ISIL

Photo essay from the frontline against IS: playing the waiting game with the Kurdish Peshmerga

September 28, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Christiaan Triebert:

A fighter from Koya in his base – a house recaptured from Islamic State – at one of the most southern positions of the Peshmerga. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Christiaan Triebert recently returned from the frontline between the Kurdish Peshmerga and Islamic State militants in northern Iraq. This is his account of his time with the Peshmerga.

***

“Get the brothers ready for tonight’s position.”

“Yes I will, inshallah.”

“Inshallah.”

A group of Peshmerga soldiers stand around a walkie-talkie. They listen to the Arabic of Islamic State (IS) fighters who are just a stone’s throw away. Another Peshmerga fighter scans the horizon with his binoculars. “There,” he points. Two cars drive off, leaving a cloud of dust behind them.

The question is whether the information is useful to the Kurds. The village where the IS fighters take their positions overnight is about 1.5km away. Close enough to clearly see it from the six-meter-high vantage point, but too far away to hit accurately. It would be a waste of ammunition. A cloth is draped around the barrels of a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun for that reason. “We’ll take it off as soon as they move toward us.”

I stand here at the frontline in northern Iraq, between the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Islamic State, east of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Oil is money, and there’s always someone who is willing to buy it, which makes this bit of land a target for IS.

In the nearby villages of Tel al-Ward and Mullah Abdullah IS flags flew six months ago. Now they have been replaced by the Alaya Rengin, the ‘Colourful Flag’ of Iraqi Kurdistan. The coalition’s air strikes have given the Peshmerga fighters the chance to recapture this territory from IS. Now they have created a new, more resilient defence line. A metre-high wall of sand separates the Peshmerga controlled area from that of IS. Every few metres a lookout has been built upon the defence line. On some of them sit sizeable guns.

An outpost overlooking 'no man’s land'. The boy holding the flagpost is fighting together with his father at this part of the frontline. — An outpost overlooking ‘no man’s land’. The boy holding the flagpost is fighting together with his father at this part of the frontline. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Peshmerga fighters listen to their commander. The house where they sit was captured from Islamic State and is now used as a Peshmerga base. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

The area between the old and the new defence lines is marked by previous battles. Major General (liwa) Wurya grabs the base plate and bipod of an improvised mortar system. According to him, chloride-loaded mortars were fired from the installation. He then points to a huge hole. Twisted steel lies in and around it. “An Islamic State suicide vehicle exploded there, luckily enough we managed to hit it just in time before it exploded at our lookout.”

These suicide trucks, so-called VBIEDS (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device), are nightmares for the Kurds: heavily armoured vehicles loaded with explosives that drive straight into the Kurdish positions and are detonated by the driver in exchange for a one-way ticket to paradise.

“Have you ever seen the movie Mad Max,” asks retired liwa Abozid Salih. I nod. “Such vehicles are also made by IS. But worse. One foggy morning, we saw an armoured harvester armed with heavy artillery looming towards us. Bullets and rocket launchers were fired — nothing helped. That day, we lost a lot of men.”

It is not surprising that many fighters emphasise how happy they are with the German supply of MILAN anti-tank-missiles, which have proved to be effective against these moving monsters.

Yet many Peshmerga soldiers complain about the poor condition of their weapons and their lack of ammunition. Most of their weapons were seized from Saddam’s forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. There are also several tanks and other hardware, but none of it can compare to the modern American-made weapons IS militants have looted from Iraqi bases.

In addition to the anti-tank-missiles, Germany has provided around 6,000 assault rifles: 3,000 G3s (“old junk”) and another 3,000 G36s (the standard weapon of the Bundeswehr), as well as thousands of machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

But still there are not enough weapons on the front. One soldier asks where the other weapons are. To which another responds, “In the hands of the KDP”. Others nod in agreement. Kurdish police officers had earlier said that Massoud Barzani, the current president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR), had a monopoly on arms distribution.

Former liwa Saleh holds 44-mm rocket for the RB M57, a Yugoslavian rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). — Former liwa Saleh holds a 44-mm rocket for the RB M57, a Yugoslavian rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

A fighter in position with his Russian made PK machine gun at the frontline south of Kirkuk. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Despite the fact that the Iraqi Kurds are united in their fight against IS, the Peshmerga has always been plagued by internal division. The forces are still divided along political lines. Although they led the Kurdish resistance against Saddam together, armed conflict has broken out sporadically between the different Kurdish political groups, most notable in the bloody Kurdish civil war from 1994 to 1997.

On one side is the group that swears allegiance to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of the incumbent President Massoud Barzani and his family. On the other side are the groups that are loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani and his family. The two political parties together form the ruling coalition of the KAR.

The divide is noticeable on the frontlines. ISIS graffiti is often repainted with ‘PUK’ rather than ‘Peshmerga’. The KDP Peshmerga is mainly in the north while the PUK Peshmerga is stationed in the south. When Islamic State militants pushed an offensive on Kirkuk in June 2014, both factions sent too many troops to the region, leaving other strategic positions unmanned. At the moment, the Kirkuk front is predominantly staffed by PUK Peshmerga.

An older generation of PUK Peshmerga fighters. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Writing on a building just behind the frontline. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

The main danger for the men at the Kirkuk front comes from IS mortars. Snipers are less of a threat: the walls of sand are tall enough and the distance is just too far.

Apart from the occasional mortar attacks, the front is quiet. Perhaps too quiet. In early August, Kurdish commanders said that many jihadists seemed to have been transferred from here to the IS stronghold at Mosul. But every so often there is a larger attack; recently 600 IS fighters attacked Peshmerga positions.

“I do not understand,” Wurya says. ‘Of those six hundred we killed, at least a hundred were foreigners. Why do Westerners, sometimes even with a university background, blow themselves up here? What is their right to fight here?”

