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A Nuke-Free UK? A Case Against Unilateral Disarmament

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By Sarah M. Koch

28 January 2019

Protestors march against nuclear weapons in Oxford in 1980. (Photo credit: Kim Traynor)

 

When the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, a new era of international relations began. As President Truman asserted in his last State of the Union address on January 7, 1953, a nuclear war could ‘destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations.’ Decades later, the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and military strategy still inspires heated debate. For some, the risk of nuclear arms proliferation is assumed to be self-evident. Growth in the number of nuclear warheads around the world is inevitably linked to an increase in the likelihood that a nuclear weapon may fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue states.[i] For others, the spread of nuclear weapons could be a powerful force for the maintenance of peace— nuclear-armed nations are forced to become rational actors.[ii] In part, due to this debate, a total of 191 countries have signed the UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which includes a commitment to pursuing a nuclear disarmed world. However, as I will argue, using the United Kingdom as an example, a nuclear disarmed world will not be attained through unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear weapons are not as important to the UK now as they were when the UK was an imperial power. In the current political reality, disarmament could be considered acceptable as long as the UK remains under the American nuclear umbrella.[iii] When the British government began building its nuclear arsenal in the 1950s, it needed to protect its imperial holdings and uphold its status as a first-rate power. For much of the Cold War, the British government strove to build and maintain a nuclear capability that matched that of the US and USSR in quality, if not in size. Though British imperialism has since waned, the UK continues to keep one nuclear-armed submarine on patrol at all times. In the case of complete destruction of the UK’s conventional capabilities, this submarine would be able to launch a catastrophic retaliatory strike. In the post-colonial Britain of 2017, the economic burden of these nuclear weapons may overshadow their value as deterrence tools. According to a 2017 report to Parliament, replacing the current generation of submarines will cost more than thirty billion pounds to ensure that the UK can maintain this nuclear deterrent until the 2060s. Alternatively, the UK could abandon its nuclear operational independence and rely on the US nuclear arsenal to avoid a nuclear strike against Europe.

Despite the financial appeal of this option, it would leave the UK vulnerable and over-dependent on its American allies. Though the US and the UK have maintained a special relationship for decades, the particulars of this relationship have changed with the priorities and personalities of each nation’s leaders.[iv] The security situation in either country has the propensity to change suddenly and dramatically; therefore, complacency and over-dependence on this relationship could prove costly. If the US were to leave the European continent, would the UK rely on France to deter aggression by Russia, Iran, or their successors? Historically, the US has demonstrated the tendency to retreat into periods of isolationism.[v] In such a situation, a non-nuclear UK could be strong-armed by another nuclear power. Despite arguments to the contrary, such as those made by Scott Sagan, minimal evidence exists to support the notion that unilateral nuclear disarmament will thwart or de-incentivise the rise of new nuclear powers.[vi] Only one nation, South Africa, has ever willingly dismantled its nuclear program. Additionally, a nuclear weapons program could be veiled under the guise of peaceful energy research.[vii] Weapons themselves can be easy to transport and conceal.[viii] These concerns about deception and treaty defection make even multilateral disarmament unappealing.

Finally, the relationship between nuclear weapons and international prestige should not be underestimated. The five nations with permanent seats on the UN Security Council [France, US, UK, Russia, and China] are all nuclear-armed states. The possession of nuclear weapons has directly afforded the UK ‘a seat at the table’. Post-colonial Britain would be reduced to international insignificance without its nuclear arsenal. As was discussed earlier, the strategic value of nuclear weapons may have decreased in the UK context. However, nuclear armament still provides the UK with a strong bargaining chip diplomatically in the twenty-first century. Without its imperial holdings, the UK is now an island nation ranked 22nd with respect to population. As Mark Bell wrote in 2015, nuclear weapons are a ‘weapon of the weak’. States with limited conventional capabilities stand to gain the most from nuclear armament.[ix] Nuclear weapons can keep powerful states from asserting their will over smaller, weaker states.[x] For this same reason, T.V. Paul labeled nuclear weapons the ‘great-equalizer’ in 1999.[xi] Though the UK has lost world-power status, the ‘symbolic function’ of its nuclear arsenal forces other nations to take it seriously on the international stage.[xii] Perhaps the most compelling reason for the UK to maintain its nuclear arsenal is prestige — not security.

