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Daesh in Pakistan: The allure for the urban militant – Part II

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By: Zoha Waseem

Islamic-State-and-Pakistan

Daesh, otherwise referred to as Islamic State or ISIL, has been expanding its presence around the world beyond its stronghold in Syria and Iraq. In the coming weeks, Strife will be focussing a number of articles more closely on emerging areas of concern in Asia, speaking with practitioners on the ground and academics who interrogate the potential threat posed by Daesh. The first piece is from Strife Senior Editor Zoha Waseem who contributes this two-part analysis on Daesh from Pakistan. You can access Part I here.

 

Daesh and the ‘New Generation Militant’ in Pakistan

Through a sophisticated campaign of information dissemination, Daesh has become a brand that is carefully manufactured and delivered to a tech-savvy, younger generation that has an appetite for learning and doing more, and is particularly drawn to the internet.[1] A few traits can be loosely applied to urban jihadists emerging in Pakistan and elsewhere over the last several years.

They are born and raised in cities and not always combat-trained in the northern areas of Pakistan or Afghanistan (or the Middle East). They do not necessarily belong to the stereotypical martial races (Punjabi, Pashtun, or Baloch) but include Urdu-speaking and Bengali minorities as well. They are educated, possibly up to university levels, most likely in co-education institutions and not madrassas. They are raised by middle or upper-middle class families and reside in affluent neighbourhoods. They are self-radicalised or influenced by religious or sectarian (not necessarily extremist) companions, online, within social or familial networks, or through a movement known as Tableeghi Jamaat.[2] Further, they may prefer a certain degree of comfort as a recruitment motivator, such as promises of money, payment of debts, a chance at family life, and employment in other sectors of a terrorist organisation, not just its militant wings. They may also be allured by a sense of adventure, belonging, and alternative social environments.[3] Moreover, they take a keen interest in local, national and international politics and current affairs which become key motivators complementing their religious sentiments.

What differentiates them from previous generations of militants is a desire to be a part of something bigger – a ‘utopia’ of sorts, which Daesh promises through grand narratives of a Sunni caliphate and a functioning society[4], which is not soft on religious minorities, kafirs (non-believers) or apostates, but merciful towards those ‘who repent for their past beliefs and practices’.[5] As such, urban jihadists are generally more aware of their religious and sectarian identities. In many ways, the existing sectarian divisions in Pakistan and the high number of sectarian attacks between 2010 and 2015 (with a declining trend in violence but not in the existence of sectarian outfits)[6] have already exacerbated these differences for exploitation and capitalisation by Daesh’s sectarian narrative.

Urban areas are attractive for terrorists for multiple purposes that are well-established, including: access to financial and other resources, through employment or fund-raising, property and wider recruitment pools; and the potential to liaise with criminal groups for arms, drugs, safe houses and escape routes. There is also the possibility of assimilation and camouflage in ethnically and religiously diverse environments; the publicity generated from high-profile attacks in cities; and opportunities for networking, connectivity, and access to information. They are also particularly attractive for lone-wolf urban jihadists.

In October 2015, a 60-page security manual titled ‘Safety and Security Guidelines for Lone Wolf Mujahideen and Small Cells’ was translated into English and circulated online, allegedly by a Daesh supporter.[7][8] It is an adaptation of an older al Qaeda manual and tackles concepts such as security, vigilance, and covert warfare. Important for urban jihadists are instructions on how to manage information, ‘hide in plain sight’, keep up to date with technology, and avoid having links with other cells within a country. At the time of writing, there was no evidence to suggest that the Sialkot, Lahore or Karachi cells were in contact with one another, though their handlers, within or outside Pakistan, may have been aware of their existence. There is also no evidence to suggest that they were in contact with the commanders of Wilayat Khorasan in Afghanistan, suggesting that while the Wilayat may be recruiting from a certain pool of jihadists, the urban cells are generally self-proclaimed ‘jihadi’ volunteers who are not necessarily interested in being trained under the leadership of a previous generation of militants in Afghanistan-Pakistan.

Karachi is, by no means, unfamiliar with urban terrorism and has been a strategic hub for sectarian militants as well as TTP, al Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban.[9] In 2011, a Pakistani naval base was attacked jointly by TTP and al Qaeda militants in the port city. In June 2014, Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport was attacked by militants belonging to the TTP and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (a close affiliate of al Qaeda). In September 2014, days after its formation, al Qaeda in South Asia (AQIS) claimed the attack on a naval dockyard in Karachi. These recent attacks, all high profile, are multiple reminders that terrorists have been familiarising themselves with Pakistan’s financial capital and largest city for years. For the Daesh-inspired Karachi cell, this familiarisation preceded individual decisions to turn to religious militancy.

The case of the Karachi Cell

It is believed that the Tahir Saeen group became active in Karachi in January 2015, shortly after al-Adnani’s statement recognising Wilayat Khorasan. Known members of this group include Abdullah Yousuf (one of the masterminds, suspected of being in Syria according to interviews with security officials), and Tahir Minhas alias ‘Saeen’, the second mastermind. Saeen, along with Saad Aziz, Hafiz Nasir, Azhar Ishrat, and Asad ur Rehman were arrested shortly after the Safoora attack, but an unknown number of perpetrators and facilitators remain at large.[10] Saeen’s previous affiliation was with al Qaeda, since the 1990s,[11] but ended after a falling out over resources. Saeen met other members of the Karachi cell in Hyderabad and Karachi (Sindh’s two urban centres). He himself was from Punjab.

All of the arrested attackers were educated, barring Saeen – who was a high-school dropout.[12] Nasir and Rehman had degrees from the University of Karachi; Ishrat studied at Sir Syed University (Karachi) and worked for a mobile service provider; and the most infamous of attackers, Saad Aziz had an undergraduate degree from the Institute of Business Administration (Karachi), a prestigious university.[13] Another perpetrator, not yet arrested, was an engineering student. Together, the Karachi cell was allegedly responsible for a host of attacks, including an attack on a paramilitary official, Brigadier Basit, in February 2015, grenade attacks on schools between February and March, an attempted targeted killing of American professor Debora Lobo, the assassination of social activist Sabeen Mahmud in April, and the attack on the Ismaili community in Safoora Goth in May.[14]

