nuclear

Can the Abraham Accords Encourage the Denuclearisation of Israel?

October 28, 2020 by Aleix Nadal Campos

by Aleix Nadal Campos

From left to right, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, the Prime Minister of Israel, the President of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the United Arab Emirates sign the Abraham Accords at the White House (Image credit: Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead).

The Arab states have laid two pathways for Israel to normalise its diplomatic ties with them. The first is through the Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which establishes that Arab states will only recognise Israel once a peace settlement with Palestine has been achieved. The second, and less noticed one, is through the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East’s (WMDFZME) initiative, whereby the Arab states and Iran have implicitly acknowledged that Israel could gain their formal recognition once the latter has dismantled its nuclear arsenal. Yet, the agenda of the Arab states and Iran in regard to the Zone initiative is presumably incompatible with Israel’s, whose single objective is to establish diplomatic relations with regional states. In this vein, by offering diplomatic normalisation with two Gulf countries without any stipulation that binds Israel to clear disarmament commitments, the Abraham Accords have undermined the few instruments that Arab states and Iran had at their disposal to entice Israel into foregoing its nuclear capabilities.

The Abraham Accords

Israel’s (unrecognized) nuclear arsenal serves to ultimately safeguard the country from self-perceived existential threats and quantitative asymmetries vis-à-vis other regional states. These asymmetries, however, could soon be diminished. On 15 September 2020, U.S. President Donald J. Trump hosted a ceremony at the White House where the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain forged official bilateral diplomatic ties with Israel. Immediately following this, the three Middle Eastern countries issued a joint declaration of principles that has been since dubbed as the Abraham Accords. Statements by US and Israeli officials suggest that other regional countries may soon follow in Bahrain’s and UAE’s footsteps, giving Israel the official recognition it has always sought. Because Israel has justified its nuclear arsenal on the basis of a threat of an all-out war against them, one could surmise that the Abraham Accords could become a watershed moment for the eventual de-nuclearisation of Israel and the region as a whole. Unfortunately, diplomatic and security-related factors emerging from the Accords will further deter Israel from acquiescing to join a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

The history of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East

To dismantle Israel’s nuclear monopoly and shrink its strategic superiority, Arab countries and Iran have long advocated for the de-nuclearisation of the Middle East. In 1974, Iran and Egypt submitted a joint proposal to the United Nations General Assembly to create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East (NWFZME) that would forbid the development, testing, possession, acquisition, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons in the region. Since 1980, annual resolutions from the UN General Assembly endorsing the proposal were approved unanimously until 2018, including by Israel, demonstrating that even the latter supports the initiative. The scope of the prospective treaty was subsequently broadened to include all weapons of mass destruction following a proposal by the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1990.

Whilst several dialogues have taken place since the initiative’s inception, through both official channels and backchannel diplomacy, progress has been notably absent, at least until recently. In November 2019, a conference under the United Nations’ auspices was held where all Arab states and Iran, as well as extra-regional countries, participated to discuss the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZME). Henceforth, the November Conference is expected to be held annually until an agreement on the Zone is secured. Citing that the conference represented an attempt by the Arab states and Iran to impose a diplomatic process without prior consultation, Israel declined to participate in the first edition and is not expected to attend the second one, partly withering away the momentum generated by the new multilateral process. If this opt-out continues, the credibility of the entire process could be put into question, for the dismantlement of Israel’s nuclear capabilities remains the chief target of the initiative.

In essence, the persistent lack of progress and Israel’s non-involvement in the Conference reflects the fact that the ultimate objectives of Arab countries and Iran are diametrically opposed to those of Israel. For the former countries, the Zone is an instrument to dismantle Israel’s nuclear arsenal and erode the military edge that Israel enjoys over other regional countries. For the latter, any framework to negotiate a WMDFZ in the Middle East is desirable to the extent that Israel can use the process itself to normalise diplomatic relations with regional countries. These conflicting objectives have translated into a sort of chicken-and-egg dilemma about the sequencing between ‘regional peace’ and ‘disarmament’. In particular, Israel has adopted a security-based approach whereby disarmament should only occur in a context where regional peace has been previously reached. Conversely, Arab countries and Iran contend that disarmament itself creates regional peace and as such Israel should proceed with dismantling its nuclear arsenal if it ever wants peace in the region.

The question that remains, then, is whether the Abraham Accords can encourage Israel to re-engage with the Zone initiative and participate in the yearly conferences until its de-nuclearization is agreed upon.

The Abraham Accords and the de-nuclearization of Israel

In addition to the UAE’s and Bahrain’s failure to extract disarmament commitments from Israel, which undermines the ‘disarmament first’ approach taken by Middle Eastern countries, there are two security-related factors emanating from the Abraham Accords that thwart the efforts to establish the Zone. First, the Accords are an extension of the increasing bilateral cooperation that has taken place for the past few years between Israel and some of the Gulf countries in the security field. This cooperation has been largely motivated by their shared interest to contain the emergence of Iran as a determined geopolitical player and by their hostility towards the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). By formalising this anti-Iran coalition, the deal may then contribute to exacerbating inter-state polarisation in the Persian Gulf, potentially encouraging Iran to resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In turn, the escalation of tensions could strengthen Israel’s self-perceived legitimacy to have a nuclear deterrent as the country considers Iran as its largest security threat. Thus, in Iran, Israel would have the perfect alibi to not seriously engage with the Zone initiative.

Second, reports that the US would reward the UAE’s normalisation agreement with Israel by allowing it to purchase the F-35 fighter further dwindles the prospects of a WMDFZME. Such a sweetener would not be unprecedented in the context of a US Administration brokering a peace deal between Israel and an Arab country. Indeed, the US delivered significant military assistance to both Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994, respectively, when they signed their peace treaties with the Jewish state. If the UAE was to receive this military payoff, however, Israel’s qualitative military edge over Middle Eastern countries that the US has long been committed to would be compromised, albeit only partially.