In conclusion, unilateral disarmament is an ineffective and unrealistic path to a nuclear disarmed world. As demonstrated by the UK’s current situation, it is illogical to assume that a country would dismantle its nuclear program of its own accord without multilateral agreements. Unilateral disarmament would make a powerful, albeit idealistic, statement with respect to a nation’s commitment to counter-proliferation; however, it could also put the state in a strategically perilous and diplomatically precarious situation. Possession of a robust nuclear deterrent can avoid over-dependence on allies, deter strong-arming by other nuclear powers, and garner international respect. To disarm unilaterally would be an ill-advised gamble with clear risks and unclear returns. As long as nations assume that nuclear weapons bring security and influence to those that possess them, this attitude will not only inhibit disarmament but also power proliferation. We can idealise a world at nuclear zero, but few countries — if any — will want to take the first step alone.

Sarah Koch is a Marshall Scholar and a postgraduate student in the War Studies department. She holds an MSc in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Edinburgh and a BA in Middle Eastern Language & Literature from the University of Virginia. She will return to the U.S. Army after graduation.

Notes:

[i] Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?” The National Interest, no. 109 (September/October 2010): 88-89; Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, “Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: The Norms of Western Practice,” Contemporary Security Police 19, no. 1 (1998): 36-39.

[ii] Sagan and Waltz, “Best Option?:” 93-94.

[iii] Nuclear umbrella refers to the assumed protection that nuclear-armed states extend to their allies. Assumed American nuclear protection has been key to NATO defense of the European continent since the Cold War.

[iv] A weakening relationship, at least outwardly, can be seen under the current Trump and May administrations.

[v] After its founding, the US embraced its geographic isolation, and this sentiment endured until the Spanish-American war. These feelings were revived after WWI. The outbreak of WWII gave rise to the America First Committee. Calls for “America first” have returned in the Trump era.

[vi] Sagan and Waltz, “Best Option?:” 88-91.

[vii] Wyn Bowen, Matthew Moran, and Dina Esfandiary, Living on the Edge: Iran and Nuclear Hedging, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 51-59.

[viii] Sagan and Waltz, “Best Option?:” 92.

[ix] Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” International Security 40, no. 1 (2015): 118.

[x] Sagan and Waltz, “Best Option?:” 92.

[xi] T.V. Paul, “Great Equalizers or Agents of Chaos? Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Emerging International Order,” in International Order and the Future of World Politics, ed. Paul and John A. Hall, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 374.

[xii] Scott D. Sagan, “Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 75.

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anti-nuclear_weapons_protest,_UK_1980.JPG#filehistory

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Title: A Nuke-Free UK? A Case Against Unilateral Disarmament

Author: Sarah M. Koch

Profile: Sarah Koch is a Marshall Scholar and a postgraduate student in the War Studies department. She holds an MSc in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Edinburgh and a BA in Middle Eastern Language & Literature from the University of Virginia. She will return to the U.S. Army after graduation.

Keywords: nuclear, disarmament, United Kingdom

Image caption: A 1980 anti-nuclear weapons march in Oxford

Image source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anti-nuclear_weapons_protest,_UK_1980.JPG#filehistory

 

How much is enough? The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the value of nuclear parity

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By Alexandria Reid

 

The underwater Baker nuclear test, Bikini Atoll, 25 July, 1946 (Credit Image: Wikimedia Commons)

The release of the Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on 2nd February marks a decisive shift from the Obama Administration’s approach to nuclear weapons. Responding to a ‘dramatic deterioration of the strategic environment’ since the last review was published in 2010, this NPR contains a particularly notable departure in US nuclear strategy: the intention to further develop low-yield non-strategic nuclear capabilities. Unsurprisingly, the Pentagon’s determination to supplement the already extensive US arsenal with lower-yield warheads has stimulated a fierce debate on the logic of nuclear deterrence. Most importantly, it has raised questions about whether the world’s preeminent military power really needs a like-for-like arsenal to credibly deter a nuclear opponent.

This calculation is fundamental to the everyday practice of deterrence. Since the advent of the nuclear age at the end of the Second World War, debates about the trade-offs between the quantity and quality of weapons required to deter an adversary have dominated discussions about the composition of the ideal arsenal. Overall, estimates about the number of nuclear weapons required to deter an opponent have generally become more conservative since the end of the Cold War. Times have changed since in the crudest of Cold War calculations, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara once judged that the US would need the capacity to eliminate between 20 and 25 percent of the Soviet population, and destroy 50 percent of its industry in order to deter the USSR from a first strike. Contemporary advocates of ‘minimal deterrence’ now hold the position that because of the unambiguously destructive quality of nuclear weapons, very few weapons are actually required to deter a rational opponent. Unsurprisingly, universal consensus on the ideal recipe for deterrence remains to be found.

Estimates of the number of weapons necessary still vary between single digits to hundreds, or even thousands of warheads. Crucially, advocates of minimal deterrence assert this small arsenal must survive a second strike so that a retaliatory threat of punishment is credible in the event of a first strike. To retain second strike capability, the nuclear platforms generally recommended are a combination of ballistic missile equipped submarines (SSBN), mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers carrying a variety of missiles (ALCMs). The US nuclear triad continues to be built on this model.

