Israel

A Victory for Whom? Lessons from the 1982 and 2006 Lebanon Wars

June 12, 2018 by J. Zhanna Malekos Smith

By Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith

Israeli troops in South Lebanon, June 1982 (Credit Image: P.mielen, CC BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Commons)

‘Historia (Inquiry); so that the actions of people will not fade with time.’[1] Herodotus

Although Israel achieved a tactical victory in the First Lebanon War, it was a ‘strategic mishap’ because it catalyzed Hezbollah’s formation, failed to produce a durable peace agreement with Lebanon and set in motion the Second Lebanon War of 2006. Here, the word tactical refers to the Israeli Defense Force’s military victory in forcing the Lebanese government to expel Yasser Arafat and purge Beirut of PLO members.[2] This essay evaluates the causes and outcome of the two Lebanon wars.

The Lebanon Civil War (1975-1990)

First, applying Herodotus’ recommendation: A proper historia of these wars must feature Lebanon’s 1975 Civil War; for what use is a sail boat’s mast and boom if it is not attached to the mainsail?

Lebanon’s Civil War began in 1975[3] and for 15 years the nation was caught in a cycle of conflict and unstable political settlements.[4] Internally, the Lebanese government’s consociational democracy – a system of power sharing between diverse ethno-religious groups – had collapsed after becoming imbalanced with migration shifts.[5] Externally, Farid El Khazen cites competing strategic interests, for ‘throughout the war, external actors, particularly the regional actors that took an active part in the war, [Israel, Syria, Iran and the PLO], had as much at stake as the Lebanese parties themselves.’[6] His observation that conflict exists in internal and external dimensions deftly captures the spirit of the Lebanon Wars.[7]

The 1982 Lebanon War

For two decades after Israel’s founding, the state’s involvement in Lebanon had been kept to a minimum under a limited action policy.[8] Stemming from Israel’s 1981 election and Syria’s increasing military presence in Lebanon, however, this policy was reversed by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.[9] Although personality politics did accelerate military action, it was not the sole factor.[10] Any victor of the 1981 election would have grappled with choosing between military action, or inaction, as Israel’s northern border was besieged.[11] Prime Minister Begin faced two decisions: If Israel took no action, ‘it would abandon a two-decade-old commitment to oppose Syrian involvement in Lebanon. On the other hand, if Israel moved to deter Syria from intervening on the side of the Christians, it would in fact save the PLO-Left coalition and abandon its own Christian allies.’[12] Thus, the 1982 war was caused by a combination of political, social and religious factors.

Israel’s strategic objectives were to (1) solidify an alliance with the Christian Maronites to eradicate the Lebanese-Palestinian terrorist network;[13] (2) remove Yasser Arafat from power; (3) protect Israel’s northern border; and (4) defeat the Syrians in Lebanon.[14] Begin and Sharon, however, held different visions of achieving this.[15] According to Hala Jaber, ‘Israel’s invasion was the brain-child of Ariel Sharon[.]’[16] While Begin held ‘narrower military objectives’ in leveraging the strength and power of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), Sharon envisioned a more aggressive campaign to eradicate the PLO.[17]

These competing visions were harmonized under the July 1981 ceasefire agreement.

Anver Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber explain, ‘Begin’s Cabinet needed a reasonably acceptable pretext for moving into Lebanon. . . . Israeli officials repeatedly presented the July 1981 cease-fire as a matter of linkage. Either the PLO respected the cease-fire on all fronts or the cease-fire was null and void.’[18]

Apart from the involvement of regional actors, the United States and USSR were also involved.[19] In 1982 Sharon visited Washington DC to speak with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, about the planned offensive.[20] Haig cautioned that there must be an internationally recognized provocation to justify an invasion.[21] Critical of the US’ discussions with Israel, Zeev Schiff writes ‘[a]lthough the Americans sounded circumlocutory warnings for public consumption, the American nay was so feeble that the Israelis regarded it merely as a diplomatic maneuver designed to exonerate the United States should the military operation go sour.’[22] According to Schiff, Israeli leaders opined that the US would support the operation if it undermined the USSR’s allies.[23]

On 3 June 1982, this provocation basis was met when the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, was shot in the head by a Palestinian gunman.[24] Despite the Israeli intelligence forces’ knowledge that the gunman was not part of the PLO, but a dissident faction of Abu Nidal, Prime Minister Begin publicly declared it to be a violation of Israel’s cease-fire agreement with the PLO.[25] As a result, Israel commenced its invasion of Lebanon the following day. [26] Israel mounted a successful aerial offensive and land campaign against Lebanon in Operation Peace for Galilee.[27] In the end, the war was a tactical victory for the IDF because it forced the Lebanese government to remove Arafat and purge Beirut of PLO members.[28]

Israel’s strategic objective to secure a durable peace with Lebanon, however, was a failed effort. Why? Hala Jaber explains ‘Sharon traumatized Lebanon, shocked the Israeli public and succeeded in creating a new enemy to harry Israel’s northern border: Hezbollah[.]’[29] Israel allowed the Phalange militia to enter the Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatilla, which led to the massacre of refugees, and galvanized the formation of the Lebanese National Resistance[30] and Hezbollah.[31] As Ahron Bregman of King’s College London War Studies notes in Israel’s Wars: A History Since 1947, the aftermath of the Palestinian refugee massacre resulted in Sharon’s removal from office and the resignation of senior military commander, Colonel Eli Geva, during the conflict.[32] By 1983, Hezbollah formed its first council (shoura), established a newspaper, Al-Ahed (The Pledge) in 1984, and by 1985 Hezbollah published its manifesto on Islamic Resistance.[33] Although a peace agreement was entered into by Israel and Lebanon, it was a short-lived gain because Syria coerced Lebanon’s leader, Amin Gemayel, to repeal it.[34] Overall, Israel’s conduct in 1982 unintentionally triggered the growth of the Islamic Resistance Movement and conditions leading to the 2006 war.[35]

The 2006 Lebanon War

This 34-day war was caused by a combination of unresolved political, social and religious grievances from the 1982 war. The primary actors were Israel, Iran and Hezbollah, and the fighting was concentrated in Lebanon and Israel.[36] Despite Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in May 2000, hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah steadily escalated with fringe conflicts.[37] On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah initiated war when it crossed into Israel and killed and kidnapped several soldiers.[38] In retaliation, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) commenced Operation Specific Gravity against Hezbollah.[39] The IDF also mounted a ground campaign to combat Hezbollah’s Katyusha rocket attacks and dispersed guerilla network.[40] Both sides sustained high casualties. Israel was struck with 3,970 rockets as it sought to weed out guerilla fighters. [41] Schmuel Tzabag characterizes this conflict as an ‘asymmetrical confrontation between a sovereign state [Israel] and a guerrilla organization [Hezbollah] controlling part of a neighbouring state [Lebanon] and operating against its will by means of terrorism[.]’[42] On 14 August 2006, the UN intervened in brokering a ceasefire agreement.[43]