From this series of operations, Saad Aziz became the most publicised attacker. A resident of Karachi from an upper-class background and member of the Tableeghi Jamaat, Aziz graduated from IBA in 2011. At university, he joined the Iqra Society, a religious discussion group. It is believed that it was here that Aziz ‘drifted towards radicalisation’.[15] Fluent in English, he familiarised himself with the works of Sayyid Qutb and notable writings on political Islam.[16] He met an al Qaeda operative in 2013, after which he met Tahir Saeen.[17] Together, they pledged allegiance to Daesh. After his arrest, he confessed to murdering Sabeen Mahmud because she was ‘promoting liberal, secular values’.[18]

Even more concerning revelations emerged following the arrests of two couples in Karachi in December 2015, facilitators of the Tahir Saeen group. Adil Masood, a resident of an affluent neighbourhood in Karachi and board member of the College of Accounting and Management Sciences was taken into remand by CTD Sindh.[19] Masood was allegedly also a business partner in Saad Aziz’s Mexican restaurant in central Karachi and had graduated from Indiana University and Fordham University in the United States.[20] A second facilitator taken into custody was Khalid Bari, a former employee of Pakistan International Airlines. Security officials have alleged that the wives of these two facilitators ran a so-called ‘women’s wing’ of Daesh in Karachi, under the garb of an organisation known as Al Zikra Academy through which they collected funds from affluent women in the names of donations and charity for the Karachi cell.[21] Their roles beyond financial support for this cell are difficult to ascertain but nonetheless help understand the reasons outlined above as to why terrorists find urban centres attractive for their operations and why urban militancy remains a complex and complicated threat for Pakistan to tackle.

The Way Forward: A Need for Non-Militaristic Approaches

Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies have been struggling to cope with militancy in urban areas over the last few decades because of the difficulties of profiling terrorists and distinguishing them from ordinary civilians in densely populated neighbourhoods; enduring a politicised and corrupt police force that favours tall budgets for military equipment and training but insufficiently fund investigations; and continued reliance upon paramilitary forces that are inadequately trained in urban counterinsurgency but increasingly equipped with policing powers. Above all, Pakistani counterterrorism practices have generally been ad hoc and highhanded, lacking long-term strategies and foresight.

In retaliation for the ongoing military operation, Zarb-e-Azb, militants affiliated with the TTP attacked the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014. Following the attack, the government of Pakistan launched a twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP) to counter terrorism. Prior to NAP, the government had relied upon the National Internal Security Policy and the Pakistan Protection Act 2014 as part of its counterterrorism strategy, both of which were haphazardly drafted.[22] The NAP complemented the establishment of military courts for speedy trials and the lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty. National subcommittees and provincial apex committees (consisting of senior civil and military leadership but no overseeing body, legal framework, or transparency) were set up to oversee NAP’s implementation. The NAP also escalated operations in northern Pakistan and Karachi, reducing terrorist and sectarian violence considerably during 2015.[23]

However, the lack of implementation of non-military aspects of the NAP remains a source of much criticism, with one report describing this as the ‘militarisation of counterterrorism policy’.[24] Of relevance here, are aspects of the plan dealing with (a) countering hate speech and extremist propaganda; (b) banning the glorification of terrorist organisations through print and electronic media; (c) dismantling communication networks of terrorist organisations; (d) taking measures against the use of social media for terrorism; and (e) dealing with sectarianism.[25] Though these points have not been elaborated upon further in the NAP, taken together, they provide a non-militaristic framework that may help contain Daesh’s ideology, prevent cells from carrying out potential activities, and make it difficult for new recruits to be influenced towards radicalisation.

Yet there have been reports of Daesh using radio transmissions in northern areas of Pakistan to spread their propaganda from Afghanistan[26], and pro-Daesh pamphlets are known to be distributed across Pakistan[27], including those discovered at the site of the Safoora attack. According to a report, despite NAP provisions directed against hate speech and the use of media for terrorism, publications and electronic media produced by groups such as Jamaad-ud-Dawa and Jaish-e-Muhammad, are still being circulated.[28] Further, residents of Islamabad remain perplexed at why Lal Masjid’s cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz, who defended the 2014 Peshawar massacre, threatened suicide attacks[29], and has publicly endorsed the female students of Jamia Hafsa madrassa supporting Daesh, has been allowed to operate in Islamabad. In late 2015, residents began complaining of the state’s inability to prevent Abdul Aziz from delivering sermons through the mosque. Through these sermons, the cleric reportedly spoke in favour of Daesh and called for the imposition of Sharia in Pakistan.[30] The state, instead of arresting Aziz for repeated violations of the NAP, chose to disrupt mobile phone services on a number of days to prevent the sermon from being heard, which served merely to inconvenience local residents.[31]

Selective implementation of the NAP can be the result of multiple factors. First, deep-rooted religious sentiments exist in Pakistani society (across classes) that can be ignited in retaliation to extreme measures by the state, possibly escalating violence in the country. Second, patronisation by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan of sectarian organisations and madrassas dating back to the late 1970s continues, as Islamabad’s policy towards the recent conflict between Riyadh and Tehran remains unclear. Third, Pakistan’s history of supporting non-state actors in the region (particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir) has created monsters too big to reign in without backlash. And lastly, each of Pakistan’s four provinces and disputed territories has internal militant or criminal elements of its own.[32] These are Pakistan’s complex ‘tiers of militancy’[33], which makes its war on narratives that much more challenging.

However, some practical considerations are worth mentioning. Given Pakistan’s social and cultural realities, it is unlikely that Daesh will achieve territorial gains in the country. Majority of Pakistanis are not Wahhabi, Salafi, or Deobandi (minority subsects of Sunni Islam from which individuals are most likely to turn to jihad) but rather followers of the Barelvi subsect. Despite pan-Islamist and sectarian narratives, Daesh promotes a predominantly Arab culture, which is distinct from that of South Asia, and can pose another barrier to Daesh’s large-scale penetration into regional societies. Also, most Pakistanis do not speak Arabic, nor are they familiar with Arab pop-culture, fashion or literature (aside from Quranic texts). Pakistan is also incomparable with Afghanistan or Iraq in terms of ungoverned spaces and has been actively seeking to restore the writ of the state in areas such as FATA.[34] That said, should existing sectarian divisions and tensions within Pakistan be exacerbated, Daesh’s strong Sunni narrative might continue luring jihadists from the region (including those from local militant groups).[35]

This is why Pakistan must prioritise countering Daesh’s narrative and propaganda which requires reading beyond militarised frameworks. In addition, Pakistan should understand the nexus between political grievances and ideological greed which is fuelling resentment within a growing young population with easy access to online forums. Grievances towards the state because of lack of employment, corruption, and highhandedness of security forces, coupled with the search for a strong ideological identity (due to a lack of consensus over what is Pakistan’s Islamic identity[36]), give the youth resentment, excitement and a need to belong, which is a combination that groups like Daesh will continue exploiting, unless the state provides alternatives.

