivation of domestic talent will be required to provide an adequate supply moving forward.

Indeed, the fact that Daesh appear to be relying so heavily on short-term water management solutions seems to suggest that the group still lacks both expertise in this area, and a dedicated governing body for managing the system and developing long-term policies. While also underlying all of this, is what appears to be a fundamentally unstable cultural dichotomy. With Daeshs’ primary ideological drive seemingly to expand the state through war, at the expense of their civic ambitions to establish a civil Caliphate becoming more secondary.

Concluding remarks

Ultimately, with waters importance in war, also comes its inseparability from peace. And in order for Daesh to survive as a state they must have in place robust and effective agricultural, hydrological, and infrastructure policies to keep the waters flowing and the people alive. While also working to mediate fresh water inequalities within and without their borders. This responsibility (on top of their other duties as a de facto state) will place great strain on Daesh leadership and it seems that they still lack the expertise and stability necessary to effectively deliver on key public services and move beyond short-term solutions.

This matters because while water politics and the use of water as a weapon seem to have been a key asset of Daesh in their early years. As time moves on they will likely find water issues to be much more of a problem than an asset. Indeed, while the inability to provide basic services is not always in in of itself enough to topple governments, and the Daesh regime may indeed be popular with some. Daesh must also know all too well that fresh water shortages can still be a significant contributing factor to instability in a once prosperous region. Despite that, the situation in their territory seems to indicate that Daesh are largely failing both at providing those services in the short-term and in building a system which can ensure stable supplies of water and other services in the long-term, making their future as a state seem as uncertain as the waters of the rivers that support them.

 

 

Harris Kuemmerle is a doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies and the Department of Geography at King’s College London. His research focuses on the role of provincial engagement in the formulation and implementation of national security and management policies along the Indus River. Twitter: @HarrisKuemmerle

 

 

 

[1] 2016, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2016: Water and Jobs

[2] 2013, Impact of the conflict on Syrian economy and livelihoods, Syria Needs Analysis Project, ACAPS

[3] Aron Lund, 2014, Drought, Corruption, and War: Syria’s Agricultural Crisis, Carnegie Endowment

[4] Ian Sample, 2015, Global warming contributed to Syria’s 2011 uprising, scientists claim, The Guardian, 2 March, 2015

[5] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, 2 July, 2014

[6] Ibid.

[7] Saira Khan, 2016, The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure, Tel Aviv Notes, Volume 10, Number 3

[8] 2014, Iraq insurgents use water as weapon after seizing dam, Reuters

[9] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, July 2, 2014

[10] The Islamic State, “The Flood,” Dabiq, Issue 2, 1435 Ramadan

[1] John Vidal, “Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,” The Guardian, July 2, 2014

[12] Liz Sly, The Islamic State is failing at being a state, The Washington Post, December 25, 2014

[13] Laith Alkhouri and Alex Kassirer, 2015, Governing the Caliphate: The Islamic State Picture, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point Military Academy

[14] Saira Khan, 2016, The Islamic State and Water Infrastructure, Tel Aviv Notes, Volume 10, Number 3

ISIS and its conduct of war: interview with Professor Dr. Albert A. Stahel

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By: Annabelle Vuille

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Professor Dr. Albert A. Stahel is the founder and head of the Swiss think tank Institut für Strategische Studien [Institute for Strategic Studies]. He has taught strategic studies at the Military Academy of the ETH Zürich and holds the title of honorary professor in the same field at the University of Zürich. His research findings have been featured in over 400 publications of Swiss and international scientific journals, as well as in specialised literature and book chapters.

Annabelle Vuille: What would you say is the primary factor making ISIS such a severe threat?

Prof. Dr. Albert Stahel: I would say that it is no single, but rather a triad of factors. Firstly, there is the Caliphate that has a profound impact on the Islamic world. Secondly, ISIS has been able to seize control of significant swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. Finally, its reach goes far beyond the borders of the Middle East and has spread to various regions across the globe. It is this combination that makes ISIS such a real threat.