Other Arab countries could then interpret that peace with Israel in exchange for US military assistance would be the new gold standard and subsequently demand analogous conditions, contributing to the erosion of Israel’s conventional military superiority in the region. In such a scenario, it would be hard to envisage Israel being more willing to take progressive steps towards nuclear disarmament when nuclear superiority would constitute the ultimate strategy to offset this potentially new military reality. In fact, some Israeli officials have already aired their concerns that an arsenal of the F-35 fighter jet in the hands of an alternative leadership cadre in the UAE that is less keen on building bridges with Israel would constitute a security threat.

Conclusion

The Abraham Accords might usher in a new era in the Middle East where regional peace is progressively achieved. Accordingly, they could result in the configuration of novel security conditions that are more conducive to Israel’s nuclear disarmament. Seen in this light, the Accords could be positively assessed in terms of its contribution to nuclear disarmament. In fact, it is not implausible to assume that Israel could participate in upcoming editions of the November Conference as a gesture of goodwill towards the Arab states, for its participation would not entail any binding commitments with respect to its nuclear posture. Nevertheless, despite their positive potential, the Accords may have entrenched a series of incentives that undercut the (already) dim prospects of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East in the foreseeable future.

Aleix Nadal Campos received his MA in European Studies: International Relations and European Politics from Maastricht University. He is currently an EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium intern at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. In the course of his internship, he has published a paper on the policy options that the European Union can adopt to streamline the prospects of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. You can find him on Twitter @AleixNadal.

Nuclear Non-Use: Normative versus Legal Constraints

September 10, 2020 by Anahad Khangura

by Anahad Kaur Khangura

“Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants,” as General Omar N. Bradley famously said with reference to nuclear weapons and their use. Pictured: the atomic cloud over Nagasaki (Image credit: Wikimedia Commons).

The emergence of nuclear non-use is understood to be a significant norm of constraint in the international security arena. During the Cold War, non-use emerged as an instrument to maintain deterrence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This longstanding tradition of non-use is surprising when one considers that with the inception of the nuclear era, it was broadly assumed that nuclear weapons would become a ‘standard feature of modern warfare’. In March 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower even stated that nuclear weapons should be ‘used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else’. However, the striking fact about nuclear weapons is that they have not been used since 1945. Nevertheless, nations are actively constructing nuclear weapons programmes to maintain their strategic interests.

In light of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is questionable whether the use of nuclear weapons would still be legal under the current laws of conflict set up under the Geneva Conventions. However, even though nuclear non-use stands strong today, there is no guarantee that nuclear-armed countries would not consider using such weaponry when their national integrity is under imminent threat.

Normative constraints on non-use

When considering the origin of normative constraints regarding the nuclear taboo, it is imperative to understand the meaning of the term ‘norm’. A norm could be defined as “a shared expectation about behaviour, a standard of right or wrong.” Research on the subject of nuclear non-use uses a variety of terms such as ‘nuclear taboo’ and ‘tradition’ to define its nature. Should nuclear non-use become a ‘taboo’, it could be identified as a “powerful de facto prohibition against the first use of nuclear weapons.” Indeed, violent instances such as the wars in Korea and Vietnam highlight that the US military addressed ethical and normative concerns while discussing the deployment of nuclear bombs, or the non-use thereof. These examples display that normative concerns have previously acted as driving factors within the USA’s nuclear decision-making. Such a taboo doctrine can also be affiliated with a prevalent repulsion towards nuclear capability and widely-held inhibitions on their use.

The scope of the normative aspect of nuclear non-use is that it can either restrain the use of nuclear weapons instrumentally, where it could appear in the ‘form of a perceived cost’; or it could curb their proliferation more substantively when the set of a country’s core values do not align with their use. In the past, the nuclear taboo has served as a ‘moulding’ component in the historical pattern behind non-use. However, one ought to remember that ‘norms do not determine outcomes, they [merely] shape realms of possibility’. As such, norms influence the likelihood of a certain course of action. By stigmatising the use of nuclear weapons, then, the nuclear taboo lowered the probability of nuclear weapons use. However, it remains hard to quantify such a statement without a legal component.

Legal constraints on non-use

Legal frameworks on nuclear non-use are an instrument to maintain mutual deterrence among adversaries. Legal constraints such as the No First Use policy (NFU), a pledge made against the using nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary are beneficial in upholding the custom of nuclear non-use within a legal structure. Therefore, the mutual guarantee against the deployment of nuclear weapons, as it is based on internationally recognised legal conventions, serves as an incentive in preserving the tradition of non-use.

However, the current machinery of international politics is facing immense obstruction due to the lack of trust and confidence among nations. Think for example of the slow process in formalising the NFU policy between India and Pakistan. For this reason, legal restrictions are gaining momentum as they promote accountability and provide states with enhanced confidence regarding nuclear non-use by their adversaries. In addition to ensuring confidence, legal constraints on non-use are also supported by a framework of culpability which ensures repercussions upon any party which violates the clauses of any legally binding agreement.

Other constraints on non-use

While it is imperative to recognise the complementary nature between the legal and normative constraints on nuclear non-use, it would be misleading to only consider these elements in describing the structure of nuclear non-use and its function.

Whereas the realist approach towards non-use emphasises the maintenance of mutual deterrence through the regulation of material interests; constructivism approaches from the perspective of norms. Therefore, the overemphasis of the normative elements might overlook the need for maintaining strategic stability and the significance of rational self-interest which played a vital role in forming the non-use tradition at the height of the Cold War. Similarly, overplaying the legal frameworks might lead to ignorance on normative constraints.