Zoha Waseem is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, researching urban security and policing in Pakistan. She is also a senior editor at Strife and the head of the Afghan Studies Research Group at King’s. She tweets at @zohawaseem.

* This is the second part of the two-part analysis on Daesh in Pakistan. I am thankful to Mr Abdul Basit, Mr Zia ur Rehman, and officials of the Counter Terrorism Department, Sindh, for their continued support.

[1] C. Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual “Caliphate”’, Quilliam Foundation (October 2015), available at http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf.

[2] Tableeghi Jamaat is a Sunni movement that began in India in the 1920s and spread worldwide. According to participants interviewed for this article in Karachi in January 2016, tableegh is the preaching of basic Islamic principles. Volunteers travel within or outside Pakistan, visiting mosques to spread Islamic teachings, at their own expense. They do not advocate jihad or debate politics. However, participants may independently choose or be influenced by certain elements within a jamaat (assembly) to move from tableegh to askariyat (militancy). According to affiliates of the Jamaat, some tableeghs may be used by militant as a safe place to protect themselves from law enforcement agencies for months at a time.

[3] R. Barrett, ‘The Islamic State’, The Soufan Group (November 2014), p. 9, available at http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf.

[4] C. Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual’.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report (2016), p. 27.

[7] ‘Safety and Security Guidelines for the Lone Wolf Mujahideen and Small Cells’, initially by Al-Fajr Media Center, available at https://ansarukhilafah.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/safety-and-security-final.pdf.

[8] M. W. S. Ryan, ‘Hot Issue: How Daesh’s Lone Wolf Guidance Increases the Group’s Threat to the United States’, The Jamestown Foundation (24 November 2015), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44834&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=381#.Vpjs9_l97IU.

[9] Z. Rehman, ‘Is ISIS Knocking on Karachi’s Doors?’, The News (16 March 2015), available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/29453-is-isis-knocking-on-karachis-doors.

[10] Personal interviews with security officials, October 2015 and December 2015, Karachi.

[11] F. Zahid, ‘Tahir Saeen Group’, p. 155-156.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid; personal interviews with security officials between October and December 2015, Karachi.

[14] F. Zahid, ‘Tahir Saeen Group’, p. 155.

[15] Ibid, p. 157.

[16] N. Hussain, ‘Pakistan’s New Breed of Militants’, Foreign Policy (09 June 2015), available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/09/pakistans-new-breed-of-militants/.

[17] N. Ali & F. Zaman, ‘Anatomy of a Murder’, Herald, available at http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153209.

[18] Ibid.

[19] F. Khan, ‘Alleged Financer? College Co-Owner Held Over Safoora Bus Attack’, The Express Tribune (19 December 2015), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1012606/alleged-financer-college-co-owner-held-over-safoora-bus-attack/.

[20] Ibid.

[21] F. Khan, ‘Assistants of Terror: How Women Raise Funds for Da’ish in Karachi’, The Express Tribune (21 December 2015), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1013558/assistants-of-terror-revealed-how-women-raise-funds-for-daish-in-karachi/.

[22] For a more detailed discussion on NAP, NISP and PPA, see International Crisis Group, ‘Revisiting Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Pakistan’, Asia Report No. 271 (22 July 2015), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf.

[23] PIPS, Pakistan Security Report, pp. 7-10.

[24] ICG, ‘Revisiting Counter Terrorism’.

[25] A. Manan, ‘Fight against Terrorism: Defining Moment’, The Express Tribune (25 December 2014), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/811947/fight-against-terrorism-defining-moment/.

[26] M. Achakzai, ‘Radio Caliphate’, The Friday Times (15 January 2016), available at http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/radio-caliphate/.

[27] A. Basit, ‘How Big is ISIS Threat in Afghanistan-Pakistan’, The Counter Terrorist, vol. 8 (3), pp. 46-48.

[28] International Crisis Group, ‘Revisiting Counter Terrorism’, pp. 14-15.

[29] K. Ali, ‘Suicide Attack Threats Again Ring Out of Lal Masjid’, Dawn (20 December 2014), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1151981.

[30] K. Shahid, ‘ISIS in Punjab?’.

[31] ‘Mobile Signals Suspended for Third Friday Now’, Dawn (19 December 2015), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1227313.

[32] T. Noorani, ‘War of Narratives, Dawn (27 June 2014), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1115282.

[33] K. Hyat, ‘Finding the Real Enemy’, The News (24 December 2015), available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/83978-Finding-the-real-enemy.

[34] H. Abbas, ‘ISIS Eyes Influence in Pakistan: Focus, Fears and Future Prospects’, Jinnah Institute (23 December 2014).

[35] Abdul Basit also warns that the threat can multiply in Afghanistan-Pakistan if fighters returning from Syria-Iraq join Wilayat Khorasan or if existing militant groups begin siding with ISIS for strategic purposes (A. Basit, ‘How Big is ISIS’, p. 47).

[36] See C. Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox (Random House India, 2015), pp. 439-541.

The role of strategic outsourcing in preventing the spread of ISIL

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By: Cheng Lai Ki

British_PMC_with_G36K_and_ANA_soldier.jpg
Source: Wikimedia

Over the last eleven months, Sunni-jihadi extremists known as the the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) have been directly involved in multiple crises resulting in the deaths and displacement of civilians in Syria[1], and more recently, in Paris. For ISIL, the battlefield is not constrained to one country but is the world, visible from the bomb placed on the Russian plane and the Paris attacks (i.e. Charlie Hebdo). Their use of unconventional warfare strategies[2] and association to unconventional resource avenues makes their pacification extremely difficult and time consuming for international intelligence and security agencies.

The aim of this article is to briefly demonstrate how a strategic private-government relationship with private military and security companies (PMSCs) can benefit existing operations against extremism and does not aim to criticize existing governmental efforts. PMSCs provide multiple benefits for governments either through force multiplication and contributing valuable skills or networks. To reveal how strategic privatisation of security services (SPSS) can assist operations against ISIL on domestic and foreign fronts, this article will briefly illuminate the benefits of PMSCs in contemporary intelligence and security operations, followed by contextualising operational contributions against various areas of security, intelligence and infrastructure support.