The war’s outcome, however, is shrouded in controversy. While it ended in a ceasefire, some scholars credit Israel’s military for deterring a future war with Hezbollah, whereas Hezbollah regards it as a victory for its resistance strategy.[44] Regardless, Israel initiated the Winograd Commission to investigate why its military reached a tactical impasse with Hezbollah.[45] The Commission found that ‘Israeli military officers and Israel’s political leadership placed severe restraints on ground action because of the fear of repeating the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon and the war of attrition that followed Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.’[46] For Matt M. Matthews, the IDF suffered a tactical defeat because it was ‘confused by its new doctrine, soldiers were deficient in training and command, and senior officers seemed woefully unprepared to fight a “real war.”’[47] Overall, Israel’s military and civilian leadership lacked a unified vision in 2006 for combatting this asymmetrical threat.[48]

Conclusion

Although Israel achieved a tactical victory in 1982, in terms of achieving its strategic objectives, history shows it was a strategic mishap. Not only was the peace agreement with Lebanon short-lived, but the handling of the conflict also served to precipitate the emergence of Hezbollah and conditions for the 2006 war.

This article has been updated and republished on Strife Blog with the author’s permission. It was originally published on Small Wars Journal.

Jessica “Zhanna” Malekos Smith is a M.A. candidate with King’s College London, Department of War Studies. Previously, she served as a Captain in the US Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Prior to the military, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Jessica holds a J.D. from the University of California, Davis, and B.A. from Wellesley College, where she was a Fellow of the Madeleine Korbel Albright Institute. Opinions expressed in her articles are those of the author’s and not those of the US Department of Defense or US Air Force.

Notes:

[1] ‘Herodotus Quotes’, The Famous People, https://quotes.thefamouspeople.com/herodotus-1626.php (May 2018).

[2] Farid El Khazen, ‘Ending Conflict in Wartime Lebanon’, Middle Eastern Studies, 40:1, (2004), p. 68.

[3] ‘Lebanon’, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm (May 2018).

[4] El Khazen, ‘Conflict’, p. 66.

[5] Joel Krieger, ‘Consociational Democracy’, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195117394.001.0001/acref-9780195117394-e-0156?rskey=ujOyS9&result=152 (May 2018).

[6] El Khazen, ‘Conflict’, p. 65.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Anver Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber ‘Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?’, International Security, 8:2, (1983), p. 118.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid. at p. 127.

[13] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’, (May 2018).

[14] ‘Lebanon’, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm (May 2018).

[15] Yaniv, ‘Whim’, pp. 131-132.

[16] Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, (Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 7.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Yaniv, ‘Whim’, pp. 135.

[19] Ibid. at pp. 134-135.

[20] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Zeev Schiff, ‘The Green Light’, Foreign Policy, 50, (1983), p. 73.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Yaniv, ‘Whim’, pp. 135.

[25] Shlomo Argov, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1422910/Shlomo-Argov.html (June 2018)

[26] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’.

[27] ‘Lebanon’, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm (May 2018).

[28] El Khazen, ‘Conflict’, p. 68.

[29] Jaber, Hezbollah, pp. 7-8.

[30] Ibid. at p. 19.

[31] Ibid. at p. 220.

[32] Ahron Bregman, Israel’s Wars: A History Since 1947, (Routledge, 2010), p. 177.

[33] Jaber, Hezbollah, pp. 220-21.

[34] El Khazen, ‘Conflict’, p. 68.

[35] Jaber, Hezbollah, pp. 7-8.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Anthony Cordesman, et. al., Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, (CSIS Press, 2007), pp. 24-25.

[38] Ibid. at p. 4.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’.

[42] Schmuel Tzabag, ‘Ending the Second Lebanon War’, Israel Affairs, 19:4, (2013), p. 640.

[43] KCL WSO, ‘The Lebanon Wars’.

[44] Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared, (OP 26, 2008), pp. 1-2.

[45] Cordesman, ‘2006’, p. 6.

[46] Ibid. at p. 7.

[47] Matthews, Unprepared, p. 1.

[48] Cordesman, ‘2006’, p. 7.

Image Source:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3218834

Bibliography:

Ahron Bregman, Israel’s Wars: A History Since 1947, (Routledge, 2010).

Anthony Cordesman with George Sullivan and William D. Sullivan, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, (CSIS Press, 2007).

Anver Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber ‘Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon’, International Security, 8:2, (1983).

Farid El Khazen, ‘Ending Conflict in Wartime Lebanon: Reform, Sovereignty and Power 1976–88’, Middle Eastern Studies, 40:1, (2004).

Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, (Columbia University Press, 1997).

‘Herodotus Quotes’, The Famous People, https://quotes.thefamouspeople.com/herodotus-1626.php (May 2018).

King’s College London War Studies Online: Unit 2, ‘The Lebanon Wars’, (May 2018).

‘Lebanon’, Globalsecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon.htm (May 2018).

Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, (OP 26, 2008).

Schmuel Tzabag, ‘Ending the Second Lebanon War: The Interface between the Political and Military Echelons in Israel’, Israel Affairs, 19:4, (2013).

Zeev Schiff, ‘The Green Light’, Foreign Policy, 50, (1983).

Book review: ‘The Resistible Rise of Benjamin Netanyahu’ by Neill Lochery

January 9, 2017 by Lauren Mellinger

Reviewed by: Lauren Mellinger

netanyahu — Neill Lochery, The Resistible Rise of Benjamin Netanyahu (London: Bloomsbury, 2016, ISBN: 9781472926111, pp.400)

In November 2016, the latest crisis in Israeli domestic politics threatening to destabilize – or possibly bring down the government altogether – broke out in a heated battle in the Knesset over the pending evacuation of the Amona outpost in the West Bank. The Prime Minister was forced to battle on several fronts simultaneously – from managing the demands of the settler community, to contending with the far-right wing of his coalition to stave off a challenger in the next elections, grappling with the expectations of the international community, and the outrage of the Israeli left and centre-left.

This latest crisis is not atypical of Israeli politics, and is certainly a familiar situation for the country’s current Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who in November 2016 surpassed one of Israel’s founders and the country’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, to officially become Israel’s longest serving prime minister, and smashing Ben-Gurion’s record for the most consecutive days in office.

‘Outsider’, ‘stranger in a strange land,’ the ‘American’, ‘right-wing zealot’, ‘pragmatist’, and ‘fear-monger’ – each of these terms has been used to describe Netanyahu throughout his political career. Yet, which of these labels is an accurate characterization of Benjamin Netanyahu?

British historian Neill Lochery sets out to explore this question in the first English-language biography of the man regarded by veteran observers of Israeli politics as ‘the comeback kid,’ and who Lochery describes as ‘a hugely polarizing figure in Israel, the Middle East, the United States and the wider world.’[1] Lochery, who in a recent interview declared his boredom with the traditional womb-to-tomb structure of political biographies, purported to address this question by structuring the book with nine chapters, each reflecting a decisive moment in the Israeli politicians’ life, to assess what Netanyahu himself took away from these experiences – the successes and failures – and how over time, he applied these lessons to advance his political career.