However, both approaches are obstructed by deficiencies as the sole reliance on either realist or constructivist approach might be an incomplete approach towards understanding non-use. To avoid oversimplifying a complex issue, one ought to be aware that other factors also contribute to the longstanding existence of nuclear non-use as a custom. In fact, understanding the complexity of nuclear non-use requires the addressing of a combination of factors that impact a nation’s decision-making process towards nuclear weapons and their (non-)use.

There are major anomalies if nuclear non-use is only understood from a single vantage point. A notable example is the case of nuclear non-use between India and Pakistan. Both parties possess nuclear weapons and are also not bound by the legal confinements of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the countries consider the treaty as a discriminative policy of disarmament that does not impose a fair and complete ban of nuclear weapons. However, despite their endemic rivalry and border insecurities regarding the disputed territory of Kashmir, both sides maintain it.

Multiple reasons could explain non-use in this scenario: it could be that both sides abide by the global non-proliferation norms that exist even outside the parameters of the NPT; both sides might be upholding the normative elements of non-use to avoid large scale destruction; or both parties might well be adopting non-use to preserve their global reputation as responsible members of the international community. However, the tradition of non-use should not be understood as absolute but rather be considered loosely, keeping in mind that states might alter the custom to elevate their national interests.

Additionally, legal frameworks can also be interpreted as a form of internalisation and institutionalisation of the nuclear taboo. Therefore, normative and legal constraints on non-use not only interact with one another but they also provide a “stabilising” effect on nuclear non-use. Consequently, the prescriptive nature of nuclear non-use can only be conceived in its true essence when an integrated approach is adopted which uniformly acknowledges all factors involved.

Anahad Khangura is a Master’s student at War Studies. Her academic interests are inclined towards types of political violence and counterterrorism strategies. Additionally, Anahad bears a keen interest in the security concerns of the Asia Pacific region, specifically in context of the trilateral relations between India, Pakistan and China. For her Masters dissertation, Anahad evaluated the adaptability of terrorist organisations in light of a comparative analysis between Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hezbollah.

Risking New York for Paris? The Illusion of the US Nuclear Umbrella

May 1, 2020 by Orion Noda

by Orion Noda

President Donald J. Trump reinstates sanctions on Iran after the US withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal in May 2018 (Image credit: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images)

Deterrence theory is almost as old as the nuclear age. Consequently, the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and the use of nuclear weapons as a retaliatory deterrent has dominated the field of nuclear weapons and politics from the 1950s onwards.[1] However, like any field, a series of biases infect it. This blind trust and belief in the postulations of Deterrence Theory has established what Nick Ritchie called the “regime of nuclear truth” and denominated “nuclear absolutism.”[2] The effects of this unquestionable belief in Deterrence Theory sharply increases States’ reliance on and valuing of nuclear weapons. Consequentially, it poses an existential threat to disarmament processes and severely undermines nuclear weapon States’ Article VI obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is long past time these ‘truths’ were punctured.

Deterrence Theory, derived from a Realist school of thought, postulates that the possession of nuclear weapons – the ultimate deterrent – will thwart and deter attacks against the possessor. The sheer destructive power inherent in a single nuclear weapon, let alone thousands detonating in quick succession, make their use (almost) unthinkable. As a means to solidifying a unified front against the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Western European States along with the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 to deter the Soviet Union’s massive conventional forces, as well as its ever-increasing nuclear arsenal after its first test a few months later. With NATO, the United States became the guarantor of the defence of Western Europe, and the so-called US nuclear umbrella was born.

As stated in Article V of the NATO treaty, an attack on one member was an attack on all of them. The US nuclear umbrella is, therefore, a security assurance agreement that the US deterrent intended primarily to defend itself, also extends over the territory of its NATO partners.[3] In other words, the United States would defend NATO members against aggressors, even resorting to nuclear weapons, should the situation require these capabilities to be deployed. In theory, the US nuclear umbrella would soothe NATO members’ anxieties and serve as an alternative to the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons.[4] However, given its Realist roots, the crucial question arises: when push comes to shove, would the United States be willing to risk its own security to defend its allies in Europe? What are the costs of sustaining the illusion of the US nuclear umbrella? While these questions retained an academic quality for some time, in the Age of Trump, they urgently require revisiting.

Alliances under Anarchy: a Realist Take

Realism puts significant emphasis on self-help given the anarchical setting of the International System. Cooperation is scarce and limited, and only possible if states see it in their primal interest of survival and quest for power. Nevertheless, military alliances do happen and are circumscribed in the theoretical postulations of Realism—they last for as long as the states involved see it as comparatively advantageous. In particular, alliances are formed to counter a third, more powerful, state.[5]

The US nuclear umbrella, one of the crown jewels of NATO, relies heavily on the existence and credibility of military alliances. If the alliance fails, so do the security assurances. In that sense, even though military alliances do exist, it seems almost incredible that, under Deterrence and, therefore, Realist logic, military alliances would include credible nuclear security assurances. In other words, following the Realist rationale of self-help and its ultimate goal of survival, it seems highly unlikely that a state would risk its own security and survival to come to the defence of another state, ally or not, that is threatened by a third.

Historically, military alliances based on mutual assistance and defence have proven to be nothing but empty promises. In 1924, Czechoslovakia and France signed the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, which stated that the two States would come to the other’s aid in times of peril.[6] In 1938, given the rise of tensions just before the Second World War in Europe, Czechoslovakia also had a gentleman’s agreement with the United Kingdom regarding the latter’s aid in case of a military invasion of the former by Germany.[7] However, when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, neither agreement was fulfilled, following several of the bedrock assumptions of the Realist school of thought.