Yet many critics have long been concerned that the deterioration of the global threat environment means that a small number of weapons is not large enough to fulfil the multiple responsibilities assigned to the US arsenal. After all, US nuclear deterrence extends to both allied territories and the central deterrence of the American homeland. Keith Payne therefore argues that a credible minimum deterrence approach is based on ‘ideologically driven arguments’ that collapse when confronted by ‘cold reality.’ Yet as evinced by the NPR, the Trump Administration is less preoccupied with the US ability to achieve overall parity in nuclear weapons at a strategic level, and more concerned with a lack of like-for-like parity in low-yield nuclear weapons, sometimes referred to as ‘tactical nukes’.

It is clear from the NPR that the development of these low-yield warheads is mainly aimed at deterring any limited use by Russia in a regional conflict. Citing numerous Russian statements, the NPR refers to the fact that since 2000, Russian doctrine has reserved the right to employ low-yield weapons in a ‘de-escalation’ strike ‘in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies’. This includes a scenario in which Russia finds itself losing in a conventional regional conflict. In 2010, this doctrine was refined to only allow the use of nuclear weapons when ‘the very existence of the state is placed under threat’. Ironically, this mirrors the Flexible Response strategy adopted by NATO at the height of the Cold War in 1967. Motivated by its inferiority in terms of conventional forces, NATO’s strategy was to meet any Soviet aggression in Europe ‘with a credible threat of escalation in response to any aggression below the level of a major nuclear attack.’

With Russian revisionism back on the cards, the Trump Administration’s policy shift is motivated by the belief that the US force structure should be able to credibly deter this ‘de-escalation’ strike with a proportionately lower-yield weapon. Washington therefore intends to introduce two new capabilities into its arsenal: a low-yield warhead for the existing Trident D-5 (a submarine-launched ballistic missile, or SLBM), as well as the development of a new submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM). The NPR explicitly links this procurement drive to ‘correcting’ the Russian perception that there is a ‘coercive advantage’ in using nuclear weapons at lower – i.e. tactical — levels of conflict. Whilst maintaining a commitment that these weapons are not meant to enable nuclear war-fighting, this NPR clearly considers the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons to be politically viable as they appear to be a more proportionate response. Some have therefore suggested this development lowers the nuclear threshold in international politics today.

The merits of a low-yield nuclear response to a de-escalation strike make for a polarised discussion. The Trump Administration is by no means the first to recognise the strategic rationale for the development of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Indeed, several theorists in the eight years since the 2010 NPR was published have advocated this position, worried that the US would find itself ‘self-deterred’ in the event of a limited nuclear strike. With an arsenal equipped with only disproportionately large-yield nuclear weapons, some believe the US would be cornered into a situation of ‘surrender or suicide’.

Others are less enthralled with the idea. Nuclear theorist Adam Mount suggests that it would be in the US interest not to respond with nuclear retaliation even in the event of a limited nuclear strike by Russia. Instead, he suggests that the US would be better served by utilising its overwhelming conventional strength in battle, therefore strengthening the nuclear taboo and proving that there can be no political utility in the use of nuclear weapons for coercion. Meanwhile, although Survival’s Matthew Harries concedes that the Trump Administration’s assessment of the threat landscape is understandable, he argues that it would be a ‘thoroughly stupid idea’ for Russia to be the first country to deploy nuclear weapons since 1945. If Russia really were to use a nuclear weapon in Europe, it would surely become an unrivalled pariah state. In line with Harries’ argument, it’s easy to see it would be a thoroughly stupid idea for America to become the second country to use a nuclear weapon since 1945. A retaliation by nuclear counterattack would surely do more to undermine American global leadership than all of Trump’s foreign policy combined.

 

Alexandria Reid is a recent graduate of Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London, funded by a Sir Evelyn de Rothschild Scholarship. She was recipient of the Sir Michael Howard Award for Best Graduate in BA War Studies, 2016. Alex currently works for Strife Blog as Communications Manager, and as a research assistant for Professor Michael Rainsborough. Twitter: @AlexHREID.

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How might Europe react to Trump’s Iran Deal policy?

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By Lélia Rousselet and Jackson Webster

Mohammad Javad Zarif , the Iranian Foreign Minister, and Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in Brussels in February 2016 (Credit: Olivier Hoslet/EPA)

 

The Iran Deal – former American President Barack Obama’s defining diplomatic accomplishment – may soon be coming to an end. The “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) was signed in July 2015 and marked the end of eight years of intense multilateral diplomatic efforts, conducted by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Germany, and the EU, and spearheaded largely by Secretary of State John Kerry.

