Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for missile

missile

Japan’s Role in the North Korean crisis will remain a marginal one

by

By Andrea Fischetti

A North Korean Hwasong-12 missile, the model fired on August 29th (Credit: KCNA)

 

The latest missile test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 15 was the second in a row to directly involve Japan. The Korean intermediate range missile flew over the land of the rising sun for the second time in two weeks, and these tests undoubtedly pose a new challenge to Japan’s institutional pacifism, reawakening the debate on whether Japan needs to possess offensive military capabilities. However, Japan’s role in the North Korean crisis remains limited, and the country is not likely to become a key actor alongside the U.S. and South Korea in tackling the regime of the Kim dinasty.

In the early morning of August 29, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a ballistic missile: Pyongyang’s fourth test in four days (Held, 2017). The country has tested more than fifteen missiles since February (USPACOM, 2017), and their effectiveness gradually improved, a sign that its current weapons program will not stop until it reaches its goal. North Korea’s ultimate objective, is considered to be a nuclear warhead-topped missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Such a weapon would secure the position of the Kim dynasty, as Pyongyang believes it would deter the U.S. from interfering in the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK conducted a further test on September 15, which flew once again over Japanese territories.

The August 29 test was the first to involve a missile going over Japan without being announced or preceded by any warning. The intermediate-range ballistic missile Hwasong-12, known as NK-17, was fired over Japan’s territory, specifically the northern island of Hokkaido. Residents were given a short-notice warning inviting them to take cover, and the missile flew in Japanese airspace for almost two minutes. The act was condemned by the US and its allies, including Japan and South Korea; while China stated that the North Korean situation had reached a “tipping point”. Pyongyang’s latest missile launch seemed to affect Japan more than any other country, as it passed over Japanese territory.

Nonetheless, the North Korean tensions are far more threatening for other countries than for Japan, and Tokyo’s role in this situation remains only a marginal one compared to that of the U.S. or South Korea. As reporter Kjeld Duits pointed out, since 1998, North Korea’s tests violated Japan’s EEZ and airspace many times, three of which during the last two months. Pyongyang’s declared ambition, however, is that of being able to hit U.S. territories. In fact, the NK-17 that travelled over Hokkaido broke up more than 1180 Kilometres from Japan’s mainland, suggesting that the country never was an objective in the first place. The missile’s range has been estimated to be 4000 Kilometres, which potentially makes Guam – and its American military base – a realistic objective. Furthermore, North Korea has a number of short-range capabilities which can cause significant damage to nearby potential targets such as Seoul in South Korea. Arguably, that is the biggest threat that North Korea poses in the short term, and the reason why the U.S. must be careful in dealing with Pyongyang.

Accordingly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered a show of “overwhelming force” (Crabtree and Kemp, 2017) against North Korea, involving the dropping of bombs near the Northern border and joint drills of four South Korean F-15 fighter jets with four American F-35 stealth fighter jets and two B-1B American bombers, while U.S. President Donald Trump declared that “talking is not the answer”.

On the other hand, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe does not have the same freedom of operation. Firstly, although Japan has excellent missile defence systems, taking down high-altitude missiles fired from North Korea to territories beyond Japan – such as Guam – is legally challenging, and it would raise many questions about Japan’s stance on the use of military force for non-defensive purposes. This is due to Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, especially considering that Japan is not the target of the DPRK’s tests. Secondly, and more importantly, even considering the effectiveness of the modern Air Defence System MIM-104F (PAC-3) acquired by Japan, there would be technical challenges in shooting down Pyongyang’s missiles, as the system is designed to counter inbound offensive missiles at lower altitudes, instead of hitting the bottom part of the missile by chasing it at higher altitudes. In other words, for Japan it would be easier to shoot down a missile that is actually targeting Japan rather than one that is only flying over its territories.

Two days after Pyongyang’s test, Japan’s Defence Ministry requested a budget increase for 2018 (Pollmann, 2017) which would include enough funds for further developing its radar system and acquiring weapons capable of shooting down high-altitude missiles. The North Korea tensions, including the launch of a NK-17 over Hokkaido, come at a time when Prime Minister Abe’s approval rating is decreasing. Also, his plan to amend the Japanese Constitution, in particular its Article 9 which prevents Japan from possessing offensive military capabilities, is far from guaranteed to succeed. In order to meet popular demands of a country with strong anti-militaristic norms (Berger 1993; 1998) and which is more concerned with achieving peace and prosperity than security objectives, Abe’s rhetoric has been focusing on Japan’s role as a ‘proactive contributor to peace’. Whether this role involves shooting down North Korean missiles for non-defensive purposes, however, is unclear.