Alliances, therefore, are susceptible to failure. As hard as it is for military alliances to succeed, the nuclear age amplifies the obstacles for their endurance. Even at the height of the Cold War, inside the war planning rooms of the Pentagon and the Strategic Air Command, the nuclear security assurances seemed to tremble. During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, top US officials were reconsidering whether the United States should employ nuclear weapons to defend an eventual military incursion of the USSR in West Germany.[8] Since the development of nuclear weapons and the dominating logic of nuclear deterrence, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that security assurances in the nuclear age are quasi-empty words. In 2020, revisiting the bases of the US nuclear umbrella—particularly in Europe—does it still hold any value as a credible security assurance?

New York for Paris? The US Nuclear Umbrella Revisited

The strength of the US nuclear umbrella guarantee raised questions from the very start, most notably from France. In the 1960s, General Charles de Gaulle was highly sceptical of US nuclear security assurances, particularly after the USSR developed intercontinental ballistic missiles with enough range to reach the United States. This scepticism led de Gaulle to pose the question whether US President John F. Kennedy would be willing to risk New York for Paris. Eventually, this very lack of confidence fomented the development of France’s force de frappe—the French nuclear arsenal – allowing France to be able to protect itself and avoid a strict dependency on NATO.[9]

The question posed by de Gaulle summarises the central issues with the credibility of US – or any – nuclear security assurances and umbrellas. In 1970, given the USSR’s massive conventional forces and its nuclear parity with the US, President Richard M. Nixon believed the nuclear umbrella was no longer sustainable.[10] Despite his beliefs, Nixon could not publicly admit the frailty of the US nuclear umbrella lest it create anxieties in its European allies and tampers with the Cold War balance.[11]

Fast forward to the present day, Donald Trump was elected President in 2016 with the slogan ‘America First.’ Ever since tensions have risen in the nuclear sphere in multiple fronts. President Trump, echoing President Harry S. Truman’s words from 1945, famously threatened “fire and fury” against North Korea and withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal. Moreover, relations with Russia have also deteriorated after the mutual withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the seemingly unwillingness to extend New START—the only treaty remaining treaty limiting US and Russia’s nuclear arsenals—despite Russian President Putin’s positive signalling towards extension.

Similarly, President Trump has repeatedly shown his contempt for NATO, after moving to cut US contributions to the organisation. Despite Trump’s increased reliance on nuclear weapons and desire of a larger arsenal, it seems unlikely Trump and his ‘America First’ mentality would risk New York – or any other US city, for that matter—for Paris. The illusion of the US nuclear umbrella seems to be surfacing at last. On the other side of the Atlantic, a recent poll conducted by the Körber Foundation showed that the German population would rather either rely on France and the United Kingdom for nuclear assurances or even forgo them than to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Notwithstanding, high-ranking military officers seem to hold on to the current regime of nuclear truth.

Sustaining the illusion of the US nuclear umbrella incurs other costs whose effects have a global reach. By perpetuating the current regime of nuclear truth, the US is selling its nuclear umbrella, using it as a rock-solid alibi to keep the United States from abiding by its disarmament commitments. Under Article VI of the NPT, each State “[…] undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.[12] One key-argument against US nuclear disarmament for decades has been the anxieties it would create amongst its allies under the US nuclear umbrella.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is already strained as it is. Arms control seems to be failing and non-nuclear weapons States are frustrated with the slow pace of disarmament efforts. The so-called ‘grand bargain’ of the NPT – non-proliferation in exchange for nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the promise of disarmament – is in jeopardy. The maintenance and belief in the US nuclear umbrella and the growing frustration from the non-nuclear weapon States with its nuclear peers coalesce in existential threats to the cornerstone treaty keeping nuclear proliferation at bay. Were the illusion of the umbrella finally exposed, it would eliminate a key hindrance to nuclear disarmament.

The US nuclear umbrella seems to have lost its credibility. President Trump, in practicing his ‘America First’ policy has opened the blinds showing the illusion of its nuclear security assurances, particularly in the post-Cold War world. The dismantlement of the US nuclear umbrella – being replaced by a European nuclear umbrella, led by France and the United Kingdom, or eliminated completely – would likely have no de facto changes in European security. Rather, it would cripple to anti-disarmament movement in the United States. The United States is unlikely to risk New York for Paris, and its European allies seem to already know it. Waking up from this illusion would create a more inviting environment for nuclear disarmament.

[1] Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels, eds. (2019), The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

[2] Nick Ritchie (2013), Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons, Contemporary Security Policy, 34(1):152.

[3] Today, the US nuclear umbrella extends also to Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

[4] France and the United Kingdom, both NATO members, are nuclear weapons States, despite being under the US nuclear umbrella. France’s development of nuclear weapons was fomented, in part, by General Charles de Gaulle’s lack of confidence in the US nuclear umbrella. See Fred Kaplan (2020), The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[5] See, e.g., Hans Morgenthau (1948), Politics Among Nations. New York: A. A. Knopf; John Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.

[6] Treaty of Alliance and Friendship (1924), 23 U.N.T.C., pp. 163-169.

[7] See, e.g., Gerhard Weinberg (1995), A World at Arms: a Global History of World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[8] Kaplan (2020).

[9] Ibid.

[10] James Cameron (2018), The Double Game: The Demise of America’s First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[11] Melvyn Leffler and Odd Westad, eds. (2010). The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume II: Crises and Détente. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[12] The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 729 U.N.T.S., 173.

Orion is a doctoral researcher currently at the Department of War Studies – King’s College London. He joined the Department of War Studies in 2019, as part of the Joint PhD-programme between King’s College London and the University of São Paulo, his home institution. He holds an MA (Hons) in International Security from the University of Groningen and a BA in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais, with a period at the Sorbonne University – Paris XIII. His doctoral research focuses on nuclear weapons and politics, particularly the symbolism behind nuclear weapons. He analyses the overarching relationship between symbolism, identity, and behaviour within the nuclear arena, focusing on the history of US nuclear strategy post-Hiroshima.

