Pakistan

Karachi attack on Shia community calls security operation into question

May 13, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

Forty-five members of a minority community, the Ismailis were gunned down while traveling on a bus carrying sixty people in Karachi on the morning of May 13th. The bus belonged to a not-for-profit, Al-Azhar Garden that provided inexpensive housing and transportation to Ismaili residents of Safoora Goth (a neighbourhood on the outskirts of the city).

The gunmen – allegedly six of them riding on three motorcycles – entered the moving bus and shot and killed the driver. A statement by a female survivor to news agencies revealed that all passengers were asked to lower their heads and duck down. One of the gunmen then ordered the others to open indiscriminate fire – a mode of attack witnessed in numerous cases across Pakistan (particularly on Shia pilgrims traveling on buses through Balochistan), and is reminiscent of the brutal, cold-blooded shootings in Peshawar’s Army Public School last December.

According to initial reports, 45 people were killed – most died on spot, many from the same families. One girl was later found to be crouching in the bus out of fear. She survived.

The gunmen ran and remain at large. At the time of writing, responsibility for the attack had been claimed by Jundullah, a splinter group of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that pledged support to the ISIS last year. The same group was allegedly behind the attack on a Shia Imambargah in Shikarpur (interior Sindh) in January this year in which over 60 people were killed. According to one source that cannot be verified, the gunmen had dropped pro-ISIS pamphlets at the site of the attack that stated it was in retaliation for ‘atrocities against the Ahle-Sunnat Wal Jamaat’ (ASWJ), a pro-Sunni political party, as well as in retaliation to police encounter killings of militants in Karachi.

The Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif has cancelled his three-day visit to Sri Lanka. Karachi Police and Sindh Rangers – whose presence is scarce in areas like Safoora Goth – reached the site of attack shortly after it took place. Sindh government has promised financial assistance for family members of all victims. One day of mourning (yom-e-sog) has been declared in Karachi (endorsed by political parties). This will close down local businesses in the city tomorrow. Condemnations and condolences have poured in from across Pakistan, as well as from the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi.

Ismailism is essentially a branch of Shia Islam. Generally considered a peace-loving and hardworking business community in Pakistan, Ismailis in Karachi have reportedly been receiving threats for ‘some time now’, according to one member of the community who spoke to me shortly after the attack. Last year, Ismailis were threatened by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Chitral (northern Pakistan) in a pressure tactic to get them to convert to Islam.

Safoora Goth is a scarcely populated area and its infrastructures (roads, in particular) are severely underdeveloped. It is likely that the attack was carefully planned keeping these logistics in mind. It has called into question the on-going Rangers and Police-led security operation in the city.

Security operations in Karachi – against criminals, terrorists, and militants associated with political parties – have been routinely organised and carry out since the 1990s, often critiqued for being deeply politicised. Following the June 2014 attack on the Jinnah International Airport, the city became a crucial chapter in the military-led operation against terrorists in Pakistan, Operation Zarb-e-Azb. After the Peshawar attack last December, the operation escalated.

While initially restoring some calm in certain neighbourhoods of Karachi earlier this year, the city has continued to suffer from a spate of targeted killings against police officers, doctors, members of the Shia community, university professors, and most recently a human rights activist Sabeen Mahmud.

Many criticise the Karachi operation for targeting one political party while lacking any sectarian focus or long-term agenda to rid the city of its various militant groups. Sectarian attacks have claimed over 130 lives in Karachi this year alone.

The citizens of Karachi are increasingly getting frustrated at the lack of stability these operations are providing. Law enforcement officials regularly boast of lowering levels of street crime and target killings, but the latest attack is a stark reminder that the quality of security for civilians of Karachi remains vulnerable and exposed to all sorts of threats from a host of actors and organisations.

It is clear that Pakistan’s war on terror has fronts across the country and the regional neighbourhood, but its most complicated battles will be fought in the country’s urban centres.

Zoha Waseem is a Doctoral Candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and Senior Editor for Strife. She tweets @zohawaseem.

Operation Decisive Storm: when Riyadh calls on Islamabad

March 31, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

With Iran-backed Houthi rebels advancing in Yemen, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has called upon its trusted and indebted partner Pakistan for support in so-called ‘Operation Decisive Storm’. There has been much speculation over the last few days as to what sort of support Islamabad is considering on providing Riyadh, with whom it has both a military partnership as well as an ideological relationship.

