Islamic State

What does the fall of Ramadi mean for Iraq?

May 20, 2015

By Victoria Fontan: Dr. Victoria Fontan writes this article from Duhok, Kurdistan.

EDITORS NOTE: On May 20, following the publication of this article, the Iraqi government granted conditional entry to Baghdad for IDPs fleeing the violence in Ramadi. However, as of May 22, Sharqia News, Iraqi TV was reporting the bridge had only been opened for 1,000 IDP’s, leaving 5,000 remaining IDPs stranded.

The town of Ramadi has completely fallen to the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Many commentators have already stated that this is a major defeat for the government of Prime Minister Abadi. Indeed, it represents both a long and short-term disaster for the current Baghdad administration.

Only a month after triumphantly proclaiming that he would rid Anbar of ISIS, against US wishes to focus on re-taking Mosul, Prime Minister Abadi has failed. His strategy is not only placing Baghdad at risk, but also the Haditah Dam, the second largest source of hydropower in Iraq.

Shi’a militias are now gathering in Habaniya airbase in preparation for a major counter-offensive. Yet, a year on, Mosul is still waiting to be “saved”. This flexing of governmental and Shi’a militia muscles seems to be no more than a Baathist-style propaganda stunt, that former Saddam Information Sahhaf-style. So what does this mean for Iraq?

It is now very clear that the modern state, as Gertrude Bell designed it, belongs to the history books. Sectarian relations between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’as have reached a point of no return. Conflict resolution scholars compare relationships to an elastic band: it can be stretched, but at one point, it breaks.

Baghdad’s refusal of Anbar Internally Displaced Persons (IPDs) illustrates this. While the Kurdistan Regional Government welcomed almost two million Arab IDPs after the fall of Mosul last June, Baghdad has closed its doors to its own, clearly indicating to the its Sunni population that Iraq is no longer their country.

With this clear sign of sectarian disintegration of the country, Kurdish independence looks like a fait accomplit. It is not a matter of if, but when Kurdistan will finally exist as a sovereign State. Seen under this light, Kurdistan is indirectly benefiting from Prime Minister Abadi’s strategic and sectarian mistakes. That is a clear long-term benefit to Kurdistan, but at what price?

In the short term, it might be that once again, Baghdad’s errors have to be paid for by the Kurds, and specifically the Peshmerga forces, who remain, under-armed, in the northern frontline of the war against ISIS. In the same way that ISIS significantly benefited from the fall of Mosul in terms of weaponry; scores of armaments were left when General Berwary and his Golden Brigades left the Anbar Military Command on Sunday.

Like the Baghdad-backed Shi’a militias, ISIS is armed with the latest technology; while Peshmerga only receive a fraction of the weapons sent by the US via the Baghdad government. This makes the holding of frontlines, such as in the town of Sinjar, which I visited a couple of weeks ago, more difficult.

This also undoubtedly reinforces an unnecessary metric imbalance between ISIS and the Peshmerga. Each time that the Baghdad Government makes another gross mistake, its ripple effects can be felt at the largest frontline against ISIS, defended by the Kurds for over 1000 kilometers. Each Baghdad military defeat creates even stronger anti-bodies in the ranks of ISIS, whose fighters, thanks to the government’s strategic mistakes, have access to the latest weapon technology. With the strategic help of former Iraqi Army top commanders, the combination is proving deadly on the battlefield. If it weren’t for the Coalition airstrikes, ISIS would have made more advances.

The results are instructive. In Tikrit, Abadi’s troops were incapable of retaking the city on their own. While more than 30,000 troops surrounded Tikrit for over a month, it was only after Coalition airstrikes and the Jibouri tribe’s assistance in re-taking the neighboring town of al-Alam, that the city could be accessed. How many ISIS bodies were found inside? Between 60 and 80. In Ramadi, it was reported that 6,000 Iraqi forces fell to 150 ISIS fighters. At this rate, the Iraqi army and Shi’a militias are only making matters worse.