Feature - The Nuclear Dimension: Pathways of Proliferation and Failings in Qadhafi’s Libya

March 6, 2020 by Leonardo Palma

Colonel Muhammar al-Qadhafi, Leader of the Libyan Jamahiriya from 1969 until 2011 (Image credit: Wikimedia)

The Libyan nuclear weapons program started in the 1970s and lasted for thirty years. The acquisition of nuclear capabilities was sustained by the country’s oil wealth and by December 2003, Libya “had succeeded in procuring from abroad most of the technical pieces of the nuclear-weapon jigsaw”.^[1] Colonel Muʿammar al-Qhadafi, however, never got the Bomb, proving that money and the black market are not enough to go nuclear militarily.^[2] In March 2003, a few weeks before the Iraq War, Musa Kusa, then head of the Libyan Foreign Intelligence (Mukhabarat al-Jamahiriya), contacted the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to start talks aimed at dismantling the program in return for removing sanctions. After having examined the key drivers behind the program and how Libya proliferated, this post will assess the scale of the threat that the Libyan nuclear programme posed to the international system and how and why a potentially successful project failed.

The Colonel’s Nuclear Ambitions: Deterrence, Security, and Prestige

Libya’s position regarding the nuclear issue was characterised by ambiguity and duplicity from the start. In July 1968, the Kingdom of Libya signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but it was not ratified until years later, in May 1975; and only because of pressure from the Soviet Union. Qadhafi’s statements against the production of nuclear weapons were oftentimes disavowed by fierce appeal to the desirability of an “Arab bomb” to deter Israel.

Qadhafi’s key drivers for a military nuclear program were: security, deterrence, and prestige. Initially, deterrence from outside intervention relied primarily on the building of a conventional apparatus and the targeted neutralisation of dissidents abroad. The outcome was counterproductive: the Colonel spent billions accumulating the greatest arsenal of Africa but it remained almost useless due to the lack of skilled manpower. Meanwhile, the killing of people abroad and financial support for terrorism made him a public enemy for the West.^[3] Furthermore, political and economic support for the Palestinians put the Colonel in the crosshairs of Israel as well.

Consequently, the parallel non-conventional weapons programme assumed over time a more relevant role as security insurance for regime survival, but it also triggered a race against the clock since Tel Aviv had already demonstrated its willingness to use preemptive strikes. Indeed, the 1981 bombing of Saddam Hussein’s Osiraq reactor, as well as the 1985 attack against the PLO headquarters outside Tunis, had a great impact on Qadhafi’s mind.^[4] Following the US strike on Tripoli one year later, the regime became seriously concerned that a similar attack could occur in the future and decided to speed up the military nuclear programme.^[5]

Security for regime survival and deterrence against Israel and the West matched the Colonel’s eagerness for the spotlight and desire to bolster his image and prestige in the Middle East, seeking to promote himself as the defender of the Arab masses in the face of Israel. Therefore, going nuclear militarily was perceived also as a means towards this end. To sum things up, security insurance for regime survival, deterrence against Israel and the West, and personal prestige were the main drivers of Libya’s nuclear programme.

Pathways of Proliferation: From International Assistance to the A.Q. Khan network

Nuclear proliferation in Libya came through three different periods of research and supply, running from the early 1970s to late 2003. The first period, from 1970 to 1981, encompasses Libya’s efforts to build a civilian program but also to start a parallel nuclear military procurement. Broadly speaking, these attempts were slowed down by a general respect for non-proliferation in relation to Libya, and that was due more to the mistrust of the main suppliers towards Qadhafi, rather than to a sincere adhesion to the NPT regime by the Libyan leader.^[6]

The failure to get tactical nuclear weapons in 1970 from Beijing proved to the regime that an “off-the-shelf” weapons procurement was unlikely to succeed. Therefore, Libya decided to seek assistance for a civilian programme and to secretly divert that technology for military purposes, starting a simultaneously multi-track procurement. In so doing, the regime approached Argentina, Egypt, the US, India, and France.^[7] Paris halted the acquisition both of a nuclear power reactor and of twenty calutrons, while New Delhi soon stopped cooperating due to growing concerns about Qadhafi’s ties with Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan.^[8]

These failures pushed Libya towards the Soviet Union and from the mid-1970s, Moscow became the main source of nuclear assistance to the Colonel.^[9] The Tajura Nuclear Research Facility (TNRF) became the centre both of peaceful research and illegal uranium conversion experiments. At the same time, the regime sought to procure a stockpile of uranium but the absence of exploitable deposits prompted it to seek external sources. Some have speculated that the invasion of the Aouzou Strip in 1973 was partly related also to the hope of seizing uranium deposits.^[10] According to the IAEA, in the end, Libya did succeed in acquiring yellowcake (a type of uranium concentrate powder) from Niger between 1978 and 1981.^[11]

The second period lasted from 1981 to the mid-1990s, and it was characterised by attempts to acquire the fissile material required for weapons based on both plutonium and uranium enrichment. The plutonium route came to nothing. Experiments conducted at Tajura allowed the regime to separate a very small amount of plutonium.^[12] The regime then pressed the Soviets for the building of a light-water reactor in Sirte. The deal never went beyond the development stage, apparently because of proliferation concerns influenced by Mikhail Gorbachev’s new foreign policy.^[13]

Dissatisfied with Moscow, and worried by the safety of the Soviet-reactors after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, Qadhafi sought assistance in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, while initiating discussions with Belgonucleaire, a Belgian company specialised in reprocessing nuclear materials. The talks were halted under US pressure.^[14] Despite these setbacks, Libya kept looking for fissile materials. The regime started to seek Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCF) “no later than 1981” but no uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) was ever produced.^[15] Moreover, between 1983 and 1989, Libya held experiments to acquire experience in the dissolution and purification of yellowcake. In short, in this period Libya violated every single article of the NPT Safeguards Agreement but achieved very little in terms of becoming a nuclear power.

