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Deadly Dynamics: Crime and the Coronavirus in Latin America

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by Leah Grace

Security forces around the world have taken on new duties amid the crisis of the coronavirus pandemic (Image credit: Gerd Altmann/Pixabay)

 

The COVID-19 pandemic not only represents a global public health crisis but has also created serious political and security challenges. In Latin America, legal and illicit economies alike have been hit hard by a massive slowdown in global production and consumption, leaving most organised crime groups unusually vulnerable and exposed. These conditions offer opportunities for governments to deal a considerable blow to these criminal networks that wield enormous amounts of power in their territories. Examples include the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) in Mexico, the Columbian guerilla group the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Barrio 18 street gang, which operates throughout Central America. However, evidence from the region shows that criminal are rapidly adapting to the challenges of the pandemic and are in fact taking advantage of the overwhelmed state authorities to consolidate their power.

As the lockdown of several national economies brings businesses to a halt and threatens the livelihoods of billions of employees, it also has significant repercussions for transnational drug trade and other illicit flows. Drug cartels across Latin America have seen their access to major markets and supply chains curbed by border closures and the shutdown of transatlantic travel. A reliance on imported chemicals from China has negatively impacted the production of fentanyl and methamphetamine in Mexico. In Colombia, narcotraffickers are struggling to transport their cocaine supply to European markets due to a grounding of air traffic. In countries such as Nicaragua, where many people live from day to day, selling drugs locally has also become a challenge as local populations can no longer afford to buy the commodity.

In Europe and the United States, drug shortages at street level caused by both the disruption of supply and transportation chains and the imposition of national lockdown measures, which forced sellers and consumers to remain indoors, has led to a sharp increase in prices. As drug-dealers demonstrate their adaptability by adopting unorthodox strategies, such as delivering drugs in takeaway orders, they reap the rewards of these price inflations. In the long-term, however, restrictions on mobility and the continued closure of entertainment and hospitality venues are likely to deal a significant blow to drug markets.

As local businesses close, criminal groups face challenges in collecting their routine extortion payments. Some Central American gangs, such as the Barrio 18 Revolucionarios in San Salvador, have announced that they will waive extortion payments from informal vendors due to the massive decrease in earnings caused by lockdown measures. Others, however, have been less understanding. Mexican and Guatemalan cartels continue to harass and intimidate local businesses despite the pandemic. Since extortion constitutes the main important source of income for many criminal groups and street gangs, it is likely that even the more lenient ones will resort to increasingly violent measures to collect their fees.

Lockdowns and border closures have also created new illicit business opportunities. The closing of borders on key migration routes has increased the demand for human smuggling services – and their profitability. Before the most recent border closure on March 14 due to Covid-19, over 50,000 Venezuelans legally crossed into Colombia each day. Now, people rely solely on illegal border crossings (trochas), controlled by criminal groups such as Los Rastrojos, who charge fees for use of the route. In Central America, the sealing of borders has forced migrants to depend even more heavily on smugglers, who have seized the opportunity to charge $200 dollars per person for “safe” passage from El Salvador and Honduras to Guatemala.

Violence and insecurity

Lockdown measures have led to a general reduction in street crime and robbery as criminals become more conspicuous and their targets more scarce. El Salvador, the country with the highest homicide rate in the world, reported two days without murders immediately following the imposition of obligatory quarantine measures.

However, violence has intensified in many other countries due to the diversion of armed security forces to pandemic-related issues. Data from Brazil suggests an increase in lethal crime and homicide during the lockdown as gangs and other criminal groups continue to engage in turf wars and violent confrontations. In Colombia, both departments on the Pacific coast and frontier regions with Venezuela, an area with a long history of state absence and illegal activity by armed groups, have witnessed violent clashes between criminal gangs and the guerilla group ELN. Targeted civilian murders have also increased in the country. In the week that cities introduced quarantine measures, three community leaders were killed. Fellow activists cited the disruption to normal security protocols as putting social leaders, often targeted due to their work against lucrative illegal businesses, in positions of heightened vulnerability.