Benefits of PMSCs in contemporary security operations

Since the end of the Cold War, intelligence and security has evolved alongside the development of new communication and information technologies. The rise of the internet, secure packet sharing and the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are hallmarks of how security and intelligence sectors have entered the information era. PMSCs provide a broad range of services, ranging from operational manpower, training, logistical support and analytical assistance. The Research Institute for European and American Studies[3] revealed that 70% of the Untied States (US) intelligence budget authorised by Congress is spend on PMSC contractors. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly conducted rendition operations and clandestine raids with the assistance of Academi (formerly known as Blackwater) contractors to provide operational manpower between 2004 to 2006 during the height of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq[4]. Another example is the close relationship Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI), who possess extensive history in training support, and the US military. The utilisation of contractors are also exhibited in the United Kingdom, where British PMSC Minimal Risk was procured to provide security manage and intelligence analysts for operations in the Middle East[5].

Within the contemporary domain PMSCs are becoming increasingly involved in governmental security and intelligence operations. However, unlike governments, PMSCs are not necessarily constrained by political boundaries to assist in security and developmental operations in post-conflict domains. With strategic integration, PMSCs could be highly beneficial towards re-establishing security and critical infrastructures. This is arguably visible from the application of approved private vendors by the United Nations (UN) for humanitarian and security operations[6]. The extensive use of PMSCs by Western governments have made states more effective in developing security, assessing intelligence and developing infrastructures. The follow sections examine how PMSC effectiveness can be translated to operations against ISIL on foreign and domestic domains in security, intelligence and infrastructure.

Translating effectiveness into operations

When engaging the problem of ISIL, governmental operations have focused on training rebel forces in Syria, directly engaging ISIL forces in the battlefield, developing intelligence for follow-on missions, and strengthening domestic security and warning procedures. When tackling ISIL, privatization can assist governments in three foundational domains of security, intelligence and infrastructure support within counter-extremism operations.

Addressing security domains within counter-extremism, PMSCs can provide effective manpower support and operational training in foreign and domestic theatres. Within domestic theatres, PMSCs can provide additional and improved static security support of private and public locations. In addition, PMSCs can also provide valuable training to local police and security agencies to respond to various threats.

Like other extremist organisations, ISIL possesses operational characteristics that have come under analysis by governmental agencies, academics and private entities. PMSC staff are often ex-governmental employees with extensive academic or practical experiences in various security domains. Domestically, the knowledge of PMSCs can provide valuable training and manpower support, as is with the MPRI-US relationship. In foreign domains, PMSCs can also provide manpower support through directly participating in hostilities. A South-African PMSC, Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Training (STTEP), a reminiscent of a former PSMC, Executive Outcomes (EO), has been successful in combating Islamic extremism in Africa through directly engaging hostile forces[7].

Some critics might argue against the incorporation of contractors into security infrastructures based on grounds of unaccountability and legitimacy. However, as corporate entities, PMSCs rely on providing effective and quality support to secure future bids. In addition, although not necessarily legal institutions, the Montreux Document and International Code of Conduct are two guidelines outlining the legal and practice recommendations to PMSCs[8]. Contrary to popular belief, PMSCs do not operate in a legal vacuum but are also privy to being indicted under international humanitarian law. In addition, weaker or post-conflict states might possess operational and security capability gaps in comparison to their stronger counterparts (i.e. US) that can be supplemented by PMSC services.

Efficient security

Efficient security relies on effective “intelligence” provision. The privatisation of western intelligence communities (IC) arguably started from the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the globalised information era, giving rise to multiple new international threats. Rathmell argues that intelligence privatisation benefits ICs in three main areas of collection, analysis and costs.[9] Since Rathmell wrote in the late 90s, technology has advanced, the world has seen the rise of surveillance drones with strike capabilities, the monitoring of fibre optical traffic by national agencies and the outsourcing of intelligence analysis to private firms (i.e. Control Risks).

The outsourcing of core intelligence functions can facilitate agencies to focus on high value targets and more immanent threats against national security. In addition to privatising various analytical components, intelligence organisations have also procured PMSCs for manpower purposes – previously indicated from the CIA procurement of Academi for rendition operations. With regards to ISIL, privatisation not only can provide governmental agencies support from other experienced intelligence analysts, usually employed by PMSCs after leaving governmental service, but such privatisation can also incorporate skills and networks that analysts would have obtained from working on other intelligence operations in other geographical or target domains.

This can be done while still acknowledging the risks and difficulties instigated by the politicisation of intelligence, alongside the “consumer-producer” dilemma[10] within ICs. However, the argument could be made that the plausible deniability of PMSC services could not only repair the once secret nature of ICs (arguably lost since the dawn of the information age and intelligence crises such as WikiLeaks and the actions of Edward Snowden), but also benefit intelligence operations in politically and legally conflicted areas.

When security and intelligence domains are reinforced, PMSCs can provide effective logistical assistance for “infrastructure support.” As a private entity, PMSCs can also be contracted by other PMSCs or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that are not providing security or intelligence but logistical support. Again, the benefits are similar to being employed by governments in the provision of direct security and consultation services.

A tripartite relationship between governmental agencies, NGOs and PMSCs would highly benefit existing operations against ISIL. For instance, domestically, NGOs can provide logistical support to hospitals or community outreach programs can benefit from governmental subsidisation and also the consultation knowledge from PMSC analysts. When engaging extremist organisations, community cohesion is just as vital as intelligence and direct action as outlined by the counter-terrorism, or CONTEST, strategy in the UK. On foreign soil, NGOs, charity organisation and the UN have been known to cooperate with select PMSCs to provide risk consultation, security and intelligence for operations in post-conflict regions with unstable civil infrastructures or governments[11].

Through cooperative efforts with the ICoC Association, NGOs, PMSCs and Governmental Agencies alongside some strategic planning and cooperation, states can quickly re-establish control over regions affect by ISIL attacks by providing secure healthcare and refugee support. The integration of PMSCs in developmental infrastructures would both improve ties between nations – though on a corporate level – but also potentially improve the quality of infrastructure management, training and operation for future expansion. It must be emphasized that his component of PMSC support focuses more on infrastructure redevelopment to prevent follow-on attacks by ISIL in the future.

Moving forward

The supplementary roles of PMSCs in the three domains of security, intelligence and infrastructure support within counter-extremism operations have been briefly illuminated above. ISIL in particular, like other extremist organisations, rely on underground networks and sympathetic communities to operate beyond borders. When confronting ISIL, international authorities need to establish effective communicative, warning and investigative channels. PMSCs, being private companies, are not necessarily bound by as many political ‘red-tape’ as some organisations when providing security and intelligence services. The corporate ties and networks between companies would inadvertently benefit the governments procuring their services. However, there are grey areas of legitimacy, accountability and power distribution when assigning privatised firms too much authority and jurisdiction over inherently governmental operations.

