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Kim Jong-un’s Winter Charm Offensive: Another Attempt of Duping Seoul

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By Davis Florick

 

The statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in Mansu Hill, Pyongyang (Credit Image: J.A. de Roo - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, Wikimedia Commons)

While North Korea’s participation in the 2018 Winter Olympics and its recent government-to-government meeting with South Korean officials are both positive developments, no one should forget that Pyongyang has a long history of attempting to manipulate Seoul. On three occasions, the Kim regime pursued extensive engagement with South Korea. North Korea’s motivations for engagement meet one or more of three criteria: It feels threatened by outside events, it is in serious need of aid, or it perceives an opportunity to create tension between South Korea and the United States (US). Kim Jong-un’s efforts in the lead up to, during, and after the 2018 Olympics meet two of these three criteria. North Korea’s need for aid and sanctions relief as well as the perception that tension exists between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and US President Donald Trump explain Pyongyang’s willingness to cooperate with Seoul.

North Korea’s engagement attempts with South Korea have been motivated by extreme circumstances. First, President Nixon’s trip to China in 1972 was a dramatic moment for the Korean Peninsula. North Korea became concerned that Chinese policy shifts might cost Pyongyang a major patron. Kim Il-sung also believed the US might be retreating from East Asia, possibly leaving South Korea vulnerable. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact as well as increasing international recognition of South Korea left North Korea exceedingly vulnerable. In response, Kim Il-sung agreed to the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, thus removing US nuclear weapons from the Peninsula and dramatically reducing the perceived threat from South Korea and its allies. Third, Kim Jong-il mainpulated Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s (1998-2008) Sunshine Policy to acquire needed foreign currency and aid. Kim Jong-il undoubtedly hoped that the prospect of improved relations might pull his South Korean counterparts away from the US at a time of tension between Seoul and Washington. Thus, foreign aid, regime survival, and hope that US armed forces may leave the Peninsula have motivated North Korea’s periodic, brief overtures toward the South.

Kim Jong-un has used the 2018 Winter Olympics and follow-on meetings to achieve two goals. His immediate need is food aid and sanctions relief. North Korea requires approximately five million tonnes of cereal per year. In 2017, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization reported rainfall during the peak growing season was at its lowest level since 2001 when cereal production was two million tonnes. The drought may be amplifying the effect of sanctions. The food distribution system, ineffective at best, is only providing three hundred grams of food per person, daily. Poor agricultural output and sanctions are likely forcing North Korea to raise quotas for its fishermen, which explains the increase in North Korean fishing vessels recovered by Japan. Since Tokyo began tracking these “ghost vessels” in 2014, the twenty-eight recovered in November is a single month record. In 2017, one hundred and four ships were recovered, nearly double the sixty-six in 2016. Like his father, Kim Jong-un is counting on the kindness of the Moon Jae-in government to feed his people and get sanction relief.

Pyongyang’s second, long-term goal is to create tension between South Korea and the US. In this context, North-South engagements since the 2018 Winter Olympics concluded are particularly worrisome. North Korea has proposed improved relations and de-nuclearization in exchange for security guarantees and direct talks with the US. The Moon Administration has eagerly embraced Kim Jong-un’s offer and is attempting to push the Trump Administration into direct talks.

There is nothing wrong with US officials talking to their North Korean counterparts, but there is serious danger in external expectations overtaking the initial purpose of bilateral dialogue. Moon Jae-in ran on a platform featuring North-South rapprochement. Improving relations with the North would likely boost his popularity in South Korea. Therefore, he will probably forcefully encourage the US to compromise with North Korea. Other parties such as China, Russia, and the Europeans may also pressure the US into accommodating North Korea.

With the international community expecting the US to compromise, Kim Jong-un probably hopes he can replicate the outcomes from the Sunshine Policy era. North Korea will limit concessions while relying on others, particularly South Korea, to pressure the US. Similar to the Sunshine Policy era, Seoul’s desire for progress toward reunification and Washington’s reluctance toward policies it perceives as appeasing the Kim’s could create US-South Korea tension. Exacerbating the possibility of US-South Korea friction is the perceived personal animosity between Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump. If taken to its extreme and to some extent based on President Trump’s own campaign rhetoric suggesting leaving the Korean Peninsula, Kim Jong-un may hope that North-South rapprochement will set events in motion creating irrevocable tension between Seoul and Washington.