This central piece of the Obama legacy has been endangered by President Donald Trump, who repeatedly expressed his disdain for the agreement on the campaign trail, and has now officially ‘de-certified‘ Iranian compliance with the deal’s conditions to Congress on Friday, October 13. European diplomats had tried for months to convince the Trump administration to avoid de-certifying the deal. Much has already been said about the potential political fallout in Washington, most strikingly the possibility that US Defence Secretary James Mattis and others could be pushed out of the administration following a decertification of the Iran Deal. This article will review the knock-on effects of these possibilities in Europe, both politically and for business, and to evaluate how Europe might respond.

Its important here to note that Trump’s de-certification does not necessarily lead to the end of the JCPOA. The US Congress now has less than two months to decide whether or not to reimpose sanctions. Though Obama faced trouble in getting the agreement past Congressional muster, it’s uncertain if Congress will reimpose sanctions, effectively killing the deal. Kicking the ball to Congress creates more unpredictability in the coming weeks, all in the knowledge that the process might repeat itself in three months for the next certification. To stop this cycle, Congress must pass a new law ending Washington’s internal certification process, so that the only organization which has the legitimacy to assess Iran’s nuclear capabilities would be the IAEA. And since the deal’s signing, all of the IAEA’s reports are clear: Iran is respecting its part of the deal.

Political consequences for Europe

As is often the case, there will not likely be a unified “European response”, rather several “European responses”. Now that Trump has “de-certified” the deal, Europeans must react in three different dimensions.

First, France, Germany, and the UK must clearly and continually state their disagreement with Trump’s decision and support for the deal. As French President Emmanuel Macron did in his “Make our planet great again” speech after Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the European members of the JCPOA will have to employ a strong rhetorical rebuke of Trump’s policy. This seems to be the path chosen thus far by European leaders — shortly after Trump’s announcement, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British PM Theresa May, and Macron released a joint statement reaffirming their support to the JCPOA. Similarly, the Chief of the EU External Action Service, Federica Mogherini, issued a strong declaration in support of the deal and against a unilateral American withdrawal.

Second, the most significant concern would obviously be the reaction towards Washington, as Europeans must express a clear disagreement without endangering transatlantic relations. That is exactly what Macron did during a TV interview on October 15, when he reaffirmed the necessity to maintain dialogue with Trump to avoid entering a “zero-sum game”, to be open to broader negotiations on Iran, and to recognize the deal’s importance to regional security and stability. Macron stated that European governments should look more closely into Iran’s role in the region. This approach could help Europeans to convince Trump that controlling Iranian nuclear enrichment actually means being tough on Iran and having full access to its nuclear facilities. Furthermore, should this approach preserves diplomatic ties with Tehran, Europeans could agree to re-negotiate only on specific aspects of the deal such as the “sunset clauses”. A title change, and the use of tougher language, with minimal substantive modifications might even be enough for Trump to take political ownership of the agreement.

Third, the bilateral reaction towards Iran. Europe’s main objective should be to contain escalation. European leaders, in particular those in Paris and London, have invested significant time and resources into the deal and opening the Iranian economy. To de-escalate, Europeans will need to reaffirm their commitment to dialogue to keep the door open for diplomacy with their Iranian counterparts.

As for now, the main long-term risk to the agreement would be an Iranian withdrawal in response to US threat, achieving in the process a victory for hard-liners in Tehran. This key factor is, unfortunately, out of European policymakers’ control. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif took to Twitter after Trump’s announcement, taking two interesting positions. First, he singled out Trump personally. He claimed that “Trump’s friendship is for sale to the highest bidder”, but did not seem to associate the overall American government with Trump’s personal vendetta against Iran. Second, he reiterated an oft-used line of President Hassan Rouhani, calling Trump’s actions worthy of the label of a “rogue state”. The Iranian government also reacted strongly by promising a “crushing response” to Trump’s designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. There is no word thus far from Tehran as to how Iran might respond to broader Congressional sanctions, particularly where it endangers relations with Paris, London, Berlin, and Brussels.

 

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Head of the EU External Action Service Federica Mogherini (C) and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) during the talks for the signature of the JCPOA (Credit photo: Herbert Neubauer/EPA)

 

Business consequences for Europe

Economic fallout from reinstated American sanctions would follow an initial political shockwave. However, this would likely have limited impact on Europe with greater political implications than economic ones.

Following the signing of the 2015 deal, and the ensuing lifting of sanctions, a flurry of foreign investment was expected to rush into Iran. Despite the country’s attempts to lure European investors, takers were few and far between. Doing business in Iran remains costly and dangerous, mainly due to targeted sanctions on Iranian nationals with certain political or organizational ties. Particularly surprising has been the near-complete absence of banks investing in Iran. BNP Paribas, for its part, has been shy in recent years, owing to a €9B (£8.1B) fine imposed by American authorities after the bank’s connections to Iran, Sudan, and Cuba were exposed.

