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Justin Trudeau

In foreign policy, Canada has chosen style over substance

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by Jack Cross

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is welcomed to the Philippines for the 31st ASEAN Summit in Manila (Credit: Adam Scotti, PMO)

After the triumph of his election victory in 2015, the new Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau declared: “Canada is back!”. Five years on from that soundbite, many are starting to ask, where has Canada gone? On the international stage, the Trudeau government has been noticeably absent. There has been a lack of commitment to international peacekeeping missions, and a general lack of energy in its foreign policy and diplomatic activities.

The Trudeau Ministry began with such promise, declaring a ‘feminist foreign policy,’ and a re-engagement in international affairs. While this was largely to satisfy its domestic audience, it did raise hopes for Canadian diplomacy. But in June 2020 the Canadian government suffered the embarrassment of failing to secure a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. This was despite intensive lobbying, spending $2 million on the effort and sending Trudeau on a world tour. While this not a rejection of Canada’s ‘feminist foreign policy, it was a rejection of Canada’s approach to the UN and its desire for greater influence. This was a second defeat in seeking a seat for Canada, as the previous Harper Ministry had made the attempt ten years ago. At present Canada appears increasingly isolated and saddled with an ineffective foreign policy full of great style but lacking in proper substance.

A key problem in current Canadian foreign policy is a lack of substance and action to back up its style and rhetoric. While this is not an unusual position for a government to be in, the Trudeau Ministry has clearly wished to expand Canadian influence on the world stage, as a more palatable North American alternative to the bullish, isolationist policies of the outgoing Trump Administration. However, influence is usually dependent on participation, something which the current government has failed to recognise.

As of November 2020, there were less than fifty Canadian military and police personnel involved in UN peacekeeping missions. This ranks them 76th in terms of the size of their contribution and makes up roughly 0.046% of the total number of personnel involved in peacekeeping missions. These figures go against previous promises made by Trudeau, to provide the UN with six hundred soldiers and one hundred and fifty police officials for peacekeeping work by 2019. Not only this, and despite rhetoric to the contrary, Canada’s commitment to UN climate change goals has been lukewarm. On current projections, the Canadian government is unlikely to meet any of its 2030 climate targets. While Canada is not alone in its climate policy failures, when seeking it elevate its position within the UN, a good record on pursing its goals would certainly have been an asset. One would presume that governments base their vote on council membership on what a country has to offer and clearly a large bloc of UN member states do not know what Canada has to offer. Of the four states which put themselves forward for this slate of UN elections, Canada, Ireland, Norway and San Marino (which withdrew itself from consideration), Canada is considered the most powerful of the four, as a member of the G8 and with a larger military global military presence. Yet power on paper does not always equate to success.

By direct comparison, the two member states who beat Canada for Security Council seats, Ireland and Norway, both rank higher in terms of contributions to UN peacekeeping. While it is true that Canada’s monetary contribution to the UN budget is larger than that of Norway and Ireland combined, this does not equate to active participation. It’s also worth noting that the Canadian government only began their campaign for the 2020 vote in 2016, whereas Ireland and Norway announced their intention for this particular election in 2005 and 2007. This sort of late decision reaffirms the idea of Canadian inactivity, as governments of both major parties failed to launch an earlier bid for this seat. It suggests that Canada wants a seat at the top table, without doing the hard graft needed to actually get there.

The problem of style over substance can be seen right across current Canadian foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. The idea of an explicitly ‘feminist’ foreign policy is an initiative which should be applauded, seeking to empower women around the world, through education, financial independence and control over their own bodies. However, this has not always stood up to scrutiny. While there have been some clear successes, such as a focus on children and the empowerment of women through Canadian assistance in Mali, there have been inconsistencies within the government’s policy. The Canadian government have continued to sell arms to Saudi Arabia whose ruling class’s attitude towards women needs no explanation. In 2019 alone, arms exports worth almost $3 billion were delivered to Saudi Arabia, almost doubling the previous year’s exports and dwarfing annual amounts sold under the previous Conservative government.