While it may seem unlikely, North Korea wants tension between South Korea and the US to lead to US forces leaving the Peninsula. Pyongyang has repeatedly made this request in the past, because its leadership views the removal of US forces as the key to reunifying the peninsula. Without the US military presence, the Kim regime believes South Korea lacks conviction and, therefore, is vulnerable. Since 1953, Pyongyang has argued that US forces saved South Korea’s oppressive puppet regime in Seoul during the Korean War and that the South Korean people would rebel against that government if it were not propped up thanks to Washington’s support.

Although aid, sanctions relief, and exacerbating US-South Korea tension are likely primary factors shaping Kim Jong-un’s decision making, there are other considerations as well. Given its ability to control internal messaging and the goodwill attending the Winter Olympics engendered, North Korean participation probably had few drawbacks. Similarly, its willingness to talk with the South Koreans may demonstrate to patrons in China and Russia that Pyongyang is making an effort – thus sanctions should be eased – even if nothing comes from dialogue. Recognizing these factors is important, but only reinforces the need for approaching North Korea with caution.

Kim regime policies are always predicated upon self-interest. History has shown that North Korea only engages with South Korea and the US when it believes there is an opening that it can manipulate. Flushed with success and optimism from the 2018 Winter Olympics, Seoul’s dialogue with Pyongyang and encouraging US-North Korea bilateral talks is playing right into Kim Jong-un’s hands. North Korean overtures are intended to entice South Korean officials and create division between Seoul and Washington. Kim Jong-un is trying to replicate the conditions and outcomes of the Sunshine Policy era while hoping that perceived tension between Presidents Trump and Moon will separate the US and South Korea more than during the early 2000s. While reunification is a worthy pursuit, South Korean and US officials must recognize that Kim Jong-un will never move down this path unless it is on his terms.

 

Davis Florick is a James A. Kelly Non-resident Fellow with the Pacific Forum and a Senior Fellow with the Human Security Centre. Mr. Florick earned his master’s degree in East-West Studies from Creighton University and is completing a War Studies master’s degree at King’s College London.

Image Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=21244159

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Part IV – Pyongyang: The View From Beijing

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By Riccardo Cociani

Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP & President of the PRC, and Kim Jong-un, ‘Supreme Leader’ of the DPRK (Credit Image: Getty)

There is nothing easy regarding Beijing’s strategic calculus about North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK). China’s difficult relationship with the DPRK rests upon balancing its vital interests: first, peace and stability on the Korean peninsula; second, its denuclearization; third, the preservation of its influential relationship with DPRK; fourth, crisis-prevention[1]. In short, China seeks to balance the maintenance of the status-quo, while simultaneously trying to change it. By changing it, China aims to maintain the upper hand. A cost-benefit analysis of the losses and gains resulting from the pursuit of each of its interests mentioned above would require China to adopt a more assertive military stance.

Of critical importance to any strategic calculations is context: not just the territory involved, in this case the Korean Peninsula, but also the global strategic landscape. Any Chinese military strategy involving the DPRK must also take into account China’s other priorities. How should China balance its security stance vis-à-vishe DPRK while simultaneously trying to provide a stable global landscape to allow its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to grow? How to balance foreign and domestic security concerns? What is the best strategy to allow China to reach its ‘New Normal’? This article will first highlight the major factors influencing China’s perceptions of the DPRK threat; and second, it will contend that China is adopting a more assertive military stance. Ultimately, this paper will argue that the likelihood of a Chinese military intervention on the Korean peninsula has now increased, and moreover, that Beijing would benefit from a tougher military stance.