Most of the companies which invested were either French, most notably PSA Citroën and Total, or have a significant amount of their manufacturing base in France. This second case refers to Airbus, who signed deals in December 2016 and July 2017 for 170 of their A321 and A330 aircraft, a deal worth over $11B (£8.5B). These deals underscore France’s economic self-interest in keeping Iranian markets open.

The Airbus deal is particularly vulnerable in the face of potential American sanctions. Were Trump to pull the US out of the deal, re-imposing sanctions on Iran, the Airbus deal would inevitably be off. Airbus aircraft are made using parts from all over Europe and the globe, including the US. Under US Treasury Department rules, because at least some components of the A320 family of airframes are made in the US, Airbus must obtain authorization for every deal it makes to export. This authorization can be revoked at any time. Furthermore, the Airbus deal is especially tenuous, given the manufacturer’s recent quarrels with American regulators. Moreover, the US is increasingly important to Airbus’ supply chain, given its recent acquisition of the Bombardier C-Series assembly process based in Alabama.

Despite European resolve to maintain the deal, there will not likely be a single ‘European’ response in the long-term. Governments and companies have begun engaging with Iran in different ways and to varying degrees since 2015. For example, the EKF, Denmark’s export credit agency, signed an agreement with the Iranian Finance Ministry, providing a 100% guarantee for financing exports of Danish goods to Iran. Austrian and Italian creditors have followed suit. By contrast, with the exception of German stake in Airbus, German companies have generally stayed away from Iran, perhaps due in large part to the precarious fiscal and regulatory state of many major German banks.

A second key factor in play is the question of Iran’s reaction. Tehran has not indicated how much it values European economic involvement in a context of escalation with Washington. The Guardian’s Saeed Kamali claims that “other Iranian officials have hinted that Iran may continue adhering to the deal provided that the US does not obstruct European investments.”

The White House has already announced new sanctions on the IRGC. Despite being a military organization, the IRGC also has a significant stake in the Iranian economy and its leadership is filled with political hard-liners. Sanctions on this organization may impact European companies engaging in Iran. In compliance with existing prohibitions on conducting business with the IRGC, these companies do not work directly with the IRGC itself, but it is highly likely that they engage with companies at least partially controlled by them; 35-40% of the Iranian economy is estimated to belong to the “semi-state-controlled” category, a large portion of which falls under various wings of the IRGC.

Once again, the Iranian reaction is key. Should Tehran flaunt its missile program in the face of what it perceives as American deception, it will likely scare away European business.

 

 

Lélia Rousselet is a research and program coordinator at the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., Paris Office. Her work includes research on security and defense issues, French and American foreign policy, and Middle-Eastern and North African affairs. She holds master’s degrees from the Doctoral School of Sciences Po and and La Sorbonne University. She is the author of Négocier l’atome (L’Harmattan, 2017). You can follow her @LeliaRousselet

Jackson Webster is a native of Southern California and a graduate of the Department of War Studies, where he was President of the King’s College London United Nations Association. He is currently reading for a master’s in International Security with a focus on Russian/Eastern Europe and cyber security from Sciences Po Paris. You can follow him @joliverwebster

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Trump’s pledge to “totally destroy” North Korea – a threat too far?

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By Toby Fenton

US President Donald Trump addresses the United Nations General Assembly, 19 September 2017 (Image Credit: : BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI / Getty Images)

 

In his speech at the UN General Assembly in September, US President Donald Trump declared that “North Korea’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threatens the entire world with unthinkable loss of human life.” Laying out the proposed US response to this threat, Trump made his position clear: while the US “has great strength and patience,” Trump said, if the US “is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons is one of the most significant threats to regional (and even global) peace and security. Few observers – at least outside of North Korea – would disagree with Trump’s assertion that a fully nuclear-armed Pyongyang is something that “No nation on Earth has an interest in seeing”. North Korea’s provocative nuclear and ICBM tests and the US’ heightened military posture in the region, compounded by inflammatory rhetoric from both sides, represent a dangerous game of brinkmanship.

Trump’s particular phraseology regarding how the US would act might be somewhat understandable, given the nature and history of the situation. Trump’s pledge may have been intended to reassure the American public and her allies. It could bolster US credibility as a regional security guarantor against North Korean aggression. It also fits the pattern of fiery tit-for-tat rhetoric between the US and North Korea that has become commonplace over the past year. However, Trump’s threat to “totally destroy” North Korea was not only highly provocative and carelessly unthinking in its own right – it will likely only worsen the situation – but it also places the US on very shaky legal (and ethical) ground.