This is the reason why Wurya and Saleh believe that Western countries should continue to support the Peshmerga and their fight against Islamic State. “After all, many of your compatriots are fighting here.”

There is debate as to what role radicalisation plays among the Kurdish youth. Certainly the motivation to fight is greater in the older generation than among the young. While defending their homeland is a source of pride – as demonstrated by the many British and American Kurds have come back to fight here - many youngsters talk openly about their desire to go to Europe.

They are tired of the front, or even find it boring. The boys keep themselves busy by playing FarmVille, cards, or watching ‘funny videos’. That gets boring after a while. They also denounce corrupt politicians and the little wages they receive for their efforts at the front. This explains the remarkably large number of taxis just behind the front. A lot of guys try to earn extra dinars as taxi drivers when they’re not at the front.

A Peshmerga fighter is using his phone for relaxation. Several fighters said there was not much to do: — A Peshmerga fighter using his phone for relaxation. Several fighters said there was not much to do: “Waiting, waiting, waiting.” Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Peshmerga fighter Chewan, 22, bought his ‘US Army’ outfit in the local bazar in Koya. Most fighters have to pay for their own outfits. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Liwa Wury says he does not understand why so many Westerners are fighting for Islamic State. For that reason, Wurya believes, the West should continue its support for the Peshmerga. “After all, many of your compatriots are fighting here.” Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

“The problem of the youth is that they have learned to fight out of a book,” Wurya says. “We, by contrast, have gained experience by fighting in the mountains.” Holding a cup of tea, he laughs with his old comrades about the things they did during previous wars, reminiscing about the time one of them was the first on top of a bunker of Saddam’s troops.

Together they fought many armed conflicts, especially against the Iraqi authorities in the sixties, seventies and eighties. After the Gulf War, they fought against the KDP between 1995 and 1998 in the Kurdish civil war. In 2003, they stood side by side with the American elite units.

Yet there has been little training since Saddam was ousted from power, especially for a fight like the current one. “The Islamic State is by far the hardest enemy we’ve ever had,” Salih says. “And that battle is far from over.”

As night falls, the Kirkuk front becomes even quieter. But the silence is deceptive. There is unrest within the political landscape of the KRG, and frustrated youths would rather go to Europe than be stationed there. Whatever the case, Salih will continue his fight. He is certain that “something big will happen soon”.

A few days later, the Peshmerga launched a massive offensive involving over a thousand men. The attack was successful: IS was pushed back over 10km and several villages were recaptured. Air support from the coalition was vital to the success of the attack.

Salih knows how important that support is. He refers to the greater powers of the region and the world, all of whom have a stake in his fight. But it does not bother him. He is proud. “Despite the external support, this struggle is, to me, a Kurdish struggle. And with or without support — I will defend my country till my last breath.”

Retired liwa Saleh laughs with his old comrades about the things they did in previous wars, including fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein. — Retired liwa Saleh laughs with his old comrades about the things they did in previous wars, which included fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

For six months, it has been relatively quiet at this front. Some soldiers go fishing, just behind the frontline, to kill time. Photo: Christiaan Triebert.

Christiaan Triebert (1991) is a postgraduate student in Conflict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He completed his undergraduate studies in International Relations and International Organisation as well as Political Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. He has visited several conflict-torn regions, most recently Northern Iraq. You can find more of his work on his website www.christiaantriebert.com or follow him on Twitter @trbrtc

NOTES

Thanks to Thomas van Linge for recognizing the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns mounted on MT-LB’s.

What does the fall of Ramadi mean for Iraq?

May 20, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Victoria Fontan: Dr. Victoria Fontan writes this article from Duhok, Kurdistan.

EDITORS NOTE: On May 20, following the publication of this article, the Iraqi government granted conditional entry to Baghdad for IDPs fleeing the violence in Ramadi. However, as of May 22, Sharqia News, Iraqi TV was reporting the bridge had only been opened for 1,000 IDP’s, leaving 5,000 remaining IDPs stranded.

The town of Ramadi has completely fallen to the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Many commentators have already stated that this is a major defeat for the government of Prime Minister Abadi. Indeed, it represents both a long and short-term disaster for the current Baghdad administration.

Only a month after triumphantly proclaiming that he would rid Anbar of ISIS, against US wishes to focus on re-taking Mosul, Prime Minister Abadi has failed. His strategy is not only placing Baghdad at risk, but also the Haditah Dam, the second largest source of hydropower in Iraq.

Shi’a militias are now gathering in Habaniya airbase in preparation for a major counter-offensive. Yet, a year on, Mosul is still waiting to be “saved”. This flexing of governmental and Shi’a militia muscles seems to be no more than a Baathist-style propaganda stunt, that former Saddam Information Sahhaf-style. So what does this mean for Iraq?

It is now very clear that the modern state, as Gertrude Bell designed it, belongs to the history books. Sectarian relations between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’as have reached a point of no return. Conflict resolution scholars compare relationships to an elastic band: it can be stretched, but at one point, it breaks.

Baghdad’s refusal of Anbar Internally Displaced Persons (IPDs) illustrates this. While the Kurdistan Regional Government welcomed almost two million Arab IDPs after the fall of Mosul last June, Baghdad has closed its doors to its own, clearly indicating to the its Sunni population that Iraq is no longer their country.

With this clear sign of sectarian disintegration of the country, Kurdish independence looks like a fait accomplit. It is not a matter of if, but when Kurdistan will finally exist as a sovereign State. Seen under this light, Kurdistan is indirectly benefiting from Prime Minister Abadi’s strategic and sectarian mistakes. That is a clear long-term benefit to Kurdistan, but at what price?