Reports from Saudi Arabia were quick to suggest that Pakistan may be joining the Riyadh-led coalition against Houthis. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif did all but deny this when he said, ‘Pakistan has pledged to defend Saudi Arabia in case of a threat to the territorial integrity and security of a friendly country’. Foreign Office spokesman Tasnim Aslam took the podium to ease tensions within the country, only to admit that such an option was still under examination. Following a high-profile meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, COAS Raheel Sharif, DG ISI Rizwan Akhtar, and Khwaja Asif, it was revealed that a ‘threat to Saudi territorial integrity would evoke a strong response from Pakistan’. To add to the confusion, it was also reported that Pakistani and Saudi forces have been conducting joint military exercises near the Yemeni border. Furthermore, a graphic of key players involved in ‘Decisive Storm’ released by Saudi media, suggested that Pakistani warships and air support have already been provided to KSA.

A delegation inclusive of the Defence Minister, the National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz and representatives of the Pakistani army, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 31 March. Last week, Khwaja Asif had backtracked on the gravity of the situation, stating that the government is still undecided and that the Parliament will be taken into confidence, all the while stressing Pakistan’s brotherly relations with Saudi Arabia. For its part, the Parliament appears to be leaning towards a ‘no boots’ stance.

At this stage, it is difficult to argue that Islamabad is leaning towards neutrality in the Saudi-Iran-Yemen nexus and it is being suggested that Pakistan may provide logistical support: training, weapons, and possibly aerial muscle, if it has not done so already. Given the history between both countries, neutrality seems highly unlikely. And it is because of this history that it is unsurprising that Saudis have called upon Pakistan to provide assistance.

There is a long-standing economic and military partnership between both states. Pakistan has been receiving aid from Saudi Arabia since as early as the 1960s, and the latter has supported Pakistan during its conflicts with India, as was seen most evidently during the 1971 war. In 1969, Pakistan Air Force fighters flew Saudi jets over South Yemen during the Battle of Sharoora. In the face of Ayatollah Khomeini’s growing power in Iran in 1979, Pakistani troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia. In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia (along with the US) provided funding for Pakistani madrassas and mosques to create and sponsor the Mujahideen to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. This led to the expansion of the Deobandi ideology and the rise of Wahabism in Pakistan, creating ideological ties between the two countries and mushrooming jihadi groups that Pakistan has utilised in Afghanistan and Kashmir. And in the 1990s, when Pakistan was slapped with economic sanctions following the development of its nuclear programme, it was Riyadh that provided barrels of oil to Islamabad free of cost.

In 2013, Pakistan and KSA entered into an unofficial nuclear agreement, with Saudis allegedly investing in Pakistan’s nuclear projects, and in return Islamabad pledging nuclear support to Riyadh should it be needed. Last year, a 17-member Saudi defence delegation travelled to Pakistan to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

Nawaz Sharif’s relationship with the Saudi royal family is even more personal. In 1999, when Sharif was sent into exile after General Pervez Musharraf’s coup, it was Saudi Arabia that provided him with shelter. In return, the PM is indebted to the Kingdom and has made frequent visits over the past few months. Sharif visited the late Saudi King Shah Abdullah when he was unwell, then again to attend his funeral, then on 5 March when he was personally received by King Salman at the Riyadh airport with a red carpet reception. It was during this last visit that talks of Saudi demands for military troops from Pakistan began surfacing, but had probably been brainstormed for some time.

That said, the Pakistani state appears to have very little clarity on the matter – or so it has been portrayed. Updates on the situation suggest that possibilities of supporting Saudis are being ‘examined’, ‘considered’, and ‘assessed’. This has created an atmosphere of panic and frustration within the country where the consensus – barring certain religious groups – is to stay out of Yemen. Social media is roaring with opinions and analyses with very little information at hand. Since last week, most analysts, columnists and political commentators – regardless of their stance on the Pakistani army and its operations – have advised against interfering in the Middle East. It is because of this confusion – will they, won’t they – that 500 Pakistanis in Yemen boarded the first flight back home, with over 170 awaiting their turn.

On the civilian side, political parties including Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), and Awami National Party (ANP) have all advised against deploying Pakistani troops in Yemen. Shia groups such as Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM) and the Shia Ulema Council (SUC) took out separate rallies in Karachi against Saudi Arabia’s decision to attack Yemen. At the same time, the notorious Jamaat-ud-Dawa, led by Hafiz Saeed, staged demonstrations in Lahore and Islamabad, declaring their support for the Kingdom. According to one report, Ahle-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), a Sunni political party with alleged links to the terrorist group Lashker-e-Jhangvi, has also backed Saudi Arabia’s operation in Yemen. On the other hand, Sunni political organisations such as Sunni Tehreek and Sunni Ittehad Council have called for peaceful resolutions.