In a recent lecture at the University of Zurich, you mentioned that ISIS is a symbiosis between Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. How should we imagine the evolution of this connection?

The starting point was 2010. Following the death of its leaders, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was left without a functioning command structure. On the other side were the former officers of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. Lacking a formal base they were looking for an organization that would not only grant them influence in Iraq but also enable them to wage real war. This opportunity presented itself in the prison cells of Abu Ghraib, where they learned a lot about AQI and could subsequently assume control. Leadership of this new Islamic State was to be given to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – a possible member of the Prophet’s tribe and someone with a good reputation as being highly knowledgeable of Islam. On a side note, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is not his real name but merely an alias.

Ba’athism is a secular ideology and yet, ISIS is officially led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who was appointed Caliph Ibrahim. One of your hypotheses is that ISIS exploits religion for the purpose of expanding its powerbase – Realpolitik + Religion. Could you explain how ISIS instrumentalises religion?

The foundation of Al Qaeda in Iraq was Islam in the form of Salafism and Wahhabism. This element remained even when the organization evolved into the Islamic State. Today, ISIS exploits religion to influence the people in their surrounding environment, and to attract believers not only in Iraq and Syria, but also in Europe. Whether or not such a strategy will prove successful will depend on the ability of ISIS to stabilise itself in the form of an internationally recognised state.

How does the aspect of religion influence ISIS’ conduct of war?

War is something that is not related to religion. Waging war is embedded in the tradition of humanity and has its roots in Greek philosophical thought. ISIS uses a combination of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional manoeuvre warfare. When confronted with a real army ISIS employs conventional warfare, but it can also turn to guerrilla warfare to target the logistics of its enemies. Additionally, terrorism is the means most used within cities against the Shia regime in Iraq, or against the people in Europe.

You touched on these three dimensions of warfare, which is a point also made by Jessica Lewis from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). She argues that ISIS employs a form of hybridized warfare, which, as you mentioned, is comprised of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional manoeuvre warfare. Where do you see its greatest advantage?

The combination of these three dimensions is not a novel strategy but one that has frequently been used in history, for example in the Second World War. Success in war does not solely hinge on having a powerful conventional army. One also needs the ability to disrupt the logistics of the opposing force and, potentially, terrorise the enemy’s population and its regime. The recognition of this fact and the effective use of these three modes of war are that make ISIS such an agile opponent.

Let us delve a bit deeper into the aspect of guerrilla warfare. In April 2015, you published an article highlighting that Saddam Hussein had been inspired by the concept of guerrilla warfare coined by the Brazilian Carlos Marighella. How did it impact Saddam Hussein’s strategy in the 2003 Iraq War and has it transcended to the Islamic State?

In an interview given just before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein mentioned that he was fascinated by the writings of Carlos Marighella. One of Marighella’s main ideas is for the creation of small, militia-like forces that are capable of operating behind enemy lines. This is exactly what Saddam Hussein intended when he created the Fedayeen – the only forces that actively resisted the intervention of the Americans and their Coalition of the Willing. What is interesting is that the Fedayeen not only survived the occupation, but have now also become an integral part of the new armies under the Islamic State.

How would you assess the influence of Marighella in guiding the operations and tactics of ISIS? Is this what gives ISIS its operational strength?

According to Marighella, there are three phases of guerrilla warfare strategy: phase one is releasing urban guerrilla forces in large cities; phase two is releasing guerrilla forces in the hinterland; and phase three is fighting the opposing army with your own conventional forces. These three phases are, however, not mutually exclusive and can be applied simultaneously and in various combinations. In Syria, for example, ISIS is currently engaged in phases one and two, whereas in Iraq one can witness all three phases. It is not necessarily this phase-centric strategy that gives ISIS its operational strength, but rather the fact that its leaders are highly intelligent military minds. They know how to wage war, how to organize their forces, how to establish and run a government, how to finance their war efforts, and how to control their subjects. Most importantly, however, the leaders of ISIS are capable in clearly assessing the situation in each theatre of war and tailoring their strategies accordingly.