The decision to expand the country’s military budget and potentially have a more proactive role in Northeast Asian security could be partly justified by Pyongyang’s moves, in the eyes of the Japanese population, due to the perceived threat to Japan’s security. However, while Japan is involved in the North Korean crisis for geopolitical reasons, it is not Pyongyang’s main concern. Similarly, Abe is capitalising on the increasingly frequent North Korean tests to justify the need of stronger military capabilities, but increasing Japan’s involvement in this situation is not his ultimate goal. The challenge that Abe is facing is achieving a balance between rhetoric and moderate actions compatible with Japan’s current Constitution and the public opinion’s will.

While Japan’s public opinion has a negative view of North Korea, and this missile launch could influence the debate on Constitutional amendments, Japan’s public is ultimately more likely to support pacifist approaches to resolving this issue, and an overemphasis of the North Korean threat could end up being counterproductive for Abe’s goals. Kim Jong-Un’s behaviour seemed unaffected by the rhetoric of the U.S. and South Korea, their shows of force, and the UN sanctions; therefore, even by stepping up as a more central actor in the North Korea tensions, Japan would not be able change this trend.

In conclusion, Japan will keep honouring its alliance with the U.S., a country directly involved in the North Korea tensions. Abe will also attempt to emphasise the threat posed by Pyongyang for justifying his unpopular constitutional amendments. However, due to technical and legal constraints, it is unlikely that Japan’s role in this situation will significantly change in the short term.

Andrea Fischetti (@A_Fischetti) is an MA Candidate in War Studies at King’s College London specialising in East Asian Security and Japan. He recently earned a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies and worked for a year in the House of Commons. Andrea was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University and studied Japanese at SOAS and King’s College London. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

 

Notes:

Berger, T. U. (1993) ‘From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan’s culture of anti-militarism’. International Security 17(4): 119-50.

 

Berger, T. U. (1998) Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

Crabtree, J. and Kemp, T. (2017) ‘South Korean President Moon tells military to toughen up, orders show of ‘overwhelming’ force’. CNBC Defense.

 

Held, A. (2017) ”Restraint’ Appears To Be Over As North Korea Launches Missile Test Again’, NPR. Available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/26/546344429/restraint-appears-to-be-over-as-north-korea-launches-missile-test-again

 

Pollmann, M. (2017) ‘What’s in Japan’s Record 2018 Defense Budget Request?’ The Diplomat.

 

USPACOM (2017) North Korea Policy, US Pacific Command. Available at http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1310112/north-korea-policy/

War from the skies: The rise of US strategic airpower under Trump

by

By Hemant Shivakumar

The USA’s use of strategic airpower is helping gain political and military dividends for President Trump despite limitations around communicating intent and causing collateral damage.

A few weeks ago, the US military dropped a ten-ton Massive Ordinance Air Blast (MOAB) to purportedly take out ISIS-K militants operating close to the Pakistan border (in Nangarhar province) in Eastern Afghanistan. Employing a high-wattage munition against an asymmetrically weaker group signaled the Trump administration’s unprecedented, high-stakes approach towards tackling non-conventional forces. Analysts termed this as a key tactical shift in US counterterrorism operations. Moreover, far from former President Obama’s reluctance around missile strikes against the Syrian government, the US military’s use of Tomahawk missiles to destroy the Syrian government’s air bases – in response to the alleged use of chemical weapons by Assad in Khan Sheikhoun – underscored a new strategic temperament within the Trump administration. Similar to his predecessor, Trump has, so far at least, indisputably espoused airpower and aerial strikes as the principal method of applying military force by the USA.

As the administration’s unflinching confidence in airpower guides its military policy, the mixed signals it generates around US commitment and credibility is problematic. On the one hand, US air strikes on Syria risked escalation. On the other hand, Washington hardly communicated anything about the administration’s commitment to the region, leading a confused Russia and Iran to issue warnings against repeated attacks in the future. While deploying US marines to Raqqa in Syria implied US resolve, it conceded little latitude into Trump’s strategic goals over such an action. Interestingly, President Trump attested to delegating the tactical decision-making to his military chiefs - unlike his predecessor - generating further confusion about comprehending US goals and actions. Further, whether US’ tactical use of air munitions in Syria or Afghanistan deter countries like North Korea is moot, a point Trump also acknowledged. As countries struggle to assess the credibility and rationale of American actions, such ambiguity ties closely with airpower’s limitations around communicating intent. Despite such inhibitions, US preference for airpower is unlikely to be moderated.