Netanyahu: pragmatist or ideologue?

At the heart of Lochery’s analysis of Netanyahu is his attempt to explain the paradox embodied by Netanyahu’s historic tenure as a member of Israel’s political elite. As Lochery notes in the conclusion of his study: ‘For all his many failings Netanyahu remains the man who a large part of the Israeli electorate feels most comfortable leading the country. His successes have been mainly at the polls and his failures mainly in governing the country.’[2] This begs the question – in a country where the frequency of elections would undoubtedly make a stellar drinking game for anyone with a wooden leg – what factors have contributed to Netanyahu’s initial rise to power, and more importantly, to his subsequent political comeback(s)?

Lochery attributes the longevity of Netanyahu’s political career – in particular, his long tenure as Israel’s prime minister – to a host of reasons rooted in developments within Israeli domestic politics, geopolitical changes in the region and their impact on the Israeli electorate, and elements within Netanyahu’s own upbringing and the impact they have had on the development of his worldview.

A key attribute of Netanyahu’s success in politics has been what Lochery describes as the veteran politician’s ‘pragmatic skills of reinvention.’[3] Many practitioners and observers of Israeli politics continue to debate the source of Netanyahu’s hawkish stance with respect to the Palestinians, other Arab states in the region, and Iran. Yet, Lochery takes the view of those who maintain that the Prime Minister is driven by pragmatism and is simply not a right-wing revisionist ideologue always looking for the approval of his father, the late Israeli historian Ben-Zion Netanyahu. Rather, Lochery explains that what appears to observers of Israeli politics as flip flops or contradictions of Netanyahu’s own statements – most notably his initial 2009 acceptance and subsequent rejection of a two-state solution on the eve of the March 2015 Knesset elections – is arguably less a reflection of a genuine change in Netanyahu’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead, such behavior is emblematic of the fact that as a politician, Netanyahu operates first and foremost with an eye on the next election. As Lochery noted in a recent interview, Netanyahu believes that though the world is changing, time is on Israel’s side. He does not govern by seeking to implement a long-term vision for Israel’s future, but rather, ‘[w]hen Netanyahu wins an election, he almost always starts running for the next one straight away. Even his cabinet appointments are based on where he thinks the next election is going to be fought. And so power has replaced ideology.’[4]

Indeed a familiar pattern throughout Netanyahu’s political career has been his tendency to run to the right for political support when he is backed into a corner – a pattern which Lochery documents throughout the book. Such moves were (and arguably still are) considered by Netanyahu to be necessary – either to gain vital support for a pending election or to ensure the survival of his coalition – though such political manoeuvers often invoke the ire of many in the international community. For instance, commenting on the reaction of many in the international community following the surprising results of the 2015 Knesset elections in which Netanyahu succeeded in winning a fourth term as prime minister despite having made a number of inflammatory and contradictory remarks, Lochery argues that ‘[t]he trouble that the world had in dealing with Netanyahu was not that he was an ideologue, rather, that he was too pragmatic and prone to change his mind in order to curry favour with key voting groups in Israel.’[5]

The role of Israeli society

While 2016 shocked the liberal democratic world order – with sweeping changes in Europe and in the recent presidential elections in the United States – it is worth recalling that in a democracy, individuals cannot come to power without a willing and able electorate.

Israeli PM Netanyahu meeting with leaders in the British Parliament

For all practical purposes, Netanyahu’s path to the prime minister’s office was never etched in stone. While providing a brief overview of Netanyahu’s upbringing, Lochery describes how it was Netanyahu’s older brother Yonatan who was destined for a career in Israeli politics, while Benjamin was headed for a career as a businessman, likely in America. It was only following the death of his brother[6] that he began to take an interest in a career in politics. While Netanyahu rose to political prominence at a fortuitous moment – namely the democratization of Israeli domestic politics – with his command of spoken English and media savvy, he was, as Lochery describes, partly responsible for the Americanisation of Israeli politics. It is not insignificant that at the time of his first election as prime minister in 1996, Netanyahu was the youngest person to ever assume the office (and without having first served in other senior political posts), nor that at that time he represented a break from the previous generation of Likud leaders. When Netanyahu became the leader of the Likud party in 1993, he was only the third individual elected to lead the party, succeeding Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, two larger than life predecessors, who both played key roles in the establishment of the State and were firm right-wing ideologues in their own right.

However, despite Netanyahu’s adept skills as a politician, Lochery argues that in terms of the longevity of his tenure as prime minister, ‘[t]o a large extent Netanyahu’s political successes have been achieved as a result of the shortcomings of Israeli society and its political leadership.’[7] Over the years, as Lochery notes, Netanyahu has undoubtedly benefited from the failure of the left and centre-left in Israeli politics – since the assassination of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 – to produce a viable candidate, and a message that resonated with an electorate were security dominates as a prime concern.[8]

Another factor contributing both to Netanyahu’s initial rise to power and his political comeback has been his ability to tap into the innate pessimism that most Israelis feel about their future. As Lochery writes, ‘Israel remains deeply divided and unsure of its place in the world,’[9] and this overarching skepticism applies both domestically, in the ongoing struggle to determine the role of religion in state affairs, and in terms of Israel’s relationship with others in the region. For Israelis, as Lochery explains ‘the litmus test is survival.’[10] As a result of this prevailing attitude of uncertainty, the public’s view of Netanyahu as somewhat of a ‘goalkeeper’[11] has served as a critical factor contributing to the longevity of Netanyahu’s political career, as well as enabling his politics of fear to gain traction among the electorate. Indeed, as Lochery observes:

On a deeper level, there was a connection between Israel being in trouble and the electorate running towards Netanyahu. Many of those Israelis who were calling for him to return to office in late 2000 were the very same voters who had kicked him out of the same office a year and a half earlier. Netanyahu’s personality had not changed, nor had he offered a Nixon-style apology for the mistakes he had made during his first term in office. Netanyahu did not come back to the people: the people came back to him. To some extent, this would set an important precedent for the rest of his career. Whenever Israel looked to be under threat, be it from the Palestinians, the Iraqis or, in recent times, the Iranians, the majority of Israeli voters look to Netanyahu as the ‘goalkeeper of the state.’[12]

What understanding Netanyahu could mean for the prospect of peace

Though his tenure as prime minister has largely lacked significant foreign policy successes, Netanyahu’s views on Israel’s security and the security of the region have not been without merit. His statements warning of the dangerous consequences of Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, including those made while he served as Finance Minister in Sharon’s government, have largely proven correct. And his concerns about the Iranian nuclear program are shared by many in the international community, though over the last few years, Netanyahu’s efforts to gain international support for a hardline on Iran have largely resulted in diminished returns.