The pandemic’s dominance in minds and media across the world has also provided cover for crime groups to act with impunity, consolidating their power as they do so. Militia groups in Rio de Janeiro, who count former police officers as members and enjoy the support of some local politicians, have seized upon this distraction to increase their political influence in the city.

Criminal governance

The current pandemic is exacerbating socioeconomic stresses. As frustrations and fear grow, ineffective government responses are likely to erode trust in state institutions. Non-state actors are already stepping up to fill the gaps of state presence and provision. As Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, continues to play down the severity of the pandemic, drug-dealing gangs in some of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas have imposed their own curfews and hygiene measures to help combat the spread of the virus in the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of the slums. Such forms of informal criminal governance are likely to benefit the gangs by securing their power and legitimacy in local communities.

In El Salvador, cells of the Barrio 18 gang wielded their influence over local populations first to defy and then to enforce government lockdown orders. Initially, they ensured that markets in the capital city continued to operate, as these are a vital source of livelihood for many Salvadorans and provide a constant flow of extortion payments. They later changed tactics and began enforcing lockdown measures at gunpoint.

In San Luis Potosí and Tamaulipas, Mexico, the CJNG and Golfo cartels handed out food parcels to communities in boxes emblazoned with their groups’ insignia. Such deliveries are both a means to gain support from local populations and a challenge to local gangs, especially when made in disputed territories or in areas outside normal zones of operation.

A golden opportunity?

Criminal non-state armed groups across Latin America have demonstrated their influence, adaptability, and resilience in the face of COVID-19. However, even they are not immune to the impact of the pandemic, which will continue to hinder their business opportunities and restrict their ability to work undetected. Now is the time for governments to strike in a regionally coordinated effort to take out organised crime networks whilst they are at their most vulnerable. Missing such an opportunity could further bolster the power of these groups and limited the capacity of the state to deal with the region’s already severe problem of organised crime in the future.

However, the exploitation of security gaps by Latin American criminal organisation due to the diversion of resources and attention to the global health crisis may prove too much for overwhelmed states. Criminal networks are likely to bounce back from the current crisis, possibly with strengthened support bases and additional areas under their control.

Leah is an MA student in Conflict, Security and Development at the King’s War Studies Department. Her main research interests include war-to-peace transitions, organised crime, and urban violence. She primarily works on conflict-affected countries in Latin America and Central Africa.

For Latin America, Enough is Enough

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by Leah Grace

Protesters in Plaza Baquedano, Santiago, Chile on 22 October 2019. (Photo Credit: Carlos Figueroa)

A wave of anti-government protests is sweeping across the globe. From Hong Kong to Lebanon, France to Iraq, Pakistan to Haiti, people have taken to the streets en masse to express a wide array of frustrations and demands. Nowhere, perhaps, has this discontent been more acute than in Latin America where, over the past six months, mass demonstrations have erupted throughout the region, leaving political chaos, social upheaval and countless human casualties in their wake.

These dramatic outbursts have garnered international attention, with many struggling to comprehend, for example, how a four percent rise in metro fare in Chile could spark months of protest with millions of participants. Yet, what we are witnessing today is not new. Rather, it is the boiling over of economic, political and social discontent that has been bubbling furiously beneath the surface for many years.

The final straw

The initial causes of protests in Haiti, Honduras, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia are remarkably varied. They include the removal of fuel subsidies, minor increases to transport costs, corruption scandals, alleged electoral fraud, and inadequate labour rights. These issues served to push societies already on the brink over the edge. The subsequent social explosions shattered the veneer of many apparently functioning and stable countries, revealing deeply polarised and unequal societies.

In Chile and Ecuador, anger over relatively minor increases in transport and fuel costs became a catalyst for wider protests regarding social and economic inequalities and indigenous rights. In Colombia, a planned strike by labour unions ballooned into a much wider movement against the right-wing government of President Iván Duque. Among other complaints, protesters denounced the indifference, and in some cases alleged complicity, of the state regarding the murders of 727 social leaders and 173 demobilised fighters in the past three years.