Militarily, the Baghdad government has reached such a low that a sustained presence on the battlefield will only weaken its army even more, and further alienate the Sunni tribes who are still part of the coalition against ISIS. Politically, the Baghdad government should swallow its pride and start working on a serious end to sectarian politics in Iraq.

Dr. Victoria Fontan is the Interim Chair, Department of Politics and Public Policy, at the American University of Duhok, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. She is also the author of “Decolonizing Peace” (2012) and “Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq” (2008). She is now undertaking an additional PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Her thesis title is: “The Resilience of Insurgencies in Fallujah.” You can find more information on Victoria Fontan’s research on her website: http://www.victoriacfontan.com or follow her on Twitter @DecolonizingPAX.

Can POTA counter the ISIL threat in Malaysia?

May 9, 2015

By Munira Mustaffa:

Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib Razak is painting Malaysia as “a model of moderate Islam” to the rest of the world, but the emergence of a recent recruitment video and photos from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threatens to shatter that harmonious image.^[i] The video and photos feature Malay-speaking youths training with weapons in an undisclosed ISIL-controlled location.

It was recently revealed that the Royal Malaysian Police had identified 39 more Malaysians who have joined ISIL, and eight Malaysian families are now in Syria.^[ii] There are reportedly over 100 Malaysian fighters in Syria and Iraq.

The strength of ISIL’s reach is not to be underestimated; authorities are increasing their monitoring of sympathisers and making arrests to disrupt possible threats by ISIL in the country. In fact, a new terror group with a Nusantara[iii] element operating under ISIL’s command has emerged under the name Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy (lit: “the Archipelago Group”).^[iv]

To counter these new threats of Islamic extremism, Malaysian policymakers introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) just over a month ago, on 7 April, 2015. This new anti-terrorism law has drawn fire from all quarters for its draconian measures. Critics have described it as ‘a reincarnation of the Internal Security Act’. There are legitimate concerns about the potential inconsistencies in state practice in its attempts to eradicate terrorism at the local level. This is largely because there is no universally agreed definition for terrorism that could facilitate the available legal frameworks for prosecuting the actors^[v] of terrorism in a court of law. This is an issue faced not only by Malaysia, but internationally as well.

Taking this into perspective, it is necessary to examine how policymakers at Putrajaya define terrorism within Malaysia’s experience. Malaysia had a history of countering insurgencies even before the nation gained independence from the British Empire on 31 August, 1957, by employing preventive detention law as national security measures. After independence, the Internal Security Act (ISA) was enacted in 1960 to deter communist threats that no longer exist today. Under the ISA, the accused can be detained without trial or criminal charges under limited and legally defined circumstances for up to two years.^[vi]

In the last few decades, there have been instances when ISA was used to detain members of the opposition for ‘instigation’. Therefore, it should come as no surprise why so many are fearful that POTA will be wielded to curb free speech and silence the opposition in the same manner.^[vii] At present, Malaysian policymakers have yet to define exactly what qualifies as terrorism. Just like the ISA, POTA enables law enforcement officers to detain suspects of terrorism without a judicial review or a trial for up to two years, with an initial remand for 60 days with no guarantee of legal representation.^[viii] This drew ire from Human Rights Watch, who called the law ‘repressive’.^[ix] However, the Deputy Home Minister, Datuk Seri Dr. Wan Junaidi Tuanku Wan Jaafar, argued that POTA is nothing like the ISA, in that the executive power rests on a five-member advisory board and not on the minister.^[x]

It is all very well that Malaysian policymakers are stepping up to combat terrorism threats at the national level. However, a problematic law with the purpose of preventing terrorism is not sustainable in the long run, especially when a nebulous term like ‘terrorist’ is so ill-defined. POTA carries unrealistic expectations in reducing terrorism and extremism in this region.

In terms of concrete action, it is a lot more practical to try to understand why so many Malaysian Muslims are drawn into ISIL. The Malaysian authorities believe that they are influenced by the desire to be martyred and wish to express solidarity with the Muslims suffering in Syria.^[xi] Regardless, the fact of the matter cannot be denied – radicalisation in Malaysia is a serious concern, particularly amongst the Malay-Muslims.