Without discrediting Netanyahu’s own astute political intelligence, the resilience of Netanyahu is in large part a by-product of changes within Israeli domestic politics over the past several decades – the rise of the right wing, and the failures of the left and centre-left – and of changes that swept the region following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the ensuing chaos post-Arab spring. But what impact will an improved understanding of Netanyahu’s tenure in office have on the prospect of peace in the region, and in particular on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Lochery raises the question but steers clear of formally answering. Yet, if Lochery’s study of Netanyahu is correct, and the veteran politician is indeed guided by pragmatism rather than ideological rigidity, than this may provide the biggest clue for those working to move the peace process forward.

Lauren Mellinger (@Lauren_M04) is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Notes:

[1] Neill Lochery, The Resistible Rise of Benjamin Netanyahu (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), p. 1.

[2] Ibid., p. 341.

[3] Ibid., p. 339.

[4] J.P. O’Malley, ‘Sultan of Swing: Historian says Netanyahu is fickle by design,’ Times of Israel, November 26, 2016, http://www.timesofisrael.com/sultan-of-swing-historian-says-netanyahu-is-fickle-by-design/.

[5] Lochery, pp. 71; 190; 339.

[6] Yonatan Netanyahu was a member of the Israel Defence Forces elite commando unit Sayeret Matkal. In July 1976 he was killed during a mission to rescue hostages held at Entebbe Airport in Uganda.

[7] Lochery, p. 388.

[8] Ibid., p. 337.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., p. xii.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., pp. xi-xii; 211.

Image 1 credit: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Benjamin_Netanyahu_portrait.jpg

Image 2 credit: http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-militant-islam-causing-sunni-arabs-to-view-israel-as-ally/

Book cover credit: http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/the-resistible-rise-of-benjamin-netanyahu-9781472926111/

Film Review: Zero Days (2016)

September 21, 2016 by Cheng Lai Ki

Gibney, A. Zero Days, Jigsaw Productions, (2016). (PG-13) More information from: http://gb.imdb.com/title/tt5446858/.

By: Cheng Lai Ki

“The science fiction cyberwar scenario is here…” This statement comes from members of the United States National Security Agency (NSA), and others in the intelligence community, role-played by actress Joanne Tucker. Zero Days, directed and narrated by documentarian Alex Gibney – who produced the award winning documentaries Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (2005) and Taxi to the Dark Side (2007) – explores the evolving nature of computer network exploitations (CNEs). In a world where critical infrastructures (i.e. energy suppliers, telecommunication infrastructures), military communication grids (i.e. US Global Information Grid - GIG) and diplomatic communications are conducted on information-communication technologies (ICTs); the documentary illuminates the uncomfortable realities and vulnerabilities within cyberspace.

Zero Days explores StuxNet, a computer worm developed by a US-Israeli effort to cripple the uranium enrichment capabilities at the Natanz enrichment plant in Iran. The documentary debuted at the 2016 Berlin film festival and was awarded a four-star review by the Guardian’s Peter Bradshaw, who described Gibney’s 2016 documentary as ‘intriguing and disturbing’. Named after the technical term ‘zero day’ that represents a computer network vulnerability that is only known to the attacker, the investigative documentary tells Gibney’s journey in uncovering ‘the truth’ behind StuxNet’s technical capabilities and attributed political motives. Despite discussing a cybersecurity threat, the documentary goes beyond the technical landscape and introduces various geopolitical elements within – such as the Israeli disapproval of Iran cultivating national nuclear capabilities. Given the relative basic nature of its discussions, this documentary appears to be intended for the general public rather than specialists in the field. However, Gibney appears to have followed along an investigative journalistic approach (something he undoubtedly is famous for) and guides the viewer along a path of what essentially is a cyber-attribution journey implicating the US and Israeli agencies. The documentary was constructed with strategically cut interviews from cybersecurity specialists (i.e. Kaspersky; Symantec), former senior-leaderships from ‘three-letter’ government agencies, industrial experts (i.e. Ralph Langner, a German Control System Security consultant) and pioneers within the investigative journalism (i.e. David Sanger) in discussing StuxNet’s discovery and capabilities. In addition to these interviews, Gibney wanted a more ‘real’ source of information. This was where the anonymous NSA intelligence community came in. Collectively using transcripts of these employees (and the help of actress Joanne Tucker), Gibney was able to incorporate an inside-source that gave this documentary a little more power behind its claims.

A collection of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) that are crucial technological components within most critical infrastructure. The StuxNet worm targeted specficially the Siemens Simatic S7-300 PLC CPU with three I/O modules attached.

The documentary excels in unveiling to the general public that: i) cybersecurity is not purely a software issue, but also a hardware one; and ii) digital-malware can be easily weaponised for intelligence gathering and strike purposes.

First, Symantec Security Response specialist, Eric Chien, states in an interview: ‘…real-world physical destruction. [Boom] At that time things became really scary for us. Here you had malware potentially killing people and that was something that was Hollywood-esque to us; that we’d always laugh at, when people made that kind of assertion.’ Through conducting a simple experiment where Symantec specialists infected a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) – the main computer control unit of most facility control systems – with the StuxNet worm. Under normal conditions, the PLC was programed to inflate a balloon and stop after five-seconds. However, after being infected with the StuxNet worm, the PLC ignored commands to stop the inflation and the balloon burst after being continuously filled with air. Through this simple experiment, the specialists (and Gibney) managed to reveal the devastating impact of vulnerable computer systems that control our national critical infrastructures or dangerous facilities such as Natanz.

Second, the NSA employees that decided to talk to Gibney revealed who the US cyber intelligence community recruits and more importantly, their capacities to create digital-techniques for intelligence gathering – or in the case of StuxNet, strike purposes. Cybersecurity specialists that were analysing the StuxNet code discovered older versions that were focused on data-collection. It wasn’t until the later versions that more offensive objectives were made more apparent within the code. According to forthcoming NSA employees, this shift within the code was done by the Israeli foreign intelligence services (Mossad) and not the American agencies. Regardless, Zero Days does an excellent job in revealing the highly adaptive nature of cyber ordinances.

national_security_agency_headquarters_fort_meade_maryland — The United States National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, Maryland. There, information technology experts developed the multiple version of the StuxNet worm at the Cyber Command unit (USCYBERCOM) established in 2009 that was housed wihtin.

However, to security academics, this documentary suffers from several limitations undermining its credibility. Two of its main limitations are: i) over centralization on investigative attribution; and ii) inherently negative portrayal of governmental personnel and activity.

First, as earlier mentioned, the documentary is a journey of cyber-attribution at its core – much akin to the work of investigative journalist, David Sanger. To show this, we need to review the structure of the documentary. It begins with discussing the cybersecurity incident, how the worm was found, and how it baffled cybersecurity specialists. Next, the documentary explains the geopolitical and security tensions between the US, Israel and Iran; in addition to discussing the American position on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Next, it progressed onto the technical and security domains; explaining the infrastructure of American and Israeli cyber-intelligence capabilities and operations. Finally, Gibney asks harder questions of implications and opinions during his interviews with American intelligence, security and military subjects. Obviously, for national security and secrecy reasons, these could not be answered. It would appear that Gibney wanted to ask these questions to highlight his disgust in the lack of transparency within the security sector. Throughout the late part of the documentary, he supplements various claims with an informal-esque interview with the NSA employees using Joanne Tucker as an avatar. To the general public, this documentary is undoubtedly an interesting journey of exploration and revelation about American and Israeli cyber capabilities. While highlighting several cybersecurity concerns afflicting cybersecurity specialists in governmental and industrial sectors, the documentary quickly narrows its attributive direction towards the United States and Israel - leaving little room for alternative arguments.

