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The time has come to revoke Turkey’s NATO membership (but offer it a lifeline)

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By: Austin Luce

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Source: Wikimedia

The idea of removing Turkey from the ranks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would send shockwaves through the international community. Never before has the alliance ousted a member, as the need for unity, especially in the days where a war with the Soviet Union seemed like a real possibility, always superseded in importance the conduct and dissention among individual states. However, with the USSR relegated to the dust bin of history, and even though Russia is no longer the threat to the West it once was, the gross misconduct of Turkey has continued to go overlooked. However, last year’s incident in which Turkey shot down a Russian aircraft unprovoked underscores the point that apologizing and diluting Turkey’s actions are not only no longer necessary, but dangerous.[1] This author is pro-NATO, and in favour of its continued existence, and while the nations that constitute the treaty are not perfect either, and have much to apologize for themselves, the idea of a Western alliance cannot survive compromise of its principles, which Turkey threatens to do. This author is also not the first to suggest or propose expulsion.[2] Also, Turkey’s shooting down of Russian aircraft is hardly the first transgression, but rather part of a long history of incidents typical of a rogue state that threaten the security and stability of both Europe and the Middle East.

The pattern of Turkey’s offenses can be traced back over 100 years. It seems unfathomable that the Armenian genocide during the First World War has continued to be ignored; 1.5 million deaths is not an insignificant number, even when compared to the hundreds of millions of victims of other 20th century conflicts. However, as history cannot be undone, the concern is no longer whether Turkey committed this atrocity, but that it continues to officially deny that the Armenian genocide ever even took place![3] Germany and Japan make no such efforts to dissemble and prevaricate regarding their actions or atrocities committed during World War II.[4] Why isn’t the same expected of Turkey? When it comes to expectations of decency, Turkey continues to remain exempt; an exemption that must end, if NATO is to have and retain any meaning.

Adding insult to injury, the much forgotten Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus in the 1970’s behoves condemnation, even if it comes four decades later. Russia, (and not your father’s Russia in terms of strength, but) having lost none of its belligerence, annexes Eastern Ukraine and earns international censure. When Turkey behaves similarly, NATO has seen fit to sweep it under the rug, despite thousands dead.[5]

The very nature of the alliance is summed up in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: “An attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies.”[6] By flexing its political and military muscles, Turkey is playing a game of provocation intended to lead the rest of the alliance into war. World War I began in a similar way: One nation, the Kingdom of Serbia, was able to drag the entire world into the abyss of armed conflict, responsible for the loss of an entire generation of men. Thus, if Turkey, with its posturing, were able to precipitate a similar situations with Russia today, NATO would have no choice but to rush to Turkey’s aid, or risk the alliance disintegrating. This must not be allowed to happen.

In the new century, President Recep Erdogan, Turkey’s supreme leader has taken his country back several decades in terms of progress. The new regime is known for arresting journalists, academics, and activists who speak out against the regime; none the more typified then by the recent government takeover of Zaman, the nation’s #1 circulating daily newspaper.[7] There have been aspersions of corruption (millions of lira going missing, likely embezzled by Erdogan and beneficiaries,) as well as fraudulent elections.[8] When westerners think of these things, they usually associate them with Russia, or failed states in the third world; not a Western ‘democracy.’

Finally, there is the issue of the fight against Daesh, otherwise known as ISIS, ISIL, or just IS. It has been widely reported that Turkey is one of the main sources of income for IS, buying the oil that Daesh produces, as well as greatly inhibiting the Kurdish resistance in the region; of which there are many Kurds in Syria, Iraq, as well as Turkey. [9] [10] One cannot be an ally of both NATO AND IS. They are mutually exclusive! It grows more complicated still, as Erdogan is a Sunni Muslim, the same sect of Islam as both ISIS and our “friend” Saudi Arabia. As for the Kurds, who want their own homeland, independent of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, Turkey has no desire to allow its Kurdish minority to establish their own democratic state (and a secular one to boot!) and will continue to block their efforts. Thus, seeing his main rival Syria become so fragmented is something Erdogan must relish; and so continues to pour fuel on the fire.[11]

Some propose that ousting Turkey from NATO would weaken the alliance. However, this author would argue that discharging the Turks would in fact be a show of strength, not weakness. NATO failed to display a collective determination when Russia annexed Eastern Ukraine, and before that Georgia (Russia failed in that attempt.)[12] Not to mention the decade long quagmire of Iraq and Afghanistan; so if there was ever a time where the alliance appeared weakened, it is now. As it stands, NATO has a chance to send the world a message that it doesn’t need Turkey for its defense; that the alliance can stand on its own without the support of a morally corrupt regime.

It is doubtful whether Turkey would be as gung-ho in shooting down Russian jets without the backing of NATO; and should that support disappear, as this author suggests, and Turkey finds itself without friends, Premier Erdogan would think twice about provoking a potential war. The alliance could consider establishing a framework for allowing Turkey to re-enter NATO at a later point in time; if it redresses the injuries it has engendered, and assuage the arrayed concerns of the other members. It could then be thought of as a suspension of membership, like being on probation. However, actions, as it is said, speak louder than words. Even Germany, one of NATO’s largest constituents, has been ambivalent towards Turkey’s membership in the European Union and not, it would seem, without justification (a majority of Germans surveyed are against Turkey’s inclusion).[13] Turkey’s membership in that institution also rests on it accountability, especially in regards to the Syrian refugee crisis, in which Erdogan is expected to help. However, his recent track record does not bespeak the qualities one would expect from a peace-maker, like compassion and understanding, but rather a belligerent (callousness and moral compromise). Put simply, if Turkey wants to be a member of the international community, it must act like one.

 

 

Austin Luce is a graduate student in the MSc War & Psychiatry program at King’s College London.

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34912581

[2] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bernardhenri-levy/turkey-nato-kobani_b_5983082.html

[3] http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/german-resolution-on-armenian-genocide-expected-to-sour-turkey-relationsip/

[4] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/japan-korea-comfort-women/422016/

[5] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-ordered-to-pay-cyprus-90m-for-1974-invasion-9358319.html

[6] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm

[7] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/06/seized-turkish-opposition-newspaper-zaman-erdogan-government

[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/15/were-there-irregularities-in-turkeys-2015-elections-we-used-our-new-forensic-toolkit-to-check/

[9] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-turkey-isi_b_8808024.html

[10] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-blast-idUSKCN0WF0PP

[11] http://europe.newsweek.com/erdogan-launches-sunni-islamist-revival-turkish-schools-292237?rm=eu

[12] http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/

[13] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-poll-idUSKBN0E71JQ20140527

Polska Walcząca: Poland and the United States at NATO

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By: Jackson Webster

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Source: Reuters, via Voice of America

On July 8th, heads-of-state and government figures from the 28 member-states of the world’s strongest military alliance will meet in the Stadion Narodowy in Warsaw, Poland. The NATO Summit occurs on an ad hoc basis and acts as a steering conference where the alliance’s leaders meet, discuss and decide on NATO’s new initiatives and primary goals. While recent Summits have focused on either the War in Afghanistan or on alliance expansion, this year’s Summit will likely concentrate on the status of NATO’s conventional forces in Central and Eastern Europe. This shift in alliance policy will likely amplify the role of NATO in European security, in line with changing American assumptions about the European relationship with Russia since the outbreak of the Ukrainian Crisis.