ISIS has expanded its bases from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria to Yemen and, most recently Libya. With each sphere hosting unique terrain and opposing forces how do you judge ISIS’ strategies in these differing domains?

Firstly, the main bases of ISIS remain in Iraq and Syria. However, with its most important enemy the United States focusing on combatting the situation in these two domains, ISIS has recognised an opportunity to divert attention to its satellites in Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen. Therefore, this expansion is intended to ensure that the Americans are engaged on multiple fronts. Concerning its strategies, ISIS differentiated between its main and secondary theatres of war. Thus, Afghanistan and Libya terrorism is the most frequent means of combat, whereas in Iraq ISIS employs conventional manoeuvre warfare.

In your experience, how can such an agile opponent be weakened or even defeated? How would the US-led coalition have to adapt its approach and strategy?

Currently, ISIS controls approximately one third of Iraq and half of Syria. The only way that the US-led coalition could defeat or even weaken ISIS is therefore to seize and subsequently reoccupy these territories. This can, however, only be achieved through a huge conventional army and the problem is that the United States remains reluctant to put boots on the ground. In all of the decisions submitted to Congress, Barack Obama excludes the possibility of engaging ground troops and instead, looks towards mercenaries like the Kurds to get the job done. However, they are not the real army that is needed; ISIS can only be defeated with a conventional army – any other approach will prove ineffective.

Saudi Arabia recently announced that it is willing to send ground troops to Syria in the fight against ISIS. How effective do you think such a strategy would be in securing an operational advantage?

I think it would certainly be a good idea. However, it is important to note that by sending troops to Syria, Saudi Arabia is ultimately engaging in a realm that is not particularly friendly toward its regime. Thus, the effectiveness of such a strategy will depend on the support extended by the Americans, both politically and militarily. Whether or not Barack Obama will give his blessing is very difficult to assess. By backing Saudi Arabia, the United States would prove itself willing to take the risk of a direct confrontation not only with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but also with Russia.

In one of your recent lectures you mentioned that ISIS might be a factor that the international community will have to accept and live with for another decade. Why is this so and what impact will it have on the Middle East?

That is correct. Essentially, one must recognise that ISIS has a government, a territory, and citizens. Thus, according to international law and the three-element-doctrine of George Jellinek, ISIS constitutes a state. If the international community and the United Nations accept this fact, it would not only nullify the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement but also ultimately lead to the disintegration of two artificial states: Iraq and Syria.

Is there any other relevant aspect or issue pertaining to ISIS and its conduct of war that we haven’t discussed today, and that you would like to mention?

I would say that we are currently at a crossroads. Either the situation will further deteriorate and ISIS will continue to exist or, if the coalition makes a definite decision to commit ground troops, then we could see ISIS defeated. The man who will ultimately decide on the future fate of ISIS sits in Washington DC.

 

Professor Dr. Albert Stahel was interviewed by Annabelle Vuille, a series editor at Strife and MA candidate in the Department of War Studies, in Zurich in February 2015. This is an edited version of the transcript.

Pushing back the black flag: The critical importance of southeast Asian security in the fight against ISIL

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By: Lai Ki Cheng*

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Source: The Malaysian Insider

On January 14th 2016, Indonesia experienced its most hard-felt kinetic strike by the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL, also known as the Daesh militancy) in its capital of Jakarta. The city first experienced explosions from Indonesian ISIL militants followed by a series of firearm engagements. Attacks were coordinated to target both dense civilian populations and police posts in the business district of the city and within close vicinity to a United Nations Office, according to a timeline constructed by the Guardian.[1] At the May-2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong revealed the growing importance of monitoring ISIL activities in the region as ‘the threat is no longer over there, it is over here.”[2] He could not be more right. A majority of the region’s population is comprised with those of the Islamic faith and therefore represents a large untapped resource to those supporting and fighting ISIL. Over the last decade, the entire world has witnessed large populations of sympathisers travelling to Syria and Iraq. Since, multiple European and American governments have established countermeasures aimed at interdicting the flow of radicalised Islamists migrating to the Middle East and the exploitation of cyberspace for recruitment and propaganda. Hence, Southeast Asian governments have begun to follow suit, establishing programs to monitor social media, immigration and general counterterrorism activities against ISIL supporters in their own states. Southeast Asia is in the crosshairs, making its national and regional security of paramount importance in the fight against ISIL.