Second, to security specialists this documentary leaves out several key areas of consideration, such as the crucial importance of having an effective intelligence collection and pre-emptive strike capabilities for reasons of national security. During interviews with government leaderships, they were either explaining the structure of their national intelligence agencies/capabilities or talking about how certain operations were transferred between presidents – StuxNet was known within the American government community as ‘The Olympic Games’. As such, government interviewees played only an informative role, participating in few discussions. Another comment would be on the NSA employees that decided to be vocal. Playing the devil’s advocate, certain questions about credibility and accuracy can be raised: How do we know these were really NSA employees from their cyber divisions? Do we know if they are really vocalizing because they wanted to? Or were they instructed to? There was a significant amount of blame placed on Mossad for ‘weaponizing’ the StuxNet code when the Americans just wanted to utilise it solely for intelligence collection purposes. Within the realms of intelligence, this sounds more like disinformation rather than truth. To some civil-servants from security or intelligence backgrounds, this documentary appears to portray such government operations in a negative light and perpetuates the concept of transparency with little regard for its ramifications. Sometimes, knowing the ‘truth’ might do more harm than good.

Zero Days is an excellent documentary and investigatory source of information that raises awareness of cybersecurity issues and its importance in our modernized era. First, its innovative and effective use of animations coupled with strategic uses of interviewees from various backgrounds provides it credibility and persuasiveness when discussing StuxNet. Second, it increases awareness about the importance of cultivating a better understanding of cybersecurity and how vulnerable digital and hardware systems can have significantly harmful consequences. However, in his quest to push for transparency behind government intelligence operations, Zero Days promotes a dangerous notion. Operational secrecy is not a negative notion but sometimes vital for national security. The ubiquitous nature of cyberspace, like Pandora’s Box, opens nations to a new dimension of threats that cannot be as easily defended like that of Air, Land, or Sea and increased transparency can deal much more harm. Regardless your position regarding the motives behind Zero Days, it remains an excellent documentary in raising cybersecurity awareness.

Zero Days (2016) Documentary Trailer:

Cheng served as an Amour Officer and Training Instructor at the Armour Training Institute (ATI) in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and now possesses reservist status. His master’s research revolves around security considerations within the Asia-Pacific Region and more specifically around areas of Cybersecurity, Maritime Security and Intelligence Studies. His Graduate thesis explores the characteristics and trends defining China’s emerging Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare capabilities. He participated in the April 2016 9/12 Cyber Student Challenge in Geneva and has been published in IHS Janes’s Intelligence Review in May 2016. You can follow him on Twitter @LK_Cheng

Notes:

Bradshaw, P. ‘Zero Days review – a disturbing portrait of malware as the future of war’, The Guardian, Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/film/2016/feb/17/zero-days-review-malware-cyberwar-berlin-film-festival, (17 Feb 2016).

Gibney, A. ‘Director Profile’, JigSaw Productions, Available from: http://www.jigsawprods.com/alex-gibney/ (Accessed October 2016).

Internatinale Filmfestipiele Berlin 2016, Film File: Zero Days (Competition), Available from: https://www.berlinale.de/en/archiv/jahresarchive/2016/02_programm_2016/02_Filmdatenblatt_2016_201608480.php#tab=filmStills (2016)

Langer, R. ‘Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon’, TEDTalk, Available from: https://www.ted.com/talks/ralph_langner_cracking_stuxnet_a_21st_century_cyberweapon/transcript?language=en, (Mar 2011)

Lewis, J.A. ‘In Defense of Stuxnet’, Military and Strategic Affairs, 4(3), Dec 2012, pp.65 – 76.

Macaulay, S. ‘Wrong Turn’, FilmMaker, Available from: http://www.filmmakermagazine.com/archives/issues/winter2008/taxi.php#.V-A8_Tvouu5, (2008).

Scott, A.O. ‘Those You Love to Hate: A Look at the Mighty Laid Low’, The New York Times, Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/22/movies/those-you-love-to-hate-a-look-at-the-mighty-laid-low.html?_r=1, (Apr 22 2005).

Image Source (1): https://i.ytimg.com/vi/GlC_1gZfuuU/maxresdefault.jpg

Image Source (2): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/82/SIMATIC_different_equipment.JPG

Image Source (3): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/84/National_Security_Agency_headquarters,_Fort_Meade,_Maryland.jpg

Lessons from Israel’s Security Zone: from ‘Pumpkin’ to the Present

September 5, 2016 by Lauren Mellinger

By: Lauren Mellinger

Ten years ago, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 brought the Second Lebanon War to an end. Almost immediately journalists, historians and policy analysts began grappling with the significance of the 34-day conflict. Yet to date, the pivotal events in the years that preceded that war – namely, the 15-year period between 1985 and 2000 in which Israeli troops maintained a security zone in southern Lebanon before unilaterally withdrawing all Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in May 2000 – have largely been overlooked.

In his recent war memoir Pumpkin Flowers: A Soldier’s Story, author Matti Friedman begins to fill this gap.[1] Friedman’s own experiences as an IDF solider serving in southern Lebanon took place in the final years of the security zone – at a time when there was a growing and vocal movement within Israel advocating for withdrawing from Lebanon.

During his service, Friedman was stationed at Pumpkin (Dla’at in Hebrew), one of dozens of fortified hilltop outposts that comprised the security zone.[2] The self-proclaimed first historian of the outpost, Friedman provides a unique account of this period in a memoir that is part a history of the war and part-political analysis, recounting the experiences of a generation who grew up under the promises of a ‘new Middle East,’[3] only to find themselves in southern Lebanon, observing as the seeds of twenty-first century warfare were planted. Yet, this period in Israeli – and for that matter, in the region’s history – remains incredibly relevant. Indeed, as Friedman argues in Pumpkin Flowers, ‘It is hardly possible to understand current events without understanding these ones [the Security Zone years], and yet they have been overlooked.’[4]

Israel’s troubled history in Lebanon: 1982 – 2016

Prior to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, cross-border incursions perpetrated by Palestinian terrorist organisations based in southern Lebanon were a frequent occurrence. Though Israel ultimately achieved the mission’s stated purpose of routing the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)[5] from its base of operations in southern Lebanon, in their place emerged a new, and ultimately more formidable adversary: Hezbollah.