What’s in a threat?

President Trump’s threat was not that the US would use something akin to ‘all necessary measures’ (a phrase beloved by the UN Security Council) against a North Korean attack. Nor did Trump state explicitly that the US is prepared to use its own nuclear weapons if it came to an actual or imminent nuclear exchange. Instead, Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea if the US was “forced to defend itself or its allies”.

While much attention is paid to the legality of the use of force in international relations, arguably less attention is paid to threats to use force. Yet under international law, these concepts bear close similarities. UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibits “the threat or use of force” in international relations – with the only two Charter exceptions being force authorised by the UN Security Council under Article 42, and force as an act of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51. In its oft-cited 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted that “if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal – for whatever reason – the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.” The ICJ further noted that determining whether a threat to use force would violate Article 2(4) “depends upon whether the particular use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or against the Purposes of the United Nations or whether, in the event that it were intended as a means of defence, it would necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality.” In this view, the legality of a threat to use force for self-defence is subject to the same criteria as the use of force so envisaged.

Under customary international law the two constitutive criteria of the ‘inherent right’ (as it is called in the UN Charter) of self-defence are necessity and proportionality. US-British diplomatic correspondence following the mid-19th century Caroline incident established that the necessity of using force in self-defence must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation”. Force must be an absolute last resort. In the face of an actual or imminent attack by North Korea, the US’ use of force in self-defence would prima facie meet the requirement of necessity. The post-Caroline correspondence also established the criterion of proportionality: force used in self-defence must not be “unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it”. The use of force must be proportional to what is necessary to defend against a particular attack.

To totally destroy, or not to totally destroy? That is the question…

Would the total destruction of North Korea be legally justifiable as a means of self-defence? The legality of the use or threat of force by the US would be determined by the nature and circumstances of the attack (‘anticipatory’ or ‘pre-emptive’ self-defence notwithstanding). Fortunately, such an attack has not occurred; and it is difficult to say what form it would take. However, Trump’s threat to “totally destroy” North Korea goes far beyond what could reasonably be considered both necessary and proportional in self-defence. Attempting or threatening to “totally destroy” another country as a means of self-defence is unlikely to ever be lawful – unless doing so is the only way to defend against an attack.

This raises another question: under what circumstances would a North Korean attack make the total annihilation of that country and its 25 million people – the vast majority of whom are civilians – both necessary and proportional? In making such threats, neither Trump nor his legal advisors – assuming they were consulted – appear to have given these questions serious consideration. That there exists an inherent right of every state (indeed, every person) to use force for self-defence is unquestionable. However, Trump’s threat was positioned against the prospect of the US being “force to defend itself” against some unqualified North Korean attack, with the inference from Trump’s statement being that any attack by Pyongyang would automatically trigger the US to initiate the total destruction of North Korea. That threat is likely to have constituted a serious violation of international law – articulated, ironically, in the primary chamber of the very organisation established to advance international peace, security, and the rule of law.

A pattern is apparently emerging in the US administration. Trump’s stated threat towards North Korea (legal opaqueness notwithstanding) follows the administration’s inability, or refusal, to articulate a coherent legal basis for its cruise missile strike against a Syrian airbase in April this year, following an alleged chemical weapons attack. In that case, many (especially Western) political leaders and observers supported the US strike – although, importantly, the lack of proper US legal justification arguably nullified any potential opinio juris (that is, a sense of legal obligation to act in a certain way) that could be attributable to Washington, thus in turn making subsequent international support for the strike legally moot. Following Trump’s speech at the UN General Assembly in September, however, the international reaction was far more discouraging. Perhaps threatening the total annihilation of another country really was a step too far.

Toby Fenton recently completed a Masters degree in International Peace & Security at King’s College London.

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Film Review: Zero Days (2016)

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Gibney, A. Zero Days, Jigsaw Productions, (2016). (PG-13) More information from: http://gb.imdb.com/title/tt5446858/.

By: Cheng Lai Ki

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“The science fiction cyberwar scenario is here…” This statement comes from members of the United States National Security Agency (NSA), and others in the intelligence community, role-played by actress Joanne Tucker. Zero Days, directed and narrated by documentarian Alex Gibney – who produced the award winning documentaries Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (2005) and Taxi to the Dark Side (2007) – explores the evolving nature of computer network exploitations (CNEs). In a world where critical infrastructures (i.e. energy suppliers, telecommunication infrastructures), military communication grids (i.e. US Global Information Grid - GIG) and diplomatic communications are conducted on information-communication technologies (ICTs); the documentary illuminates the uncomfortable realities and vulnerabilities within cyberspace.