 

Security ‘with Chinese Characteristics’

China’s East Asian insecurity rhetoric blames United States (US) troops, bases, and regional allies for surrounding China with a ‘containment by alliance’ coupled with efforts to undermine China from within[2]. Of greater importance for China is the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Conventional scholarly wisdom held that, should the DPRK acquire nuclear weapons, other states like Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan also would have pursued their own nuclear program. This has not been the case and it remains unlikely. China’s concern of a ‘nuclear containment’, therefore, only rests in theory. There is also the risk of proliferation of nuclear material and weapons to non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. Xi Jinping cannot afford this; the BRI must remain unthreatened and its economy must grow according to its ‘New Normal’[3]. This complicates China’s pursuit of its interests and begs the question: will China intervene? The increasing securitisation of the Sino-DPRK border[4] [5], the opening of China’s first overseas base in Djibouti[6], and the most recent report of a military base in Afghanistan[7] indicate an increasingly assertive China, raising the perspective of Chinese interventionism[8]. While it is noted that China has historically breached its policy numerous times[9], the DPRK may bring the official birth of Chinese interventionism. By no means will this situation create a stable Korean peninsula and increased pressure from the international community will test China’s non-interference sustainability[10].

For China to reach some of its most important vital interests, it may have to reconsider its relationship and alliance with Pyongyang. At the same time, the Sino-DPRK alliance comes with its own benefits, too: a buffer zone. This provides Beijing with faster access to North-Korea, thereby allowing China to reach and secure the DPRK’s nuclear reactors and weapons before the US and its allies could. Furthermore, this middle-ground impedes the American military from reaching China’s border. It also allows China to project its political, economic and diplomatic outreach to the North. Of critical importance to the DPRK are Chinese energy exports. This buffer zone therefore presents a Chinese political extension covered by Beijing’s economic and diplomatic power, with the possibility of military action.

 

China, the US, and the DPRK: The Future of the Korean Peninsula

Only time can tell what Beijing’s next significant move will be. China’s strategic calculus, more than ever, must also find a balance with ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ (XiJinping xindai zhongguotese shehui zhuyi sixiang). China’s pursuit of the status quo[11] appears to be trickling down to its end. For the time being, it appears that China is biding time to create enough room for political, diplomatic, and strategic manoeuvre to rebalance the strategic calculus on the Korean peninsula. This does not signify a particularly decisive shift when historically compared. Nevertheless, the stakes appear higher than ever not only for China, but for the US too.

US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric against the DPRK misguided; evoking military action without clear end goals will not solve anything. In fact, Trump’s rhetoric is accompanied by an inappropriate military approach: limited strike against DPRK nuclear facilities will not lead to limited conflict.[12] Only time would be limited, before DPRK and China would intervene militarily. Limited strikes, therefore, may lead to unlimited war. Their post-9/11 military interventions point to this lesson.

Trump’s threats are more likely to upset Beijing, ultimately raising hostility between the US and China, while simultaneously pushing one another further away. Instead, they should seek military rapprochement, which unfortunately appears unlikely for the time being. Furthermore, as Oriana Skylar Mastro points out, the deterioration of Sino-DPRK relations over the past two decades would lead Beijing not to intervene to protect itself, but to “secure its own interests”[13]. In addition, during Xi Jinping’s most recent visits to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), he called for them to be ready to fight, to win any war, and to “neither fear hardships nor death”[14]. The PLA’s current modernization and restructuring further indicates this: by practising joint warfare capabilities, the CCP expects its armed forces to fight and win on its own. Yet, following the current Sino-American strategic mistrust, this would bring the US and China closer to war rather than closer to peaceful cooperation. Therefore, should Trump’s brinkmanship rhetoric cause conflict, the US and the rest of the world should not expect China to come to their help: China’s self-interests will trump American and global worries.

The deployment of the US’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea in 2017 represents just this. China has strongly opposed its deployment[15]. The anti-ballistic missile defence system is currently deployed to counter the DPRK’s ballistic missiles. Although THAAD’s effectiveness [16] in the Korean peninsula is disputed, China feels particularly threatened by its capabilities, most critically its radar performance. THAAD can detect airborne objects over 1000km away, which is well within Chinese airspace. In addition, THAAD could strengthen the US alliance system in East Asia “by virtue of [its] technical characteristics”[17] by allowing American and South Korean radars, and even Japanese ones if it also acquires THAAD, to be connected. Not only would this improve the alliance’s cohesion, but also improve the chances of hitting targets. Lastly, increased detection and response capabilities signify that any Chinese offensive would have very little surprise effect, thereby hindering its chances of military success. To check and balance THAAD, China may expand its nuclear arsenal and target South Korea “should hostilities erupt between China and the US”[18].