Canada’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is hardly a unique one within global politics, but it does directly contradict their officially feminist foreign policy. It has continued to sell arms to a state which has presided over a humanitarian disaster in Yemen, propping up a government which itself has an appalling record on women’s rights. By contrast, Canada has imposed an arms embargo against Turkey, citing concerns over human rights abuses and its intervention in the Syrian Civil War. More damaging than this was Trudeau’s defence of the engineering firm SNC-Lavalin, senior officials of which admitted to committing fraud and bribery while operating in Libya. Governmental ethics officials confirmed in 2019 that Trudeau’s interference in the investigation amounted to a serious ethics violation. Actions like this have harmed Canada’s reputation around the world, with polling data showing that 41% of Canadians believe that the country’s international standing is poorer than it was ten years ago.

So, what can be done to reverse the decline in Canada’s international fortunes? From everything already discussed, it’s clear that if Canada continues to pursue a seat on the UN Security Council, reengagement is required. Partly, this means greater commitments to peacekeeping missions and to combating climate change. Though most importantly, it means following through on promises. At present, the foreign policy commitments made by the Trudeau Ministry remain largely unfulfilled. If the Canadian government wishes to be taken seriously, then it needs to start following through on its pledges. Once Canadian politicians understand this, they can start to repair the damage and return the country’s standing to the more respectable position it once enjoyed. It was the late Pierre Trudeau, former prime minister and father of the incumbent who in the pursuit for international peace, earned the praise of John Lennon and became the first western leader to recognise the People’s Republic of China. The elder Trudeau charted an independent, successful course for Canadian foreign policy, perhaps the younger can still do so as well.

Jack Cross is currently pursuing a masters in the History of War in the War Studies Department at King’s College London. His main research interests are diplomatic history, the role of great and middle powers within current international politics, as well as the politics of the Balkans and Middle East.

Strife Feature - Trudeau’s First Year: The Fundamental Shifts in Canadian Foreign Policy

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By: Marc-Olivier Cantin

President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau review the troops. (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy)

‘We’re back!’ It was with this unequivocal assertion that, in his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reclaimed Canada’s seat at the international table, hinting at the fundamental foreign policy overhauls he intended to implement. Indeed, a year has passed since Trudeau settled in Ottawa and it appears that the lines of fracture are manifold between the genuinely Westphalian conception of the world of former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau’s uninhibited internationalism. Over the last twelve months, under the leadership of the new prodigy of world politics, the legacy of the Conservatives’ intergovernmental and hard-power oriented foreign policy has dramatically withered in favour of a truly transnational approach. In this context, this article endeavours to underscore the chief manifestations of these foreign policy shifts and to shed a light on their implications for the international landscape.

The revamping of Canada’s international agenda has been ubiquitously observable in the country’s most recent global endeavours. The shift that is perhaps the most evident is the reaffirmation of Canada’s commitment to multilateralism. Stephen Harper, in his decade-long reign at 24 Sussex Drive, fostered a sincere repugnance for international rostrums, favouring bilateral channels over what he perceived as ineffective and corrupted platforms. By contrast, Trudeau appears to lean closer to the promise of transnational organisations and has repeatedly reasserted Canada’s adherence to the core values of such organisations, particularly the United Nations and NATO.

This reengagement was evident in Trudeau’s first NATO summit where he pledged that Canada would assemble and lead the organisation’s new battalions. These will be stationed in the Baltic countries and in eastern Poland to deter the exponential boldness of Russian interventionism in the region. This renewed commitment to multilateralism is equally apparent in Canada’s utilisation of the UN as the paramount catalyst for its international aspirations. Concurrently, Trudeau’s administration has undertaken significant diplomatic efforts over the past year to acquire one of the rotating seat on the Security Council in 2020, a bet that could improve the clout of the country’s international voice and that would simultaneously provide a potent source of political leverage for this middle power that can struggle in translating its wishes into deeds.