This is because the US administration’s reliance on aerial platforms for counterterrorism and targeted strikes since 2012 has been exceptional, aided by Precision-Guided Weapons (PGWs). Given the increased reliance on PGWs, the number of sorties and strike rates are lower than those conducted during the Gulf War in 1991 and the campaigns against Serbia in 1998 and Afghanistan in 2001. According to US Air Force Lt. General Robert Otto, the increasing precision of air munitions has rendered such ‘dumb’ large-scale bombing unnecessary. Similarly, US Army Lt. General Mayville noted during initial coalition airstrikes against ISIS in 2014 that 96 percent of munitions used were precision-guided. Soon after the US military scaled down its active fighting presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration set up Special Forces (SOFs) teams for carrying out local training and operations and expanded the use of airstrikes. Under Operation Inherent Resolve, US SOF and coalition forces trained national armies in Iraq and used precision air strikes and drone attacks to guide their tactics. For instance, US SOF often carries out drone-based targeting of militants in western Mosul and in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan to achieve tactical goals. The Iraqi and the Afghan armies are currently assisted by superior US air intelligence capabilities as well – such as aerial reconnaissance, air surveillance; as well as signal intelligence that is supplemented with local human intelligence. As of early 2016, nearly 11,000 airmen were using Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) such as Reaper and Predator drones for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) operations. Such increasing range of US airpower against non-conventional forces represents a significant promotion – moving away engaging several ground forces to a high-octane airpower guiding local ops.

Moreover, strategic airpower is providing both political and military dividends for the new administration. The new administration’s missile strike on Syria ratcheted up US involvement in the conflict while attesting to broad Republican consensus around setting up safe zones in Syria. Republican senators John McCain and Jeff Flake agreed with Trump’s decisions to bomb Syria; while earlier in April 2017, Hillary Clinton had also admitted to the necessity of US military involvement in the conflict. Aerial bombing is also seen as a secure, inexpensive intervention tool by the American public as well. In a recent CBS-conducted poll, while 18 percent of Americans approved the use of US ground forces in Syria, 57 percent approved the use of limited airstrikes. President Obama’s drone warfare targeted specific militants using Hellfire missiles, while the precision-based and the technological advancements of delivery systems have expanded the range of air munitions such as MOAB or Hellfire missiles to achieve a wider variety of strategic goals such as denying terrain, bunker bombing, taking out mines, etc. In Iraq (Mosul) and in Afghanistan, remote drone attacks are helping the coalition forces gain key tactical positions against ISIS and thwart advances by the Taliban. Further, should the USA achieve a military victory against ISIS and the Taliban in the future, airpower would unarguably have been an enduring factor. There is little to broker any domestic or military opposition to such a hands-off, low-cost (in terms of American lives) strategy.

The US’ growing conviction in its airpower triumphs has also meant relying less on traditional military allies such as Pakistan to counter terror. Since the 2011 operation by US forces in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad to capture Osama Bin Laden, US aid commitments have stalled and the Trump administration has illustrated little interest (so far) in the relationship. On the other hand, multiple US administrations over the last sixteen years have scaled up? their level of defense commitments with India, much to Pakistan’s chagrin. Further, with the development of well-sized national armies and police in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US administration is more directly involved in working with local national governments and picking up homegrown intelligence to help with its operations. During his recent visit to Pakistan, the US National Security Adviser McMaster advised Pakistan to tackle terror in all its forms, reflecting assessments that Pakistan is an impediment to the US’ ongoing counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan.

Lastly, collateral damage and related mixed messaging due to airstrikes remain a concern. In Afghanistan and Syria, coalition airstrikes threaten to collapse the benefits accrued by ground-based counter-insurgency (COIN) forces over the preceding years. The inadvertent bombing of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) hospitals in Kunduz and in Aleppo, and the ensuing collateral damage reflect the limitations of airpower as a primary use of force. However, such setbacks seem to have no bearing on moderating the use of strategic airpower in the early days of the Trump administration.

Hemant Shivakumar is an MA student in the War Studies program and is the Managing Editor at StrifeBlog.

Notes:

[1] The ISIS-K (also ISIS Khurasan) is a faction of the militant Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Image credit: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-%E2%80%98the-mother-all-bombs%E2%80%99-means-trumps-foreign-policy-20180

Feature image credit: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-mother-of-all-bombs-moab-slated-to-be-used-against-iran/5333811

US Cruise Missile Strike in Syria and Implications for International Law

by

By Toby Fenton

A US guided-missile destroyer launches a Tomahawk cruise missile during NATO’s intervention in Libya, 2011. Image Credit: Wikicommons | U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jonathan Sunderman/Released

 

The US approach to Syria has entered a new phase. On 4 April, a suspected chemical attack [i] occurred in Khan Sheikhoun, a town in Syria’s Idlib province; more than 80 people have reportedly been killed, with many others suffering from related symptoms. According to the US, UK and NATO, Syrian fighter jets conducted a chemical weapons airstrike (scenario 1). According to Syria and Russia, Syrian fighter jets conducted a conventional weapons airstrike against a rebel-operated chemical weapons storage site, with the impact resulting in the dispersal of toxins (scenario 2). On 7 April 2017, two US Navy vessels in the Mediterranean launched 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase alleged to be the launch site for the suspected chemical attack. The missile strike reportedly killed at least 6 people and destroyed the facility. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law, and for many observers, and the US response was justified. Yet the US strike itself has serious implications.