Setting the Stage

The importance of Southeast Asia in deterring ISIL efforts of expansion must be understood. To accomplish this, ISIL-related activity in the region must be identified, namely the countries of Malaysia and Indonesia, who possess high levels of ISIL activity; in comparison to Singapore and the Philippines, who possess lower levels of ISIL activity. Collectively, they form part of the Southeast Asian community that ISIL has recently targeted to gain support for their activities in the Middle East. The following explores each country and examines the varying levels of ISIL activity and the potential causalities.

Malaysia

Over the last decade and since the end of the Second Iraq War, ISIL has been gradually establishing a state – a caliphate – in the Middle East. It has since set its sights on South East Asia, a region full of Muslims and local militias with resentment towards their governments. This was a perceived untapped resource for sympathetic and potentially devote supporters to be recruited to the ISIL cause. Estimated figures of Malaysians who have journeyed to Syria and Iraq to join the jihadist struggle with the Daesh militancy varies from 30 to 150. Those that have returned are spreading and encouraging more Malaysian Muslims to join the group, heightening the level of domestic militancy – 122 people have been detained for possessing a connection to ISIL by 2013.[3] After the attacks in Indonesia, arrests of ISIL suspects have illuminated the intentions to stage an attack in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur.[4]

Over the past ten years, Malaysia has experienced varying levels of civil instability with corruption scandals and large scale protests in Kuala Lumpur – potentially degrading the trust of the Malaysian population in their government. Their actions are also made easier due to roughly 60.4% of the population being of the Islamic faith.[5] There might be additional factors involved, but the argument can be made that the civil strife generated through corruption coupled with the majority Islamic population fundamentally provides ISIL with an easy target for radicalisation through manipulation of information and resentment of authority. This is further evident in the identification of Malaysian uniformed personnel who assisted the transporting of Malaysian citizens overseas to train and fight in the Middle East.[6]

Indonesia

Looking further South and home to the largest Muslim population in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has witnessed a varying rate of ISIL supporters travelling overseas while those on the homeland are imprisoned. The two key areas of ISIL or ISIL-related activities in Indonesia can be identified within prisons and through open campaigning. Prisons, often criticised as ‘schools of crime’, have supplied ISIL activists with an entire populace of militants and other communities with resentment against the government who are also ripe for radicalisation through dissemination of propaganda or direct recruiting.[7] Even within maximum-security penitentiaries, inmates have surprisingly large degrees of communication and access to ISIL literature and translations in addition to being able to announce allegiances that would have gained audience from other detainees and the public.

In addition, Indonesia has seen open recruitment efforts for ISIL in Jakarta, through the organisation of mass gatherings where over 2000 Indonesians have expressed support for the cause. Amongst the multiple pro-ISIL groups in Indonesia, the most vocal campaigns were organised by the Indonesian Islamic entity ‘Forum of Islamic Law Activists (FAKSI)’ founded in 2013.[8] The democratic system and earlier ignorance of the Indonesian governmental services did little to stifle the rise of ISIL in the country. The “Achilles heel” of Indonesia would be its multiple militia groups sympathetic towards ISIL and their influence over the locals amongst its rural populations. Groups like the Abu Sayyaf faction (who possesses close ties with al-Qaeda and the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah) have recently pledged allegiance to ISIL. The Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (MIT) – who has pledged allegiance to Santoso (also known as Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi al-Indonesi) – is one of the most active terrorist organisations in Indonesia. According to Chalk, the group fundamentally has become ‘an umbrella movement for militants based in the simmering conflict zones of Poso, Palu and Bima and has been linked to numerous attacks on the police’.[9] The group has also continued to expand the capabilities of ISIL by searching and recruiting individuals with proficiency in information technology to exploit cyber avenues for propaganda and ‘to wage a domestic jihad’.[10]