Irrefutably, the Liberals aim to foster a truly pivotal role for Canada within these organisations. This trend reflects a sharp contrast to the traditional scepticism towards the prospects of multilateralism from the former Conservative-led government. With this aim in mind, Ottawa has been overhauling the hierarchy of its international priorities while simultaneously rethinking its strategic approaches. Indeed, Trudeau has been prioritising “low politics” and “soft power” in attempting to realign the country’s actions to its actual political, economic and military capabilities. Canada has, for example, renewed focus on its traditional areas of expertise including increased emphases on human rights, environment, promotion of equality, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid. Such issues are more compatible, in Trudeau’s mind, to the inherent identity of Canada’s progressivism.

Comparatively, Stephen Harper adhered significantly more to the potentialities of “hard power” and increasingly turned his back on Canada’s traditional prudent on the world stage to bet on a more muscular foreign policy posture. After a year in office, Trudeau appears to be opting for persuasion rather than for coercion and has abandoned Harper’s “boots on the ground” strategy to embrace an approach focusing on peace keeping. This fundamental shift was evident in the recent launch of the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOS), in which Canada pledged $450 million CAD and more than 600 soldiers to promote peace building and stability worldwide. This new programme is a clear manifestation of Trudeau’s desire to “address the causes and the effects of conflicts, to prevent their escalation or recurrence and to work on early warnings, prevention, dialogue and mediation (Government of Canada, 2016)” rather than to rely on mere military deterrence. Hence, by committing to train, assist and advise their allies around the world instead of fighting alongside them on the battlefield, Trudeau and his Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion are betting on Canada’s operational expertise and are capitalising on its reputation as a Blue Helmets pioneer to enhance the international visibility of Canada as a whole.

US Secretary Kerry and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau toasting to the US-Canada relationship on March 10th, 2016.

Canada’s Emerging Security Role

This new perspective on Canada’s role in global security is also manifest in the way Trudeau grounded its planes in Iraq to prioritize the training and equipping of regional forces. It is also found in peacekeeping training programs implemented in key West African states such as Senegal, Ghana and Mali. Additionally, the central role Canada plays in the actual refugee crisis similarly highlights Trudeau’s reliance on alternative means of influence enhancement in his attempt to bolster the country’s international credentials.

Indeed, by pledging to welcome more than 25,000 refugees in the first few months of his mandate, Trudeau aimed at positioning Canada in the foreground of the world’s most critical issues. Thus, Justin Trudeau seems to be disavowing the compartmentalized approach of his predecessor by opting instead for an integrated approach that combines foreign policy, defence, development and national security in one converging international direction. Moreover, in terms of a commitment to humanitarian assistance, the Trudeau administration appears to be diametrically opposed to its Conservative forerunners as Harper was known to be rather parsimonious in his approach to foreign aid while the current government is indubitably untying the purse’s strings. Ottawa will be spending $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance over the next three years, supporting programs such as emergency relief, health and sanitary operations, educational programs and infrastructure schemes. In this instance as well, this renewed commitment to humanitarian principles underscores Trudeau’s soft power-oriented foreign policy and his quest to seduce to world rather than to compel it. Thereby, restoration of Canada’s reputation as a principled and compassionate actor in world politics is undoubtedly a key priority of the Canadian PM.

Furthermore, the new Liberal government appears to be utilising commerce as a power leverage to further the country’s credibility and to revamp its international “brand”. However, in comparison to the former administration, the difference is one of kind not of degree since the reliance on international trade isn’t significantly different in quantitative terms between both eras of Canadian foreign policy. Yet, while Stephen Harper largely favoured bilateral channels and intergovernmental agreements, Justin Trudeau is undeniably privileging larger multinational covenants. Particularly exemplified by his commitment towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Trudeau’s new trade policy appears to be an attempt to fortify relationships with key partners around the world and to showcase Canadian leadership in negotiations of vital importance.