Joseph Chinyong Liow was correct when he argued that Malaysia’s current brand of Islam could be the main cause of concern for the ISIL dilemma. This brand alienates non-Muslims by establishing exclusivity and ownership on the religion and language with ‘no intentions to encourage pluralism or compromise’.^[xii] This feeds into a form of state-sponsored extremism, where Islam is consistently utilised to legitimise and justify state power to interfere with not only the private and political lives of Muslims in Malaysia, but also to encroach on the right of non-Muslims to simply exist.

There are community leaders and politicians who encourage this divisive behaviour with their own polarising views and loose statements on religious policing, that can be seen as “othering” the non-Muslims and non-Malays, and even excluding gender and sexual minorities. Some recent notable examples include the cow-head protest incident, prohibiting non-Muslims from using the word “Allah”, and refusing to acknowledge Muslim women’s agency. To illustrate his point, Liow highlighted the worrying results of 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which showed that 39% of Malaysian Muslims believe that “violence against enemies of Islam is justifiable”.

In order to counter extremism more effectively, policymakers in Malaysia should consider aiming for a more realistic disruption and prevention goals rather than enacting an iron-fisted anti-terrorism law that may not be constructive in the long term, as well as opening the door to abuse. It is more feasible to put a concerted effort into increasing community resilience and wellbeing, particularly amongst the Malay-Muslims, to make them less susceptible to extremist ideologies.

This could potentially be done through a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, a a sense of nationhood between Malaysians could be fomented through governmental policies that emphasise inter-community cooperation. On the other, the government could censure those who stoke hatred. It is important that the Malaysian government should make a point of refusing to give legitimacy to divisive views.

In Malaysia’s context, community resilience could mean the ability to withstand threats of extremism through an active engagement with local communities and education. Promoting interfaith acceptance and encouraging an embrace of diversity can achieve this. People should be encouraged to challenge and question religious sermons and teachings that contain insidious and dangerous messages that could incite hatred and exclusions.

Considering the country’s diverse cultural and religious identity, interfaith discussions should not be seen as a threat or viewed with suspicions by certain quarters, but instead should be welcomed as a crucial part of nation-building efforts. Through a strong and supportive community, empathy can be promoted and a safe space for an open dialogue can be created. In the long run, counter-radicalisation efforts could potentially encourage vulnerable Malaysian Muslim youths to reject extremist ideologies and reduce the threats that emanate from extreme and false interpretations of Islam.

Munira Mustaffa is pursuing her MSc in Countering Organised Crime and Terrorism at the Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, University College of London. She is also an intelligence analysis consultant for several corporate intelligence and security firms in London and New York. She tweets at @FleetStGir1.

NOTES

^[i] Zakir Hussain, ‘ISIS Posts Footage of Boy-Trainees From South-East Asia’, The Straits Times, March 17, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/isis-posts-footage-boy-trainees-south-east-asia-20150317

^[ii] The Malaysian Insider, ‘Jumlah Keluarga Rakyat Malaysia Sertai ISIS Meningkat’, March 4, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/jumlah-keluarga-rakyat-malaysia-sertai-isis-meningkat-kata-polis

[iii] It varies depending on national and historical context, but in this essay, nusantara refers to both Malay- and Indonesian-speaking archipelago.

^[iv] The Malay Mail, ‘New IS Militant Wing for Malaysians, Indonesians Uncovered’, March 4, 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/new-is-militant-wing-for-malaysians-indonesians-uncovered

^[v] ‘Actors’ in this write-up is defined as any non-state individuals or organisations engaged in acts of terror.