In the short term, it might be that once again, Baghdad’s errors have to be paid for by the Kurds, and specifically the Peshmerga forces, who remain, under-armed, in the northern frontline of the war against ISIS. In the same way that ISIS significantly benefited from the fall of Mosul in terms of weaponry; scores of armaments were left when General Berwary and his Golden Brigades left the Anbar Military Command on Sunday.

Like the Baghdad-backed Shi’a militias, ISIS is armed with the latest technology; while Peshmerga only receive a fraction of the weapons sent by the US via the Baghdad government. This makes the holding of frontlines, such as in the town of Sinjar, which I visited a couple of weeks ago, more difficult.

This also undoubtedly reinforces an unnecessary metric imbalance between ISIS and the Peshmerga. Each time that the Baghdad Government makes another gross mistake, its ripple effects can be felt at the largest frontline against ISIS, defended by the Kurds for over 1000 kilometers. Each Baghdad military defeat creates even stronger anti-bodies in the ranks of ISIS, whose fighters, thanks to the government’s strategic mistakes, have access to the latest weapon technology. With the strategic help of former Iraqi Army top commanders, the combination is proving deadly on the battlefield. If it weren’t for the Coalition airstrikes, ISIS would have made more advances.

The results are instructive. In Tikrit, Abadi’s troops were incapable of retaking the city on their own. While more than 30,000 troops surrounded Tikrit for over a month, it was only after Coalition airstrikes and the Jibouri tribe’s assistance in re-taking the neighboring town of al-Alam, that the city could be accessed. How many ISIS bodies were found inside? Between 60 and 80. In Ramadi, it was reported that 6,000 Iraqi forces fell to 150 ISIS fighters. At this rate, the Iraqi army and Shi’a militias are only making matters worse.

Militarily, the Baghdad government has reached such a low that a sustained presence on the battlefield will only weaken its army even more, and further alienate the Sunni tribes who are still part of the coalition against ISIS. Politically, the Baghdad government should swallow its pride and start working on a serious end to sectarian politics in Iraq.

Dr. Victoria Fontan is the Interim Chair, Department of Politics and Public Policy, at the American University of Duhok, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. She is also the author of “Decolonizing Peace” (2012) and “Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq” (2008). She is now undertaking an additional PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Her thesis title is: “The Resilience of Insurgencies in Fallujah.” You can find more information on Victoria Fontan’s research on her website: http://www.victoriacfontan.com or follow her on Twitter @DecolonizingPAX.

Can POTA counter the ISIL threat in Malaysia?

May 9, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Munira Mustaffa:

Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib Razak is painting Malaysia as “a model of moderate Islam” to the rest of the world, but the emergence of a recent recruitment video and photos from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threatens to shatter that harmonious image.^[i] The video and photos feature Malay-speaking youths training with weapons in an undisclosed ISIL-controlled location.

It was recently revealed that the Royal Malaysian Police had identified 39 more Malaysians who have joined ISIL, and eight Malaysian families are now in Syria.^[ii] There are reportedly over 100 Malaysian fighters in Syria and Iraq.

The strength of ISIL’s reach is not to be underestimated; authorities are increasing their monitoring of sympathisers and making arrests to disrupt possible threats by ISIL in the country. In fact, a new terror group with a Nusantara[iii] element operating under ISIL’s command has emerged under the name Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy (lit: “the Archipelago Group”).^[iv]

To counter these new threats of Islamic extremism, Malaysian policymakers introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) just over a month ago, on 7 April, 2015. This new anti-terrorism law has drawn fire from all quarters for its draconian measures. Critics have described it as ‘a reincarnation of the Internal Security Act’. There are legitimate concerns about the potential inconsistencies in state practice in its attempts to eradicate terrorism at the local level. This is largely because there is no universally agreed definition for terrorism that could facilitate the available legal frameworks for prosecuting the actors^[v] of terrorism in a court of law. This is an issue faced not only by Malaysia, but internationally as well.

Taking this into perspective, it is necessary to examine how policymakers at Putrajaya define terrorism within Malaysia’s experience. Malaysia had a history of countering insurgencies even before the nation gained independence from the British Empire on 31 August, 1957, by employing preventive detention law as national security measures. After independence, the Internal Security Act (ISA) was enacted in 1960 to deter communist threats that no longer exist today. Under the ISA, the accused can be detained without trial or criminal charges under limited and legally defined circumstances for up to two years.^[vi]

In the last few decades, there have been instances when ISA was used to detain members of the opposition for ‘instigation’. Therefore, it should come as no surprise why so many are fearful that POTA will be wielded to curb free speech and silence the opposition in the same manner.^[vii] At present, Malaysian policymakers have yet to define exactly what qualifies as terrorism. Just like the ISA, POTA enables law enforcement officers to detain suspects of terrorism without a judicial review or a trial for up to two years, with an initial remand for 60 days with no guarantee of legal representation.^[viii] This drew ire from Human Rights Watch, who called the law ‘repressive’.^[ix] However, the Deputy Home Minister, Datuk Seri Dr. Wan Junaidi Tuanku Wan Jaafar, argued that POTA is nothing like the ISA, in that the executive power rests on a five-member advisory board and not on the minister.^[x]

It is all very well that Malaysian policymakers are stepping up to combat terrorism threats at the national level. However, a problematic law with the purpose of preventing terrorism is not sustainable in the long run, especially when a nebulous term like ‘terrorist’ is so ill-defined. POTA carries unrealistic expectations in reducing terrorism and extremism in this region.

In terms of concrete action, it is a lot more practical to try to understand why so many Malaysian Muslims are drawn into ISIL. The Malaysian authorities believe that they are influenced by the desire to be martyred and wish to express solidarity with the Muslims suffering in Syria.^[xi] Regardless, the fact of the matter cannot be denied – radicalisation in Malaysia is a serious concern, particularly amongst the Malay-Muslims.