More importantly, ISI’s media-arm, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), has been silent on the matter. Ultimately, it is the military that will be calling the shots and they will bear in mind that Pakistan and KSA are not just ‘brothers’; this is an intimate business relationship. While it has been suggested that within the Pakistani army there are talks of not getting involved in the Middle East because of Pakistan’s own internal and regional security dynamics, Pakistan could see an alliance with Saudi Arabia financially beneficial. It is unlikely that the Army will agree to providing assistance to KSA without a hefty package in return and this might be on military terms.

In 2015, KSA is expected to spend an estimated US$9.6 billion on importing defence equipment. According to IHS’ annual Global Defence Trade Report it has already surpassed India to become the world’s largest importer of defence equipment, as well as the USA’s top trading partner. KSA’s budget and defence spending has increased dramatically since the Arab Spring. In fact, the Middle East is reported to be the world’s fastest growing defence market with the US being ‘the biggest beneficiary of this market’. It could be that Pakistan is considering contributing to the defence market, for which Saudi Arabia would be a generous consumer and buyer.

But this is still early speculation. The only opinions expressed in agreement across the board concern the repercussions that interferences in the Middle East could have on Pakistan’s growing sectarian polarization. The sectarian conflicts of the Middle East have never been detached from Pakistan. Indeed, the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry, that has found a new front in Yemen, has been playing out in Islamabad’s neighbourhood for some decades now. The primary concern within the country is the exacerbation of Shia-Sunni violence. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal database, 210 people were killed in 92 incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan in 2014, and over 140 have died this year (until 22 March 2015).

What is also being discussed now is the rise of sectarianism in urban areas like Karachi, where sectarian attacks claimed 100 lives last year alone. Karachi has been recognised as one of ‘four sectarian hotspots’ and the province of Sindh, which has a history Sufism and deep respect for Shias, is routinely subjected to sectarian violence. Earlier this year, on 30 January, over 60 Shias were killed in Shikarpur, six hours north of Karachi. With Karachi police and paramilitary forces already engaged in operations against ‘crime and militancy’, the city will suffer greatly from increasing sectarian divides.

For the time being, Pakistan does not appear to be in a position to send boots on the ground, both because of militancy at home - for which it needs troops and resources to continue counter-terrorism operations - and also because there can be no easy exit strategies following such a deployment. It further needs to keep its focus on the instability at its western border with Afghanistan, and hostility on the Line of Control. But events are still unfolding and Nawaz Sharif is likely to be under tremendous pressure to cooperate with the royal family. How this cooperation will be justified in the face of Pakistan’s internal security concerns remains to be seen.

Zoha Waseem is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, researching urban security and policing in Pakistan. She tweets at @zohawaseem.

Interview - Journalist Sean Carberry on Afghanistan & conflict reporting

March 30, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Mackenzie Weinger:

Journalist Sean Carberry shut down NPR’s Kabul bureau at the end of 2014 after more than two years reporting in Afghanistan. Photo: Courtesy Sean Carberry

In December 2014, reporter Sean Carberry shut the doors of NPR’s Kabul, Afghanistan bureau. The United States public radio network had put the bureau’s closure on the calendar back in 2012, deciding to leave the country due to the planned reduction of US troops. After having a bureau in the city since 2006, NPR has now turned its coverage of Afghanistan over to its Islamabad correspondent, and Carberry has returned to the United States.

Carberry, currently a freelance journalist in Washington DC, spoke with Strife about closing NPR’s Kabul bureau, what’s next for Afghanistan, and his advice for reporting in conflict zones.

***

What did you think about the bureau closing? Did the justification for shutting it make sense to you, or was it a case of a long war and a short attention span?

I think the decision was more financial than anything else. And the feeling was similar to what they did in Iraq — NPR closed the Baghdad bureau at the end of 2011 when US troops left, so they were following that model. I understand financially why there might have been a need or desire to do that. I certainly don’t think editorially it was a decision that a number of people in management would have made.

I did have a conversation with a senior manager last summer offering to extend and stay at least through the first half of 2015 because I felt that it was essential to continue to cover the story and see how things play out at least through the first half of the year after this transition period ends. And I was told that there was agreement that editorially that would be preferable, but, you know, it was a non-starter because financially there was not a dollar to put toward that. It was a done deal at that point.

What do you think we can we expect to see from the US-Afghanistan relationship going forward?

The recent Washington visit by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah appears to have been very productive. Ghani was extremely gracious and really bent over backwards to show his appreciation of US investment in Afghanistan – both in dollars and lives. It’s a stark change from former President Hamid Karzai, who became increasingly hostile towards the US.