^[vi] 8. Internal Security Act, 1960, Laws of Malaysia Act No. 82 (January 1, 2006), The Commissioner of Law Revision, http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2082.pdf

^[vii] Bilveer Singh, ‘Prevention of Terrorism: Relevance of POTA In Malaysia’, RSIS Publications, March 31, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co15075-prevention-of-terrorism-relevance-of-pota-in-malaysia/

^[viii] FMT Reporters, ‘Legal Fraternity United in Denouncing POTA’, Free Malaysia Today, April 13, 2015, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/04/13/legal-fraternity-united-in-denouncing-pota/

^[ix] Human Rights Watch, ‘HRW Slams Malaysia’s New ‘Repressive’ Anti-Terrorism Law’, April 7, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/07/hrw-slams-malaysias-new-repressive-anti-terrorism-law

^[x] Elizabeth Zachariah, ‘POTA Not Like ISA, Deputy Minister Tells Critics’, The Malaysian Insider, April 6, 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/pota-not-like-isa-deputy-minister-tells-critics

^[xi] The Royal Malaysian Navy, Ke Arah Menangani Ancaman Kumpulan Islamic State, Dewan Rakyat, November 26, 2014, p.vi, http://navy.mil.my/index.php/media-massa/galeri/penerbitan/category/45-kertas-putih-ke-arah-menangani-ancaman-kumpulan-islamic-state#

^[xii] Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Malaysia’s ISIS Conundrum’, Brookings, April 21, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/04/21-malaysia-isis-conundrum-liow

Financing Terror, Part I: Private Kuwaiti donors in Syria's Civil War

January 12, 2015

By Arne Holverscheid:

Fighters from Islamic State in Raqqa, north Syria. (Photo: Ogbodo Solution - Flickr)

What happened to President Bashar al-Assad? When Syria descended into civil war in 2011, he was the perfect enemy for the Western public: supported by his ally Iran, he preferred watching his people die and his country be torn apart than give in to demands for freedom, democracy and civil rights. The line between good and evil, between friend and foe seemed clear: it was the Syrian people and their democratic ambitions against Bashar Assad and his powerful friend, Tehran.[i]

Now, after almost four years of fighting, this clear line has become more and more blurred. The Syrian opposition has radicalized: extremists, among them jihadist and Islamist groups, seem to have become the dominant actors.[ii] The Free Syrian Army (FSA), once bearer of hope for Syria in the Western world, is weaker than ever. States from the Arabian Peninsula, considered allies of the United States and Western countries, have joined the fight and have been financing rebel groups in Syria. Many of these rebel groups allegedly belong to the spectrum of Islamic extremism, which is arguably just as opposed to liberal democracy as is Assad.[iii]^,[iv] But in this complex conflict, private donors from the wealthy state of Kuwait have played a significant part in further blurring the lines in a manner which is much less conspicuous yet leaves a lasting impact.

According to the Koran, giving alms is ordained by Allah. Donations are meant for ‘the poor and the needy…for those in bondage and in debt, in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer’ (Sura 9.60). Kuwaiti donors have taken their religious duty very seriously during the on-going conflict and have made substantial humanitarian contributions to ease the suffering of the Syrian population.[v] The Kuwaiti government has so far refused to go beyond financial contributions and arm Syrian rebels. But many private donors and fundraisers have decided to do exactly this, and the fairly liberal Kuwaiti political system has allowed them to advocate and conduct fundraising activities freely among the Kuwaiti public.[vi] Many within the Sunni majority even openly criticize the government for not arming the Syrian opposition, and influential Salafi figures have joined the efforts to raise money for the Syrian cause.[vii]

Donations are mostly collected using Twitter and other social media networks and are delivered personally by couriers who travel to the Turkish-Syrian border. Hundreds of millions of dollars are estimated to have entered the Syrian civil war in this way, and the proportion of funds that goes to radical groups is hard to determine. However, donors tend to support and actively encourage those rebels who are specifically aligned with their own religious or ideological beliefs. The Kuwaiti fundraising scene is dominated by extreme religious figures, and it has become clear that large donations were sent to prominent groups in the jihadi spectrum. Particularly close connections have been established with Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. The latter is known to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, and both groups are reported to have recently come to an agreement with the Islamic State (IS), halting the fight against each other in order to challenge common enemies. In addition, the Sunni majority in Kuwait have recently developed a more sympathetic view toward the IS, resulting in a rift between donors about who to support (Al Qaeda/Al–Nusra or IS) and reflecting the overall competition between al-Qaeda/al-Nusra and IS.[viii],[ix]

In a 2013 report, Human Rights Watch identified individuals responsible for the funding of an attack on villages and civilians in the countryside of Latakia, Syria’s most prominent seaport. Fighters of Ahrar al-Sham, IS and Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar killed around 190 people and abducted over 200 civilians during the attack. Among the six primary figures who financed and organised the ambush were three Kuwaitis who actively used Twitter and YouTube to fundraise for the planned attack. One of them, Sheikh Hajjej al-Ajami, even travelled to the Latakia region and met the jihadists for whom he was fundraising. This journey suggests a high degree of cooperation between private donors and rebel groups and the possibility that donors are able to exercise control over the rebel groups they support.