Joseph Chinyong Liow was correct when he argued that Malaysia’s current brand of Islam could be the main cause of concern for the ISIL dilemma. This brand alienates non-Muslims by establishing exclusivity and ownership on the religion and language with ‘no intentions to encourage pluralism or compromise’.^[xii] This feeds into a form of state-sponsored extremism, where Islam is consistently utilised to legitimise and justify state power to interfere with not only the private and political lives of Muslims in Malaysia, but also to encroach on the right of non-Muslims to simply exist.

There are community leaders and politicians who encourage this divisive behaviour with their own polarising views and loose statements on religious policing, that can be seen as “othering” the non-Muslims and non-Malays, and even excluding gender and sexual minorities. Some recent notable examples include the cow-head protest incident, prohibiting non-Muslims from using the word “Allah”, and refusing to acknowledge Muslim women’s agency. To illustrate his point, Liow highlighted the worrying results of 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which showed that 39% of Malaysian Muslims believe that “violence against enemies of Islam is justifiable”.

In order to counter extremism more effectively, policymakers in Malaysia should consider aiming for a more realistic disruption and prevention goals rather than enacting an iron-fisted anti-terrorism law that may not be constructive in the long term, as well as opening the door to abuse. It is more feasible to put a concerted effort into increasing community resilience and wellbeing, particularly amongst the Malay-Muslims, to make them less susceptible to extremist ideologies.

This could potentially be done through a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, a a sense of nationhood between Malaysians could be fomented through governmental policies that emphasise inter-community cooperation. On the other, the government could censure those who stoke hatred. It is important that the Malaysian government should make a point of refusing to give legitimacy to divisive views.

In Malaysia’s context, community resilience could mean the ability to withstand threats of extremism through an active engagement with local communities and education. Promoting interfaith acceptance and encouraging an embrace of diversity can achieve this. People should be encouraged to challenge and question religious sermons and teachings that contain insidious and dangerous messages that could incite hatred and exclusions.

Considering the country’s diverse cultural and religious identity, interfaith discussions should not be seen as a threat or viewed with suspicions by certain quarters, but instead should be welcomed as a crucial part of nation-building efforts. Through a strong and supportive community, empathy can be promoted and a safe space for an open dialogue can be created. In the long run, counter-radicalisation efforts could potentially encourage vulnerable Malaysian Muslim youths to reject extremist ideologies and reduce the threats that emanate from extreme and false interpretations of Islam.

Munira Mustaffa is pursuing her MSc in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism at the Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, University College of London. She is also an intelligence analysis consultant for several corporate intelligence and security firms in London and New York. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

NOTES

^[i] Zakir Hussain, ‘ISIS Posts Footage of Boy-Trainees From South-East Asia’, The Straits Times, March 17, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/isis-posts-footage-boy-trainees-south-east-asia-20150317

^[ii] The Malaysian Insider, ‘Jumlah Keluarga Rakyat Malaysia Sertai ISIS Meningkat’, March 4, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/jumlah-keluarga-rakyat-malaysia-sertai-isis-meningkat-kata-polis

[iii] It varies depending on national and historical context, but in this essay, nusantara refers to both Malay- and Indonesian-speaking archipelago.

^[iv] The Malay Mail, ‘New IS Militant Wing for Malaysians, Indonesians Uncovered’, March 4, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/new-is-militant-wing-for-malaysians-indonesians-uncovered

^[v] ‘Actors’ in this write-up is defined as any non-state individuals or organisations engaged in acts of terror.

^[vi] 8. Internal Security Act, 1960, Laws of Malaysia Act No. 82 (January 1, 2006), The Commissioner of Law Revision, http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2082.pdf

^[vii] Bilveer Singh, ‘Prevention of Terrorism: Relevance of POTA In Malaysia’, RSIS Publications, March 31, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co15075-prevention-of-terrorism-relevance-of-pota-in-malaysia/

^[viii] FMT Reporters, ‘Legal Fraternity United in Denouncing POTA’, Free Malaysia Today, April 13, 2015, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/04/13/legal-fraternity-united-in-denouncing-pota/

^[ix] Human Rights Watch, ‘HRW Slams Malaysia’s New ‘Repressive’ Anti-Terrorism Law’, April 7, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/07/hrw-slams-malaysias-new-repressive-anti-terrorism-law

^[x] Elizabeth Zachariah, ‘POTA Not Like ISA, Deputy Minister Tells Critics’, The Malaysian Insider, April 6, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/pota-not-like-isa-deputy-minister-tells-critics

^[xi] The Royal Malaysian Navy, Ke Arah Menangani Ancaman Kumpulan Islamic State, Dewan Rakyat, November 26, 2014, p.vi, http://navy.mil.my/index.php/media-massa/galeri/penerbitan/category/45-kertas-putih-ke-arah-menangani-ancaman-kumpulan-islamic-state#

^[xii] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum’, Brookings, April 21, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/04/21-malaysia-isis-conundrum-liow

The arrival of IS in Pakistan and the politics of the caliphate

September 26, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

* * *

While Pakistan remained fixated on the political stalemate between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML-N), Imran Khan (PTI) and Tahir ul Qadri (PAT), that is now well into its second month, a foiled attack on a naval dockyard in its financial capital Karachi went unreported for two days by an otherwise animated media. A naval officer and two militants were killed in the incident that was swiftly contained by the Pakistani Navy. Spokesman for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Shahidullah Shahid told news agencies that the group claimed responsibility for the attack which was carried out with ‘support from inside the naval force’.[i] The event came three years after an assassinated journalist, Saleem Shahzad, published a controversial article on the infiltration of al Qaeda in the Pakistani military, primarily the navy, which has been at the receiving end of militant attacks on a number of occasions.[ii] On their part, the Navy remains hushed about the events of the night of 6 September 2014.