When discussing the degree of ISIL supporters from Southeast Asia, Indonesian supports formulates a large percentage of them, with over 2,000 Indonesian supporters pledging support to the Daesh militant group. Although accurate numbers might be difficult to obtain, the existing figures does reveal the scale of influence ISIL has exerted over the Indonesian community – mainly the marginalised militia groups targeted by the government. However, the most critical problems do not reside with those that travel overseas (although still a problem) but rather with those that return and with the potentially radicalised mentality they bring back with them.

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Source:The Wall Street Journal (January 16, 2016).

Singapore

Singapore, probably one of the most pluralistic (multinational) and small nations in the region, has also recently experienced the effects of ISIL propaganda. In May 2015, ‘[a] Singaporean youth has been detained under the Internal Security Act [and] another youth was arrested…for further investigations into the extent of his radicalisation’.[11] Later, after the Jakarta incident, ‘[t[wenty-seven male Bangladeshis working in Singapore have been arrested under the [ISA]’ – the first foreigner-centric jihadist cell identified in the country.[12] Since the arrests, Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Yaacob Ibrahim, urged Singaporeans to be more vigilant against radicalised teachings of ideologies and suspicious activities but ‘not discriminate against foreign workers’.[13] As Prime Minister Lee has mentioned, ‘the threat is here’ and Singapore has been very aware of the ISIL threat. Academic institutions such as the ‘Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis’ program from the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University have conducted extensive research into ISIL and other extremist activities in the region – later called upon in a televised 3-part documentary on Channel News Asia.[14] What is unique about Singapore is the sheer plurality of its community and its position on the international stage on financial, medical, defence, intelligence matters, and law enforcement. Singapore even has a religious rehabilitation centre to de-radicalise youths allegedly converted by ISIL – this is the Khadijah Mosque. Perhaps due to its relatively small size, dense population, community cohesion spurring on an inherent defiant sense of patriotism and ethnic harmony has created an ‘almost’ incorruptible environment for ISIL influences to take root. The Singapore model of establishing community centric deradicalisation centres is something that could be adopted by all countries tackling the ISIL threat, not just its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Philippines

ISIL activity in the Philippines has been thought to be as extensive as in Malaysia or Indonesia as there has been clear signs of its intentions to cultivate influence in the country through targeting Muslim majority islands in the south. However, despite evidence about recruitment activities targeting Philippine citizens (even through monetary incentives), there remains limited proof of the successfulness of these efforts. In addition, localised Islamic rebel groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front have also rejected ISIL activities due to its aggressive and violent methods.

Nonetheless, there are militia groups that have aligned themselves with ISIL. Namely the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. These two rebel organisations have operated in the Philippines over the last two decades but have been heavily hindered in terms of expansion and operational abilities to the extent where fracturing of its infrastructure is a growing possibility. Under constant engagement with localised military forces, it is unlikely these organisations would be sustainable vehicles for ISIL activities. However, the problem again is not the local people but those overseas – ‘as an estimated 2.5 million Filipino expatriates live and work in the Middle East’.[15] An argument could also be made that the size of those Islamic rebel organisations is small, and even smaller within the context of the nation’s religious diversity – Filipinos are predominantly Christians. This does not allow ISIL to conduct influence gathering operations in the country. However, due to the number of Filipinos working not just in the Middle East but also in other countries, should ISIL decide to target those communities, what can be achieved is much more terrifying.