In conclusion, security and intelligence provisions of PMSCs can inform better governmental decisions alongside assisting in logistical support capabilities to re-establish control and provide care for those affected. To prevent further spread of ISIL, the world needs to unite through application of hard and soft power strategies in public and private domains.

Formerly an Officer in the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. He is currently undertaking his MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’s where his academic interests revolve around private military and security companies and their roles as security by proxy in the contemporary security theatre, and more broadly in international security and intelligence sectors. Cheng is currently a Series Editor with Strife.

Notes:

[1] Global Overview 2015: People internally displaced by conflict and violence, International Displacement Monitoring Centre: Norweigian Refugee Council, (6th May, 2015), Accessed November 16th, 2015, http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201505-Global-Overview-2015/201505-Global-Overview-Highlights-document-en.pdf

[2] Counter-Unconventional Warfare, White Paper, United States Army Special Operations Command, (28th September 2014), Accessed November 16th, 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USASOC-CounterUnconventionalWarfare.pdf

[3] Liaropoulos, A. & Konstantopoulos, I. ‘Privatization of Intelligence: Turning National Security into Business?’, RIEAS Research Institute for European and American Studies, Accessed November 14, 2015; http://rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1319:privatization-of-intelligence-turning-national-security-into-business-&catid=14:transatlantic-studies&Itemid=89

[4] Mazzetti M. & Risen, J. ‘Blackwater Guards Tied to CIA Raids”, The New York Times, (December 10, 2009), Accessed January 12, 2015; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/us/politics/11blackwater.html?r=1&_r=0

[5] 2012 FCO spend on hiring private military and security companies’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Freedom of Information Release, Accessed December 15, 2015; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foi-ref-0293-12.

[6] Cheng, L.K., Private Contractors, Governments and Security by Proxy: An analysis of contemporary challenges, governmental developments and international impacts of private military and security companies (2015), BA Dissertation, University of Leicester.

[7] Freeman, C. “How to defeat a Caliphate: Private military contractors have a bad name, but a great record against the Islamist insurgency in Nigeria”, The Spectator, (May 30th, 2015), Accessed November 18, 2015; http://new.spectator.co.uk/2015/05/mercenaries-could-transform-the-fight-against-isis-if-we-let-them/

[8] Cheng, Private Contractors, (2012).

[9] Rathmell, A. “Privatising Intelligence”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 11:2, (1998), 199-211, DOI: 10.1080/09557579808400199

[10] Herman, M, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

[11] “List of UN Secretariat Registered Vendors: Level 1 and 2”, United Nations, (March 23, 2015), Accessed April 2, 2015; https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/un-secretariat-registered-vendors

 

 

 

Neither Churchill nor Chamberlain: Time to Ditch the Munich Analogy

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By Thomas Colley

820px-Sir_Winston_S_Churchill

An article in yesterday’s Sunday Times set out British Prime Minister David Cameron’s plan to ‘bomb ISIS in a fortnight’.[1] The article, as is so common in today’s age of spin, premediates what Cameron is likely to say in the hope of controlling the debate on extending airstrikes into Syria before it formally begins; that MP’s should ‘start behaving like Churchill, not Chamberlain’. Leaving aside the frustration many feel with being told what a politician is going to say rather than evaluating what they actually say (and do), a greater concern is that the government’s rhetoric potentially belies major flaws in its strategic thinking.

The major strategic concern is, once more, the tired allusion to the Munich analogy to impel MP’s to support extending airstrikes into Syria. As seems to be the case in almost any foreign policy situation, it seems that policymakers think that the only rhetorical device available to them during a debate on military action the comparison with Hitler in 1938. The choice to be offered to Britain’s parliamentarians is essentially to be associated with Britain’s most heroic leader or its most apparently naïve. Simplistic and readily understandable as the comparison is, it grossly underestimates the complexity of the strategic situation in the Middle East at present. Extolling the need to act like Churchill not Chamberlain says little more than ‘it is time for decisive action or the enemy will get stronger’. If this is the level of the British government’s strategic thinking, then British citizens should be extremely concerned. If not, then it is merely the crudest propaganda that grossly underestimates the British public’s (and hopefully their ministers’) understanding of the nuances of contemporary military interventions.

In rhetorical terms, the ‘Churchill not Chamberlain’ analogy is likely to be effective; it presents the illusion of choice, but in fact it is no choice at all. Just as US President Bush insisted on countries having to choose between being with or against America following 9/11, it constrains actors into taking only one option. It removes grey areas and complexity and looks to rhetorically trap politicians into only one realistic choice, if they would like their credibility to be intact. Predictably, at a time when politicians are routinely lambasted for lacking the statesmanlike qualities of their predecessors, being associated with Churchill is evidently preferable given that the only alternative is to be associated with pacifism and naïve inactivity. It can be left to others to debate whether the real alliterative comparison is actually between Churchill and Corbyn.

The apparently timeless lesson Munich provides of not appeasing tyrants is actually a terrible guide to strategy. As Europe’s analogy of choice when Putin annexed Crimea, it said as little about the actual strategic situation there as it does about the fight against ISIS today. This matters because Britain and the West’s strategy against ISIL is currently flawed, and attention to its actual flaws would be far more useful in working out the best step forward. As will be shown, the strategic basis of the comparison is so thin that in fact it would be rather depressing if the level of strategic thinking by policymakers does not go beyond the Munich analogy. With the important Strategic Defence and Security Review upon us, it would be good to see sound strategic thinking elevated above rudimentary rhetoric.

The first flaw is that apart from being demonstrably barbaric, the enemy was markedly different. Hitler, with the benefit of post-Munich hindsight, represented an existential threat to the British state; ISIL does not. ISIL can of course inflict significant damage through terrorism as it is increasingly showing. But to compare the decision to extending limited airstrikes against the organisation - an asymmetric foe - is nothing like failing to foresee an existential total war with a conventional military foe intent on dominating Europe. The costs of failure to act against an ‘existential foe’ are, quite obviously, existential. It is less clear, for example, whether extended airstrikes will result in more British casualties from domestic terrorism or less.