This foiled attack is important for a number of reasons. First, it occurred at a time when there was a relative decline in the number of terrorist attacks across the country. Second, it was ‘missed’ by the media as all eyes remained on the Capital. Third, it cast a shadow over the security operation in Karachi that started last September. Fourth, it calls into question the status and success of the military-led Operation Zarb-e-Azb against militants in North Waziristan which started earlier this year. Lastly, it corresponds with the alleged rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Pakistan. It is this last (and most recent) development in Pakistan: the arrival, place and presence of IS, which demands further examination and analysis as to what this could mean for the already-present militant groups in the country.

Over the past two months, stories have been trickling into Pakistani newspapers about pamphlets and brochures circulating across Afghanistan and the northern areas of Pakistan in Urdu and Dari, complemented by wall-chalking sighted in various areas, urging the Muslims of South Asia to join the global jihad for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, though not explicit on the idea of the caliphate itself. Al Qaeda has taken this opportunity to remind the region of its existence and outreach, with Ayman ul Zawahiri announcing the formation of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.

In his recent speech, President Obama vowed to dismantle IS’ ‘network of death’ and stressed that “those who have joined the ISIL should leave the battlefield while they can”. Razeshta Sethna, a prominent journalist and editor, spoke with Strife about these developments. ‘If the US hits the backbone of ISIS on the Syrian border with Iraq, then you may see ISIS gradually dismantled. But they have a lot of money and access to foreign fighters. They can travel easily. Where will they go if ISIS gets dismantled? They will head towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is what we need to be wary about. Pakistani and Afghan governments need to think about whether they will allow ISIS to recuperate in their territories’.[iii]

Sethna further explains that for local militant groups in Pakistan, the funds that IS brings will be a major attraction. ‘The money that ISIS leadership will have to offer al Qaeda or Pakistani Taliban, in order to gain their trust and hospitality, could feed back into logistical support for them, including training camps, recruitment of fighters, weapons, etc. If they come with money, there’s nothing stopping them’. The arrival and acceptance of wealthy Arab fighters in the region during the Afghan jihad has already set precedence for this.

Meanwhile, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a hard-line group, has splintered from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (presently headed by Maulauna Fazlullah). JuA is currently commanded by Omar Khalid Khorasani, from the Mohmand agency, with Ehsanullah Ehsan as his personal spokesman. They claim to be the ‘original’ Pakistani Taliban and have expressed frustration and discontentment at the in-fighting within various factions of the TTP taking place since the former leader, Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike last year. Khorasani is a nom de guerre, referring to one from the region of Khorasan, which is considered by certain jihadi groups as the base of international jihad (Image 1). According to one article, while the JuA faction appears to be inspired by Islamic State, Ehsanullah Ehsan has been careful not to pledge allegiance to it, although they have referred to IS as their ‘muhajideen brothers’. Regardless, social media activity by Khorasani and Ehsan depicts indirect support for IS. (Images 2 and 3).

Image 1: This map, which has been widely circulated on the internet over the past few
months, depicts Islamic State’s plan for the expansion of the caliphate.

Image 2: Social media activity by Ahrar’s spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan
welcomes the development of Al Qaeda in South Asia as well as IS.

Image 3: Social media activity by Ahrar’s spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan
welcomes the development of Al Qaeda in South Asia as well as IS.

Consider why the JuA has expressed support to IS. One of the points where both IS and JuA appear to be united pertains to the imprisonment of Aafia Siddiqui in the US, whose release was demanded by IS in exchange for James Foley (Image 4). Siddiqui, an MIT graduate and neuroscientist was arrested in Afghanistan in 2008 for allegedly attempting to shoot American soldiers. In 2010, she was sentenced by an American court to 86 years imprisonment. Jihadi groups like IS and JuA have referred to her as the ‘daughter of the ummah’. It is uncommon for non-Pakistani militant groups to rally for Siddiqui’s cause, suggesting warming interests between IS and Pakistan.

Image 4: JuA has appraised IS’ demands for Siddiqui’s release. Previously, al Qaeda,
the Pakistan Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban have demanded her release as well.

Other similarities between IS and JuA are seen by comparing leaders Khorasani and al-Baghdadi. Both head breakaway factions from groups they deemed not to be ruthless enough. Both are educated; Khorasani is a former journalist, whereas Baghdadi has a doctorate in Islamic Studies from Baghdad. Both routinely utilise media outlets and social media to convey their messages to the world that often feature the brutal terror tactic of beheadings. While IS sparked global outrage following the release of the recorded beheading of Foley, last year the TTP had released an even gorier video of militants playing football with decapitated heads of Pakistani police officers.

Nevertheless, both groups have thus far been careful not to commit to any marriage of convenience just yet and it is too premature to suggest whether they will merge in Pakistan. In fact, according to an article in Pakistan’s The Friday Times, a spokesman for IS in Pakistan, Asad al Khorasani, has explicitly denied this alliance. ‘A lot of people who had been active with the Taliban are attracted towards us because they do not approve of how the Taliban conduct themselves… The best part about our recruitment in Pakistan is that 60% of the people joining us are educated. We have differences with the TTP and they keep a distance from us and we do the same’. To what extent these figures are correct is a matter of contention.