While the eleven NATO Summits held during the Cold War focused entirely on the threat to Western Europe posed by the Warsaw Pact, the fifteen summits held since the fall of the Soviet Union have reflected NATO’s steadily broadening mandate. The alliance has moved away from conventional and nuclear deterrence to anti-piracy, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and cyber warfare. Furthermore, the alliance has expanded to encompass many former Warsaw Pact member-states. Unsurprisingly, time at each NATO Summit is scarce, and heads-of-state are very busy people. Thus, the summit agendas have become crucial, directly reflecting the changing balances of power within the alliance. There is usually a single issue around which each summit revolves, such as defense spending ‘burden-sharing’ in the case of 2014’s Wales Summit. Two governments are likely to be key players in this year’s agenda-setting process: Poland and the United States. Warsaw and Washington have both indicated renewed interest in Eastern European security under their current administrations. Additionally, these states each possess, in their own ways, important roles in the new power balance within NATO. This shifting balance has seen Western European states with ailing defense budgets begin to lose influence to Eastern member-states who face direct threats to their territory and have accordingly invested in their militaries. Washington’s role in the alliance has remained the largely same, with the Americans possessing the final word on most alliance policy given their outsized contribution to NATO forces. Polish interests, or more accurately the Baltic region’s interests, will come to define the NATO of the coming decade, and that the United States would benefit from investing time and energy in these newly loyal Eastern partners.

Eastern European member-states, particularly Poland, have a strong argument to make in favor of increased NATO involvement in their region at this year’s Summit. This argument is rooted in the emerging military strength of the Polish state, and in the willingness Poland has shown to cooperate with Brussels and Washington on intervention and conventional deterrence over the past decade. “Polska Walcząca,” or “Fighting Poland,” was first used as a slogan of the Polish resistance (Armia Krajowa) during the Second World War. The symbolic acronym “PW” has become a part of Polish nationalism and military culture since the fall of the communist government in 1989, and the significance of this national legacy of resilience is not lost on the current right-wing Polish government which seeks to portray Poland as a rising military and economic power. For the past decade, Warsaw has occupied, perhaps for the first time in two centuries, an enviable position in the European balance of power. Poland has been one of the only major European Union member-states which has raised its defense spending since the 2009 Eurozone debt crisis. This spending is directed at a massive modernization process which will replace Cold War-Era hardware manufactured in communist Poland and the USSR with modern equipment, procured both domestically and from foreign contractors, namely American and German defense companies. In 2009, Poland made the transition from a conscription-based army to a smaller, more nimble professional force of around 70,000 personnel. This expensive modernization process is possible because Poland essentially avoided the Eurozone’s financial crisis due to a savvy national banking strategy, a robust commercial banking sector, and the free-floating Polish Złoty. Additionally, public support for increased defense expenditure remains high, and more importantly the Polish public has one of the highest approval ratings of NATO of any alliance member-state at 70%.

Poland seeks to use its new capabilities to push for a greater NATO footprint in Poland and her Baltic neighbors. Polish President Andrzej Duda has repeatedly indicated in speeches and interviews that Warsaw seeks a stronger conventional presence for NATO in Eastern European member-states. Stemming from fear of Russia’s increasing military assertiveness, Duda’s statements reflect the desires of NATO’s Eastern members for the alliance to engage in stronger territorial defence. Russia’s so-called ‘hybrid warfare’ techniques have worried NATO’s eastern flank since the 2007 attacks on Estonia’s Internet infrastructure, and these fears multiplied exponentially after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Both Poland and its Baltic neighbors are concerned over the vulnerability of the “Suwałki Gap”, a small stretch of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border running between Belarus and Russian’s Kaliningrad exclave. Kaliningrad, formerly the Prussian city of Königsberg, is home to Russia’s Baltic Fleet and is one of the most heavily militarized areas in Europe. NATO military planners believe that exploitation of this gap to cut off the Baltic states from the rest of Europe, followed by the Baltic Fleet denying NATO access to the Baltic Sea, would be the first Russian move should a conventional shooting war break out in Eastern Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War, as Western European states have become reliant on the US military for European territorial defense, Washington has held somewhat of a veto power over decisions in European security policy. The European community’s largely unsuccessful experiments in defense planning over the past two decades have resulted in the EU’s Security Policy naming NATO as the organization responsible for European territorial defense, not the EU itself. This status quo is unlikely to change, given that two of NATO’s largest contributing members —Turkey and the United States— would likely not support transferring defense responsibilities over to the EU, an organization in which they have no treaty rights. While American politicians often publicly decry European states for ‘free-riding’, the United States will remain committed to NATO for the foreseeable future because the (albeit very large) American contribution to the alliance guarantees American influence in European security strategy. This logic applies to Turkey as well, which has little continuing hope for EU membership. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu indicated in remarks given to a NATO conference in Antalya that Turkey remains committed to NATO’s role in conventional defense and even discussed the possibility of enlargement, likely as a jab at Russia given Ankara and Moscow’s recent divisions over Syria.

The United States has the unique position of being able to pick its winners in regional power struggles. This ability, courtesy of the unrivalled depth of American military and economic power, is the primary tool used by American administrations in building alliances. Washington, particularly the State Department, has been wise enough in the past to use this ability to fundamentally overhaul previously problematic states. The liberal world order has been remarkably effective at bringing rising powers into the fold of the international community. In the 1950s, the United States took two devastated former adversaries —Germany and Japan— and turned them into both economic powerhouses and loyal allies.

Those who oppose strengthened ties with Poland often cite the current Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) government’s authoritarian tendencies and its stances against refugees, but the short-term political implications of this party’s power needn’t be confounded with the long-term viability of the Polish state and its contribution to collective defense. While the economic and military benefits for Washington of investment in geopolitically key partner states are obvious, the secondary benefit has been a transfer of values. Though it took decades, the market pressures caused by by increased trade brought down the authoritarian government of South Korea and replaced it with what is now one of Asia’s most robust democracies. South Africa’s reliance on the American financial sector was eventually used as leverage over the apartheid government, and the pressure of financial boycotting helped bring about the transfer of power and the end of racial segregation in that country. Though economic connectivity does not always bring about democratization —Saudi Arabia is the obvious example— these exceptions often have more to do with the characteristics of rentier states than with the given state’s relationship with Washington. This pattern, where the United States finds a given country is vital to its geo-strategic interests, invests in a military and trade relationship with this country, and turns it into a significant regional actor with liberal democratic values is likely to repeat itself in the case of Poland. As Washington redeploys conventional ground assets to the Baltic to balance Russian deployments in that region, American interests will be best served in the long-term by building up the capacities of Eastern European NATO members, namely Poland.