The second and perhaps more understandable flaw is the continuation of thinking of ISIL in terms of the sovereign states in which it holds territory. On the ground, differentiating between ISIL in Iraq and Syria makes little sense; it controls a shifting territory within those states, including the border between them. If it is to be attacked, the group’s territory, not the old lines on the map, should be what matters. As Britain’s thousands of armchair strategists are doubtless aware, if you only attack the group in one territory, and they know that, they can simply position much of what they want to protect into the other. If one insists that a tenuous, laboured World War Two analogy must be made, then the equivalent would be attacking Hitler’s forces only when they were outside German territory, but never when they are inside, and miraculously expect them to be defeated. Airpower alone will not come close to destroying ISIL, but limiting airpower to only part of its territory has always been operationally flawed.

The most disappointing aspect of the Churchill-Chamberlain analogy is that it typifies a longstanding feature of debates on British defence policy: the simplification of Britain’s options into a crude binary between military action and benign inactivity.[2] Rather than a genuine debate about Britain’s strategic ends, ways and means, the debate is reduced to the choice between interventionism or isolationism, heroism or pacifism, leadership or irrelevance, security or insecurity. The complexity of conflict in the Middle East requires far more nuanced and flexible thinking. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the government is looking to act more out of conviction in the efficacy of its strategy or merely the desire to avoid the loss of credibility that would result from Russia and France proceeding without it. As a source in the Times article suggests, it would be ‘embarrassing’ if Britain could not play its role as a reliable ally. But surely what is truly embarrassing is the idea that embarrassment might drive strategy.[3]

To conclude, the British government is poised to call for a vote on furthering an existing military intervention into an immensely complex conflict, while setting out a Strategic Defence and Security Review that is a vital element of British strategy in the coming years. If it should be drawing any lessons from history (and it should do cautiously), it should be to focus on the intricacies of an individual conflict rather than vague notions of ‘credibility’, ‘influence’ and ‘status’. It should also stop trying to persuade people by telling them they are facing Hitler again. The British public understand war reasonably well, having witnessed their military participate in so many different conflicts in recent decades. They also currently appear to reluctantly recognise the need to destroy ISIL, but have learnt that a clear, detailed political plan is needed to prevent further problems in the long run. Reducing the level of strategic debate to Churchill versus Chamberlain is woefully inadequate and will do little to resolve a complex strategic situation or generate public support. Let us hope that the government’s actual strategy is more convincing than what they tell us it is going to be.

 

Thomas Colley is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London. A former senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal, his research specialises in propaganda, strategic communication and British public attitudes to war and conflict. You can follow him on Twitter @ThomasColley

[1] Tim Shipman, “PM’s push to bomb Isis ‘in fortnight’”,

http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/National/Terrorism/article1636187.ece, 22 November 2015.

[2] Ritchie, Nick. “Trident and British Identity: Letting Go of Nuclear Weapons.” Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, September 2008.

[3] Tim Shipman, “PM’s push to bomb Isis ‘in fortnight’”.

Finding context in the chaos of the Islamic State

by

By: Aaron Noonan

Weiss, Michael D and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts., 2015. Pages: 288. £10.99 (paperback). ISBN-10: 1941393578

In a defiant interview with The Sunday Telegraph in October 2011, just as the Syrian uprising was beginning to transition to civil war, President Bashar al-Assad declared: ‘Any problem in Syria will burn the whole region. If the plan is to divide Syria, that is to divide the whole region.’ [1] This was a cautionary piece of advice to the West not to intervene against his regime, as it battles the ‘terrorists’ that it proclaims to have sparked the uprising. The problem however, is that Assad’s regime wasn’t fighting the terrorists - it was nurturing them.

That is according to ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, by Michael D. Weiss and Hassan Hassan. Weiss is a journalist who has reported from inside Syria for publications such as The Daily Beast, while Hassan Hassan is a Syrian analyst who has written for The National newspaper and now works with Chatham House. The book seeks to place ISIS (now termed the Islamic State or IS) within the broader context of the Middle Eastern strife over the past two decades. Despite taking the world by surprise with its lightning advance through Mosul in northern Iraq in June 2014, IS has existed in various incarnations for well over a decade.

Meticulously researched and using original interviews conducted by the authors with extremists and military officials, the book traces IS’ origins from the radicalisation of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Jordan in the 1980s. His turbulent alliance with Osama bin Laden in the early 2000s spawned IS’ predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI’s takfir ideology, which saw the group actively target Shia muslims during the Iraq War, became a point of contention between al-Zarqawi and bin Laden, as core al-Qaeda feared alienating the Muslim population. Their fears turned to reality, when AQI were beaten back by the US-sponsored tribal militias, the Sons of Iraq, during the Surge in 2007. The book is adept in analysing the various forces that have allowed IS to perpetuate since its early Zarqawist days. In addition, the book seeks to explain how IS is no longer merely a terrorist organisation, but rather a brutal proto-state thriving on chaos and war. The authors are perhaps at their best however when accounting for Iraqi Baathist influence within IS, and when examining the Assad regime’s complicity in allowing the organisation to exist in northern Syria.

The fall of Saddam in 2003 saw the disintegration of the Baath Party in Iraq, though by that time many of those former regime elements, under the influence of the Faith Campaign, had become more Salafist than Baathist. [2] The authors note that many members of Saddam’s regime now hold key positions in IS. [3] From the ashes of decades-long Sunni minority rule came a Shia political resurgence in Iraq, under the guidance of US occupation, which in turn inspired al-Zarqawi’s all out sectarian war against Shia Iraq. The authors make clear that US nurturing of Shia politicians in Iraq through the ‘de-Baathification’ programme, which left many former regime employees ostracised and unemployable, certainly played a role in exacerbating tensions. [4]

The section of the book perhaps most important to understanding the Assad regime’s position in the Syrian Civil War today, is the one addressing the regime’s relationship with AQI member Abu Ghadiyah. The Assad government actively facilitated the crossing of foreign fighters from the Syrian border at Deir Ezzor into Iraq, oftentimes through ‘rat lines’ maintained by Abu Ghadiyah. Despite the international community’s awareness that Syria was aiding Ghadiyah’s activities, Assad refused to put an end to it. It took a cross-border raid into Syria by US Forces in 2008 to finally eliminate Ghadiyah. [5] The authors expertly draw attention to an often overlooked aspect of the Assad regime that continues to affect the civil war today: its state sponsorship of AQI, IS’ predecessor. [6] Indeed, the authors suggest that the Assad regime is at the very least allowing IS to exist unfettered in northern and eastern Syria, despite the regime’s insistence that it is ‘fighting terrorists’ within its borders. [7]