President Obama agreed to delay his planned draw-down of troops, which both US and Afghan military officials have wanted for some time. The US also announced a new pledge of $800 million in incentive funds that Afghanistan will receive if it meets certain benchmarks. But, the question is, how long will this honeymoon last? There is a lot of Afghanistan fatigue in the US, and the public and many in Congress are wondering what the US is getting for its continued investment in Afghanistan.

Ghani’s going to have to reassure people that he is making progress on some of these key things like corruption, in terms of trying to build an economy, in terms of trying to further peace initiatives and end the fighting there. And it’s going to be difficult because he doesn’t have a lot to show on any of those, even some six months into his presidency, because he doesn’t have a full cabinet and so a lot of the ministries have been just running on fumes.

And just as Karzai gradually alienated many of his supporters in Washington, there is a risk Ghani could too. He was on his best behaviour during this recent visit, but he’s notoriously prickly, and he’s already dressed down a number of western officials and diplomats in Kabul. Some have warned that working with Ghani could become more difficult over time.

What’s your take on the prospect of a peace process? What do you think about Pakistan’s role?

I’m sceptical of that. I think there are a lot of reasons why it should be doubted right now that that process is likely to move forward. The Taliban have been making some gains militarily in parts of the country and so, from their standpoint, if they can continue to make gains then that strengthens their bargaining position. Unless some of the Taliban commanders believe that they’re actually likely to lose ground this year, then maybe they would see an incentive to start talking, but I think a number of Taliban figures are going to think they have an incentive to keep fighting and increase their leverage.

And there are still a lot of questions about Pakistan and whether Pakistan is really going to come to the table and use their influence over the Afghan Taliban to start negotiations. There’s been some optimism that Pakistan is turning over a new leaf, but from some people I’ve talked to that are close to this, they don’t really buy that there is any substantive change in Pakistan’s behaviour. For example, there’s a fundamental conflict that is unresolved between Afghanistan and Pakistan — that Afghanistan still does not officially recognise the border between the two countries. This is the Durand Line that was created by the British in the late 1800s. It took a big chunk of Afghanistan and gave it to what was British India at the time. And even though the international community, the UN, all see this as the legal, defined border, it’s a point of nationalist pride in Afghanistan to say ‘we will never recognise the Durand Line’.

As long as the Afghans refuse to recognise this line, there will be this existential angst and fear in Pakistan that has fuelled their desire to have strong influence in Afghanistan through proxies, whether it’s the Taliban or politicians or what-have-you. So unless Afghanistan decides to recognise this border, I think it’s going to be hard for Pakistan to give up this feeling that it has to have a weak neighbour that isn’t going to someday be strong enough to try to claim back this land. This is an underlying dynamic that doesn’t get a lot of attention, but I think it’s a real festering sore… It’s hard to see a peace process going forward without some resolution of this underlying border conflict.

But that’s just one of many reasons why some people are wary of Pakistan’s intentions and willingness to commit to a peace process. On the Afghan side, there are still questions whether different factions have reconciled and settled on a unified approach to a peace process as well, and they can’t move forward if some powerful people have reservations about the terms of a possible peace deal.

What would you say was the most surprising story you covered while in Afghanistan?

I keep coming back to this story about the police puncturing car tires in the city. It’s just a story that found us. I had someone over to our office that we were interviewing and when he went out, around 7 o’clock at night, his car parked in front of our compound had a couple of flat tires. And he actually had a flat tire on his way over to our house, so he thought that the repair was done badly and a coincidence he had another flat tire. Then, as my Afghan producer was leaving shortly after that to head home, he calls me and says, ‘Hey, I have two flat tires as well’. I said, ‘Ok, there’s something weird about this. Call the police office at our district and tell them this and see what they have to say.’

He calls them, and then calls me back and says: ‘I talked to the police commander and he said they did it, that this is a new policy to try to prevent car theft. If people park their car in the street at night, they’re going to puncture the tires so the cars can’t be stolen and used as suicide car bombs.’ When he explained this, I thought, this is unusual. It clearly is a solution to a problem — I’m not sure it’s the best solution to the problem.

What the police were saying was, ‘Look, there is no other way to solve this problem’. And this phrase is something that I heard constantly in Afghanistan, that ‘this is the only way’, or ‘there’s no other way’. It was a fascinating phenomenon that this was how decisions would be made and rationalised in a lot of cases.

That’s the one that’s always stuck with me as this weird, little specific thing, but it was emblematic of so many bigger aspects.