Another contrasting feature on the agendas of the aforementioned groups and Islamic State is that most TTP factions pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader and commander of the Taliban, not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph of IS. Journalist and writer Zahid Hussain on his part has suggested that it is premature to liken IS with the Pakistani or Afghan Taliban given the ambitious global reach of the former and the geographically limited aspirations of the latter. Hussain has argued that the ideological agendas differ too, with IS being distinctly more anti-Shia than the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. With regards to al Qaeda in the subcontinent and IS, Director of Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Muhammad Amir Rana has cautioned that in South Asia, the rise of IS need not symbolize the decline of al Qaeda. ‘[Militant groups] may have differences over strategies, as ISIS and al Qaeda had, but ultimately they overcome their differences. Al Qaeda might feel stunned over the ‘victories of ISIS but now, instead of arguing with ISIS over strategies, will prefer to develop a consensus over a model of caliphate’.

The idea of the caliphate as advocated by IS has been subjected to criticism by Muslim civilians and scholars around the world. As in 1924, when the caliphate was considered a rally cry to gather Muslim followers and subsequently abolished by Ataturk, so too today many consider the idea to be a political propaganda hailed by Mullah Omar, and now al-Baghdadi. There appears to be no unity over which (and whose) model of the caliphate should be established, who should be its Emir (leader), and which territories should be encompassed within it. The idea of the caliphate is less religious and more political. It can also be argued to be outdated.

In an article published by S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Commentary, Assistant Professor Mohamed Osman has argued, ‘Islam as a religion prescribed values of governance such as accountability and justice. In fact, even in the realm of jurisprudence, only five principles must be met. These principles include the protection of religious life, lineage, property and intellect. It is clear that there is nothing Islamic about the Caliphate or the regulations implemented by the ISIS when all these principles have clearly been transgressed’. Osman is similarly critical of Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in their categorisations as ‘Islamic states’ that are ‘examples of how supposed Islamic states are in fact either unjust or underdeveloped and not ‘Islamic’ by any stretch of the imagination’.

Sethna similarly emphasises the need to rethink the appeal of IS, that has less to do with religion and more with the ‘enjoyment of conflict’ by a neglected and jaded youth. ‘The general perception is that Islam is attracting European jihadi fighters to IS. It is incorrect to use this reasoning. It is not about Islam. The youth bulge and the general disquiet and discontentment surrounding the youth in the West needs to be targeted through education and economic opportunities. Communities (including immigrant communities) need to be targeted.’ Talking primarily about the specific age group of recent IS recruits from the UK, Sethna analyses that younger generations need a sense of deeper understanding. ‘They don’t know any better. At the end of the day, the long-term solution is to give them what a younger generation deserves and needs.’[iv]

At a recent talk at King’s College London, Joshua White, the Deputy Director for South Asia at the Stimson Centre in Washington D.C., delivered an insightful lecture on how groups within Pakistan view with the Islamic caliphate. There are two foundations for their perceptions. The first stems from the caliphate movement (1919-1924), while the second is rooted in the historical army of Khorasan. The latter is both a physical as well as an imagined territory. The imagined territory of Khorasan is much larger (although its reach is disputed) than the physical, and religious significance allegedly lies in a saying by Prophet Muhammad.

White has also noted that there is a lack of unity between groups in Pakistan and their idea of the caliphate. The Deobandi groups do not seem particularly enthusiastic (yet) about the idea of the caliphate and are careful in their usage of the concept. According to Deobandi texts studied by White, it is revealed that Muhammad was the last Caliph and all those who followed are ‘deputies to the deputy’. He further suggested that these texts are ‘half-hearted’ and suggest that ‘Caliphs are nice if you can get one, but regional leaders can be good too’.[v] On the other hand, Wahabi groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are more open in their desire for a caliphate. ‘The LeT has a vision that [they] should keep advocating for a caliphate. The objective is in the struggle, not about getting there’. Nevertheless, White maintains that the LeT has been unclear about their idea of the caliphate too, possibly because of their ‘close relations’ with the Pakistani state. He concurs with other analysts that on its part the TTP has pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar as their Emir-ul-mumineen (Commander of the Faithful).

While Zahid Hussain has written of ideological dissimilarities between the Pakistani Taliban and IS, White raises valid concerns about the commonalities between sectarian groups in Pakistan and IS, accompanied by the increasing linkages between the TTP and sectarian organisations. Although anti-Shia groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi may not easily buy into the idea of the caliphate, their sectarian agendas have tied them with IS. The problem now is that should the Pakistani state actively externalise these sectarian militant organisations and withdraw support, they may strengthen strategic ties with IS.

Whatever the intentions of the Pakistani Taliban, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, and Islamic State may be for Pakistan and future alliances with other jihadi groups in the region – acknowledging that these are too murky at the moment to see clearly – they pose multiple causes for concern. It suffices to say, for the moment, that their arrival in Afghanistan and Pakistan was but a matter of time. Given shifting dynamics such as Afghanistan’s uncertain future, a right-wing government in New Delhi with its hard-line approach, and Pakistan’s own internal turmoil, groups such as the IS were bound to find a vacuum in this region. The Pakistani establishment would be well-advised to shift gears from petty ‘container’ politics and competitive protests in Islamabad to operations that are losing momentum; security before democracy needs to be the motto of the day.

_________________

Zoha Waseem is a doctoral researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter @zohawaseem.

NOTES

[i] Later reports by Karachi police revealed that the officer killed in the exchange of gunfire with the Navy was a former navy official. The TTP states that this attack was in response to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, but an investigation by a leading English daily suggested that the militants involved intended to hijack a frigate purchased from China.
[ii] Most notable, the attack on the PNS Mehran naval headquarters in Karachi on 22 May 2011 that lasted over 15 hours and killed 20 people, including 11 navy personnel. It was carried out by the TTP and is considered one of the biggest attacks on the Pakistani navy in recent history. Saleem Shahzad was found dead a week later.
[iii] Sethna, R. (2014) Interviewed by author, 24 September.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] White, Joshua. ‘State and Caliphate: The Future of Islamist Advocacy in Pakistan.’ Lecture. War Studies Meeting Room. King’s College London. 11 September 2014. Lecture.