The third period, from 1995 to 2003, saw the rebirth of the program, especially in the enrichment field, thanks to the A.Q. Khan network.^[16] Libya contacted Khan for the first time in 1997 and acquired from his syndicate centrifuges, UF_6,and nuclear weapon designs. Contacts started in 1997 with a series of meetings in Istanbul between Libyan intelligence, Khan himself and his associate, Abu Tahir.^[17] Further meetings were held in Dubai and Casablanca between 1998 and 2002. Those locations reflected the transnational nature of the network and its complexities since it involved nuclear specialists, middlemen, and unaware supplier companies.^[18] Countries with weak export-controls such as Malaysia and UAE became the terminal for shipments to Libya and other countries such as Iran and North Korea. Sensitive components were assembled thanks to dual-use materials exported from Europe.^[19] Shipments to Libya were specifically made possible thanks to a Malaysian company, Scomi Precision Engineering (ScoPE).^[20]

Not only did Qadhafi buy centrifuge-related technology from A.Q. Khan, Libya also received gas handling and heat-treating materials, mass spectrometers, and perhaps even unemployed nuclear scientists from South-Africa.^[21] The network sold to Libya two types of centrifuges as well: L-1 and L-2. The former incorporates aluminum rotors while the latter includes maraging steel rotors. Both designs were probably stolen by Khan while he was working for the URENCO consortium. In addition, the procurement included systems for process gas feeding as well as frequency converters for a total amount of more than 20 complete L-1 centrifuges.^[22]

By April 2002, several machine cascades were either set up or ready for installation. However, two “demonstration models” sent by Khan were not in workable conditions.^[23] Despite all the expenses, by the late 1990s and early 2000s Libya had still failed to produce UF₆. In time, they would ask the Khan network to procure some, providing Libya with 1.7 tons of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU, enriched to around 1% U²³⁵) and some natural and depleted uranium. These contacts also came with designs and blueprints relating to nuclear weapons manufacturing. However, the projects came from an old 1960s-era Chinese design and one drawing was even missing a key part.^[24]

Explaining the Failures and Assessing the Threat

When Musa Kusa contacted British SIS in mid-March 2003, Libya had by now procured most of the technology needed for a weapon but, despite the efforts and millions of dollars spent, Qadhafi had not stockpiled a single nuclear warhead. No threshold had been reached. In her work on the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear programs, scholar Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer noticed that in 1991 Saddam Hussein was on the threshold of a breakthrough towards the bomb. Then came the Gulf War and everything halted. But Iraq did better than Libya anyway, even if the Colonel had more money, more time, and access to the black market.

Hegghamer argues that in both cases what prevented the two from getting the bomb was a lack of “prioritization” and “State-capacity,” or the professionalism of this state apparatus.^[25] Both Saddam and Qadhafi weakened their states to maximise their personal hold on power. In so doing, the strongmen endangered their respective countries’ ability to launch, plan, and micromanage some complex technical projects such as a military nuclear program. However, they went about weakening Iraq and Libya in different ways: Saddam created a bloated state with competing agencies, leaders, wrapped in paranoia, emulating Stalin’s Soviet Union; Qadhafi almost dismantled the State entirely, only the informal dimension of power worked. Consequently, Saddam had a bigger toolbox to fix his WMD program.^[26]

The Tajura Nuclear Research Facility Centre (TNRF) in Tripoli, Libya (Image Credit: Global Security)

In Libya, any kind of success was a remote prospect. Every initiative fell apart because of the lack of organisational resources. When Colonel Qadhafi launched his Cultural Revolution in 1973, the nuclear and chemical weapons programs were shielded from the Revolutionary Committees. However, the program still suffered indirect consequences as well. Moreover, fearing dissents and radicalisation, the regime did not train enough engineers or physicists. The whole program suffered a lack of continuity and poor management, as well as the absence of a high-tech industry and an associated education system.

While the regime spent billions on procurement, it failed in finding Libyans qualified to assemble the nuclear-puzzle. According to the IAEA inspectors, only a handful of them was specialised in nuclear-related matters.^[27] The lack of organisational resources was compounded by a general respect for non-proliferation towards Libya and by the constraining effect of UN sanctions after the Lockerbie bombing. By the late 1990s, the A.Q. Khan network appeared as the only route available, and it was indeed pivotal for the program but it showed that access to technology does not equate to building-capacity.^[28]

How far, then, was Libya from building the bomb in 2003? Saif al-Islam, Qadhafi’s son, declared in 2009 that they believed that they were just five years away from getting the bomb. Instead, they were far away.^[29] While it was not impossible for the regime to go nuclear militarily in the future, it was highly improbable. However, back in 2003, the threat-assessment of the Libyan nuclear program was radically different, matching with that of Saif, because it was influenced by the ongoing dynamics of the international system at the time.

After the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush’s foreign policy overlapped with national security and countering proliferation became one of the main goals of the Global War on Terror. On the eve of the invasion of Iraq, Qadhafi’s offer to dismantle his program was perceived both as a political opportunity to bolster the US administration and as an effort coherent with the broader strategy of the White House of countering the spread of WMD. Consequently, one may argue that the threat-assessment of the Libyan program ended up reflecting the context of the post-9/11 altered perception. A mix of political opportunism and sincere security concerns were the mirror through which both the British and the US looked at Libya.

In summary, the history of Qadhafi’s nuclear program proves that money, dual-use materials procurement and black-market are not enough to get the bomb. Without a top-priority programme led by the government and handled by highly-specialised scientists, acquiring all the pieces of the nuclear puzzle can result in a dead-end. Furthermore, it proves that threat-assessment of a nuclear program is easily and dangerously altered by the general dynamics of the international system (even those which are not immediately related to WMD) and to the approach and perceptions that policy-makers have regarding nuclear proliferation and international security at a given time.