The United States and NATO will increasingly look to their emerging partners. Estonia has built formidable cybersecurity infrastructure since 2007 and is now the home of NATO’s cybersecurity think tank, Poland is poised to become a major conventional military player in Eastern Europe, and Turkey has maintained high defense spending due to the proximity of threats to its security. By contrast, the investment of Western European states in their own continent’s security has weakened dramatically in recent decades. So, too, will their influence within the alliance continue to fade. The three major Western European states —Germany, France, and the United Kingdom— are either distracted by security commitments out-of-theatre, or have cast themselves into isolationism. Today, the French are largely uninterested in Eastern European territorial security, the Germans are largely uninterested in their military, and Britons appear increasingly uninterested in the rest of the world altogether. Eastern European states, largely supportive of American interests in balancing Russian influence in former Soviet states, are the most viable partnerships for Washington given the current political situation in Europe.

What the rising influence of both Poland and Turkey likely means for NATO, given recent antagonism between both of these states and Russia, is a more assertive alliance stance in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Summit provides, both practically and symbolically, the best venue to discuss this new focus on deterrence. The restraint and political engagement NATO sought under Western European influence in the 1990s are likely a thing of the past. Warsaw 2016 is set to see a second re-imagination of the alliance’s role in Europe, one which prioritizes the territorial defense sought by NATO’s newly-influential Eastern members.

 

 

Jackson Webster, a native of Los Angeles, is in the final year of a degree in International Relations at King’s College London, and will be continuing on to a master’s degree in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. His dissertation research focused on Turkey’s relationship with NATO under President Recep Erdoğan.

 

 

The future of European defence: An interview with Daniel Keohane

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Daniel Keohane interviewed by Annabelle Vuille

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Leaders gather for a photo at the February 2016 meeting of the European Council. Source: Wikimedia

Annabelle Vuille: What would you say are the most pressing security challenges faced by Europe today?

Daniel Keohane: Let me answer this question slightly differently, as there are numerous security challenges to be listed – from Russia to ISIS, failing states in the Middle East, the refugee challenge, and terrorism etc. What is more interesting, is to think about which challenge is a priority for whom. I have been struck on recent travels by the level of diversity; in Berlin at the moment, the priority is the refugee crisis; in Paris, the priority is terrorism; in Warsaw, the priority is Russia; and in the UK, the government is consumed with the Brexit referendum debate. Added to this is the fact that everybody is still recovering and, indeed, still suffering from the economic crisis, which is also a security challenge in a way as a healthy, growing economy is requisite to deal with other pressing security challenges. No doubt, there is an incredibly complex confluence of crises at the moment. So, rather than prioritizing, I prefer to understand which challenge is a priority and for whom.

In the 2016 Strategic Trends Report published by CSS, you argued that European defense cooperation is no longer primarily driven by the EU and NATO, but rather by the interests of national governments. To what extent does this dilute the strength of Europe’s collective security environment?

Well, this is a good question and I should start by explaining the reasoning behind my argument. Of course, there are some people that would say that my argument is not very new and that defense policy in Europe has always been driven by national governments. The point I am trying to make is that during the 2000s, even if you just look at operations, governments cooperated and acted mainly through the EU and NATO. The difference today is that they are doing it in a whole host of ways, be it bilaterally, regionally or ad hoc like the coalition against ISIS. Of course, governments still act through the EU and NATO, but these two institutions are no longer the central option and this is a major change from five to ten years ago. Let’s take France as an example: in Congo 2003 and Chad 2008 France acted through the EU, but since the 2011 Libya intervention, the government has mainly acted alone or as part of an international coalition, i.e. anti-ISIS. This is a change that I find quite interesting because it is not the renationalisation of policies, it is a renationalisation of cooperation; making it more complex, more messy, more widely driven by the national governments and hence, all the more interesting.

With the ‘Big 3’ (France, UK and Germany) making up the bulk of European defense expenditure, how can we expect their national interests to shape the operational priorities of NATO?

First off, it is important to note the difference between the three states. Traditionally, France and Britain have an interventionist culture with a global outlook. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and as nuclear-armed powers, both have a certain sense of responsibility for global security and, as such, are more willing to carry out external military interventions unilaterally or as part of a coalition. This is quite different from Germany. Whilst comfortable pursuing ad hoc, bilateral or mini-lateral cooperation on capability projects, as with the Dutch, Germany is much more hesitant when it comes to operations and the use of robust military force. In such instances, Germany prefers to act in conjunction with the United States, NATO, or the EU, even as it has come to take on a more active, and central role in European politics and foreign policy. Not only has Angela Merkel led the European response to the Ukraine Crisis but also, in a surprising response to the Paris attacks, Germany sent a relatively robust support team, including frigates and reconnaissance aircraft to the anti-ISIS coalition. Whilst no full-blown combat role, I think that Germany has come a long way since its abstention on the Libya intervention in 2011 and that, in contrast to the assessment by some German experts, it may slowly assume a more advanced leadership role. Additionally, Britain and France cannot do it alone; with their resources reduced, they need Germany’s help diplomatically and militarily even if only in a beefed-up role. Consequently, these three states have come to cooperate closely and this has provided some potential for convergence: All three are supporting NATO to deter Russia in Eastern Europe. All three have deployed forces to fight ISIS and other Islamists, whether in Syria, Iraq or Mali. And all three are keeping a close eye on what is going on in Libya. However, the potential for divergence still exists, particularly concerning the EU referendum in the UK. At the end of the day it is about politics and if the UK votes to leave the EU it could cause a major rift that could negatively impact defense cooperation. Another possible divergence exists over operations in the Middle East and North Africa. If in the future Britain and France are required to step up their anti-ISIS campaigns and Germany is unwilling to contribute, there could be a rift on burden sharing over who is doing what against Islamists in southern neighborhoods. Elements of both convergence and divergence are in play.

What role will Poland play in shaping NATO’s future priorities?

Poland’s main concern is Russia and territorial defense. It has long wanted a beefed-up NATO, and particularly American presence on Polish soil and things are moving in that direction. I think where Poland could come to play an interesting role is in NATO’s southern strategy, which will be discussed at the NATO summit in Warsaw in June this year. Whilst it is relatively clear on what measures need to be taken to deter Russia, it is much less clear what role NATO has in fighting ISIS, stabilizing Libya etc. If Poland demonstrates its willingness to contribute to these efforts, it would suggest a mood of, and desire for coherence among the NATO allies. If, on the other hand, Poland proves unwilling then I fear that there will be some divergence; some southern countries, such as Italy, will expect more engagement from Poland in return for supporting the deterrence efforts against Russia.

A 2016 RAND wargaming study showed that Russia could reach the capitals of Estonia or Latvia on NATO’s eastern flank within 60 hours. How well equipped is the Alliance in responding to possible Russian aggression?