As a patent manifestation of the fraternal relationship and the ideological overlaps that have developed between Justin Trudeau and U.S. President Barack Obama, the Canadian PM also seems to be mirroring the United States’ “pivot to Asia” initiated by his American counterpart. Indeed, since the November 2015 elections, the commercial focus of Ottawa has largely shifted towards Asia-Pacific, a region that will be incrementally interested in Canadian natural-resources. This reorientation is particularly conspicuous in regards to China since, after just a few days in office, Trudeau sought to put Canada’s relationship with the country on sounder footing. In comparison, the Conservatives were relying substantially more on European states and on its North American partners inside NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement) when it came to doing business outside Canada’s borders. Therefore, it is the nature and the regional focus of their international trade policy that differentiate Trudeau and Harper.

Finally, another fundamental shift in regards to the way Justin Trudeau conducts his foreign policy is the considerable thawing of Canada’s relationships with both Russia and Iran. Indeed, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ties between the two countries were severely damaged and tensions reached a critical apex. Similarly, the nuclear uncertainty surrounding Iran in Harper’s years in office dramatically impaired the diplomatic channels between both nations. Reflected through the closure of Canada’s Teheran embassy in the fall of 2012. Conversely, Trudeau capitalized on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, i.e. Iran Nuclear Deal) that reinstated Iran as an acceptable interlocutor, and on the growing influence of Russia in global issues such as the Syrian War, to normalise the relations with both countries.

If one can criticize the moral malleability of these partnership choices, the Trudeau administration appears to be thawing these relationships though a rational mind frame, being conscious of the inescapable necessity of cooperating with these exponentially influential actors and of the potential to further Canada’s national interests through them. Regarding Iran, this reconciliation was embodied by Ottawa’s decision to entirely lift the economic sanctions and trade embargo that, for many years, poisoned the bilateral relations between the two countries. Additionally, this decision might also pave the way towards an eventual improvement of their political, diplomatic and military cooperation. As for Russia, Trudeau’s appeasement policy towards the Kremlin appears to be propelled by more pragmatic incentives since both countries are compelled to cooperate in a vast array of issues including the fight against Daesh and the management of the Arctic. Hence, the thawing of the Russo-Canadian relationship is significantly more attributable to a rationalized understanding of their shared interests than a genuinely symbiotic perception of world affairs.

President-Elect Donald J. Trump during his election campaign in Arizona.

THE ‘TRUMP’ EFFECT

Certainly, the arrival of the White House’s new tenant in January 2017 will have meaningful implications for the implementation of these new foreign policy commitments. The international agenda which President-elect Donald J. Trump seemingly intends to institute is, in many regards, an antithesis of the one favoured by Trudeau. Under such circumstances, should Trump advance with his electoral promises of isolationism, the prospects of multilateralism will likely become increasingly appealing to the Canadian administration. America’s potential negligence towards the issue generates incentive for the Canadian administration to collaborate with alternative partners from the European Union, forming multilateral relationships to compensate for a weakening privilege originally shared with its southern neighbour. Hence, by engaging on the path to political seclusion, the Trump administration would inadvertently promote Canadian commitment to multilateralism and to establish more international anchorages to substitute its faltering American support.

This tendency might also materialize in terms of security if the United States develops an autarkic strategy and treat NATO with contemptuousness. In this scenario, Canada could benefit from an eventual leadership vacuum within the military alliance and becoming an indispensable pole of strategic influence on the American continent. Trudeau might be obliged to rely, politically as well as militarily, on alternative partners and allies to respond to the waning of the American support – further solidifying the need for broader Canadian-International partnerships.

As for the economic landscape, the professed isolationism and protectionism of the Trump administration might also benefit Canada insofar as the country might become a landing strip for eventual investors eager to have a foothold in North America. This consideration will be particularly true for the European Union, which has just signed a free trade agreement (Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement; CETA) with Canada. Within this context, Trudeau’s commercial shift towards the EU and the Asia-Pacific region will most likely be amplified since Donald Trump has been rather vocal about his disdain for the NAFTA agreement and about his intention to refocus on American domestic economy rather than on international commerce. These trends will undeniably consolidate Trudeau’s reliance on commerce and on alternative sources of influence to counteract the potentiality of an increasingly unreliable America. It thus seems evident that the Trump presidency will present both opportunities and challenges for Canada in the upcoming years, despite the numerous uncertainties it implies.