Barrel bombs in Fallujah – a crime against humanity?

May 13, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Dr. Victoria Fontan, with additional editing by Joana Cook and Thomas Colley:

Dr. Victoria Fontan has been spending time in Fallujah since July 2013, one of the only Westerners to do so. She wrote this piece from the ground at the date of publication.

On 21 April, two barrel bombs were dropped from an Iraqi air force MI8 helicopter in the mechanic shops area of Fallujah, close to the government protester demonstration sites.[1] An additional barrel bomb was dropped onto the al-Rashad village near Garma. This is the first such instance of their use in Iraq under the current government, though they have denied their use.[2] Barrel bombs have made themselves known recently with the Syrian government’s assault of Aleppo.[3] These bombs are artisanal; their weight and the amount of their devastation differ according to the circumference of the barrel used. They are filled with incendiary agents, explosives and bolts, and have a devastating effect on the populations on which they are launched. The impact this may have in terms of international law, as well as the ability of the citizens of Fallujah to exercise their newly won political freedoms with barrel bombs landing around the city are critical and diverse. Not only are these bombs destructive, their use against a targeted group may constitute a crime against humanity. Moreover, the international community’s complacence towards the Iraqi government in relation to the population of Fallujah and greater Anbar province may make it an accessory to this crime.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has made critical advancements for humankind. It regulates the use of weapons in situations of conflict. It presses for rules of engagement to be respected, and for some weapons to be used over others to reduce civilian casualties and suffering. Since it has legalized some forms of killing but not others, International Humanitarian Law has, in its own way, made killing legitimate. Mankind has managed to sanitize the inadmissible, so that states can both assert their sovereignty and exert their monopoly of power over their population.

There are certain places in this world where IHL appears not to apply. In the forsaken city of Fallujah, in the Anbar province of Iraq, the Baghdad government has been systematically repressing its own population since January 2013 under the pretext of terrorism, used by Prime Minister Maliki. Not only has the Iraqi government been killing civilians under the narrative of counter-terrorism, but the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI), as well as Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, have also seemingly bought into it. The International Crisis Group condemns how both parties ‘endorsed and backed the [Iraqi] government’s struggle against terrorism [while] shunning criticism of its heavy-handed approach’.[4]

In the past few years, Fallujah has been emphasized as a stronghold of resistance against the US occupation in Iraq. More than 60% of Fallujah was destroyed in the two sieges of the city in 2004, and, ten years on, it seems to be running the same course.[5] This time, it started with the same Occupy-style demonstrations seen in the US, with Iraqi’s protesting against the central government, perceived to be favoring the Shi’ite population over its Sunni counterpart.[6] As demonstrations progressed, the government tried to block popular dissent on several occasions, culminating in an Iraqi army crackdown of the mainly Sunni populated Anbar province in late December 2013. Since then, scores of civilians have been killed, wounded or displaced and more anti-government sentiment has spread beyond the Anbar province as a result.[7]

Contrary to other cities in Anbar, Fallujah was organized against the government from the start. When the Iraqi army began to move into the Anbar province, a Shura, or council was established, comprised of tribes and social groups from the demonstrations in Fallujah.[8] Its mission was to repel, at all costs, government forces. A city known for its unwillingness to surrender, it was not going to fall this time. Prime Minister Maliki had always been very quick to dismiss the Occupy Fallujah demands as mere support for al-Qaeda, even though a closer look at the demonstration showed their clear political undertone. Protesters were demanding an end to talks of federalism in Iraq, no discrimination of one part of the Iraqi population over another, and the resignation of Prime Minister Maliki.[9]

As the Maliki government’s troops attempted to enter Fallujah on several occasions in January 2014, the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) also saw an opportunity to assert its power within the region.[10] This came at a time when it was momentarily weak in Syria, and Iraq offered an opportunity to strengthen its influence where it had originated. While the Fallujah Shura originally tolerated ISIS, fearing a similar situation to that of 2004, where foreign agents of al-Qaeda escalated violence there, all outside observers of Maliki’s Anbar campaign exaggerated its influence over the city.[11] These same observers also did not understand ISIS’s clear departure from al-Qaeda strategy, rendering most media reports on Fallujah grossly inaccurate.[12] Al-Qaeda had never taken over Fallujah, and calls in Washington DC ranged between blindly supporting Maliki and a US-intervention in Iraq, could not have been less opportune. As Maliki strengthened his armed repression on Fallujah, claiming not to enter the city to spare the population, he began a relentless shelling of Fallujah in January 2014, from various strategic points surrounding it.[13] It was not long before the Shura made a deal with ISIS to defend its city against a perceived Shi’ite invader.

UNAMI never set foot on the demonstration sites and is now failing in its moral mission to monitor the Baghdad government’s actions against its own people. This, even after countless invitations were made on behalf of its leader Sheikh Hamoudi, who was executed by members of the government-friendly group Hamas al-Iraq two weeks before the December 2013 crack down.[14] Since January 2014, countless missiles, mortar rounds and Katiusha rockets have been launched against the civilian population of Fallujah, yet what is happening at present is far more disturbing than anything seen before.[15]

An Iraqi air force helicopter pilot, who in the 1980’s also launched chemical agents on the city of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan, explained in a conversation with the author: ‘The bombs are still in their developing phase, these two rounds on 23 April were experimental. We are trying to copy what Bashar did in Aleppo, and Fallujah is the perfect place for it.’[16] None of the bombs launched onto Fallujah detonated; in Garma, the bomb exploded and made a hole five meters wide and three meters deep. It took two more weeks to try to perfect the mechanism, and on 10 May, twenty more barrel bombs were launched onto Fallujah.[17] While many did not detonate, the Iraqi army will no doubt perfect its technology to be even more deadly next time.