That’s a good question because in strictly military terms, so far, the NATO efforts would not be enough in terms of conventional deterrence. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is relatively small, compared to the Russian forces on the other side. Additionally, whilst the United States is quadrupling its Reassurance budget and investing more resources into deterring Russia and beefing-up NATO’s defense, it’s still a relatively small amount; less than 1% of the Pentagon’s entire budget, which is nothing compared to the money that Russia has been investing into its military structure over the past few years. However, whilst there is more that NATO could, and even should do, that would be to miss the political and strategic point. The reason why NATO is not doing more is mainly because the United States does not want to push too hard. It is highly unlikely that Putin would attack a NATO member state and it would be unwise on his part to try and test NATO’s and U.S. resolve. Thus, I think the feeling in Washington is to strengthen deterrence and signal an alertness of a possible military threat from Russia, but at the same time, to avoid provocation or any move that would provide Russia with an excuse to attack; essentially, it is about striking a delicate balance between deterrence and détente. So, in strictly military terms NATO’s efforts are not so impressive, but in strategic terms it might be the wiser course.

In the 2016 Strategic Trends Report you also discussed the UK security and defense review of November 2015, and mentioned that its ‘main political message’ was that ‘Britain is back as a serious military power’. Additionally, Britain is NATO’s strongest European military power. Therefore, if the referendum on EU membership did result in a ‘Brexit’, what impact would this have on European defense and, more specifically, on the internal cohesion among NATO member states?

My own view is that, in theory, from a military standpoint a Brexit should not change that much for European defense cooperation as Britain will remain a member of both NATO and the UN Security Council, and it will remain a major military and nuclear-armed power. In practice, however, it might all be a little bit different. Certainly, it will make political alignments with France and Germany more difficult, which will directly impact defense policy. It has been a longstanding dream of many in Paris and Berlin to have separate EU military structures – by that I mean operational headquarters – and until this point, the UK has always been able to block such efforts. However, if Brexit were to take place, there would be nothing to stop France and Germany from doing so and would, at the very least, throw the gauntlet to them. There is another aspect to the Brexit business that has not been widely covered: the damage that it could have on the UK’s military ambitions. I think that Brexit could have the same impact on the UK defence budget as the economic crisis of 2008; diminishing government revenue and hence, taking a toll on defense expenditure. If you look at the forecasts, such as the one provided in last week’s issue of The Economist, none of them are particularly positive on the outlook for the UK’s economy if there was a Brexit. Consequently, if the UK economy suffers badly then the government’s budget will suffer badly, and this will have a negative effect on defense spending. Even if Britain sticks to 2% nominally, in real terms, it could really hurt their military ambitions as the cost of advanced equipment rises by 5% a year. The other impact of Brexit is that Britain would be diminished as a diplomatic player because it would lose its voice in guiding EU foreign and defense policy. Britain would simply matter less, particularly to the United States. Essentially, Brexit could potentially damage relations with the United States, make Britain less valuable at the UN and NATO, and it could hurt the UK’s own defense ambitions. I think the consequences are quite serious.

Could it make Europe more vulnerable?

It would – at least psychologically. Primarily because there is already a perception that Europe is frail and struggling to cope with the various crises ranging from terrorism, Russia, and ISIS to the refugee crisis. If Britain did indeed vote to leave the EU, it would create a whole host of questions: Will other countries, particularly non-Eurozone countries hold their own referendums? Will they subsequently want their own special relationship with the EU? Will the original founding members – or some of them at least – come to pursue a strategy of selective integration? In other words, you could end up having a very introverted debate about the future of European governance at the very moment when everything is falling apart around us; potentially akin to shifting the deckchairs while the Titanic is sinking. So from a psychological standpoint I think it would have a dreadful impact. Yet, it is difficult to make any definitive assessment. Some people believe that Brexit could drive France and Germany toward more integration. It might, but it might not because it could legitimise the arguments of populists and nationalists including Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. Ultimately, although there is much uncertainty as to what will happen, I am pretty sure that the effects will not be positive.

Is there any other aspect of European defence and security you would like to touch upon?

This isn’t directly a question for European security, but rather for global security. I think that the military aspects of the U.S.-China relationship will constitute the big question for the 21st century and for the international system as a whole. Europe, I believe, is only just starting to wake up to this reality because, understandably, we have been focused on the immediate crises at our doorstep. The other issue will concern what happens next in Libya and Syria. The Syrian war, we hope, will not go on forever and we will have to ask ourselves how we will remedy the situation and rebuild the Syrian state. Additionally, what will we do about Libya? Are we prepared to invest the military resources necessary to stabilise the state? These are questions that will confront Europe relatively quickly. From a long-term perspective, say 20 years, it is clear that Europe will be occupied in the broad neighbourhood; not only are there so many weak states that could potentially become beacons of instability, such as Egypt, but who knows how the situation in the Caucasus and the Sahel will develop. My experience, to paraphrase Macmillan, is that there is no certainty in predicting future events and their impact on international politics. As a consequence, political leaders across the globe will have to remain relatively flexible whilst being able to distinguish between the urgent and the important. What is urgent will not always be the most important issue at hand.

 

 

Annabelle is currently based in Switzerland and in her final year of the MA programme in International Relations and Contemporary War at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Having studied International Business in Rome, she is specifically interested in applying her economic background to the sphere of conflict and security. Her main research interest is the interplay between geopolitics and energy security, particularly in the maritime domain.

Daniel Keohane is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich. He previously held positions at the Foundation for International Relations (FRIDE) in Brussels and Madrid, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the Centre for European Reform in London. His work has been published in journals such as Survival and the Journal of Common Market Studies, and he has conducted studies (both alone and as part of consortia) commissioned by the European Union and NATO.

The Question of Limited Intervention in Syria: ‘And Then What?’

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By: Alexander Decina

NATO-backed Patriot missile defence systems set up in Gaziantep, Turkey, February 4, 2013. Picture used under Creative Commons License.

Given the atrocities witnessed during the course of the Syrian civil war—be it the Bashar al-Assad regime’s use of barrel bombs or the depravity of the so-called Islamic State—it is hardly surprising to hear continued frustration at U.S. and Western inaction. Some have estimated the death toll to be higher than 250,000—a number that will surely increase given Russia’s intervention and the recent surge in Iranian efforts. In the United States, not only Republican candidates and policymakers, but also prominent Democratic figures including Hillary Clinton and John Kerry have called for the creation of either safe zones, a no-fly zone, or both. These options were most recently discussed in July this year, when Turkey authorised the United States to use its Incirlik airbase to launch sorties, but the Obama Administration has yet to enact such measures. While some advocates of safe or no-fly zones consider this a failure and lament the lack of U.S. leadership, these proponents fail to answer, or perhaps ask, an important question – “And then what?”