 

Conclusion

Today, China would be better positioned to open its ‘lips and teeth’[19] and tell DPRK that it will “show your strength, carpe diem” instead of “hide your strength, bide your time”[20]. Xi cannot afford a conflict over the Korean peninsula. He has already stated that China will not rescue the DPRK if it causes a conflict[21]. The US has shown its willingness to fight directly against North Korea, meaning US boots on the ground and closer to China’s border, with North Korean refugees attempting to cross into China’s mainland. Xi must carefully and simultaneously balance China’s pursuit of stability on the peninsula, the strengthening of China’s national security, and the pursuit of Korean peace. Currently, China appears to be attempting to wedge into the DPRK via diplomatic, political, and economic channels in order to restrain Kim Jong-un[22]; any serious escalation will witness a Chinese military response to protect itself. Time is of the essence.

Riccardo Cociani graduated in BA War Studies from King’s College London in 2017. He was the President of the KCL Crisis Team, and held research and manager positions on projects related to China, Japan, and NATO. He is currently pursuing a Double MSc in International Affairs at Peking University and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His research focuses on international security, strategy, East Asian security, and China. You can find him at: https://www.linkedin.com/in/riccardo-cociani-32558587/

Notes:

[1] Yinhong, 2015, p.18

[2] Chung, 2011, p.100

[3] Zhang & Chen, 2017

[4] Channel News Asia, 2018

[5] “Every time China-North Korea relations worsen, there’s always a report of China moving troops around the border.” in Zheng, 2017

[6] Zheng, 2017

[7] Toktomushev, 2018

[8] Neriah, 2017

[9] Brown, 2013

[10] Brown, 2013

[11] Chung, 2011, p.108

[12] Most recent military threats only indicate a tactical reaction to an eventual DPRK provocation. It remains difficult to assert with confidence what the US’s end goals in a war against DPRK would be. This only raises doubts whether the US has an actual military strategy intended to reach those goals.

[13] Skylar Mastro, 2017

[14] Phillips, 2018

[15] The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2017

[16] Cirincione, 2017

[17] DeVore, 2017, p.70

[18] Devore, 2017, p.69

[19] Mao Zedong described the Sino-DPRK relationship to be as close as ‘lips and teeth’

[20] Famously put by Deng Xiaoping, this has shaped Chinese foreign policy and military strategy for the past three decades

[21] Skylar Mastro, 2017

[22] Daekwon, 2017

 

Image Source: Here

 

Bibliography:

Brown, Kerry. 2013. “Is China’s non-interference policy sustainable?”. Blog. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24100629.

Channel News Asia. “Troops, cameras, radiation: China preps for North Korea crisis”. Blog. Channel News Asia. 2018. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/troops-cameras-radiation-china-preps-for-north-korea-crisis-9876050.

 

Chung, Wook Chong. 2011. “The Rise of China and the Security Dynamics in the Korean Peninsula” in Li, Mingjiang and Lee, Dongmin. China and East Asian Strategic Dynamics: The Shaping of a New Regional Order, 95-112. 1 ed. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books

 

Cirincione, Joe. 2017. “No, We Cannot Shoot Down North Korea’s Missiles”. Blog. Defense One. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/09/no-we-cannot-shoot-down-north-koreas-missiles/141070/.

 

Daekwon, Son. 2017. “China’s North Korea Solution”. Blog. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/chinas-north-korea-solution/.

 

DeVore, Marc R. 2017. “Off the Radar? China, THAAD and Northeast Asia’s Alliances”. Global Asia 12(3): 68-75.

 

Nathan, Andrew J. 2009. “Principles of China’s Foreign Policy”. Blog. Asia for Educators. http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm.

 

Neriah, Jacques. 2017. “Chinese Troops Arrive in Syria to Fight Uyghur Rebels”. Blog. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. http://jcpa.org/chinese-troops-arrive-syria-fight-uyghur-rebels/.