Zero Days explores StuxNet, a computer worm developed by a US-Israeli effort to cripple the uranium enrichment capabilities at the Natanz enrichment plant in Iran. The documentary debuted at the 2016 Berlin film festival and was awarded a four-star review by the Guardian’s Peter Bradshaw, who described Gibney’s 2016 documentary as ‘intriguing and disturbing’. Named after the technical term ‘zero day’ that represents a computer network vulnerability that is only known to the attacker, the investigative documentary tells Gibney’s journey in uncovering ‘the truth’ behind StuxNet’s technical capabilities and attributed political motives. Despite discussing a cybersecurity threat, the documentary goes beyond the technical landscape and introduces various geopolitical elements within – such as the Israeli disapproval of Iran cultivating national nuclear capabilities. Given the relative basic nature of its discussions, this documentary appears to be intended for the general public rather than specialists in the field. However, Gibney appears to have followed along an investigative journalistic approach (something he undoubtedly is famous for) and guides the viewer along a path of what essentially is a cyber-attribution journey implicating the US and Israeli agencies. The documentary was constructed with strategically cut interviews from cybersecurity specialists (i.e. Kaspersky; Symantec), former senior-leaderships from ‘three-letter’ government agencies, industrial experts (i.e. Ralph Langner, a German Control System Security consultant) and pioneers within the investigative journalism (i.e. David Sanger) in discussing StuxNet’s discovery and capabilities. In addition to these interviews, Gibney wanted a more ‘real’ source of information. This was where the anonymous NSA intelligence community came in. Collectively using transcripts of these employees (and the help of actress Joanne Tucker), Gibney was able to incorporate an inside-source that gave this documentary a little more power behind its claims.

A collection of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) that are crucial technological components within most critical infrastructure. The StuxNet worm targeted specficially the Siemens Simatic S7-300 PLC CPU with three I/O modules attached.

The documentary excels in unveiling to the general public that: i) cybersecurity is not purely a software issue, but also a hardware one; and ii) digital-malware can be easily weaponised for intelligence gathering and strike purposes.

First, Symantec Security Response specialist, Eric Chien, states in an interview: ‘…real-world physical destruction. [Boom] At that time things became really scary for us. Here you had malware potentially killing people and that was something that was Hollywood-esque to us; that we’d always laugh at, when people made that kind of assertion.’ Through conducting a simple experiment where Symantec specialists infected a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) – the main computer control unit of most facility control systems – with the StuxNet worm. Under normal conditions, the PLC was programed to inflate a balloon and stop after five-seconds. However, after being infected with the StuxNet worm, the PLC ignored commands to stop the inflation and the balloon burst after being continuously filled with air. Through this simple experiment, the specialists (and Gibney) managed to reveal the devastating impact of vulnerable computer systems that control our national critical infrastructures or dangerous facilities such as Natanz.

Second, the NSA employees that decided to talk to Gibney revealed who the US cyber intelligence community recruits and more importantly, their capacities to create digital-techniques for intelligence gathering – or in the case of StuxNet, strike purposes. Cybersecurity specialists that were analysing the StuxNet code discovered older versions that were focused on data-collection. It wasn’t until the later versions that more offensive objectives were made more apparent within the code. According to forthcoming NSA employees, this shift within the code was done by the Israeli foreign intelligence services (Mossad) and not the American agencies. Regardless, Zero Days does an excellent job in revealing the highly adaptive nature of cyber ordinances.

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The United States National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, Maryland. There, information technology experts developed the multiple version of the StuxNet worm at the Cyber Command unit (USCYBERCOM) established in 2009 that was housed wihtin.

However, to security academics, this documentary suffers from several limitations undermining its credibility. Two of its main limitations are: i) over centralization on investigative attribution; and ii) inherently negative portrayal of governmental personnel and activity.

First, as earlier mentioned, the documentary is a journey of cyber-attribution at its core – much akin to the work of investigative journalist, David Sanger. To show this, we need to review the structure of the documentary. It begins with discussing the cybersecurity incident, how the worm was found, and how it baffled cybersecurity specialists. Next, the documentary explains the geopolitical and security tensions between the US, Israel and Iran; in addition to discussing the American position on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Next, it progressed onto the technical and security domains; explaining the infrastructure of American and Israeli cyber-intelligence capabilities and operations. Finally, Gibney asks harder questions of implications and opinions during his interviews with American intelligence, security and military subjects. Obviously, for national security and secrecy reasons, these could not be answered. It would appear that Gibney wanted to ask these questions to highlight his disgust in the lack of transparency within the security sector. Throughout the late part of the documentary, he supplements various claims with an informal-esque interview with the NSA employees using Joanne Tucker as an avatar. To the general public, this documentary is undoubtedly an interesting journey of exploration and revelation about American and Israeli cyber capabilities. While highlighting several cybersecurity concerns afflicting cybersecurity specialists in governmental and industrial sectors, the documentary quickly narrows its attributive direction towards the United States and Israel - leaving little room for alternative arguments.