Examples like this show the effect private donors are having on the Syrian civil war. Under the protection of Kuwait’s liberal and constitutional monarchy, they raise funds for extremists and jihadists who are aligned with their ideological beliefs and who are reportedly linked to acts of terrorism. By supporting these groups and strengthening their position, the donors implant their radical Salafi view of Islam into the conflict, fostering sectarianism among the Syrian opposition and reducing the chances for moderate forces to gain the upper hand. They also exacerbate the on-going competition between al-Qaeda and the IS over support from such donors, and are arguably partly responsible for the recent upswing in sympathy for the IS among the Sunni community in Kuwait. With the increasing friction between rebel groups and the apparent rivalry between two of the largest terrorist organizations involved in the conflict, a peaceful reunification seems less and less likely.

Now, after almost four years, who is the enemy in Syria? For the Western world, “Assad” no longer seems to be the only enemy. The conflict lines in Syria have blurred, extremists and terrorists have multiplied and the Alawite regime almost seems like a good alternative. The exemplary case of Kuwaiti private donors shows that when determining friend and foe, the situation is extremely complex. Syria has become far more than a proxy war between world powers. Private self-interests as well as opposing religious and ideological beliefs play an increasingly significant role in determining Syria’s conflict lines, conflict lines which must be understood in a wider regional context.

Arne Holverscheid is an undergraduate student of Political Science, Middle Eastern Studies and History at Ludwig Maximilians University Munich. He is currently interning for the International Center for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. His interests include terrorism funding, radical Islamic ideologies and the history of terrorism. Twitter: @AHolverscheid.

This article is part of a Strife series on financing terror. Over the next few weeks Strife will feature other articles that focus on different ways of financing terrorism. Next, Claire Mennessier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement.

NOTES

[i] “The long road to Damascus: There are signs that the Syrian regime may become still more violent”, The Economist, February 11, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21547305.

[ii] Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “How the U.S. fragmented Syria’s rebels”, The Washington Post, September 22, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/22/how-the-u-s-fragmented-syrias-rebels/.

[iii] Jamie Dettmer, “Syria’s Saudi Jihadist Problem”, The Daily Beast, December 16, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/16/syria-s-saudi-jihadist-problem.html.

[iv] Mariam Karouny, “Saudi edges Qatar to control Syrian rebel support”, Reuters, May 31, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudi-insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531.

[v] “Kuwait launches Syria relief campaign”, Al Arabiya English, January 13, 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/13/Kuwait-s-emir-appeals-for-Syrian-relief-aid.html.

[vi] Sylvia Westall and Mahmoud Harby, “Insight: Kuwaitis campaign privately to arm Syrian rebels”, Reuters, June 27 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-syria-kuwait-insight-idUSBRE95P0TG20130627.

[vii] Lori Plotkin Boghardt, “The Terrorist Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-terrorist-funding-disconnect-with-qatar-and-kuwait.

[viii] Joby Warrick, “Private donations give edge to Islamists in Syria, officials say”, The Washington Post, September 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/private-donations-give-edge-to-islamists-in-syria-officials-say/2013/09/21/a6c783d2-2207-11e3-a358-1144dee636dd_story.html.

[ix] Elizabeth Dickinson, “Kuwait: the crisis in Syria comes home”, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2, 2014. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kuwait_the_crisis_in_syria_comes_home323.