 

Phillips, Tom. 2018. “XI Jinping tells army not to fear death in show of China’s military might”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/04/xi-jinping-tells-army-not-to-fear-death-in-show-of-chinas-military-might

 

Skylar Mastro, Oriana. 2017. “Why China Won’t Rescue North Korea: What to Expect if Things Fall Apart”. Foreign Affairs. https://foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-12-12/why-china-wont-rescue-north-korea?cid=int-now&pgtype=hpg®ion=br2

 

The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2017. China’s Policies on Asia-­Pacific Security Cooperation. Beijing: Xinhua. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm

Toktomushev, Kemel. 2018. “China’s Military Base in Afghanistan”. Blog. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-military-base-in-afghanistan/.

 

Yinhong, Shi. 2015. “Painful Lessons, Reversing Practices, and Ongoing Limitations: China Facing North Korea Since 2003” in Freeman, Carla P. (arg.). China and North Korea: Strategic and Policy Perspectives from a Changing China, 17-36. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

 

Zhang, Jing., & Chen, Jian. 2017. “Introduction to China’s new normal economy”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 15(1), 1-4

 

Zheng, Sarah. 2017. “China’s Djibouti military base: ‘logistics facility’, or platform for geopolitical ambitions overseas?”. South China Morning Post. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113300/chinas-djibouti-military-base-logistics-facility-or.

 

Zheng, Sarah. 2017. “Chinese border troops hold drills in sub-zero temperatures amid tensions on Korean peninsula”. South China Morning Post. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2121820/chinese-border-troops-hold-drills-sub-zero-temperatures.

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Part I – The view from Pyongyang

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By Ashley Ryan

 

Kim Jong-un is primarily interested in the dynasty’s survival, like his father and his grand-father before him ( Credit: CC0 Creative Commons)

 

The view from Pyongyang is fundamentally different than that of the West. Pyongyang has not only a more monolithic perspective than that of London or Washington (the natural consequence of any dictatorship), it is a culturally and qualitatively dissimilar viewpoint. In order to analyse the outlook of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), however, it is first necessary to understand the mindset of its leader, Kim Jong-un. For all the American bombast about Kim being crazy, there is widespread acknowledgement amongst senior Western officials that he is, in fact, quite sane. For instance, a high-ranking CIA representative confirmed that Kim is a ‘very rational actor’. This means that Kim’s actions are more predictable (and more influenceable by the actions or inactions of the international community) than they would otherwise seem to be. Why is this so?

The Kim dynasty is largely interested in its own survival. Beyond this, the culture of the country dictates that the concept of ‘face’ is essential, and this feeds into how the DPRK relates to other countries and how it engages in diplomacy. For example, it has been noted that during the far-right violence in America (in Charlottesville, Virginia) that took place in August 2017, the DPRK was notably quiet, despite escalating rhetoric concerning Guam in the preceding weeks. It has been suggested that this sudden de-escalation occurred, at least in part, because it enabled Kim to save face while stepping back from the brinkmanship in which he had been engaged. In all likelihood, the DPRK never intended to follow through on its bellicose statements about Guam, but after US President Donald Trump had responded aggressively to the DPRK’s threats, Kim may have felt he did not have the option to back down from ‘American intimidation’ without losing face in the eyes of his citizens. A significant loss of face could work to delegitimise the Kim family’s claim to special authority over the nation and, ultimately, it could thereby leave their dynasty open to challenge and overthrow. It would be wise for Western leaders to note this ratchet effect, which can occur during particularly tense moments, as well as the release mechanism which allowed rapid de-escalation. This phenomenon should be taken into account in future negotiations.

The DPRK sees a world in which imperialist powers loom threateningly, a narrative which has unfortunately been strengthened in the mind of Kim Jong-un over recent months, not least by Trump’s bellicose rhetoric . No doubt intended as a deterrent, Trump’s comments instead served to confirm Kim’s fears – that he is, or will soon be, an American target for regime change. For example, in May 2017, Pyongyang claimed they had foiled a CIA ‘biochemical plot’ to assassinate Kim (although commentators noted it was possible this was an internal coup attempt, expediently ascribed to America). In either case, Kim seems genuinely concerned about the possibility of an assassination, and in February he took on some ex-KGB agents to advise and train his bodyguards. The South Korean intelligence agency has described Kim as ‘extremely nervous’ about the possibility that he may be assassinated in a ‘decapitation operation’. Reinforcing his concerns, it has been reported that the US Navy’s Seal Team Six (who conducted the raid in which Osama bin Laden was killed) trained alongside South Korean special forces in March 2017 in order to practice a surgical strike on Kim in the event of war.