Assad effectively sought to design his own binary narrative of the civil war, spreading the notion that it is his government versus the terrorists, a ploy used to avert the prospect of Western intervention. According to the authors, Assad allowed IS to make strong gains in Syria in order to present himself as the last line of defence against jihadists. [8] This is a bold claim to make, but one that is backed up by well-researched sources and interviews, including with radicalisation expert Shiraz Maher, the radicalisation expert at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London, who argues that Assadist forces actively sought to incite a Sunni uprising through state-sanctioned sectarian violence. [9]

ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror is a book that at its core seeks to contextualize IS within the broader confines of recent Middle Eastern history. Whilst the seemingly unexpected advance of ISIS across northern Iraq in the first half of 2014 propelled the terrorist organization onto the international stage, the book argues that IS is just another incarnation of a decades old group. The need to cover a wide spectrum of aspects pertaining to IS leads the book to adopt a broad analytical focus which, at times, is disadvantageous to particular topics. Notably, its chapters on life within IS and its ability to draw in foreign fighters through internet recruitment are sparse. However, the authors are most skilled at tracing the group’s murky origins and explaining how both the Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War allowed IS to flourish. In drawing attention to the indisputable link between the Assad regime and its sponsorship of Sunni terrorism, the authors do a great service to our understanding of how the Syrian Civil War is playing out. Assad may have warned that ‘any problem in Syria will burn the whole region,’ [10] but as Shiraz Maher points out, it is Assad himself who ‘set the Sunni Muslim world on fire.’ [11]

Aaron Noonan is currently undertaking an MA in Intelligence and International Security at King’. His interests include Middle Eastern sectarianism, terrorism, and CBRN weaponry. He can be found on Twitter @custerdome, or on his blog Louder than Bombs.

Bibliography

[1] Gilligan, Andrew. 2011. “Assad: challenge Syria at your peril.” The Telegraph, October 29. Accessed October 7, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/ 8857898/Assad-challenge-Syria-at-your-peril.html.

[2] Weiss, Michael D., and Hassan Hassan. 2015. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York:

Regan Arts, p. 23

[3] Ibid., p. 124

[4] Ibid., p. 26

[5] Ibid., p. 108

[6] Ibid., p. 102

[7] Ibid., p. 147

[8] Ibid., p. 219

[9] Ibid., p. 135

[10] Gilligan, “Assad.”

[11] Weiss and Hassan, “ISIS”, p. 135

Malaysia's Daesh problem: extremism in the shadow of moderation

by

By Munira Mustaffa:

Malaysians participating in a rally to express their desire for change. (Photo: Obtained via a Flickr account. Licensed under Creative Commons.)
Malaysians participating in a rally to express their desire for change. (Photo: Hitoribocchi, CC 2.0)

Regional analysts and Western pundits may be inclined to wonder why Daesh’s[1] influence still persists in Malaysia, despite concerted efforts to combat the group.[2] The answer lies in the fact that with a population of approximately 240 million Muslims in the region, Southeast Asia is an ideal ground for Daesh’s radicalisation ventures. Its geostrategic position in energy and commercial trade routes and maritime affairs could prove to be of value, and may even allow Daesh more latitude to expand their influence.

This much is evident from Daesh’s newly formed Bahasa-speaking unit known as Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy (aka Katibah Nusantara).[3] Recent developments have shown that Malaysia could potentially shift from its current status as a terrorist transit point to becoming a target state. Reports are rife that Daesh is encouraging their supporters through the organisation’s online magazine, Dabiq, to carry out attacks in Malaysia, as well as Singapore and Indonesia.[4] If such attacks materialise, the consequences could potentially destabilise the country’s politics and socioeconomy.

With the intention of narrowing “the divide between the moderates and the extremists”, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Najib Razak, boasts of being the pioneer of the Global Movement of Moderates Foundation (GMOMF).[5] But he is also embroiled in a grand corruption scandal[6] that even managed to grab the attention of the international media, and warranted an FBI investigation.[7] His rapidly deteriorating reputation as a state leader triggered nationwide outrage that prompted calls for his resignation.[8] The serious loss of confidence in Najib, both personally and as leader of the UMNO party, has intensified the bellowing from restless conservatives who fervently believe that it is time for the country to be governed by “a pure Islamic leader” who is willing to introduce hudud (lit: “limit” or “prohibition”) law[9] as the ultimate answer to crime and corruption.

The clamour for a more orthodox Islamic Malaysia is not a new phenomenon. Nor is it one that has occurred in a vacuum. One might argue that as much as moderation is a counter-reaction to fundamentalism, religious extremism can be seen as a reaction to modernity. While religious conservatives do not resist harnessing technology for their own purposes, the goals they espouse and the rejection of other modern values such as pluralism is a clear separation of religion, state and democracy that points back to a “simpler time”. This is even more apparent from their use of modern processes (like guerrilla warfare), technology (like encryption and social media), and ideologies, like modified forms of Marxism.

Communism and socialism have anti-clerical and anti-religious undertones, possibly resulting from their criticism of religion from a Western background. Both the anti-clerical and anti-religious elements of modern Western ideologies came from the desire to reduce something to its purest and truest form, eliminating superstition. The same is true of fundamentalist ideology, which is hostile to innovations and ‘corruption’ of tradition and culture. A lot of the doctrine of Daesh came from earlier writings and the influence of the first modern Muslim revival in the late 19th and 20th century.[10] It has been argued that the Daesh movement is rooted in the Wahhabism[11] doctrine, which demanded that all Muslims pledge their allegiance to a single Islamic authority. Those who refused would be denounced as takfiri (infidel), and would thereby deserve the punishment of death.[12]

This is why it is essential to recall Malaysia’s past association with Communism prior to Independence. As a former colony of Britain and a strategic partner of the US, multi-ethnic Malaysia is frequently described as a moderate and progressive nation. Grassroots militant jihadism in the country emerged in the late 1960’s after the insurgency era, and gained momentum during the Islamic revivalism period of the 1980’s. Anxious to detach themselves from the country’s left-wing anti-religious communist past, a number of eager young Malay Muslims took off for Afghanistan to join the mujahideen (guerrilla fighters)[13] during the Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 as an expression of solidarity and Muslim camaraderie, much like those who ventured into Syria to participate in Daesh today. There, these recruits received their training in the art of militant war, and this educational package included extreme interpretations of Islam.