The arrival of IS in Pakistan and the politics of the caliphate

September 26, 2014

By Zoha Waseem:

* * *

While Pakistan remained fixated on the political stalemate between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML-N), Imran Khan (PTI) and Tahir ul Qadri (PAT), that is now well into its second month, a foiled attack on a naval dockyard in its financial capital Karachi went unreported for two days by an otherwise animated media. A naval officer and two militants were killed in the incident that was swiftly contained by the Pakistani Navy. Spokesman for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Shahidullah Shahid told news agencies that the group claimed responsibility for the attack which was carried out with ‘support from inside the naval force’.[i] The event came three years after an assassinated journalist, Saleem Shahzad, published a controversial article on the infiltration of al Qaeda in the Pakistani military, primarily the navy, which has been at the receiving end of militant attacks on a number of occasions.[ii] On their part, the Navy remains hushed about the events of the night of 6 September 2014.

This foiled attack is important for a number of reasons. First, it occurred at a time when there was a relative decline in the number of terrorist attacks across the country. Second, it was ‘missed’ by the media as all eyes remained on the Capital. Third, it cast a shadow over the security operation in Karachi that started last September. Fourth, it calls into question the status and success of the military-led Operation Zarb-e-Azb against militants in North Waziristan which started earlier this year. Lastly, it corresponds with the alleged rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Pakistan. It is this last (and most recent) development in Pakistan: the arrival, place and presence of IS, which demands further examination and analysis as to what this could mean for the already-present militant groups in the country.

Over the past two months, stories have been trickling into Pakistani newspapers about pamphlets and brochures circulating across Afghanistan and the northern areas of Pakistan in Urdu and Dari, complemented by wall-chalking sighted in various areas, urging the Muslims of South Asia to join the global jihad for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, though not explicit on the idea of the caliphate itself. Al Qaeda has taken this opportunity to remind the region of its existence and outreach, with Ayman ul Zawahiri announcing the formation of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.

In his recent speech, President Obama vowed to dismantle IS’ ‘network of death’ and stressed that “those who have joined the ISIL should leave the battlefield while they can”. Razeshta Sethna, a prominent journalist and editor, spoke with Strife about these developments. ‘If the US hits the backbone of ISIS on the Syrian border with Iraq, then you may see ISIS gradually dismantled. But they have a lot of money and access to foreign fighters. They can travel easily. Where will they go if ISIS gets dismantled? They will head towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is what we need to be wary about. Pakistani and Afghan governments need to think about whether they will allow ISIS to recuperate in their territories’.[iii]

Sethna further explains that for local militant groups in Pakistan, the funds that IS brings will be a major attraction. ‘The money that ISIS leadership will have to offer al Qaeda or Pakistani Taliban, in order to gain their trust and hospitality, could feed back into logistical support for them, including training camps, recruitment of fighters, weapons, etc. If they come with money, there’s nothing stopping them’. The arrival and acceptance of wealthy Arab fighters in the region during the Afghan jihad has already set precedence for this.

Meanwhile, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a hard-line group, has splintered from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (presently headed by Maulauna Fazlullah). JuA is currently commanded by Omar Khalid Khorasani, from the Mohmand agency, with Ehsanullah Ehsan as his personal spokesman. They claim to be the ‘original’ Pakistani Taliban and have expressed frustration and discontentment at the in-fighting within various factions of the TTP taking place since the former leader, Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike last year. Khorasani is a nom de guerre, referring to one from the region of Khorasan, which is considered by certain jihadi groups as the base of international jihad (Image 1). According to one article, while the JuA faction appears to be inspired by Islamic State, Ehsanullah Ehsan has been careful not to pledge allegiance to it, although they have referred to IS as their ‘muhajideen brothers’. Regardless, social media activity by Khorasani and Ehsan depicts indirect support for IS. (Images 2 and 3).

Image 1: This map, which has been widely circulated on the internet over the past few
months, depicts Islamic State’s plan for the expansion of the caliphate.

Image 2: Social media activity by Ahrar’s spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan
welcomes the development of Al Qaeda in South Asia as well as IS.

Image 3: Social media activity by Ahrar’s spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan
welcomes the development of Al Qaeda in South Asia as well as IS.