More importantly, Kim has taken careful note of the fates of Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein. According to an ex-CIA analyst, the lesson Kim has taken from these scenarios is that, until he has significant nuclear power of his own, he will remain vulnerable to the vagaries of Western decision-making about whether or not he should remain in power. State media in the DPRK also makes reference to this idea. The annual military exercises (Foal Eagle and Key Resolve) between America and South Korea do nothing to dispel tensions, particularly as Pyongyang fears that the drills will one day be used as cover to achieve the element of surprise in an invasion. Also, Kim feels he is under significant time pressure to achieve military independence. Currently, in the event of the DPRK being attacked, China is bound to act in their defence per the terms of the Sino-DPRK Treaty of 1961, which was most recently renewed in 2001 (but is due to expire in 2021). Recent diplomatic signalling, however, has shown China may already be reluctant to defend the DPRK – and is therefore unlikely to renew the treaty beyond 2021. Also, Kim likely feels the proximity of American allies and weapons (including South Korea, Japan and the US military base on Guam) all too keenly. In all probability, he believes that if the DPRK is not a militarily independent nuclear power by the end of the next four years, the Kim dynasty – and therefore the DPRK – will be at imminent risk of an American (or American-backed) attack.

This time pressure is underpinned by the national ideology of the DPRK, juche (self-reliance), which is both political and religious in character. Juche means that Kim is understood as the embodiment of God by his people, rendering the ideas of religious and political leadership inseparable. Various commentators have argued about the extent to which North Koreans actually believe this, but it nonetheless seems clear that Kim, at least, sees himself as the rightful authority over all Koreans (reintegration of North and South Korea is essential to the idea of juche). Indeed, under this system Kim is positioned as the rightful saviour of humanity and civilisation. This concept may sound oddly familiar, and it should, because it mirrors the fundamental notions of American exceptionalism. The real danger in the war of words between Kim and Trump, then, is that both men arguably believe that they are the saviour of their people, and that their nations are the proverbial shining city upon a hill for the rest of humanity.

Juche, however, is also about practical things. At its core, juche aims to ensure the sovereign independence of the nation by ensuring it does not need economic, military or other links with other nations in order to function successfully. Another important idea in the DPRK is byungjin (parallel advance), which pursues nuclear weapons on the basis that – once an effective nuclear deterrent has been generated – the fiscal savings achieved can be used to benefit the nation. These ideas underpin Kim’s strategy of nuclear development, and can be seen in the symbolic name of one of his latest test missiles – the Juche Bird.

The so-called ‘provocation cycle’ that the DPRK go through when testing new missiles is, perhaps, a strategy designed to intentionally worry the international community – after all, domestically speaking, it legitimises Kim’s massive military spending and gives him greater political authority. Ultimately, though, the cause of this military build-up is simply that Pyongyang is wrestling with the same security dilemma that all states must confront. Kim, quite rationally, fears his own assassination or overthrow. He sees America as the primary threat, notes his geographical proximity to various American allies – and sees nuclear weapons as the only functional deterrent. In the contemporary world, and considering Trump’s hawkish stance, he may not be entirely wrong about that.

 

Ashley, an undergraduate in the War Studies BA programme at King’s College London, has research interests including military history, defence and security. She was awarded Third (Equal) Prize in RUSI’s 2016 Trench Gascoigne Essay Prize competition. She also is the founder the Shield blog, which focuses on defence and security analysis (https://shieldblog.com).

Image Source: https://pixabay.com/en/north-korea-kim-jong-un-2972195/

Strife Series on National Perspectives in North-East Asian Rivalries, Introduction – One Region, Different Standpoints

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By Andrea Fischetti

 

Northeast Asia is a region of crucial importance, from a strategic and economic point of view.

 

East Asia is home to one fifth of the world’s population, and some of the global economic powerhouses. In particular, the second and third world largest economies, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan, are located in Northeast Asia. The region may subsequently be characterised as one of crucial importance for international affairs not only for the size of its economy, but also from a strategic point of view.