Upon their return, not only did they bring back knowledge of military combat to share with fellow sympathisers, but also their radical ideology. More homegrown militant groups have surfaced since then, such as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and al-Mau’nah. By the late 1990’s, a number of these sympathisers enlisted with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), after being moved by the plight of oppressed Muslims around the world.[14] Two of them gained infamy in their own right, the now-deceased Noordin Md. Top and Azahari Husin. One study identified 13 homegrown radical militant groups, and they all share one common goal: to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) out of Malaysia.[15]

Since its Independence on 31st August 1957, much of Malaysia’s national security and nation building has centred on race relations, given the country’s diverse population. Those who believe that the iron-fisted Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) – recently enforced in September 2015 – will be an effective countermeasure to terrorism will be disappointed if policymakers continue to reject and dismiss reality. Enabling racist and polarising views, fanning paranoia of the Jewish/Chinese conspiracy purportedly seeking to dismantle Muslim faith[16], and legitimising and empowering Malay supremacist sentiments are all reasons why extremism exists in the first place. There is no doubt that the incumbent Malaysian government is very keen on promoting fundamentalist and austere elements of religion only when it suits their purposes and benefits the state.

Moreover, the model of Malaysia’s religious authority is similar to models of how religious authorities in the Muslim world are treated as extensions of the state, which finds its origins in the relationship between the Egyptian state, the al-Azhar University, and Egypt’s religious leaders. Malaysia’s religious authorities are appointed by the state, therefore it is in their best interests to collude with state authority and legitimise the state’s policies. Despite government reassurances that POTA is employed only to tackle radicalisation and mitigate terror activities, it could possibly be misused and abused to subdue critics of the incumbent leadership. In fact, a dissident critic of Najib Razak was recently detained under SOSMA (Security Offences (Special Measures) Act) for having the audacity to demand government accountability over the corruption allegations.[17]

In the face of extremism, a more active state effort in addressing bigotry and dissociating itself from racial chauvinism and religious supremacy is pivotal for reformation. This is a necessary step in strengthening nation building and community resilience. Much of this must come from a demonstrably positive leadership, one that requires accountability and transparency.

There is no denying that the root of Malaysia’s growing extremism lies not just related to the global spread of fundamentalist religious ideologies, but is also ingrained in the attitude of the country’s irresponsible policymakers, community leaders and politicians – all of whom refuse to be held accountable for their actions. This much is evident from UMNO Supreme Council member Tan Sri Annuar Musa, who proudly and wrongfully proclaimed that racism is acceptable in Islam, knowing full well that his peers in power would never castigate him.[18] Nevertheless, such statements feed and validate Islamophobic rhetoric that marginalises Muslim minorities across the globe, which in turn is a reactive co-radicalisation factor in the formation of reactionary extremism.[19]

Two wrongs will never make a right. When one recognises Malaysia’s history of religious policing, and the way that its authoritative ruling power breaches even the most personal boundaries[20] of its people and infringes the space of both Muslims and non-Muslims[21] alike, is it any wonder that Malaysia is suffering from a problem of extremism?

Munira Mustaffa completed her MSc in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism at the Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, University College of London, and her dissertation was on mapping and analysing terrorism in Malaysia. She is also an intelligence analysis consultant for several corporate intelligence and security firms based in London and New York. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

NOTES

[1] Throughout this entire essay, ISIS/ISIL will be referred to as Daesh.

[2] John Hudson, ‘Why does Malaysia have an Islamic State problem?’, Foreign Policy. September 9, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/09/why-does-malaysia-have-an-islamic-state-problem/

[3] TRAC. ‘Kuala Lumpur Cell / Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah / Malay archipelago unit for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria / Majmu’ah al Arkhabiliy / Katibah Nusantara’, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/kuala-lumpur-cell-katibah-nusantara-lid-daulah-islamiyyah-malay-archipelago-unit-islamic-state

[4] The Malay Mail Online. ‘Police counter-terrorism unit says beefing up security after IS threatens attack on Malaysia’, September 11, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/police-counter-terrorism-unit-says-beefing-up-security-after-is-threatens-a

[5] The Global Movement of Moderates, http://www.gmomf.org/

[6] Jennifer Pak, ‘1MDB: the case that’s riveting Malaysia’, BBC News, August 28, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33447456

[7] Oliver Holmes, ‘US investigators launched probe into scandal-hit Malaysian PM Najib Razak,’ The Guardian, September 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/us-investigators-launch-probes-into-scandal-hit-malaysian-pm-najib-razak

[8] Ansuya Harjani, ‘Malaysia’s anti-government protests: what’s next?’, CNBC, August 31, 2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/31/malaysias-anti-government-protests-whats-next.html

[9] Islamic penal law for severe crimes considered being against the rights of God as outlined in the Holy Quran and hadith. See Oxford Islamic Studies, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e757

[10] Karen Armstrong, ‘Wahhabism to ISIS: how Saudi Arabia exported the main source of global terrorism’, Newstatesman, November 27, 2014, http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2014/11/wahhabism-isis-how-saudi-arabia-exported-main-source-global-terrorism

[11] A Sunni movement founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, described to be radical and extremely orthodox. See Crooke (2014) and Armstrong (2014).

[12] Alastaire Crooke, ‘You can’t understand ISIS if you don’t know the history of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia’, The Huffington Post, October 27, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html

[13] “Mujahideen” is translated as “one who engages in jihad (struggle)”, but in contemporary conflicts the term has become synonymous with Muslim guerilla fighters.

[14] Sidney Jones, 2005, ‘The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59:2, p.169-178.

[15] Mohd. Mizan Aslam, 2009, ‘The thirteen radical groups: Preliminary research in understanding the evolution of militancy in Malaysia’, Jati, 14, p.145-161.

[16] Ian Buruma, ‘The ‘Jewish conspiracy’ in Asia’, The Guardian, February 9, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/06/judaism-race

[17] The Malay Mail Online, ‘Khairuddin rearrested under Sosma moments after court orders his release’, 23 September, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/khairuddin-rearrested-under-sosma-moments-after-court-orders-his-release

[18] Sheridan Mahavera, ‘I am racist and my racism based on Islam, says Umno’s Annuar Musa’, The Malaysian Insider, September 16, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/i-am-racist-and-my-racism-based-on-islam-says-umnos-annuar-musa

[19] Douglas Pratt, ‘Islamophobia as reactive co-radicalization’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 26:2, p.205-218, January 28, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09596410.2014.1000025

[20] Kamles Kumar, ‘Cover up to “respect” Muslims, mufti tells non-Muslims in dress code rows’, The Malay Mail Online, June 28, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/cover-up-to-respect-muslims-mufti-tells-non-muslims-in-dress-code-rows

[21] The Malaysian Insider, ‘What more do you want from me, Borders manager asks JAWI’, 25 March, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/cover-up-to-respect-muslims-mufti-tells-non-muslims-in-dress-code-rows