Safe Zones
Critics, activists, and leaders in the United States and abroad, have called for the creation of safe zones to protect civilians from the forces loyal to the Assad regime and the Islamic State. One such safe zone discussed could be up to 60 miles long and 25 miles deep into Syria along its border with Turkey. If established, the area would serve as a crucial operation centre for various elements of the Syrian opposition, ranging from those affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to the more dominant and radical groups including Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, which are under the Army of Conquest umbrella. It remains to be seen who would be tasked with enforcing this safe zone. Placing U.S. or other Western troops on the ground would be highly undesirable, not only for the sending countries, but also for communities in Syria in the long run. If Turkey, which has pushed for the establishment of the safe zone, sent its own troops, this would inevitably result in clashes with the Kurdish forces in northern Syria. The Kurds have already accused Ankara of bombing the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Alternatively, Arab countries opposed to Iranian influence could send their troops to Syria as they have in Yemen, but the last thing Syria needs is the influx of additional foreign fighters on either side of the conflict. Perhaps it would be best if Syrian groups themselves controlled the area, but such an endeavour would require far more weapons and support than the United States and the West are currently providing.

If more aid is needed for the opposition to enforce the safe zones, then which of the Syrian groups should Washington support? The administration has recently come under fire for its limited success in training and equipping Syrian rebels, yet the smaller numbers are not due to a lack of resources but rather the high vetting standards for the rebels. There are reports that the Department of Defense is lowering these standards, but this, if true, would be a dangerous move. There are numerous challenges to the vetting process, mainly stemming from the lack of information available on the individuals in question. However, even if with lower vetting thresholds the United States continues to restrict equipment provisions to FSA-affiliated groups only, this still poses substantial risks. There have been multiple reports of FSA fighters, and sometimes entire units, joining forces with Nusra. Short of this, there is also nothing to stop FSA groups from selling, if not surrendering, weapons to more extreme militias including ones they are actively fighting.

Thus, the more material support Washington supplies to any Syrian rebels, even the FSA, the higher the likelihood that those weapons and ammunition will fall into the hands of Nusra and other radical groups. Some may argue that if the FSA is strengthened, it will be less vulnerable and less susceptible to defections and loss of equipment, however this is unlikely. Considering how fragmented the FSA’s brigades are, it is hard to believe that it could stand as a cohesive entity against Nusra or the Army of Conquest, especially given that the latter groups are backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey—all of which use far less discretion than the United States. As such, these jihadist groups will surely maintain their edge over the moderate elements of FSA. With safe zones keeping the Assad regime, the regime’s backers, and the Islamic State out of large pockets of Syria—and absent strong opponents within the Syrian opposition—Nusra and groups like it will surely reap further benefits. And then what? Is tipping the scales against Assad worth bolstering Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate?

A No-Fly Zone
If a safe zone is too complicated to establish effectively, then shouldn’t the United States and its allies at least implement a no-fly zone? Protecting Syrian civilians from the indiscriminate barrel bombings of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF) is indeed a worthy goal. However, even if decisions concerning Russian maneuverability within the airspace were placed aside, this measure would still have its complications. Horrific as the SAAF’s attacks are, it does more than target civilians or even the FSA. It also targets the extreme jihadist organisations mentioned earlier by attacking their leadership, stockpiles, and supply routes. Having cleared the SAAF (and perhaps Russian jets) from the skies, would the United States be prepared to pick up the mantle of neutralizing jihadist organisations that pose a legitimate threat?

It is worth remembering the case of Ansar al-Sharia, one of the Islamist militias that rose up under the cover of a NATO-enforced no-fly zone in Libya. After the September 2012 attack on the United States consulate in Benghazi (which Ansar al-Sharia is suspected of carrying out), Benghazans stormed the group’s headquarters. Ansar al-Sharia then withdrew, only to return the following year with weapons looted from Muammar al-Gaddafi’s stockpiles. In coordination with other Islamist and revolutionary militias, Ansar al-Sharia took control of Benghazi in the summer of 2014. While it has lost control of most of the city and has been weakened since last year, the group still conducts its operations and retains its stockpiles and training camps. Thus, its fighters still pose a real threat in Libya and abroad.

When applying the lessons of Libya to Syria, if the United States and its allies are to impose a no-fly zone, what will be their response when such measures inevitably bolster Nusra and other radical forces? Thus far, the United States has conducted strikes on Nusra concurrently with its attacks on the Islamic State, but this has not yet had a major impact on the group. If Washington were intensify these efforts and mount a serious campaign against Nusra, its fighters and leadership could either temporarily recede into the background as Ansar al-Sharia did, splinter off into new Sunni groups, or even join allied groups in the Army of Conquest umbrella that the United States is less likely to target.

And then what? If the United States were to aggressively continue targeting Nusra’s members after the group’s disbanding—an operational approach that would be wrought with imprecision and mistakes due to insufficient information—such measures would not be well received by the Sunni community in Syria and the region. Furthermore, Nusra would be able to continue building its weapons stockpiles, whether under its own name or under the auspices of other groups, and the United States would have no reliable means to prevent this.

U.S. Limitations in Syria
The creation of either a safe zone or a no-fly zone risks bolstering radical groups within the Syrian opposition by increasing their access to weapons and support. It will neither tip the scales and overwhelm Assad, nor bring an end to the conflict, but will instead contribute to prolonging it. Thus it is imperative the United States understands the very real limitations it has in addressing the Syrian civil war. Although extraordinarily difficult, instead of a limited intervention, Washington should work towards creating an environment in which Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, and other states will be willing to stem the flow of weapons and support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. This is an arduous undertaking that may indeed be impossible, but the alternative should not involve adopting a short-sighted policy that lacks a realistic end goal. Frustrating as it may be, acting for the sake of acting is a reckless approach. Thus, before attempting to alter the situation in Syria, the Obama administration, and future administrations, must ask themselves “And then what?”

Alexander Decina is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. He previously worked for the Tripoli, Libya-based Sadeq Institute and for the Sustainable Democracy Center in Beirut, Lebanon.

NATO, State (Re)emergence, and Military Capabilities and Commitments: the Terms of the Debate

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By: Alex Calvo

USS John Fitzerald Kennedy entering Tarragona Harbour in 2002. The city could be an alternative to Rota as a home port for the US Navy missile defence destroyers in the Mediterranean. https://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/3047221282/in/photolist-5DgNHY
USS John Fitzerald Kennedy entering Tarragona Harbour in 2002. The city could be an alternative to Rota as a home port for the US Navy missile defence destroyers in the Mediterranean. https://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/3047221282/in/photolist-5DgNHY

 

The possible (re)emergence of states within NATO, at a time of renewed international tensions and widespread concern over the capabilities and commitments of existing member states, means that any such country seeking recognition will have to answer a fundamental question: will the combined capabilities and commitments of the two resulting successor states be greater or smaller than those of the existing parent state? In the run up to the Scottish referendum last year for instance, this was discussed, with some voices in the United States expressing their concern at the possible impact on the military capabilities of Washington’s first and foremost partner. The Atlantic Council, a US-based think-tank published a comparative study of Scotland and Catalonia, which praised the latter, emphasizing plans for naval specialization which fit with perceived US and NATO needs. At the political level, US President Barack Obama expressed his hope that voters would support Scotland staying in the UK, while remaining silent on Catalan independence and deploying USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) to Barcelona a few days before the 9 November semi-official referendum.