“Bundle of Sticks” Security

The analysis of the various ISIL activities in each Southeast Asian nation has illuminated their strategy for the region. Domestically, ISIL or radicalised Islamic activity targets the minorities and outliers of local communities within the countries and specifically within penitentiaries. The successfulness of this strategy is only realised due to the inadequacy of the local government’s penal and prison services. In addition, the corruption that plagues multiple states within the region (i.e. Malaysia, Cambodia) further degrades the state’s ability to deter ISIL efforts and increases the potential for exploitation through monetary incentives. It has also been evident that ISIL is targeting the religious understanding of locals through militia and detained sympathisers, a technique similar to al-Qaeda when collating homegrown terrorists in the United States. In Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia, the impacts of such tactics are significantly more extensive given the religion demographics of the two nations. The most important point here is that ISIL is targeting the marginalised Muslim population within Southeast Asia. Therefore, domestic security must be enhanced to contribute towards a larger framework of a cohesive international security network – collectively striving towards influence interdiction.

Security studies have proposed the strengthening of national migration, citizenship, and counterterrorism programs and legislations. However, these strategies often would come at the price of potentially alienating Muslim minorities through legal injunctions or social unrest amongst other members of the population. What can be done is a collative effort of all the Southeast Asian states to form a standardised set of counter-radicalisation objectives and a multinational organisation perhaps under the jurisdiction of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, deradicalisation institutions/mosques such as the one in Singapore could be established in each nation and in smaller scales to assist domestic efforts to stemming the rise of radicalised Muslims. Like a ‘bundle of sticks’, Southeast Asian nations must work together to generate a strong cohesive network of intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism operations to suppress the threat. ISIL is targeting the region for the number of potential sympathisers it can convert to refill its ranks lost in Iraq and Syria. It is hence more important now to rally together and protect the region from the Black Flag, pushing back the radicalisation and interdicting ISIL’s human resources strategy. Only by choking its supply of manpower, not only with force but also with compassion and deradicalisation programs like that in Singapore, can we successfully counter this insurgency from the Islamic State.

 

Formerly an Officer in the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. He is currently undertaking his MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s where his academic interests revolve around proxy warfare strategies in the contemporary security theatre, and more broadly in international security and intelligence sectors. Cheng is currently a Series Editor with Strife.

*The views and opinions represented within this piece does not represent that of the Singapore government or its Ministry of Defence but are only the intellectual analysis of the author.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Safi M. & Weaver, M. ‘Jakarta attacks: Islamic State militants claim responsibility – as it happened’, The Guardian, (January 14, 2016).

[2] Rogin, J. ‘Islamic State is Rapdily Expanding in Southeast Asia’, BloombergView, (May 29, 2015).

[3] Chalk, P. ‘Strategy: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, (December 2015).

[4] Ngui, Y. & Fernandez, C. ‘Malaysian Arrests After Jakarta Attack Fuel Fears of Islamic State’s Reach’, The Wall Street Journal, (January 16, 2016).

[5] ‘Malaysia Religion’, GlobalSecurity.org, Available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/malaysia/religion.htm, Accessed January 25, 2016.

[6] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 11.

[7] Walker, Nigel, “Nozick’s Revenge”, Philosophy, Vol. 70, pp. 581-586, (1995).

[8] Chalk, P. ‘Islamic State goes Global: ISIL Spread in Indonesia’, The National Interests, December 21, 2015.

[9] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 13.

[10] Ibid.

[11] ‘Self-radicalised Singaporean youths – one arrested, one detained under ISA’, Channel News Asia, (May 27, 2015).

[12] Kok, L.M. ’27 radicalised Bangladeshis arrested in Singapore under Internal Security Act: MHA’, The Straits Times, (Jan 21, 2016).

[13] Driscoll, S. ‘ISA arrests: Singaporeans must be more vigilant against radical ideologies: Yaacob Ibrahim’, The Straits Times, (Jan 20, 2016).

[14] RSIS, ‘Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis’, Nanyang Tehcnological University. Available from: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/ctta/#.VrCX8jbPyu4, Accessed February 2, 2016.

[15] Chalk, ‘Black Flag’, pp. 16