How would you suggest reporters entering war zones or areas impacted by conflict approach their jobs?

I spent time in Libya in 2011 and spent time in Iraq and other conflict zones, and I think one thing I would say is every conflict is different. Even though someone’s a war reporter, each situation has its own dynamics and things you do need to study and learn and pay attention to before you get on the ground. There are some places where it’s safe to associate with certain rebel groups and things like that, and they’ll take care of you, but in all these cases — especially when you’re doing any kind of embedding — you are taking a side in the story.

When you’re embedded with US troops, you are part of that. You are a target whether you want to be or not. You can try to argue to the Taliban that you’re a journalist, but they’re not going to see it that way. You’re part of that establishment. And the same thing in Libya. If you’re there, embedded with the rebels back in 2011, you’re taking a side. And there was, I think, a clear western narrative that the rebels were on the right side and the Gaddafi regime was on the wrong side.

That’s just one of the big ethical questions for all of us in this industry: Are we always neutral? There are times where there’s a decision that the Taliban is the enemy and so if you’re reporting there are you going to be biased against the Taliban? Conceptually, I would have loved to have embedded with the Taliban to cover their side of things. My greatest reservation was that I didn’t want to be with a group of Taliban when a drone strike happened and just felt the risk factor of trying to get that other side was pretty high.

You end up embedding with forces that you can logistically do it with, so you get that part of the story, but you don’t necessarily see the other parts. And sometimes, news organisations, countries, etc., decide: ‘Well, look, this group is bad, so it’s okay to embed with the good guys and do reporting that’s focused on how they’re trying to kill the bad guys.’ But, every once in a while, I see conversations about that and discussions asking: what are the ethics and journalistic responsibilities to try to cover these things in a more neutral fashion? Or should people buy into a narrative that says, ‘This group is the enemy and therefore the reporting is going to reflect that’?

There are different things that dictate how that’s going to come out, but, as I say, it’s easy to embed with the US army, it’s not so easy to embed with ISIS, Taliban, a militia in Libya these days… There are some people that are going out and doing that, trying to do that, and, journalistically it’s worth doing. But I almost feel like it’s people who are just trying to push the edge and I’m not always sure about the quality of the reporting that comes out of some of those efforts. I think often a lot of the reporting tends to be about the journalist rather than the people that you’re trying to report on.

I get the draw to want to do that kind of thing, but I am just very wary of stories that start with the word ‘I’ or ‘we’. It’s not about us. I think that’s the challenge, to realise that we’re witnesses, we’re not participants.

Mackenzie Weinger is an MA student in War Studies at King’s College London focusing on the media and conflict. Twitter: @mweinger

Financing Terror, Part II: Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism

January 19, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Claire Mennessier:

: Taliban fighters demobilising in Afghanistan. Photo: Isafmedia (some rights reserved)

For the last 25 years Pakistan has been involved in the sponsoring of terrorism on a national and international scale. As a result of its role in the development of terrorism in Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir, Pakistan is a good example of a country which is both a supporter and a victim of terrorism.

The early 1980s saw a rise in state sponsorship of terrorism.[i] State sponsoring, where a government lets a terrorist group act with relative impunity, is beneficial to both the sponsor state and the terrorist group. On the one hand, it allows states to carry out a limited risk and low-budget foreign policy while denying any association with the terrorist group by claiming ignorance or incapacity.[ii] On the other hand, terrorist groups that enjoy state support have been found to be more destructive than those without state support, as they are ‘more able and willing to kill large numbers’.[iii] Indeed, sponsor-states provide them with, inter alia, safe havens, funding, arms, training and intelligence. Perpetrators of terrorist acts also enjoy more freedom as the sponsor-state can protect them from direct coercion and legal claims.[iv]

Ironically, state sponsoring of terrorism is less widely denounced than individual acts of terrorism. One reason is that outside governments fear state-sponsored retaliation.[v] Another is that it is a widely misunderstood phenomenon, which stems from the difficulty of reaching a definitional consensus on state sponsoring.[vi] However, under international law, states have to take all reasonable measures to prevent terrorist acts. Lack of due diligence and the state toleration of such acts both create liability. And if the existence of state-sponsored terrorism can be established, then the sponsoring state may be violating Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.[vii]

The United States Department of State routinely lists a number of states which it claims sponsor terrorism.[viii] Its current formal list includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. This list represents a good example of flawed policy response, as much of the enigma caused by state sponsorship today includes countries that are not even on the list, Pakistan being one of the important potential omissions. These ‘new’ state sponsors present an additional threat as they are often linked to Sunni jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda.[ix]