The report by the Atlantic Council, and President Obama’s different attitude towards Scotland and Catalonia, are a reminder that each case is different. The (re)emergence of a state within NATO is neither good nor bad in and of itself. It would be as irresponsible to oppose any such internal expansion without a detailed look at the particular case as it would be to blindly welcome it without applying the same careful examinatio. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate, both in general and abstract terms, drawing on the case of Catalonia and Spain as a reference.

GDP. A state’s investment in defence is a measure of its total GDP multiplied by the coefficient determined by its political institutions. The division of an existing state can affect the size of the two resulting economies in different ways. On the one hand, it can lead to smaller and thus less efficient domestic markets. On the other, it can prompt more agile, dynamic, outward-oriented economies. Separation can put an end to the so called “rational underdevelopment” of some regions and to hard-to-justify discriminatory policies in areas like infrastructure, and regional and industrial policy.

A split can have a negative impact, at least in the short run, on both resulting economies if political risk assessments rise, or uncertainty remains over aspects such as the allocation of the national debt. If one of the successor states used to be a net payer to the common treasury (that is, it paid more in taxes than it received in public spending) and the other was a net recipient (it used to pay less than it received), then some questions arise. The short-term question is whether the additional post-independence growth in the net payer will compensate for the drop in the net recipien. In the longer run, the issue is whether the latter will benefit from more rational economic policies and an improved work ethic once it no longer enjoys funds from the former. Both Spain proper and Scotland are net recipients, while Catalonia’s yearly net fiscal transfers to the former are estimated at around 8 percent of the GDP in the last 15 years.

In the case of Catalonia, in 2000, 57 percent of Catalan exports were bound for the Spanish market, with the remaining 43 percent sent abroad; while in 2014, the percentages had reversed. In previous years, boycotts against Catalan products have been organized in Spain proper. The idea behind the boycotts was to prompt Catalan businesses and trade unions to oppose moves for further devolution (in particular the 2006 reform of Catalonia’s “Statute of Autonomy”, a law defining the powers of the regional authorities), for fear of losing market share in Spain proper, with the resulting negative impact on employment. However, rather than diminishing support for independence, such moves have largely backfired, while providing added momentum to the drive for internationalization.Regulated industries (such as banking) still under Madrid’s yoke remain shy when it comes to expanding abroad, but the myriad small and medium-sized enterprises accounting for much of Catalonia’s economic tissue less so, with quite a few having become “pocket multinationals”, that is not very large corporations which are nevertheless present in a wide range of countries. A post-independence boycott by consumers in Spain proper remains a possibility, and would have a negative short-term impact on Catalan GDP, however this would not translate into lower longer-term economic growth, rather the contrary. The reason is that, just like with the boycotts against the 2006 reform of the “Statute of Autonomy”, they would prompt businesses to expand in other countries, thus gaining size and competitiveness. Furthermore, in an independent Catalonia this trend would also involve those industries currently regulated by Madrid, such as infrastructure management and banking, which to date have internationalized to a very small degree. We should also remember that, while Spain’s Castilian core may remain hostile to the new state, Valencia and the Balearic Islands are likely to take a much more nuanced approach. In addition to sharing a language with Catalonia, their economic structure is similar. They also suffer a large fiscal deficit (difference between taxes paid and public spending received) and a lack of infrastructure investment, while their economy is based on small and medium-sized enterprises, which have been excluded by successive Spanish governments from the defence industry and related sectors such as airspace. A third consideration is that the value of Catalan exports to Spain proper include the value added by exporters plus the value of the intermediate goods used to produce them (that is, commodities, energy, and components, bought in Catalonia or abroad by Catalan companies to produce goods bound for Spain proper). Thus, taking the latter out, the effective percentage of Catalan GDP included in exports to Spain proper is lower, 22.5% of the GDP.

Concerning Spain proper, there are no Catalan plans for a boycott, and the independence movement has rather been careful and stress its desire to see good bilateral relations after separation. In that event, as Catalonia opens up further to world trade, and Spanish enterprises lose their current advantage in terms of common legislation and considerable overlap in the mass media sphere, they will face stronger competition from third-country producers in the Catalan market. This could be beneficial for Spanish companies, by forcing them to become more competitive. It would also promote their internationalization in two ways: thanks to this greater competitiveness forced by greater competition in the Catalan market, and due to a loss of market share in Catalonia pushing them to seek alternative markets.

In the short term, however, it is the loss of Catalan subsidies that may have the strongest impact on the economy of Spain proper, which has become structurally dependent on easy money from Catalonia and could suffer a significant GDP loss as these funds dried out. Although the EU and the IMF may push for a gradual easing out of financial flows, with some transitional agreements, Catalan independence would sooner or later mean that the more than 16 billion euros transferred to Spain proper every year would not longer be there. This would not necessarily be bad in the longer term. It could release Spanish entrepreneurial spirits and force a more rational set of economic policies, with for example greater infrastructure spending in industrial areas, more business-friendly tax regulations, and greater competition. Having said this, it is however likely to prompt further defence cuts in the short run. Ideally, this should prompt a fundamental transformation of Spain’s Armed Forces into a smaller, but non-political, agile, and better prepared military. Section 8.1 of Spain’s 1978 constitution reads “The mission of the Armed Forces … is … to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order”. This passage, believed to have actually been drafted by the military themselves, is widely understood to mean that Spain’s Armed Forces can be used to prevent Catalan independence, and seemed to be on Defence Minister Pedro Morenes’ mind when he said, in the run up to the 27 September election to the Catalan Parliament, that there would be no military intervention “as long as everybody does their duty”. If to the possibility of a military intervention in Catalonia we add the regular harassment of Gibraltar at sea, we can observe two very serious distractions for the Spanish Armed Forces.

Pyrenees Regiment No. 1 on training exercises. https://www.facebook.com/606201522730252/photos/pb.606201522730252.-2207520000.1445134712./606640706019667/?type=3&permPage=1
Ski Company, First Pyrenees Regiment, training during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This elite unit was set up by mountain sports enthusiasts and served under the Catalan Government.†

Defence investment and procurement. Due to economies of scale, it could be argued that successor states will need to invest more simply to achieve the same capabilities as the parent state. In some cases, it could even be argued that some or all successor states will not be able to afford expensive hardware. On the other hand, this may facilitate greater integration and coordination with allies, with less duplication and fewer prestige projects. It may also lead to a renewed emphasis on maintenance and training, stressing not nominal capabilities, but real, deployable capabilities (which a country can effectively transport, deploy, and maintain).