[1] Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation. Stepping Back from the Brink (Routledge, 2017), p. 25.

[2] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons (Cornell University Press, 2016).

[3] Derek Lutterbeck, “Arming Libya. Transfers of Conventional Weapons”, in Contemporary Security Policy, 30:3, 2009, pp. 505-528.

[4] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak. Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks”, in International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, pp. 101-132.

[5] Ronald Neumann, Senate Testimony on US Policy Toward Libya, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 2000. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67394/pdf/CHRG-106shrg67394.pdf

[6] “Libya Has Trouble Building the Most Deadly Weapons”, in The Risk Report, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Vol. 1, No. 10, December 1995, pp. 1-4.

[7] Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (Routledge, 2016), p. 68; “Annex 8: Nuclear Infrastructures of Argentina and Brazil”, in Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation Policies, Issue 2, 2001, http://npc.sarov.ru/english/digest/digest_2_2001.html.

[8] Ibidem, p.68, Cooley, Op. Cit., pp. 232-233. See also: Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb. The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 98–99; Technology Transfer to the Middle East, US Congress, September 1984, OTA-1 SC-173, p. 380, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html, p. 397. On the Libyan–French deal: Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 63–65.; Technology Transfer to the Middle East, US Congress, September 1984, OTA-1 SC-173, p. 380, http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html, p. 397.

[9] Bowen, Ibidem, pp. 29-30.

[10] Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Authority, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp; Project Number LIB/3/004, Nuclear Raw Materials.

[11] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by Director General, IAEA, May 20, 2004. https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf.

[12] IAEA Report, May 2004, Op. Cit., p. 6.

[13] K.D. Kapur, Soviet Nuclear Non- Proliferation Diplomacy and the Third World (Konark Publishers, 1993), p. 148. See also: “Soviets Draw Back from Helping Libyan Program”, in Nuclear Engineering International, December 1987, p. 27.

[14] OTA, Technology Transfer to the Middle East, Op. Cit., p. 380; MacLachlan and Knapik, Belgium and Libya, p. 5, quoted in: Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 33.

[15] IAEA Report, Implementation of the NPT, Op. Cit., p. 4. See also: “Japanese Parts Used in Libya’s Nuke Program,” in Herald Ashi, March 13, 2004. Quoted in: Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 34.

[16] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford University Press, 2006).

[17] Royal Malaysia Police, “Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Program”, February 20, 2004, http://www.rmp.gov.my/rmp03/040220scomi_eng.htm.

[18] Bowen, Op. Cit., p. 37.

[19] Anwar Iqbal, “Khan Network Supplied N-Parts made in Europe, Southeast Asia”, in Financial Times, June 10, 2004. See also: James Doyle, Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Non-proliferation. Achieving Security with Technology and Policy (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008).

[20] Andrew Koch, “The Nuclear Network: Confession of a Proliferator”, in Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 24, 2004.

[21] IAEA Report, Implementation of NPT, Op. Cit., Annex 1, p. 6; Stephen Fidler, and Mark Huband, “Turks and South Africans Helped Libya’s Secret Nuclear Project”, in Financial Times, June 10, 2004.

[22] David Albright, and Corey Hinderstein, “Libya’s Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered”, in Institute for Science and International Security, March 1, 2004, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya.

[23] David Albright, International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction Counter-proliferation Initiative, Statement before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, June 23, 2004. http://www.senate.gov/∼govtaff/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=185&WitnessID=673.

[24] IAEA Report, Op. Cit., p. 3. See also: Andrew Koch, “The Nuclear Network. Chinese Warhead Drawings Among Libyan Documents”, in Los Angeles Times, February 16, 2004.

[25] Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons”, Seminar at Woodrow Wilson Centre, September 15, 2017.

[26] Braut-Hegghammer, Ibidem.

[27] Richard Stone, “Agencies Plan Exchange With Libya’s Former Weaponeers”, in Science, Vol. 308, No. 5719, April 8, 2005, pp. 185-186.

[28] Chairman Hon. Laurence H. Silberman, and Hon. Charles S. Robb, Report to the President of the United States, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding WMD, March 31, 2005, pp. 259-260. See: Federation of American Scientists (FAS), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf .

[29] Braut-Hegghammer interview with Saif al-Islam. Quoted in: W. Wilson Centre Seminar, September 2017.

Leonardo Palma attended the Military Academy of Modena and holds a B.A. in Political Science and a M.A. in International Relations from Roma Tre University. He has been visiting research student at King’s College London, Department of War Studies. Twitter: @HadrianPAelius.

Event Review - London’s Nuclear Week: The Future of Nuclear Arms Control

December 14, 2019 by Orion Noda

by Orion Noda

(Photo credit: @UKPONI, 29 November 2019)

In the last week of November 2019, London hosted three insightful events sharing an overarching theme: Nuclear Weapons. On 26 November, King’s College London’s (KCL) Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) brought together three experts to discuss the future of the global nuclear order, ultimately posing the question: are we on the precipice of peril? The panel was chaired by Professor Wyn Bowen, head of KCL’s School of Security Studies, and it featured Dr Heather Williams (lecturer from the CSSS), Shatabhisha Shetty (Deputy Director of the European Leadership Network), and Marion Messmer (co-director of the British American Security Information Council, BASIC).

On 28 November, KCL teamed up with British Pugwash for a screening of the documentary “The Beginning of the End of Nuclear Weapons”, followed by a lively debate between Dr Lyndon Burford, a post-doctoral candidate at KCL and supporter of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and Paul Ingram, Senior Fellow at BASIC and a friendly sceptic of the TPNW. The debate was chaired by Dr Salma Shaheen, from KCL’s Department of War Studies.