In Bolivia, long-standing tensions finally reached breaking point this October. The fourteen-year rule of socialist leader Evo Morales, the country’s first indigenous president, came to a bitter and violent end when the president claimed victory in highly dubious elections to maintain power for a fourth term. The ensuing clashes between Morales supporters and opponents revealed a highly fragmented Bolivian society. Morales supporters condemn his removal as a coup and fear the reversal of his social policies that benefited the poor and indigenous. His opponents celebrate the same events as the restoration of democracy. With both sides resisting compromise, divisions are likely to deepen, and the immediate future of Bolivia seems highly uncertain and volatile.

Us against them

Repressive official responses to the social unrest have fuelled further protests and exacerbated public anger across Latin America. Chilean president Sebastián Piñera announced that “we are at war against a powerful enemy” after the first day of protests in Santiago. As in Ecuador and Colombia, the government deployed the army to the streets and imposed curfews in major cities. The use of excessive force to contain protests demonstrates the failure of governments to engage with their populations to address the underlying causes of social unrest.

Human Rights Watch found compelling evidence that police in Chile committed serious human rights violations in response to protests. At least 26 people have died since the outbreak of protests on 18 October 2019, including three protesters allegedly fatally shot by military forces using live ammunition. A call for police reforms has been added to the list of protestors’ demands. In Colombia, an eighteen-year-old student died after being shot in the head by a police projectile whilst participating in a peaceful protest. This sparked calls for the dismantling of the country’s riot police and widespread condemnation of state-sanctioned violence.

With protests persisting in both countries, heavy-handed tactics and superficial solutions will only exacerbate problems in the long-term. Initial government responses have served only to heighten the perceived division between the political elite and the rest of society. Like many countries in the region, both Chile and Colombia have troubled and violent histories. Governments must do their utmost to build more trusting and constructive relationships with citizens instead of invoking legacies of repressive authoritarian rule and brutal armed conflict. State security crackdowns seem to be a knee jerk response to popular unrest, but they are only adding fuel to the fire of Latin American discontent.

What’s next?

The recent social unrest comes at a high cost. Thousands of people have been injured and hundreds have died across the region. The destruction of infrastructure and disruption to business have severely damaged already fragile economies. People’s daily lives are on hold as schools close, workers go on strike, and streets clog with marchers. But these mobilisations also offer the prospect of dialogue and real change. Despite the diverse reasons for global protest movements, there is a powerful sense of solidarity amongst demonstrators across countries, facilitated by the mass diffusion of images and interviews on social media. People have felt ignored by politicians for too long. On the streets, at last, they are beginning to regain their voices.

The longer-term outcomes of these social movements are uncertain. Protestors’ demands will not be satisfied overnight, but it is also unlikely that they will simply give up in frustration. The scale and persistence of the mobilisations require engaged and committed responses from those in power. The global protest movement may be explained in part as a chain reaction, with one country after another toppling over into mass social unrest. However, this should not obscure the specific demands of protesters in each country, and thus the different pathways to regain stability.

In Bolivia, perhaps the most volatile situation, measured responses and compromise from both sides are crucial if further violence is to be avoided. The interim government’s priority must be the facilitation of credible and inclusive elections within the next three months. In Ecuador, the government should work with social and indigenous leaders, not against them, to reduce discontent. In Chile and Colombia, political leaders must take seriously the demands of their people and implement significant political, economic and social reforms. The immediate future remains uncertain for Latin American countries, but if governments opt for superficial, short-term solutions to paper over discontent, or resort to repressive force, we will undoubtedly see renewed and intensified social explosions in the not-so-distant future.

Leah Grace is an MA student in Conflict, Security and Development at the King’s War Studies Department. Her main research interests include war-to-peace transitions, local participation in peace processes, and urban violence. She primarily works on conflict-affected countries in Latin America and Central Africa. Prior to joining King’s, she worked as a research assistant at the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation in Colombia where she worked on projects relating to the reintegration of former combatants and the impacts of stigmatisation on this process. She also coordinated several community projects with a local NGO focused on violence prevention and the promotion of human rights. Leah Grace holds a BA in French and Spanish from the University of Cambridge.