Second, to security specialists this documentary leaves out several key areas of consideration, such as the crucial importance of having an effective intelligence collection and pre-emptive strike capabilities for reasons of national security. During interviews with government leaderships, they were either explaining the structure of their national intelligence agencies/capabilities or talking about how certain operations were transferred between presidents – StuxNet was known within the American government community as ‘The Olympic Games’. As such, government interviewees played only an informative role, participating in few discussions. Another comment would be on the NSA employees that decided to be vocal. Playing the devil’s advocate, certain questions about credibility and accuracy can be raised: How do we know these were really NSA employees from their cyber divisions? Do we know if they are really vocalizing because they wanted to? Or were they instructed to? There was a significant amount of blame placed on Mossad for ‘weaponizing’ the StuxNet code when the Americans just wanted to utilise it solely for intelligence collection purposes. Within the realms of intelligence, this sounds more like disinformation rather than truth. To some civil-servants from security or intelligence backgrounds, this documentary appears to portray such government operations in a negative light and perpetuates the concept of transparency with little regard for its ramifications. Sometimes, knowing the ‘truth’ might do more harm than good.

Zero Days is an excellent documentary and investigatory source of information that raises awareness of cybersecurity issues and its importance in our modernized era. First, its innovative and effective use of animations coupled with strategic uses of interviewees from various backgrounds provides it credibility and persuasiveness when discussing StuxNet. Second, it increases awareness about the importance of cultivating a better understanding of cybersecurity and how vulnerable digital and hardware systems can have significantly harmful consequences. However, in his quest to push for transparency behind government intelligence operations, Zero Days promotes a dangerous notion. Operational secrecy is not a negative notion but sometimes vital for national security. The ubiquitous nature of cyberspace, like Pandora’s Box, opens nations to a new dimension of threats that cannot be as easily defended like that of Air, Land, or Sea and increased transparency can deal much more harm. Regardless your position regarding the motives behind Zero Days, it remains an excellent documentary in raising cybersecurity awareness.

Zero Days (2016) Documentary Trailer:

 

Cheng served as an Amour Officer and Training Instructor at the Armour Training Institute (ATI) in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and now possesses reservist status. His master’s research revolves around security considerations within the Asia-Pacific Region and more specifically around areas of Cybersecurity, Maritime Security and Intelligence Studies. His Graduate thesis explores the characteristics and trends defining China’s emerging Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare capabilities. He participated in the April 2016 9/12 Cyber Student Challenge in Geneva and has been published in IHS Janes’s Intelligence Review in May 2016. You can follow him on Twitter @LK_Cheng

 

Notes:

Bradshaw, P. ‘Zero Days review – a disturbing portrait of malware as the future of war’, The Guardian, Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/film/2016/feb/17/zero-days-review-malware-cyberwar-berlin-film-festival, (17 Feb 2016).

Gibney, A. ‘Director Profile’, JigSaw Productions, Available from: http://www.jigsawprods.com/alex-gibney/ (Accessed October 2016).

Internatinale Filmfestipiele Berlin 2016, Film File: Zero Days (Competition), Available from: https://www.berlinale.de/en/archiv/jahresarchive/2016/02_programm_2016/02_Filmdatenblatt_2016_201608480.php#tab=filmStills (2016)

Langer, R. ‘Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon’, TEDTalk, Available from: https://www.ted.com/talks/ralph_langner_cracking_stuxnet_a_21st_century_cyberweapon/transcript?language=en, (Mar 2011)

Lewis, J.A. ‘In Defense of Stuxnet’, Military and Strategic Affairs, 4(3), Dec 2012, pp.65 – 76.

Macaulay, S. ‘Wrong Turn’, FilmMaker, Available from: http://www.filmmakermagazine.com/archives/issues/winter2008/taxi.php#.V-A8_Tvouu5, (2008).

Scott, A.O. ‘Those You Love to Hate: A Look at the Mighty Laid Low’, The New York Times, Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/22/movies/those-you-love-to-hate-a-look-at-the-mighty-laid-low.html?_r=1, (Apr 22 2005).

Image Source (1): https://i.ytimg.com/vi/GlC_1gZfuuU/maxresdefault.jpg

Image Source (2): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/82/SIMATIC_different_equipment.JPG

Image Source (3): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/84/National_Security_Agency_headquarters,_Fort_Meade,_Maryland.jpg