The Long Road Ahead

Ultimately, the fundamental shifts in Canadian foreign policy are tangible and are showcasing the evolving international trajectory that Justin Trudeau has set out for the country. Certainly, this new approach will have genuine implications for the world in the next few years, as Canada might become a vital ally in the safeguarding the values that are under threat by the current proliferation of far-right movements, religious fundamentalism and populist politics. Essentially, as Trudeau prophesied in his inaugural speech, these changes mean that Canada is back, back to its historical roots as a principled and progressive actor in international politics, back as a pacifist and moderate player in global issues, and back as a nation opened to the world.

 

 

About the Author:

Marc-Olivier Cantin is a postgraduate student in International Relations at King’s College London. He focuses on Canadian foreign policy, Middle Eastern affairs and security matters.

 

 

 

AUSTIN, I. (2012). “Canada Closes Tehran Embassy and Orders Iran Envoys to Leave”. The New-York Times. September 7th 2012. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/world/middleeast/canada-closes-its-embassy-in-iran.html. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

BBC. (2016). “TPP: What is it and why does it matter?”. BBC. July 27th 2016. URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32498715. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. (2015). “The Peace and Stabilization Operations Program”. Government of Canada. 2015. URL: http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/world_issues-enjeux-mondiaux/psop.aspx?lang=eng. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. (2016). “Canada to Support Peace Operations”. Government of Canada. 2016. URL: http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1117209. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

LEBLANC, D., ZILIO, M. and STONE L. (2016). “Canada’s Changing Role in the Fights Against the Islamic State”. The Globe and Mail. July 20th 2016. URL: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/canadas-changing-role-in-the-fight-against-islamicstate/article28659664/. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

STANDISH, R. (2016). “Can Justin Trudeau Use the U.N. to Rebrand Canadian Foreign Policy?”. Foreign Policy. September 2016. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/20/can-justin-trudeau-use-the-u-n-to-rebrand-canadian-foreign-policy-unga-obama/. Consulted on October 16th 2016.

THE GUARDIAN. (2016). “Canada meets target to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees”. The Guardian. March 1st 2016. URL : https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/01/canada-target-resettle-25000-syrian-refugees. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

THE GUARDIAN. (2016). “EU and Canada sign CETA free trade deal”. The Guardian. October 30th 2016. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/30/eu-canada-sign-ceta-free-trade-deal-trudeau-juncker. Consulted on November 3rd 2016.

Image 1 Source: https://medium.com/@WhiteHouse/in-photos-the-official-canadian-state-visit-94db196bedc8#.7kqrem8j9; (Accessed: 10 March 2016)

Image 2 Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Secretary_Kerry_and_Canadian_Prime_Minister_Trudeau_Raise_a_Toast_to_the_U.S.-Canada_Relationship_at_a_State_Luncheon_(25680800665).jpg; (Accessed 15 November 2016)

Image 3 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump_presidential_campaign,_2016#/media/File:Donald_Trump_(27150683144).jpg; (Accessed 12 August 2016)

*An earlier variant of Marc’s article can be found on Global Policy Journal: http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/19/10/2016/year-under-trudeau-fundamental-shifts-canadian-foreign-policy

Canada Needs to Rethink Foreign Policy: Peacekeeping isn’t the Answer

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By: Zachary Wolfraim

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/Canadian_Army_Brig._Gen._Dave_Corbould,_center_left,_the_deputy_commanding_general_of_Coalition_Effects_and_Transitions,_Combined_Joint_Task_Force_101,_Regional_Command_East,_talks_with_an_Afghan_National_Army_130523-A-XM609-063.jpg
Brigadier General Dave Corbould meets with Afghan National Army personnel.

The election of Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party on 19 October marks the end of a decade of Prime Minister Harper’s dominance in Ottawa. After a grueling 78-day campaign, voters convincingly rejected the Harper government and put a majority Liberal government in place for the first time in 15 years. This campaign has largely been a referendum on Harper’s leadership and one of the areas that has evinced the most visceral reaction from his opponents has been in foreign policy.