Political scientists have classified Pakistan as an ‘active’ state sponsor of terrorism, as it seems to deliberately provide critical support to terrorist groups, in the form of money, weapons, training and intelligence.[x] Over the last 25 years, Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), the intelligence service of Pakistan and the Pakistani Army, both backed by the Pakistani government, have developed an elaborated nexus of terrorist apparatus and have assisted in their growth.[xi] Both the Taliban and Pakistani terrorist group LeT provide good examples of such terrorist apparatus, as they have arguably worked and flourish under the sponsorship and protection of Pakistan. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s role in the sponsoring of international terrorism needs to be presented in a balanced way, as explained below.

Aided by the United States, Pakistan played an instrumental role in the creation and development of the Taliban on the political scene of Afghanistan in the 1990s.[xii] At the height of the Cold War and the struggle for control of the Middle East and Central Asia, the United States and Pakistan recruited the mujahideen from, inter alia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. The United States also supplied training and weaponry in order to fight the Soviets that had invaded Afghanistan.[xiii] This is how the Taliban became the main laboratory to prepare future Islamic mujahideen and how LeT was created.[xiv]

It has been argued that Pakistan and the ISI had a long strategic and mutually beneficial relationship with Osama bin Laden and his terrorist affiliates.[xv] On the one hand, it would have proven difficult for bin Laden to operate freely within the Pakistani borders and to use Pakistan as a base to conduct international terrorist operations without the ISI. On the other, bin Laden’s relationship with ISI went beyond the Afghan movement, as he provided funding for the Pakistani-sponsored attacks within Kashmir and ultimately in India’s large cities, such as Mumbai in 2008. While former Pakistani President, Pervez Musharaff, promised Pakistan would break its links to the Taliban after 9/11, it is unclear today whether ISI and the Pakistani Army continue to back the Taliban.[xvi]

Additionally, Pakistan’s sponsoring of terrorism in the Punjab and Kashmir has been part of the country’s long-term foreign policy of securing the independence of Kashmir from India. During the period of British colonial rule, Kashmir had developed its own mode of regional nationalism, which didn’t easily fit into the national vision of India or Pakistan. At the time of India’s independence from Britain in 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir’s decision to accede to India, which came with the promise for a plebiscite that never occurred, led to the movement for azaadi, or the movement for independence from the Indian State.[xvii] Consequently, the Indian state started pursuing a ‘catch and kill campaign’, through which Kashmiris were governed through force, not law, and were rejected as potential militants. The Indian state response to this complex social and political problem was, and still is, one of violence and repression, creating a culture of impunity.[xviii]

As a result of India’s repressive policies toward the Kashmiris and Pakistan’s aspirations for accession of Kashmir, what began as a national, indigenous, secular movement for independence soon became a Pakistani-sponsored radical Islamist crusade to control Kashmir.[xix] ISI, through its proxy networks such as LeT, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), provided money, carried out training and propaganda, and educated and indoctrinated Kashmiri militant groups within Pakistan and Afghanistan. By training operatives in the latter, ISI could easily deny the Indian charges that Pakistan was sponsoring terrorist attacks.

It has been postulated that ISI is the main body channelling financial and material resources across the borders to jihadist-linked groups, protecting them from government counterterrorism measures and looking the other way as they recruit and raise money.[xx] If this is the case, it would mean that ISI aims to fully control the jihad. As stated by a former HUM militant, ‘the moment the ISI feels that the Jihad body is becoming powerful, it incites trouble in that party or tries to split it. Breaching the bigger groups by throwing money, arms and vehicles by putting new leaders in the driving seats is their style’.[xxi] This sentiment is clearly reminiscent of Pakistan’s political agenda to maintain power against India in the Kashmir Valley.

A potential long-term concern is the increasing number of Islamic religious schools, madrassas, which provide free education, food, housing and clothing.[xxii] When the United States and Saudi Arabia funnelled millions of dollars and weapons into Afghanistan in the fight against Soviet occupiers, the United States and Pakistani dictator Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq promoted madrassas as a way to recruit troops for the anti-Soviet war.[xxiii] Following the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989 and the cessation of US aid to the Mujahideen fighters, huge caches of arms remained with the Afghan Northern Alliance and the ISI, which were subsequently used to arm the jihad. With the madrassas considered an important supply line for the jihad, it is understandable how madrassas are seen as a catalyst to the jihadi expansion.[xxiv] Despite promises by Pakistan to control madrassas, their number has grown since 9/11 and few have registered with the government: in 2000, only 4350 of the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 madrassas in Pakistan had registered with the government.[xxv] With many schools now being financed by wealthy Pakistani industrialists and countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Pakistani state has lost its control on the madrassa institution, rendering it even less controllable. With less state supervision, madrassas are now more prone to the preaching of violent versions of Islam.[xxvi]