Barrel bombs are not distinctly mentioned in any international arms convention, they are simply invisible.[18] UNAMI will not likely object to their use, as it is the complacence of its representative Nicolas Mladenov in relation to the Anbar campaign, that has seemingly emboldened Maliki enough to resort to using barrel bombs, among other weapons, with impunity against its own population. Overall, mainstream media has also been silent in relation to the issue, while at the same time condemning Bashar al Assad for the same deeds against his population in Syria.[19] For the moment, barrel bombs can only be seen in blogs around the internet, and on Fallujah-related social media, restricting international attention from this critical development.[20]

On 10 May, Fallujah’s infrastructure, alongside its power and water stations, was targeted in the government’s most ferocious reprisal yet. Civilian casualties which have resulted from these attacks between January 2014 and today amount to 40 dead and 60 wounded.[21] Adding insult to injury, 10 mosques have also been destroyed, all Sunni.[22]

The perceived Shi’ite war against the Sunni population of Fallujah may well have become a reality due to these extreme acts of violence. Under the circumstances, it could be questioned whether the use of barrel bombs and the indiscriminate use of force against the population of Fallujah constitutes a crime against humanity. According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a crime against humanity can be defined as the “[P]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”[23] If, in fact, Sunnis in Fallujah are being specifically targeted by the government, then this could be interpreted as a crime against humanity.

If anyone, entity or government, assists in the political persecution of a group of people, would this not make them accessory to this crime? The UN’s support of Nuri al-Maliki, the US government’s impending renting of F16 airplanes to the Iraqi government, the international media’s hate speech against the people of Fallujah: in a perfect world, this could all be prosecuted.[xxiv] Yet while International Law and International Humanitarian Law are meant to be universal, they appear to neglect the people of Fallujah.

_________________

Dr. Victoria Fontan is a Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Duhok, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and author of “Decolonizing Peace” (2012) and “Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq” (2008). She is now undertaking a PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Her thesis title is: “The Resilience of Insurgencies in Fallujah.” You can find more information on Victoria Fontan’s research on her website: http://www.victoriacfontan.com

NOTES
[1] Telephone conversation with an Iraqi air force officer 27 April and 10 May 2014. The name is being withheld as they are not authorized to speak on the matter.
[2]World Bulletin, ‘Iraq Denies Using Barrel Bombs’. 13 May 2014 http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/136196/iraq-denies-using-barrel-bombs-in-fallujah
[3] See BBC News, ‘Syria conflict: Barrel-bombed Aleppo ‘living in fear” 28 April 2014 athttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27180006 and http://brown-moses.blogspot.de/2013/12/syrias-barrel-bomb-technology-relative.html, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[4] See Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[5]Fontan, V. (2006). ‘Polarization between occupier and occupied in Post-Saddam Iraq: humiliation and the formation of political violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(2): 217-238.
[6]Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[7]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[8]Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[9] See http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/07/24/occupy-fallujah/, retrieved on 12 May 2014.
[10] See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/iraq-government-loses-control-fallujah-20141414625597514.html, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[11]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[12]Caillet, R. (2013). The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind. Canergie Endowment for International Peace.
[13]Group, I. C. (2014). Iraq: Fallujah’s Faustian Bargain. Middle East Report. Headquarters. Brussels, International Crisis Group. 150.
[14] On 1 December 2013, militant group Hamas al-Iraq claimed responsibility for the murder of Sheikh Hamoudi online. On the assassination and Hamas al-Iraq’s relationship with the Maliki government, see http://paxinnuce.com/2013/12/09/sheikh-al-hamoudi-and-the-right-to-peace/, accessed on 12 May 2014; on the Occupy Fallujah invitation of UNAMI, see Fontan, V. (Forthcoming in 2014). Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there is a field. Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition. H. Toros and Y. Tellidis. London, Routledge.
[15] Telephone and Viber conversations with Fallujah residents, names withheld, between January 2014 and now.
[16] Ibid. On the Halabja chemical attack, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[17] See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/iraq-army-using-barrel-bombs-fallujah-2014511134023608197.html, accessed on 12 May 2014, the article says ‘alleged’ use of Barrel Bombs since it has not been confirmed by any Human Rights organization, however Fallujah residents testimonies concur, as well as that of Mohammed F. Iraqi Air force pilot. The allegation has since been corroborated by eyewitness reports and the helicopter pilot.
[18] The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons does not mention Barrel bombs, yet it bans the use of incendiary weapons. Iraq, however, is not a signatory to this particular convention, hence cannot be held accountable for its use of barrel bombs as an incendiary weapon. See: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/500?OpenDocument, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[19] See http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/american-can-stop-the-barrel-bombs-in-syria/2014/05/07/f3a24554-d498-11e3-95d3-3bcd77cd4e11_story.html, or http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27180006, both accessed on 12 May 2014.
[20] See http://www.r4biaplatform.com/content/news-story/iraq-army-used-barrel-bombs-fallujah-chieftain, or http://brown-moses.blogspot.de/2014/05/is-iraqi-air-force-using-improvised.html, accessed on 12May 2014.
[21] Telephone and Viber conversations with Fallujah residents, names withheld, between January 2014 and now.
[22] Ibid.
[23] See http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/icc/statute/part-a.htm, accessed on 12 May 2014.
[24] See http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/05/08/exclusive_iraq_in_a_major_shift_might_want_some_us_troops_back?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMorning%20Brief&utm_campaign=MB%200509, accessed on 12 May 2014.

ISIL

Footer

Contact

Recent Posts

Tags