In the case of Spain, procurement is deeply imbalanced, with the country embarking on expensive projects mainly motivated by a mixture of prestige and industrial policy, rather than operational considerations. The result: a large gap between nominal and real capabilities, problems in deploying and sustaining forces far from her shores, and a lack of funds for training, maintenance, and operations, with the bulk of defence spending going into personnel and procurement. To be fair, these problems are not unique to Spain. For example, the German deployment in Afghanistan was plagued by equipment failures, with a 2014 official report explaining that “only 42 of Germany’s 109 Eurofighters are available for immediate use because of fuselage defects. The navy faces similar problems with only 4 of its 22 Sea Lynx helicopters and 3 of its 21 Sea Kings currently operational.” However, the case of Spain is perhaps even more extreme, going beyond a lack of proper maintenance. A study on “Southern Europe Defence in Times of Austerity” noted that “[t]he Spanish military industrial base ranks tenth in the world and sixth in Europe thanks in part to its stake in EAD, one of the leading global aircraft companies. This means that any major cut in military investment projects in Italy and Spain directly affects their national economies and aggravates the domestic economic crisis environment. This disparity could explain why the Spanish and Italian governments chose to primarily reduce personnel and operations/maintenance programmes rather than investment programmes, whereas the Portuguese and Greek governments reduced defence expenditures across the board.”

Catalonia’s national security community is keenly aware of such problems, as reflected in successive unofficial white papers by the Military Studies Society (SEM). Its latest on defence budgets, published in June, lays down a set of serious, realistic budgetary guidelines for an independent Catalonia, based on the experience of NATO allies. The text stresses that operations (expenditures covering costs for deployed operations outside member state’s territory) and equipment maintenance have “been a problem common to many Western armed forces” due to a lack of “available resources in this area” of maintenance, prompted by the “excessive costs of acquisition programs.” The white paper strongly emphasizes that “The Catalan Defence Forces (CDF) cannot make these mistakes,” and recommends that “the percentage of the defence budget devoted to operations and maintenance should be between 35 and 40 percen.” For Catalonia, starting from scratch after 300 years without her own armed forces, this is a golden opportunity to avoid past mistakes, by both the Spanish military and those of many allies. The result should be a more agile, balanced military, where equipment is purchased according to perceived needs, rather than by industry lobbying, and then properly maintained.

Turning to the legitimate question of whether Catalan defence budgets will be large enough to sustain acquisition programs in areas like strategic airlift, a quick look at the numbers shows this should not be a problem. Catalonia currently accounts for roughly 20 percent of Spanish GDP, Madrid in turn spending 0.6 percent on defence. An independent Catalonia following NATO guidelines, as suggested by the SEM, would thus be spending the equivalent of 0.4 percent of current Spanish GDP. Adding in the expected long-term greater economic growth from the end of fiscal transfers, irrational economic policies, and sabotage to key infrastructures, it is not easy to imagine total Catalan defence spending surpassing the figure for today’s Spain. Spain may well find herself unable to sustain current levels of defence spending, however, since much of these capabilities are either not being properly maintained and used in training, or are directed towards fellow NATO member states (UK) or American allies (Morocco), it is not something that should concern alliance planners much.

Intra-alliance conflict (between successor states, or between the existing parent state and other partners). Concerning post-independence relations between successor states, at one end of the spectrum we could imagine two good neighbours leaving behind tensions and now able and eager to work together, both bilaterally and within wider permanent alliances and ad-hoc coalitions. At the other end of the spectrum, two hostile states with unresolved disputes and at least one failing to rule out a resort to force, prompting most of their capabilities to be addressed at each other rather than available to allies.

When the parent state has persistently been employing non-lethal force against a fellow NATO member state, the question arises whether once reduced in size it will persist in this policy, now with fewer resources, or whether it will abandon such an approach. In the latter case, the impact on the alliance’s capabilities will be doubly positive, since capabilities devoted to intra-alliance conflict will now be available to NATO, as will be those employed by the other member state to defend itself.

In Spain’s case, the country seems able to work with some of her former colonies, as shown by the successful incorporation of some 30 Portuguese commandos in the Spanish Legion’s detachment deployed in Iraq in a training and mentoring capacity. Unfortunately, this seems to be the exception rather than the rule, with Madrid unable or unwilling to recognize Gibraltar’s right to decide her own future, and the ensuing policy of constant harassment. In 2015, from 1 January to 23 June, the Spanish Navy had engaged in 23 violations of British territorial waters, while absent from BALTOPS201 , in a reminder that in a world with limited resources, failing to rule out the use of force against a fellow ally puts a dent on any potential contribution to NATO. It also has an impact on that ally’s contribution. Thus, when measuring Spain’s net contribution to the Atlantic alliance, we should subtract all the assets and capabilities devoted to the harassment of Gibraltar, plus the corresponding British assets and capabilities employed to defend the people of the Rock. Catalonia, having excellent relations with Gibraltar and the United Kingdom, which the national security community sees as a key partner, does not suffer such handicap. The new state will not have to spend a cent on disturbing the life and property of her Majesty’s subject

Ceuta and Melill, two cities located in North Africa, the former right in front of Gibraltar, administered by Spain but claimed by Morocco, also merit a mention. While this conflict is more low key, a significant portion of Spanish forces are deployed with their defence in mind. Since Morocco is a US Ally, again we would have to subtract them when measuring Madrid’s potential contribution to NATO. Not a problem for Catalonia, which is not party to any territorial conflict with the North African country. To add insult to injury, Ceuta has become the main logistic support base for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean and North-East Atlantic, with Madrid blatantly disregarding Western sanctions in the wake of the Crimean crisis. In 2014 for instance, Russian warships docked at Ceuta on 13 occasions, while nine such visits have taken place in the first six months of 2015. By opening up Ceuta to Moscow, Madrid has forfeited the claim that it is in NATO’s interest to see Catalonia, including key ports like Tarragona and Barcelona, remain in Spanish hands.

Pyrenees Regiment No. 1 on training exercises. http://webs.racocatala.cat/cat1714/milicies2.htm

Defence industrial policy and international defence industry cooperation. Smaller domestic weapons markets can be cited as having a potentially negative impact. On the other hand, in those states where the dominant nationality has excluded another from the defence industry, the resulting end to the defence industry “apartheid” may enable weapons development and production to take root. In particular, where the excluded territory used to have an arms industry earlier in its history, and retains a significant civilian industrial base, as is the case in Catalonia.

The issue for third countries — in particular those involved in international consortia featuring the existing parent state — is the net impact. This may depend on possible synergies with existing civilian industries in the territory previously excluded from arms production.

Successive Spanish governments have excluded Catalan enterprises from the defence industry and many dual sectors, while subsidizing production in areas like Seville (Airbus Group), with little or no industrial tradition. A 2015 official report on Spain’s security and defence industry provides details of 47 companies, none of which is based in Catalonia, with only three in Valencia Region. Madrid has also strived to keep Catalonia isolated from southern France, home to most of the country’s aircraft industries. An end to this defence policy “apartheid” would allow Catalan enterprises to expand into the defence—and dual—industries, in a move which would benefit maritime democracies, including partners in the F-35 consortium. Spanish industry would contract, but this would liberate the country’s partners from the extra costs involved in manufacturing in regions with no industrial traditio. A look at FDI (foreign direct investment) reveals a completely different geography from that of the defence industry programs jointly sponsored by Spain’s Defence and Industry Ministries. In the second quarter of 2015, 35.1 percent of Spain-bound industrial FDI went to Catalonia, while none of Spain’s at least 300 8×8 wheeled infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) based on General Dynamics’ Piranha 5 will be manufactured in Catalonia. The initial order is expected to be worth EUR1.5 billion.