Involvement in the financing of terrorism doesn’t come without a cost. One of the costs of ‘outsourcing’ terrorism to militant groups for Pakistan is that it now faces a typical principal-agent problem: the agenda and interests of Pakistan (the principal) and those of the non-state actors (the agent) are not fully aligned anymore. Some terrorist groups have ties to a wide range of jihadists who, in addition to serving Pakistan’s interests in Kashmir, are also engaged in other struggles, some of which are directed against the government of Pakistan. [xxvii] A recent example of this backlash is the Pakistani Taliban attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, Pakistan, which claimed 140 lives, 132 of them children. This attack showed the Pakistani government’s shortcomings in its fight against terrorism. This was an attack by a group that it inadvertently helped create and underscores the urgent need for a new anti-terror strategy.[xxviii] Pakistan’s leadership has since agreed on a comprehensive anti-terrorism action plan, which includes the establishment of special courts to expedite the trials of terror suspects and a 5000 strong counter-terrorism force.[xxix]

Is Pakistan’s new counter-terrorism strategy too little, too late? Caught between the need to protect itself against an internal enemy and having to partner with militant forces to fight external threats, positive results in the fight against terrorism may be limited - Pakistan’s anti-terror strategy is rife with contradictions.

Claire Mennessier holds an MA in International Studies & Diplomacy from SOAS and an MA in International Relations from Griffith University (Australia). Her research interests include terrorism and counterterrorism, and more specifically the strategic dimension of terrorism and state approaches to terrorism and political violence.

This article is part of a Strife series on financing terror. Over the next couple of weeks Strife will feature other articles that focus on different ways of financing terrorism. Next, Samuel Smith will address the frightening trend of kidnapping for ransom as a source of finance for terror groups through a case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

NOTES

[i] Daniel L. Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of destruction? Applying principal-agent analysis to state-sponsored terrorism,” International Studies Perspectives 11 (2010): 1-18.

[ii] Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Terry, “Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy Analysis,” Naval Law Review 159 (1986).

[iii] Daniel L. Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University press, 2005).

[iv] Terry, n. 2.

[v] Scott S. Evans, “The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine”, Maryland Journal of International Law 18(1): 21-76.

[vi] Kerry A. Gurovitsch, “Legal Obstacles to Combating International State-Sponsored Terrorism”, Houston Journal of International Law 10 (1987): 159-180.

[vii] John A. Cohan, “Formulation of a State’s Response to Terrorism and State-Sponsored Terrorism”, Pace International Review 14 (2002): 77-119.

[viii] Daniel L. Byman, “The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism”, Saban Center Analysis Paper (2008).

[ix] Byman, n.8.

[x] Arjun Subramaniam, “Challenges of Protecting India from Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence 24(2012): 396-414.

[xi] Byman, n.8.

[xii] Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Settle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 111-118.

[xiii] Washingtonsblog, December 30, 2014, “Sleeping With the Devil: How U.S. and Saudi Backing of Al Qaeda Led to 9/11”, September 5, 2012, http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/09/sleeping-with-the-devil-how-u-s-and-saudi-backing-of-al-qaeda-led-to-911.html

[xiv] Poonam Mann, “Fighting Terrorism: India and Central Asia”, Strategic Analysis 24(11) (2008).

[xv] Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm”, The Annals of American Academy 618 (2008): 32-45.

[xvi] Riedel, n.15.

[xvii] Helen Duschinski, “Reproducing Regimes of Impunity”, Cultural Studies 24(1) (2010), 110-132.

[xviii] Haley Duschinski and Bruce Hoffman, “Everyday violence, institutional denial and struggles for justice in Kashmir”, Institute of Race Relations 52(4) (2011), 44-70.

[xix] Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture”, Foreign Affairs 79(6) (2000): 115-126.

[xx] Mann, n.14.

[xxi] Ghulam Hasnain, “Ready for Jehad”, Outlook 40(37) (2000): 34.

[xxii] Stern, n.19.

[xxiii] Anita Demkiv, “Pakistan’s Fata, Transnational Terrorism and the Global Development Model”, Journal of Global Change and Governance 2(1) (2009).

[xxiv] Stern, n.19.

[xxv] Stern, n.19.