On 29 November, RUSI and BASIC co-organised a workshop entitled “Beyond 2020”, focusing on the expectations for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference of 2020 and the overall future of the global nuclear order. The day-long event brought together young scholars, activists, and technicians to share their views on the future of non-proliferation and disarmament, and to propose ideas to make progress in the nuclear arena. Despite being focused on interactive group discussions, the workshop was kicked-off by expert briefings from Jamie Kwong (PhD candidate at the CSSS), Lord Hannay of Chiswick (GCMG), and Dr Dan Plesch (SOAS’s Centre of International Studies and Diplomacy).

Each event had its own specific scope, but all shared the same overarching theme: the future of nuclear weapons and arms control. On CSSS’s panel, it was interesting to see how each of the speakers brought avenues for discussion alternative to the NPT. Dr Williams mentioned the (surprisingly) US-led initiative “Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” (CEND), consisting of informal talks in order to overcome the technicalities that seem to dominate nuclear arms control talks and the NPT Review Conferences. The distinguishing feature of CEND is the fact that it includes States that are not usually at the table, such as Israel, India, and Pakistan – all non-signatories of the NPT.

Shatabhisha Shetty’s talk focused on the P5 process, an initiative based on transparency and confidence-building measures between its members. It seeks to create a more amicable environment between the involved parties to work on matters of non-proliferation, nuclear risks and disarmament. Despite a hiatus of two years (2017 and 2018), the P5 process returned to the agenda in 2019 due to an initiative from China. Currently, the scope of the P5 process is to further develop a glossary of terms, which would standardise the members’ understanding of nuclear terms. Yet, critics argue that the P5 process should focus on more pressing matters, and that the glossary of terms is merely a distraction or a waste of time. For instance, disarmament (one of the pillars of the NPT) has been stagnating for years, creating a sense of frustration from non-nuclear weapons states: if the P5 do not hold up their end of the bargain, why should non-nuclear weapons states hold theirs?

Marion Messmer talked about the progressive work that BASIC has been involved with, together with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Stepping Stones approach seek to create small goals and milestones that, despite being short of the more ambitious and pressing goals of the NPT, already spurred some progress, however small.

Resonating with Marion’s talk, Paul Ingram’s scepticism over the TPNW stems from the hasty and untimely factors of its arrival. Despite being an activist and working towards a non-nuclear world, Ingram mentioned how the introduction of the TPNW at this stage might eclipse the NPT , which is already struggling. The argument is that by putting forward a legally binding treaty to ban nuclear weapons at a time when negotiations around arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation are fragile might be overwhelming for nuclear weapons states. Instead, he argued that the way forward is through phases, and the Stepping Stones approach, which he has been involved with through his work at BASIC, is the most appropriate strategy.

In contrast to this argument, Dr Lyndon Burford believes that the TPNW does not tamper with the NPT. Both serve different purposes, and both should be proposed and get all the attention they can. Lyndon brought to the debate the necessity of involvement of non-State actors, such as technicians, activists, and the civil society in general. The 2017 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) put anti-nuclear activism in the spotlight, creating a setting for further progress in the non-proliferation and disarmament agendas.

After being exposed to these insightful contributions and debates, RUSI and BASIC’s workshop was the perfect ending to this series of nuclear-related events. The workshop allowed conference participants to take initiative, voice concerns and propose solutions to the gloomy views on the future of nuclear arms control. The initial expert briefings by Jamie Kwong, Lord Hannay of Chiswich, and Dr Dan Plesch provided a well-rounded introduction to the debate, which presented a different topic from other featured events: the role of the UK in shaping the future of the global nuclear order.

Throughout the day, much was discussed in terms of our concerns and hopes regarding the future of nuclear arms control, the UK’s role in it, and ideas to move forward. A clear consensus amongst the groups was the deep concern over the development and integration of new technologies to nuclear weapons – particularly artificial intelligence (AI), echoing a point raised by Dr Williams in the CSSS event. Amongst these young leaders – ranging from Master students to teaching fellows, technical experts, policy analysts, and activists – the removal of the human component and integration of a raw and deeply flawed AI system to nuclear weapons is something that must be immediately addressed. Proposed ways for that included increased engagement from the public and raised awareness about the dangers of creating a real-life doomsday machine.

Much was discussed also about the UK’s role, as a member of the P5, in exercising active leadership in breaking the stalemate of nuclear arms control. Nevertheless, our the participants’ prospects are not the most optimistic, particularly after Lord Hannay of Chiswick brought to our attention the lack of a clear position on nuclear policy from the UK’s candidates. With the Review Conference taking place in April and May 2020just around the corner, whoever occupies 10 Downing Street will have limited time to prepare. Furthermore, the UK’s current political situation threatens its leadership status in contributing to the NPT goals: the withdrawal from the European Union would likely lead to an approximation with the US, putting in check the UK’s credibility in impartially leading nuclear disarmament talks. Nevertheless, the workshop also produced a few ideas of what the UK can do to promote the NPT goals. These included a ‘no first use’ declaration and categorisation of its nuclear capabilities as measures of last resort, and reinforced commitment (not only from the UK, but from all NPT parties) to the NPT and its goals, despite the unlikelihood of a consensus document being produced at the end of the Review Conference in 2020.

On the overall future of the global nuclear order, the participants had an interesting and much-needed discussion on the special status of nuclear weapons: why have the bans on other weapons of mass destruction achieved relative success compared to nuclear weapons? Why is there such a stigma on nuclear weapons? There is a dire need to analyse the symbolism behind nuclear weapons to understand what drives its politics. To move away from the perception of nuclear weapons as symbols of status, prestige, modernity, and civilisation is to move forward in the quest for diminishing – and eventually eliminating – States’ reliance on nuclear weapons. It is the next generation of leaders’ task to de-mythify nuclear weapons and to call them what they really are: inhumane harbingers of doom.