In this area, North Korea in particular has been in the limelight during the past year due to its aggressive nuclear program and tests, which resulted in strategic and diplomatic tensions. This country, however, is not the only cause for disputes in Northeast Asia. The whole region is deeply divided in terms of culture, ideology, and politics, resulting in some cases, in inter-state relations characterised by “hot economics, cold politics”.[1]

Although current tensions in East Asia are considered of increasing importance by the international community, many of the Northeast Asian divisions and rivalries are primarily fuelled by historical roots. Amy King and Brendan Taylor identify a “history spiral”[2] in this region: a competitive approach to “re-remembering”[3] and rewriting history, common to all regional actors. The lack of effective international multilateral organisations is a further reason why this region is “ripe for rivalry”.[4]

Therefore, the purpose of this series is to explore the national perspectives of Northeast Asian countries. Understanding what Pyongyang’s priorities are, how Japan sees itself, what worries China, and where do the differences between Taiwan and China come from, can help to understand regional disputes as well.

In the first article, Ashley Ryan takes us to Pyongyang, where the North Korean thought and perspective on international affairs is unveiled. She analyses the strategic thinking of Kim Jong-un and explains what is the ultimate goal of Pyongyang, arguing that what North Korea has been doing so far is both rational and coherent in strategic terms.

In the second article, Andrea Fischetti explains why Japan is a pacifist country, and how Japan’s pacifism affects Tokyo’s approach to disputes with its neighbours such as China and South Korea. According to Fischetti, the post-war period largely shaped culture and society of Northeast Asian countries, and the differences in culture and society now encourage rivalries as countries have different perspectives on the same issues.

In the third article, Dean Chen explores the Taiwan issue and the nature of cross-strait relations, analysing Taiwan’s national perspective. The author argues that Taiwan and China have mismatching identities, which from an ontological security perspective, results in a rivalry characterised by misunderstandings.

Lastly, in the fourth article, Riccardo Cociani analyses the strategic and political challenges that the North Korean tensions pose to Beijing. Adopting a Chinese perspective, he explores China’s approach to tackling these challenges, with an eye to regional security.

This series offers a unique opportunity to explore the ideas and points of view of some of the main regional actors in Northeast Asia. Thanks to Ryan, Fischetti, Cociani, and Chen, these different perspectives come together in one place, and all contribute to further our understanding of Northeast Asian rivalries.

Andrea (@A_Fischetti) is a MEXT scholar and conducts research on Japan’s national identity and East Asian Security at the University of Tokyo. He is also a Series Editor for Strife. He recently earned his MA in War Studies from King’s College London, following a BA with First Class Honours in International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies. He worked for a year in the House of Commons. A recipient of the JASSO Scholarship (日本学生支援機構), he was a visiting student at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University. More information about Andrea can be found at www.about.me/afischetti

Notes:

[1] Dreyer, J. T., 2014, pp. 326-341.

[2] King, A. and Taylor, B., 2016, p. 113

[3] King, A. and Taylor, B., 2016, p. 112

[4] Friedberg, A. L., 1994, pp. 13-14

Image source:

Here at https://spfusa.org/chairmans-message/flurry-of-east-asia-summits-signals-thawing-of-icy-relations/

Bibliography:

  • Dreyer, J. T. (2014) China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’. Orbis, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 326-341.
  • Friedberg, A. L. (1994) Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5–33
  • King, A. and Taylor, B. (2016) Northeast Asia’s New ‘History Spiral’. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 111–119.

Trump’s pledge to “totally destroy” North Korea – a threat too far?

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By Toby Fenton

US President Donald Trump addresses the United Nations General Assembly, 19 September 2017 (Image Credit: : BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI / Getty Images)

 

In his speech at the UN General Assembly in September, US President Donald Trump declared that “North Korea’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threatens the entire world with unthinkable loss of human life.” Laying out the proposed US response to this threat, Trump made his position clear: while the US “has great strength and patience,” Trump said, if the US “is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons is one of the most significant threats to regional (and even global) peace and security. Few observers – at least outside of North Korea – would disagree with Trump’s assertion that a fully nuclear-armed Pyongyang is something that “No nation on Earth has an interest in seeing”. North Korea’s provocative nuclear and ICBM tests and the US’ heightened military posture in the region, compounded by inflammatory rhetoric from both sides, represent a dangerous game of brinkmanship.