Three years later, on January 14, 1985, then-Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced the cabinet’s decision to deploy IDF troops to maintain a 328-square mile buffer zone in southern Lebanon, to prevent the area from being used as a staging ground for acts of terrorism targeting northern Israel. For the next 15 years, those residing in northern Israel were able to maintain a relatively normal life, free of the fear of terrorist infiltration, (though they were still subject to occasional attacks from mortars and rockets launched from within the security zone by Hezbollah). Moreover, as a result of the relative quiet, residents in Israel’s north benefited from a thriving tourism industry during this period.[6]

But this improved quality of life came at a price. Between 1985 and May 2000, Hezbollah attacks on Israeli troops stationed in the security zone became the organisation’s raison d’être. The IDF lost an average of two dozen troops annually, which according to the army’s estimates amounted to 559 fallen soldiers, including 256 in combat operations.

When the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah proclaimed an Arab victory. Indeed in a now infamous speech, given on May 26, 2000 – Hezbollah’s declared ‘Victory Day’ – Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah remarked, ‘Israel . . . is feebler than a spider’s web.’

But following the withdrawal the newfound ‘quiet’ along the border would not last, and in July 2006, the Second Lebanon War broke out in response to a Hezbollah provocation. Since the 34-day conflict ended in August 2016, the security situation along the Israel-Lebanon border has been governed by mutual deterrence, with neither Israel nor Hezbollah eager for the next round of fighting, despite Hezbollah’s efforts to enhance its military capabilities in the interim.

Meanwhile, the events that took place in the security zone between 1985 and 2000 foretold the type of conflicts that the United States and coalition forces would soon find themselves immersed in following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Why the security zone years are worth remembering

Visitors to Israel are familiar with the country’s painstaking efforts to memorialise its military history, especially the service and sacrifice of Israeli troops. Yet bookended by two wars, to date, the 15-year period in which Israeli troops were stationed in southern Lebanon still has no official name, and no official national monument. The ‘security zone’ era, as it is referred to, seems to have been largely forgotten. Yet, there are several reasons why the events that took place during this period are worthy of greater consideration.

Fertile training ground for new techniques

In the first place, during this period, attacks on IDF troops stationed in southern Lebanon became Hezbollah’s raison d’être, and the organisation developed a series of tactics which they employed against Israeli troops in the security zone that presaged the type of counterinsurgency that would confront U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Friedman argues, ‘[s]uicide car bombs, roadside explosives, booby-trapped boulders, videotaped attacks, isolated outposts, hit-and-run, a modern military on hostile territory fighting a long, hopeless war against a weaker but more determined enemy for unclear and ultimately unattainable goals – before Iraq, before Afghanistan, there was this protracted affair in Lebanon.’[7]

Many of these tactics would eventually be exported outside of the security zone. After the Israeli government deported 415 members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Lebanon in December 1992, they wound up receiving training in suicide terrorism from Hezbollah. Eventually they were allowed to return and in April 1993, Hamas carried out the organisation’s first suicide attack in the West Bank – a trend that would continue for much of the next decade. And it was Hezbollah’s claim of victory in May 2000 following Israel’s unilateral withdrawal that, according to Brig. Gen. (ret) Yossi Kuperwasser, served as ‘wind in the sails’ of Palestinian militant groups in the West Bank, when the Second Intifada broke out four months later.

That the Security Zone in essence served as an incubator for a range of innovative techniques – that only a few short years after Israel’s withdrawal would be employed by actors throughout the region, giving modern armies a run for their money – renders this period a worthwhile case study for the IDF and Israel’s political leadership, as well as for other countries who have already embarked on, or are contemplating, similar military engagements.

Civil society v. the security establishment

A second reason why the history of the security zone era is relevant today, is that the decision to unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon remains a unique instance in Israeli history where a grass-roots movement (led by the Four Mothers Movement) held greater influence on national security policymaking than the military establishment, whose assessment on security policy is typically regarded as sacrosanct in Israeli domestic politics.[8] Indeed, prior to 1997 the Israeli public had largely been shielded from the day-to-day events in the security zone, for a host of reasons, including the fact that military reservists were largely not among those soldiers sent to Lebanon, a tight grip on the media (mainly by keeping the security zone off-limits to reporters), and the relatively low-level of casualties on an annual basis.[9]

The turning point came following an incident on the evening of February 4, 1997, where two IDF helicopters carrying troops bound for Lebanon crashed while still in Israeli airspace, resulting in the death of 73 troops. The helicopter incident, together with the emergence of the Four Mothers Movement almost immediately intensified the public interest surrounding the rationale of maintaining the security zone. As Avraham Sela argues, ‘the main achievement of civil society in this case [the security zone] was mobilising the media to develop a public debate which questioned the validity and necessity of the security zone and confronted the security establishment with an alternative rationale and discourse.’[10] Indeed, in the 1999 elections, Ehud Barak campaigned on a promise to ‘return the boys home’ within his first year of office.

It is the relatively short time in which Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon was accomplished, juxtaposed with the ongoing debate surrounding Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967 which renders the history of the security zone worthy of further examination.

Poor decision-making on national security matters

Third, the security zone years were unfortunately not the last instance of the Israeli political leadership’s adherence to poor decision-making processes when it comes to national security issues. The 15 years in which the IDF was deployed in southern Lebanon uncovered a host of weaknesses in the political leadership’s decision-making and management of national security issues, a number of which have yet to be adequately resolved.

The security zone period was marred by the government’s failure to clearly outline objectives and goals. As Friedman writes, ‘[t]hat’s why this war never had a name – a name would suggest a decision . . . This wasn’t a matter of debate so long as the price wasn’t too high.’[11] This was compounded by the absence of reservists serving in southern Lebanon, and the tight media controls, which taken together impeded the flow of information from the security zone to the Israeli populace as to what exactly was occurring on a day-to-day basis in southern Lebanon.[12] Yet, the political leadership’s failure to state clear objectives and keep the cabinet apprised so as to enable them to make informed decisions occurred again in 2006, and during Israel’s three subsequent wars with Hamas.

Lastly, the lack of sufficient debate within the government is another attribute of the political leadership’s national security decision-making process, prevalent during the security zone years, that has endured. In his account of this period, Friedman argues that prior to the February 1997 helicopter accident, (and apart from brief military operations in southern Lebanon in 1993 and 1996), the security zone had not been a matter seriously debated by the government, and in fact, that ‘there had never quite been a decision to create it in the first place.’[13] Following Operation Protective Edge in 2014, similar claims regarding the lack of sufficient debate on Gaza – and as to what precisely was known to members of the security cabinet prior to the start of the war regarding Hamas’s offensive tunnels – have been brought to light.[14] According to MK Ofer Shelah there was only one meeting discussing Gaza during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s third term, prior to the June 2014 kidnapping of three Israeli teenage boys in the West Bank, the event that precipitated Operation Protective Edge.[15] Similar claims as to the lack of proper discussion of the threat from Gaza have been made by others in the Israeli national security establishment.