The location of Airbus Group’s plant in Seville, in the southern region of Andalusia, where there is little private industry, does not make sense. From a French perspective, a Catalan town would seem more logical, since French aeronautical industry is concentrated around Toulouse, close to Catalonia. This would also benefit UK taxpayers, given the significant connection between the Spanish and British defence industries, to a large extent due to the two countries’ cooperation in aircraft projects. According to the official Spanish report on 2014 weapons exports, the United Kingdom ranked first among the country’s customers, with purchases worth 862.7 million euros, 26.9 percent of the total. The report explains that three aerial refuelling tankers accounted for 573,9 million euros and a transport airplane for 121.8 million euros, with a portion of the balance coming from parts for the EF-2000 fighter and the A400M military transport plane. As we can see, this is not trade in finished weapons systems, but rather intra-industry trade among countries cooperating in joint projects, where the distribution of the work involved is often related to the volume of orders from each defence ministry. Therefore, by excluding Catalan industry and imposing manufacture in areas like Seville, with little tradition of private industry, Madrid is raising the total cost of production of these aircraft.

Cohesion, internal security. When an existing state resorts to force, or the threat of force, to retain its present territory and population, a portion of its security and defence capabilities will have to be devoted to this task, and thus unavailable to NATO. Distracted by the need to coerce part of their population into remaining, collective defence may not be a priority.

This is the case in Spain, where the military granted itself the duty and right to employ force to keep the country together in the 1978 Constitution. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy, Catalonia’s last attempt to find a reasonable accommodation within Spain, also prompted sabre rattling, and on 17 May 2015 Catalan police caught three Spanish soldiers stealing an independence flag in Figueres. Stealing flags is obviously not the best way to train for NATO operations, while wasting Catalan police’s time does not contribute to the fight against Jihadist terrori. Every minute spent by Catalan police officers investigating such deeds is a minute not spent fighting against international terrorism and organized crime. The extent to which the resort to force to prevent Catalan self-determination distracts and perverts Spanish defence policy is clear from available statistic. While the defence budget has shrunk by 32 percent since 2008 (68 percent according to some sources, but this may not fully take into account defence spending from other departments’ budgets, for example the Industry Ministry to fund weapons programs involving domestic manufacturing, as well as extra-budgetary liabilities), that of the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) grew by 9.7 percent in 2015. Details may not be available on open sources, but it is suspected that the bulk of this increase is devoted to the “dirty war” against the Catalan independence movement.

Catalonia, on the other hand, has made clear from the outset that Val d’Aran, with her own language and culture, was free to join the new state or go her own way. No Catalan military capabilities will be needed to keep inside those who want out. Whether Spain without Catalonia will stop seeing the military as a political actor is not clear at this stage. Ideally this change should take place, releasing military capabilities currently not available to the Atlantic alliance.

Citizens’ loyalty: Draft and reserves. If some citizens within the parent state feel little loyalty, or even a measure of hostility towards it, for whatever reasons (justified or otherwise), there may be a gap between its theoretical manpower pool and the actual number of deployable citizens, be they regular or reserve. While the parent state may resort to a purely professional military to avoid this problem, it may then translate into a lower degree of political support for defence policies.

This is clearly the case in Spain, where there is little love between the state’s Castilian core and many of her non-Castilian citizens, leading to a downward spiral where the more the centre uses—or threatens to use—force against those wishing to leave, the less the latter feel bound to support the former’s resort to force as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Many Catalan citizens who feel alienated by the Spanish military may well wish to support their Catalan counterpart, for example by joining the reserves, making the combined manpower pool available to the two successor states larger.

Transitional issues: Inheriting defence assets and personnel. Downsizing and building one’s military. In addition to wider economic issues, the transition from parent state to successor states also features some aspects specific to the military. Among them, the distribution of existing defence assets and personnel and the accompanying downsizing of the parent state’s and (re)creation of the successor states’ armed forces.

Concerning the distribution of Spanish military assets, preliminary defence planning in Catalonia has featured two views, with some analysts favouring the taking over of some naval and air assets, while others prefer to avoid systems not necessarily best suited to Catalan and allied needs. With regard to Spanish military personnel wishing to join Catalonia’s Armed Forces, the issue is highly sensitive and has not been publicly discussed by the Catalan Government. However, both the Catalan Government and parties have stressed that Spanish Government employees in Catalonia will keep their jobs after independence, and in so doing they have not excluded any category. The Advisory Council on the National Transition, a government agency tasked with preparing a number of white papers to prepare for independence, also refers to Spanish Government workers without excluding the military, although again without referring to them explicitly. Some members of the Spanish military may have discreetly enquired about the possibility of joining Catalonia’s Armed Forces, but they are unlikely to do anything which may put their jobs at risk until this possibility is a real one. We could also mention that when Catalan Police, the Mossos d’Esquadra, began to expand in the 1980s to become responsible for most public security duties, Spanish Police and Civil Guard (a constabulary-type force) officers in Catalonia were given the chance to join. Catalonia may also need to provide for those members of the Spanish military who do not wish to follow this route but who refuse to follow orders contrary to international law and fear subsequent reprisals.

Conclusions. The factors discussed are only a sample of those that may have an impact on state succession within NATO, resulting in greater or lesser capabilities and commitments towards the alliance. This work should ideally be followed by more extensive research and case studies, but should at least serve the purpose of underlining that, no matter how distressing the (re)emergence of states can sometimes be, the consequences to defence policy should be approached rigorously. It is also a reminder that any new state wishing to be recognized by existing states will have to explain to the international community how it will not only defend itself but also its allies and partners. Even more so at a time of increasing tensions, a country’s contribution to collective security is bound to be one of the main factors determining its recognition, or lack thereof, by the international community.

In the case of Catalonia, preliminary defence planning is geared towards the creation of a modern, capable, and agile military, ready to protect the country’s territory and population and make a powerful, positive contribution to NATO. This scenario could also give Spain the chance to reform her own military, in which case the Atlantic alliance would gain two net security contributors. However, it is still too early to say whether Catalan independence will prompt a rationalization of Spanish defence policy and thus a positive contribution to NATO from Madrid.

Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan), focuses on security and defence policy, international law, and military history, in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. He tweets at Alex__Calvo and his work, which includes “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Concept, Issues at Stake and Regional Impact”, Naval War College Press Working Papers, No 1, US Naval War College, 23 December 2013, is available at http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Working-Papers/Documents/WP1-Calvo.aspx, can be found at https://nagoya-u.academia.edu/AlexCalvo

† http://www.facebook.com/606201522730252/photos/pb.606201522730252.-2207520000.1445134712./606640706019667/?type=3&permPage=1