Consider why the JuA has expressed support to IS. One of the points where both IS and JuA appear to be united pertains to the imprisonment of Aafia Siddiqui in the US, whose release was demanded by IS in exchange for James Foley (Image 4). Siddiqui, an MIT graduate and neuroscientist was arrested in Afghanistan in 2008 for allegedly attempting to shoot American soldiers. In 2010, she was sentenced by an American court to 86 years imprisonment. Jihadi groups like IS and JuA have referred to her as the ‘daughter of the ummah’. It is uncommon for non-Pakistani militant groups to rally for Siddiqui’s cause, suggesting warming interests between IS and Pakistan.

Image 4: JuA has appraised IS’ demands for Siddiqui’s release. Previously, al Qaeda,
the Pakistan Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban have demanded her release as well.

Other similarities between IS and JuA are seen by comparing leaders Khorasani and al-Baghdadi. Both head breakaway factions from groups they deemed not to be ruthless enough. Both are educated; Khorasani is a former journalist, whereas Baghdadi has a doctorate in Islamic Studies from Baghdad. Both routinely utilise media outlets and social media to convey their messages to the world that often feature the brutal terror tactic of beheadings. While IS sparked global outrage following the release of the recorded beheading of Foley, last year the TTP had released an even gorier video of militants playing football with decapitated heads of Pakistani police officers.

Nevertheless, both groups have thus far been careful not to commit to any marriage of convenience just yet and it is too premature to suggest whether they will merge in Pakistan. In fact, according to an article in Pakistan’s The Friday Times, a spokesman for IS in Pakistan, Asad al Khorasani, has explicitly denied this alliance. ‘A lot of people who had been active with the Taliban are attracted towards us because they do not approve of how the Taliban conduct themselves… The best part about our recruitment in Pakistan is that 60% of the people joining us are educated. We have differences with the TTP and they keep a distance from us and we do the same’. To what extent these figures are correct is a matter of contention.

Another contrasting feature on the agendas of the aforementioned groups and Islamic State is that most TTP factions pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader and commander of the Taliban, not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph of IS. Journalist and writer Zahid Hussain on his part has suggested that it is premature to liken IS with the Pakistani or Afghan Taliban given the ambitious global reach of the former and the geographically limited aspirations of the latter. Hussain has argued that the ideological agendas differ too, with IS being distinctly more anti-Shia than the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. With regards to al Qaeda in the subcontinent and IS, Director of Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Muhammad Amir Rana has cautioned that in South Asia, the rise of IS need not symbolize the decline of al Qaeda. ‘[Militant groups] may have differences over strategies, as ISIS and al Qaeda had, but ultimately they overcome their differences. Al Qaeda might feel stunned over the ‘victories of ISIS but now, instead of arguing with ISIS over strategies, will prefer to develop a consensus over a model of caliphate’.

The idea of the caliphate as advocated by IS has been subjected to criticism by Muslim civilians and scholars around the world. As in 1924, when the caliphate was considered a rally cry to gather Muslim followers and subsequently abolished by Ataturk, so too today many consider the idea to be a political propaganda hailed by Mullah Omar, and now al-Baghdadi. There appears to be no unity over which (and whose) model of the caliphate should be established, who should be its Emir (leader), and which territories should be encompassed within it. The idea of the caliphate is less religious and more political. It can also be argued to be outdated.

In an article published by S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Commentary, Assistant Professor Mohamed Osman has argued, ‘Islam as a religion prescribed values of governance such as accountability and justice. In fact, even in the realm of jurisprudence, only five principles must be met. These principles include the protection of religious life, lineage, property and intellect. It is clear that there is nothing Islamic about the Caliphate or the regulations implemented by the ISIS when all these principles have clearly been transgressed’. Osman is similarly critical of Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in their categorisations as ‘Islamic states’ that are ‘examples of how supposed Islamic states are in fact either unjust or underdeveloped and not ‘Islamic’ by any stretch of the imagination’.