Conclusion

For decades, successive commissions of inquiry have reported deficiencies in the government’s decision-making with respect to national security and have called for improvements to the quality of the discussions in the government. But, problems are still endemic. The political leadership has failed to adequately implement these recommendations. Moreover, the years following Israel’s initial invasion of Lebanon in 1982 have challenged the country’s traditional security concepts of deterrence and military decision – core pillars of the national security doctrine that has existed since Israel’s founding in 1948. During the security zone years, the threat facing the IDF evolved from that of conventional armies on traditional battlefields, to the threat posed by hybrid politico-military organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Yet, in the years since the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the army has utilized reservists, and incorporated more liberal policies regarding media access when engaging in hostilities with these new, formidable adversaries. As a result, when military operations are underway, the Israeli public is now kept abreast of most developments, often as they are unfolding in real time. Yet, the political leadership has done an inadequate job at coordinating the public’s expectations with respect to how the concepts of deterrence and military decision have evolved in this new era dominated largely by asymmetric warfare - a change that began with Israel’s earlier experiences in Lebanon.

The adoption of a new military strategy in August 2015 seeks to remedy a number of these deficiencies. Yet the problem remains that the military does not operate in a vacuum – it remains subject to the decisions handed down by the political leadership. Therefore, it is imperative that building on the publication of the IDF’s new strategy that the political leadership takes the opportunity to reform its decision-making processes in accordance with the recommendations of previous commissions, and enacts a national security strategy that includes coordinating the public’s expectations with the new concepts of deterrence and military decision, while implementing the requisite reforms to its decision-making process on matters of national security. Until that happens, the security zone years should serve as a cautionary tale.

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04

Notes:

[1] Matti Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers: A Soldier’s Story (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 2016).

[2] Per Israeli military jargon at that time, it was common to name things after produce — hence a range of hilltops in southern Lebanon with names such as Red Pepper, Basil, and Crocus. Floral code words were popular as well – if the code word ‘flowers’ was sent over the radio, that meant there were wounded soldiers. Id, p. 24.

[3] Id; See also Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1993).

[4] Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers, p. 20.

[5] At the time, the PLO was classified as a terrorist organisation by the Israeli government.

[6] See Gal Luft, “Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon – A Tragedy?” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 7, no. 3 (September 2000), pp. 13-20.

[7] Id, p. 20; 30-35.

[8] Avraham Sela, “Civil Society, the Military and National Security: The Case of Israel’s Security Zone in South Lebanon,” Israel Studies, Vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 53-78. See Also Yagil Levy, Israel’s Death Hierarchy: Aversion in a Militarized Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 2012), p.71-81.

[9] Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers, p. 179-180. At the time, the rate of casualties in the security zone was on average around two dozen per year.

[10] Sela, p. 54.

[11] Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers, p. 100.

[12] Id., p. 179-180.

[13] Friedman bases his claim on the language used in the cabinet decision from January 1985 that announced a three stage unilateral withdrawal plan for the IDF. According to the cabinet decision, the withdrawal was to occur in three stages, with the timeframe for the latter two stages to be set based on conditions inside Lebanon. Stage 3 called for the army to “deploy along the Israeli-Lebanese international border while maintaining a zone in southern Lebanon where the local forces – the South Lebanon Army – will operate with Israeli army backing.” See Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers, 99. [emphasis added] See also Thomas L. Friedman, “Israel Announces Three-Stage Plan to Leave Lebanon,” The New York Times, January 14, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/15/world/israel-announces-three-stage-plan-to-leave-lebanon.html.

[14] Amos Harel, “This Lawmaker Won’t Let the Gaza War be Pushed Under the Rug,” Haaretz, April 24, 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.653167.

[15] Ofer Shelah, HaOmetz LeNatzeach (The Courage to Win) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2015), p. 34. [Hebrew]

Image Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Israel_Lebanon_Border.JPG

Are Hamas rockets terrorism? Hollywood weighs in

June 30, 2016 by Lauren Mellinger

By: Lauren Mellinger

On June 20, 2016, NBC Universal (Universal Cable Productions) filed a lawsuit in a California federal court against its insurer, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company. At first glance the case appears to be a typical dispute over a contract – a Hollywood production company is suing its insurer for failure to pay the expenses incurred due to last minute decisions made by the production company in response to the last round of fighting between Hamas and Israel during the summer of 2014. Yet, at the centre of the case lies the question: Whether Hamas’s rocket attacks during that conflict should be classified as a war between sovereign nations, or as the militant acts of a terrorist group.

Summer 2014: A Brief Overview of Operation Protective Edge

On June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered in the West Bank. Hamas would later claim responsibility for the attack but in the ensuing weeks, Israel cracked down on Hamas operatives in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza responded with a barrage of rocket fire. On July 7, over 85 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel, for which Hamas claimed responsibility. The next day, the Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Protective Edge. Neither Israel nor Hamas wanted the conflict to escalate – becoming the third in a series of rounds in a war of attrition that has existed between the two sides since Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007. The operation lasted seven weeks, ending in a cease-fire on August 26.

Now for the obvious question – Why is the operation suddenly being featured in The Hollywood Reporter?

Enter Hollywood

In the summer of 2015, USA network aired the miniseries Dig, the television show at the centre of this lawsuit. When production began the previous summer, the plan was for the mystery-conspiracy-thriller which is set in Jerusalem to film on location in Israel – the location shoot being integral to the creative process. Indeed at a panel at that summer’s annual Comic-Con, Dig’s creators boasted that “[s]hooting there [in Jerusalem] is paramount to the story in capturing the vividness and emphasizing the characters of the show.”

But when the violence broke out that June, only the pilot episode had been filmed. Following a week-long unplanned hiatus (an expensive undertaking for a production company, especially on an overseas location shoot), Universal opted to relocate filming to New Mexico and Croatia for the duration of production for that season. Due to the unanticipated relocation, Universal incurred $6.9 million in unforeseen costs. When Universal submitted a claim to its insurer, Atlantic, for reimbursement, the company denied the claim.

So far – a typical contractual dispute. But now for the added twist:

According to Universal Cable Productions, of which USA Network is a subsidiary, after the violence broke out, the U.S. State Department attributed the rocket attacks to Hamas. At that point, Universal argues, it submitted a claim to Atlantic, which then denied coverage.

In their complaint, Universal maintains that Atlantic’s rationale for failing to reimburse the production company contravenes the official policy of the U.S. government, which to date has not recognised Hamas as a sovereign government. Indeed according to the documents filed with the court, Universal argues that:

“[t]he United States government has officially designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Nevertheless, Atlantic has ignored the United States government position and applicable law. It claims Hamas is a sovereign or quasi-sovereign government over the Gaza Strip (even though Atlantic admits the Gaza Strip is not a recognized sovereign nation), in a self-serving attempt to invoke the war exclusion and avoid its coverage obligations.”