Trump’s particular phraseology regarding how the US would act might be somewhat understandable, given the nature and history of the situation. Trump’s pledge may have been intended to reassure the American public and her allies. It could bolster US credibility as a regional security guarantor against North Korean aggression. It also fits the pattern of fiery tit-for-tat rhetoric between the US and North Korea that has become commonplace over the past year. However, Trump’s threat to “totally destroy” North Korea was not only highly provocative and carelessly unthinking in its own right – it will likely only worsen the situation – but it also places the US on very shaky legal (and ethical) ground.

What’s in a threat?

President Trump’s threat was not that the US would use something akin to ‘all necessary measures’ (a phrase beloved by the UN Security Council) against a North Korean attack. Nor did Trump state explicitly that the US is prepared to use its own nuclear weapons if it came to an actual or imminent nuclear exchange. Instead, Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea if the US was “forced to defend itself or its allies”.

While much attention is paid to the legality of the use of force in international relations, arguably less attention is paid to threats to use force. Yet under international law, these concepts bear close similarities. UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibits “the threat or use of force” in international relations – with the only two Charter exceptions being force authorised by the UN Security Council under Article 42, and force as an act of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51. In its oft-cited 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted that “if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal – for whatever reason – the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.” The ICJ further noted that determining whether a threat to use force would violate Article 2(4) “depends upon whether the particular use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or against the Purposes of the United Nations or whether, in the event that it were intended as a means of defence, it would necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality.” In this view, the legality of a threat to use force for self-defence is subject to the same criteria as the use of force so envisaged.

Under customary international law the two constitutive criteria of the ‘inherent right’ (as it is called in the UN Charter) of self-defence are necessity and proportionality. US-British diplomatic correspondence following the mid-19th century Caroline incident established that the necessity of using force in self-defence must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation”. Force must be an absolute last resort. In the face of an actual or imminent attack by North Korea, the US’ use of force in self-defence would prima facie meet the requirement of necessity. The post-Caroline correspondence also established the criterion of proportionality: force used in self-defence must not be “unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it”. The use of force must be proportional to what is necessary to defend against a particular attack.

To totally destroy, or not to totally destroy? That is the question…

Would the total destruction of North Korea be legally justifiable as a means of self-defence? The legality of the use or threat of force by the US would be determined by the nature and circumstances of the attack (‘anticipatory’ or ‘pre-emptive’ self-defence notwithstanding). Fortunately, such an attack has not occurred; and it is difficult to say what form it would take. However, Trump’s threat to “totally destroy” North Korea goes far beyond what could reasonably be considered both necessary and proportional in self-defence. Attempting or threatening to “totally destroy” another country as a means of self-defence is unlikely to ever be lawful – unless doing so is the only way to defend against an attack.

This raises another question: under what circumstances would a North Korean attack make the total annihilation of that country and its 25 million people – the vast majority of whom are civilians – both necessary and proportional? In making such threats, neither Trump nor his legal advisors – assuming they were consulted – appear to have given these questions serious consideration. That there exists an inherent right of every state (indeed, every person) to use force for self-defence is unquestionable. However, Trump’s threat was positioned against the prospect of the US being “force to defend itself” against some unqualified North Korean attack, with the inference from Trump’s statement being that any attack by Pyongyang would automatically trigger the US to initiate the total destruction of North Korea. That threat is likely to have constituted a serious violation of international law – articulated, ironically, in the primary chamber of the very organisation established to advance international peace, security, and the rule of law.

A pattern is apparently emerging in the US administration. Trump’s stated threat towards North Korea (legal opaqueness notwithstanding) follows the administration’s inability, or refusal, to articulate a coherent legal basis for its cruise missile strike against a Syrian airbase in April this year, following an alleged chemical weapons attack. In that case, many (especially Western) political leaders and observers supported the US strike – although, importantly, the lack of proper US legal justification arguably nullified any potential opinio juris (that is, a sense of legal obligation to act in a certain way) that could be attributable to Washington, thus in turn making subsequent international support for the strike legally moot. Following Trump’s speech at the UN General Assembly in September, however, the international reaction was far more discouraging. Perhaps threatening the total annihilation of another country really was a step too far.

Toby Fenton recently completed a Masters degree in International Peace & Security at King’s College London.

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