Both the left-wing Liberal and NDP parties, when discussing foreign policy, were more than willing to (rightly) point to Canada’s diminishing role in the world. Prime Minister Harper and his supporters have been quick to state that their foreign policy has been more forceful in defending Canadian interests internationally and has intentionally steered away from previous government’s ‘fence-sitting’ and moral equivocation. Nonetheless, it is hard to dispute that on the foreign policy file, while Canada has remained an active member of the international community, its diplomatic initiatives have been wanting.

In discussing foreign policy, both Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau and NDP leader Thomas Mulcair stated that Canada needs to reprioritize peacekeeping as a vital component. This is a mistake. The mythological Pearsonian peacekeeping tradition to which they are referring, died with the Cold War. Trying to apply its tenets to the current international environment would invariably fail. That said, this presents an interesting opportunity for whoever forms the next government to start thinking seriously about foreign policy.

The current international environment is, to put it lightly, a mess. With a retrenched United States, rising China, revanchist Russia, and a refugee crisis in Europe spurred by instability through the Middle East it is hard to see where exactly a peacekeeping force would offer added value. A military commitment to NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe and participation in coalition operations in Iraq and Syria give Canada international visibility, however, this doesn’t necessarily translate into influence. Utilising hard power as the key means to promote Canada’s interests and values internationally is neither sustainable nor feasible.

While Canada’s military has had over a decade as the go-to tool by which to implement Canadian foreign policy aims, it requires significant investment and strengthening. A long decade of action in Afghanistan combined with a high tempo of operations means that the military needs revitalisation. Similarly, a reinvigoration of the diplomatic service and a re-examination of Canada’s foreign aid programs would offer a more robust and holistic approach to foreign policy priorities. This is an opportunity by which Canada can not only rebuild its diplomatic reflexes but also seriously re-engage with the international forums such as the UN and NATO which act as force multipliers. Indeed, there is a risk for Canada that as a comparatively small country (population-wise), it can have difficulty making its voice heard amidst the international chaos. Offering a constructive presence in these forums is a way by which Canada builds international influence and enables it to punch above its weight.

In doing so, this makes Canada’s opinion consequential again. One of the key criticisms of Harper’s foreign policy was that it represented bullhorn diplomacy – this is our position, take it or leave it. Supporters of this style of foreign policy suggest that this means Canada gets taken seriously, but in reality, it generally means that Canada is left shouting from the margins. Treating diplomacy like any other type of negotiation is a misjudgment at best, particularly given that the consequences of failing to negotiate effectively can be catastrophic. Moreover, by throwing the military at every major international security issue, it automatically escalates both Canada’s commitment by risking Canadian lives and military assets in a way that diplomatic initiatives tend not to, but also raises the likelihood of deeper military involvement.

Invoking a role as international peacekeeper has become the solution of choice for countries that want to remain internationally engaged while limiting their investment in the military. The UK is already going down this route as Minister of Defence Michael Fallon indicated recently, he intends to commit the UK’s stretched defense capabilities to future peacekeeping missions. However, this should not be seen as a sustainable avenue to pursue a foreign policy agenda in the current international environment, particularly given that there is currently very little peace to keep. Unless a commitment to peacekeeping is coupled with a commitment to streamline the UN’s capabilities and also has the support of other Security Council members, it is unlikely to offer a serious method by which to assert security policy.

Ultimately, it needs to be remembered that in many ways, the international system is pay-to-play and underinvestment usually reaps diminished influence. Canada’s incoming Liberal government will need to do more than re-hash ‘traditional’ foreign policy roles but instead decide what Canada’s international priorities are going to be and how it will achieve them over the next four years. It will be a serious undertaking to recalibrate Canadian foreign policy after years of neglecting both military and diplomatic capabilities, particularly while also tackling the ambitious domestic agenda that the Liberal party articulated during the campaign. Given that it has been a decade since Canada’s last foreign policy review it may be time to revisit what its key foreign policy priorities should be heading forward.

Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he focuses on the role of narratives in shaping foreign policy in relation to NATO operations. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. You can follow him at @Zachwol.