Atlantic maintains that the company denied Universal’s claim on the grounds that, per the terms of the contract, coverage is excluded for war or warlike actions. According to documents filed with the court, Atlantic stated that the company informed Universal in a letter dated July 28, 2014 that at the time “the terrorism coverage should not apply” to the events of July 2014, as Hamas’s actions did not target either the United States or its policies, and that “the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury has not certified the [Hamas/Israel] events as acts of terrorism.”

Barring any issue of justiciability per U.S. law, should the case proceed, the California federal court will be forced to confront an issue that has seemingly confounded policymakers and international jurists since January 2006: How to define Hamas.

The Challenge of Defining Hamas

While it is too early in the proceedings to state with certainty, the likelihood is that Atlantic is not taking a stand on political grounds. Rather, it is more likely that they saw the amount incurred by Universal when production was moved at the eleventh hour, and looked for a loophole that would allow them to avoid payment. The fact that Atlantic can even ask the court to entertain its argument is due to what has amounted over the past decade, if not longer, to an “accepted ambiguity” in international law and policymaking regarding Hamas.

This “accepted ambiguity” with respect to accurately classifying Hamas is primarily the result of two factors: first, the fact that the organisation’s victory in the 2006 elections caught Israel and the international community off guard, and many government officials, academics and foreign policy experts found it difficult to explain how an entity, regarded by many as a terrorist organisation, could ascend to power through a democratic process without first having relinquished its armed strategy. (This element of surprise certainly applied to the Bush administration, which had invested in the Palestinian Authority as part of a larger effort to promote democratic governance in the region, and at the time, had encouraged the Palestinians to proceed with the elections.) The second factor has been the subsequent intellectual inertia of policymakers who have failed to adequately respond to the threat posed by the Hamas’s transformation from a terrorist organisation, to a democratically elected terrorist organisation, now with actual governing responsibilities and access to state budgets and other resources.

On January 25, 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, when its Change and Reform party list won 74 out of 132 seats. In the wake of the results, some counterterrorism analysts and Middle East specialists argued that participating in democratic elections, and subsequently serving in a government, would result in the group’s eventual moderation. Yet, notwithstanding the periodic moderate statements made by some members of their leadership, Hamas’s actions since the election wholly contradict the assertion that participation in politics will ultimately tame them. Hamas, since coming to power and becoming the de facto government in Gaza, has implemented a system of government that largely adheres to the movement’s core principles – espoused in a founding document the organisation has yet to officially renounce. This includes adhering to the use of violence, and refusing to recognise Israel. Hence, serving in the capacity of a democratically elected government has not impeded Hamas’s efforts to further its militant ideological goals.

In short:

Is Hamas a terrorist organisation? Yes.

Is Hamas a government? Yes.

Is Hamas currently in de facto control of the Gaza Strip? Yes, for the time being, in light of their takeover of the coastal enclave in June 2007, and until such time as the Palestinians hold new legislative elections (or the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority manages to reclaim control over Gaza.)

The challenge for policymakers is to understand the nature of the adversary they are confronting and formulate policies to mitigate the threat posed. It is long overdue for policymakers (and academics) to embrace a new paradigm with respect to Hamas – that of the hybrid terrorist organisation.[1]

In his latest book Global Alert, Israeli counterterrorism scholar Boaz Ganor has proposed a definition for hybrid terrorist organisations. Ganor’s model consists of a single organisation comprised of three interrelated wings: first, the terrorist or guerrilla wing, per the classic definitions. To this a second wing is added – a political wing, that enables the organisation to participate in institutional politics, where it can gain legitimacy, albeit gradually. Lastly, such groups often maintain a robust social-welfare network, the purpose of which is to ensure a steady stream of new recruits to the organisation over time.[2]

That an organisation can exist as a “hybrid” challenges the theory, widely accepted in both academia and among policymakers, that an armed group’s decision to participate in electoral politics is an automatic indication of its eventual transition into a “legitimate” political actor (i.e., a political party that has abandoned its armed strategy.)[3] Yet, groups like Hamas are challenging the conventional wisdom. In her study of Islamist terrorist and guerrilla groups in transition in the Middle East, scholar Krista Wiegand found that an organisation’s existence as a hybrid or a “dual-status” group does not presuppose the group’s eventual transition to a non-violent political party. Rather, it reflects a rational choice. According to Wiegand, for armed groups that embody a hybrid status, “the use of political violence is a strategic rational choice under certain conditions, while under other conditions, non-violent political participation is more rational . . . violence and non-violence are not mutually exclusive choices.”[4]

In other words, a hybrid group has the best of both worlds – the opportunity to slowly gain international legitimacy while obtaining access to state resources, without ever having to forsake the use of violence.

What Happens Next?

Given the international community’s glacially slow response to understanding the threat posed by hybrid organisations, it is likely that the immediate effect of Universal’s lawsuit will be on Israel’s relationship with Hollywood. In 2014, Dig was not the only Hollywood production filming in Israel that opted to relocate due to the ongoing violence in Gaza. Indeed, one day before USA pulled production from Israel, the FX series Tyrant also decided to move production for season one to Turkey due to the hostilities. Production on The Dovekeepers, a new biblical miniseries that CBS originally intended to film on location in Israel, was relocated to Malta. That decisions such as defining Hamas may be subject to the ad hoc rulings of lower courts may hamper Israel’s efforts to entice foreign production companies to consider Israel when looking for suitable foreign locales for film and television projects.

Still, the growing challenge that hybrid organisations such as Hamas pose to Israel is by no means exclusively a challenge for Israel. Modern history is replete with examples of armed groups that have eventually transitioned to non-violent political parties. At present, what sets Hamas (and for that matter, groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah) apart from other armed organisations that have undergone some form of transition is an issue that lies at the heart of this lawsuit – are these organisations in fact in the process of transitioning? Or rather, do they embody a new type of security challenge for democratic states?

The latter is more likely in the case of Hamas. Therefore, those states that opt to designate only the militant wing of an organisation such as Hamas as a terrorist organisation, excluding the political arm of the organisation, are doing little more than creating an artificial distinction. By effectively enshrining a false dichotomy into law – that an organisation can either be a “terrorist organisation” or “the political wing of an armed group” – the state fails to account for the organisational and operational reality of hybrid groups, namely, that existence as a hybrid is a rational choice, not to be misconstrued with the initial phase in an eventual transition a legitimate political party. Only with an appropriate understanding of such groups can states begin to devise adequate policies to mitigate the threat such groups pose to their security.

Notes:

[1] For a more in depth understanding of the emerging concept of the “hybrid” organisation see: Boaz Ganor, Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to the Liberal Democratic World (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 73-83; Amichai Magen, “Hybrid War and the ‘Gulliverization’ of Israel,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 5(1) (2011): 59-72; Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013); Jeroen de Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements,” in ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2008); Krista E. Wiegand, Bombs Over Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010).

[2] Ganor, Global Alert, p. 74.

[3] See Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London: Routledge, 2003); Marina Ottoway, “Islamists and Democracy: Keep the Faith,” The New Republic, June 6 and 13, 2005.

[4] Wiegand, Bombs Over Ballots, p. 75-76.

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