The suspected chemical attack

While news reports convey the aftermath of the suspected chemical attack, it appears too early to conclusively say what happened. Open-source researchers have corroborated the likelihood of the first scenario; and a number of chemical weapons experts say that if the targeted building had housed chemical weapons — as the Syrians and Russians claim — these would have been obliterated, not released, by the airstrike. However, this first scenario is not without weaknesses. Pending further investigation, it remains possible that the targeted building was indeed a chemical weapons storage site, and that some toxins on-site might not have been entirely obliterated during an airstrike but could have instead been released and dispersed through the impact.

While the purpose here is not to analyse various hypotheses of the incident, there is currently an absence of strong material evidence that would allow for the conclusive dismissal of either of the above scenarios. This means there is a danger that the US decision to strike at this stage that may set a problematic precedent, i.e. the resort to force as a punitive measure requires a relatively low threshold of evidence. On the other hand, even if Syrian forces conducted a chemical attack, the US response itself is legally problematic.

The US cruise missile strike

The use of force by one state against another state is prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The two Charter exceptions to this is force that is a) authorised by the UN Security Council, and b) used in self-defence. Neither of these conditions was satisfied by the US cruise missile strike.

The Security Council did not authorise the use of force in Syria. The Security Council resolution drafted by the US, UK, and France following the suspected chemical attack did not call for military action and has not (yet) been put to a vote. Countries engaging in military intervention without explicit Security Council permission at the time have occasionally sought to justify their intervention by reference to one or more prior Security Council resolutions that explicitly or implicitly mandated future military force — for instance, if certain conditions remained unfulfilled or certain obligations were subsequently violated. However, previous resolutions on the Syrian conflict have not contained such a provision for the use of force [ii].

The conditions for the exercise of self-defence were also not met. In particular, one of the jus ad bellum conditions for self-defence is that the use of force be ‘necessary’, as determined by the ‘imminence’ of an attack. The US (including any US troops in Syria) was not attacked by Syria, nor is there any allegation that such an attack was either planned or imminent.

The US has not justified the cruise missile strike in legal terms but in terms of responding to an unacceptable act (the suspected chemical attack). The US (and the UK) have, however, emphasised that the strike was “limited” and “proportionate”, perhaps implying that it met the jus in bello principle of ‘proportionality’. However, if the use of force does not have Security Council authorisation and does not qualify as self-defence, the claimed proportionality of that force is insufficient to impute lawfulness. In other words, while the particular application of force — cruise missiles against the Syrian airbase — may have been proportional to the alleged need to destroy Syria’s means of conducting potential chemical weapons attacks, the initial resort to force per se likely remains unlawful.

The US missile strike does not appear to meet the criteria for a case of ‘illegal but legitimate’ military action à la Kosovo. The strike was conducted with “no apparent international support”, and President Trump’s statement following the strike framed it primarily in terms of advancing or protecting US national interests, rather than being spurred by humanitarian purposes.

Resolve or escalation?

The use of chemical weapons is a violation of international law, prohibited under several international agreements. By virtue of their relatively indiscriminate nature and dispersed effects, their use — particularly in a civilian-populated area — would likely constitute a de facto war crime and violation of the international humanitarian law. However, the Security Council retains exclusive competency to authorise military force in response; any unauthorised response by force is likely to be unlawful, regardless of the original illicitness of the use of chemical weapons.

Syria’s critical ally Russia has condemned the US missile strike as an act of aggression and a violation of international law. Moscow has suspended the Russia-US flight safety agreement that was intended to prevent mid-air collisions between Russian and US military aircraft over Syria. Moreover, it has pledged to reinforce Syria’s anti-aircraft defences. Even if the intent was to demonstrate resolve against a violation of international law in one sense, the US cruise missile strike on Syria may have violated and weakened it in another sense — while escalating an incredibly volatile situation.

Toby Fenton is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in International Peace & Security at King’s College London.

Notes:

[i] This terminology follows the BBC’s practice (at the time of writing), pending clarification of the incident.

[ii] Security Council Resolution 2249 (2015) called on Member States to “take all necessary measures” against ISIL/Da’esh (aka Islamic State), but did not actually authorise the use of force under Chapter VII on the UN Charter.

Feature Image credit: http://bit.ly/2oglOva