Sethna similarly emphasises the need to rethink the appeal of IS, that has less to do with religion and more with the ‘enjoyment of conflict’ by a neglected and jaded youth. ‘The general perception is that Islam is attracting European jihadi fighters to IS. It is incorrect to use this reasoning. It is not about Islam. The youth bulge and the general disquiet and discontentment surrounding the youth in the West needs to be targeted through education and economic opportunities. Communities (including immigrant communities) need to be targeted.’ Talking primarily about the specific age group of recent IS recruits from the UK, Sethna analyses that younger generations need a sense of deeper understanding. ‘They don’t know any better. At the end of the day, the long-term solution is to give them what a younger generation deserves and needs.’[iv]

At a recent talk at King’s College London, Joshua White, the Deputy Director for South Asia at the Stimson Centre in Washington D.C., delivered an insightful lecture on how groups within Pakistan view with the Islamic caliphate. There are two foundations for their perceptions. The first stems from the caliphate movement (1919-1924), while the second is rooted in the historical army of Khorasan. The latter is both a physical as well as an imagined territory. The imagined territory of Khorasan is much larger (although its reach is disputed) than the physical, and religious significance allegedly lies in a saying by Prophet Muhammad.

White has also noted that there is a lack of unity between groups in Pakistan and their idea of the caliphate. The Deobandi groups do not seem particularly enthusiastic (yet) about the idea of the caliphate and are careful in their usage of the concept. According to Deobandi texts studied by White, it is revealed that Muhammad was the last Caliph and all those who followed are ‘deputies to the deputy’. He further suggested that these texts are ‘half-hearted’ and suggest that ‘Caliphs are nice if you can get one, but regional leaders can be good too’.[v] On the other hand, Wahabi groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are more open in their desire for a caliphate. ‘The LeT has a vision that [they] should keep advocating for a caliphate. The objective is in the struggle, not about getting there’. Nevertheless, White maintains that the LeT has been unclear about their idea of the caliphate too, possibly because of their ‘close relations’ with the Pakistani state. He concurs with other analysts that on its part the TTP has pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar as their Emir-ul-mumineen (Commander of the Faithful).

While Zahid Hussain has written of ideological dissimilarities between the Pakistani Taliban and IS, White raises valid concerns about the commonalities between sectarian groups in Pakistan and IS, accompanied by the increasing linkages between the TTP and sectarian organisations. Although anti-Shia groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi may not easily buy into the idea of the caliphate, their sectarian agendas have tied them with IS. The problem now is that should the Pakistani state actively externalise these sectarian militant organisations and withdraw support, they may strengthen strategic ties with IS.

Whatever the intentions of the Pakistani Taliban, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, and Islamic State may be for Pakistan and future alliances with other jihadi groups in the region – acknowledging that these are too murky at the moment to see clearly – they pose multiple causes for concern. It suffices to say, for the moment, that their arrival in Afghanistan and Pakistan was but a matter of time. Given shifting dynamics such as Afghanistan’s uncertain future, a right-wing government in New Delhi with its hard-line approach, and Pakistan’s own internal turmoil, groups such as the IS were bound to find a vacuum in this region. The Pakistani establishment would be well-advised to shift gears from petty ‘container’ politics and competitive protests in Islamabad to operations that are losing momentum; security before democracy needs to be the motto of the day.

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Zoha Waseem is a doctoral researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter @zohawaseem.

NOTES

[i] Later reports by Karachi police revealed that the officer killed in the exchange of gunfire with the Navy was a former navy official. The TTP states that this attack was in response to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, but an investigation by a leading English daily suggested that the militants involved intended to hijack a frigate purchased from China.
[ii] Most notable, the attack on the PNS Mehran naval headquarters in Karachi on 22 May 2011 that lasted over 15 hours and killed 20 people, including 11 navy personnel. It was carried out by the TTP and is considered one of the biggest attacks on the Pakistani navy in recent history. Saleem Shahzad was found dead a week later.
[iii] Sethna, R. (2014) Interviewed by author, 24 September.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] White, Joshua. ‘State and Caliphate: The Future of Islamist Advocacy in Pakistan.’ Lecture. War Studies Meeting Room. King’s College London. 11 September 2014. Lecture.

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