[xxvi] Ashok K. Behuria, “Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at war with itself”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61(4) (2007), 529-543.

[xxvii] Byman and Kreps, n.1.

[xxviii] Zachary Laub, ‘Behind Pakistan’s Taliban War”, Council on Foreign Relations, December 17, 2014.

[xxix] RT, “Pakistan agrees on new terrorism plan, pledges to ‘eradicate Taliban’”, December 25, 2014.

Over 130 Children Killed in Tragic Peshawar Attack

December 16, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

A Pakistani soldier escorts schoolchildren from the Army Public School after they were rescued. Source: Reuters

Heart-breaking images from Pakistan’s north-western city of Peshawar flooded news channels around the world today as over 140 people, including 132 children, were killed in one of the deadliest attacks ever to take place in the country. In a rescue operation that lasted over eight hours, six militants associated with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (which eventually claimed responsibility for the attack) were also killed by the armed forces of Pakistan. The site of the siege, Peshawar’s Army Public School is not just for the children of army officials; most of its students are children of civilians. The attack has received widespread condemnation from within and outside Pakistan.

At around 10AM in Peshawar, militants equipped with suicide vests, guns and grenades entered the Army Public School via a graveyard at the back of the school, breaking a wall to make their way in and reportedly setting alight a car they had used. The school is divided into four blocks. According to a press conference by the Director General of the Inter-Services Public Relations (DG ISPR), militants entered an auditorium at the centre of the premises where students had been gathered in the morning. They opened fire, causing children to run towards the two exits available. The militants then began indiscriminately firing at the children on both exits, resulting in bodies piling up.

A gun battle ensued between the militants and Pakistani commandos, as the premises were cordoned off and the militants found themselves cornered into one of the four blocks. A search and rescue operation began to secure the over 900 students and members of staff inside the school. Reports of hand grenades being hurled at security forces and IEDs being planted across the school were also revealed. Over 130 children were wounded, while 132 have been reported to have died thus far. Seven SSG officers have also been injured. The principal of the Army Public School, Tahira Qazi, has also been killed.

DG ISPR has claimed that intelligence agencies know which group was behind the attack and who the militants were communicating with, but the agency has so far refrained from disclosing these details. The nationalities of these militants are also still unkown to the public. According to DG ISPR, there appeared no desire on the part of the militants to take any hostages. The idea was to claim as many lives as possible, without surviving the attack. The siege brought the entire country to a standstill and it bore the markings of a carefully planned and executed attack.

Tehreek-e-Taliban’s (TTP) spokesman Muhammad Umar Khorasani told a media agency that his group, which is reportedly headed by Mullah Fazlullah, was responsible for the attack. This is the same group that shot the seventeen-year-old Nobel Peace laureate, Malala Yousufzai. Khorasani has made the following remarks regarding the attack.

‘Our suicide bombers have entered the school. They have instructions not to harm the children, but to target the army personnel. We targeted the school because the army targets our families. We want them to feel out pain. It’s a revenge attack for the army offensive in North Waziristan.’¹

Mullah Fazlullah’s faction of the TTP is being targeted in an army-led security operation (Operation Zarb-e-Azb) in North Waziristan that began in June 2014, shortly after the attack on Pakistan’s busiest airport in Karachi that killed around 30 people. TTP-affiliated groups have repeatedly vowed to retaliate against the Pakistani army for this operation.

Peshawar, in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is in a critical location. Close to the Khyber Pass that links Pakistan with the Afghan border, Peshawar’s peripheries have been largely insecure and it has frequently been in the news for militant attacks. It is the second-largest Pashtun city in Pakistan after Karachi. A large number of Afghan migrants have integrated into Peshawar’s urban population (an estimated three to four million people).

One of the key strategies to accompany Operation Zarb-e-Azb should have been the implementation of widespread security operations in urban areas of Pakistan, to secure and protect its cities from an influx of militants escaping from the northern areas of Pakistan. Cities like Peshawar and Karachi provide militants the ideal landscapes, criminal networks, and underground economic support to camouflage, regroup, and prepare for retaliatory onslaughts against the security forces of Pakistan and its civilians. For these urban areas, the government of Pakistan needs to ensure that the police and paramilitary forces are equipped and trained appropriately to avoid attacks and combat security breaches in an efficient manner. Such attacks, including the one in Peshawar today, have been predicted since the moment Zarb-e-Azb began.

Security operations now need to continue relentlessly in the cities of Pakistan, such as the one ongoing in Karachi. That said, the successes of these can only be measured (if at all) in due time, depending on how sustainable these operations are, and to what extent they can be independent of political influences and corrupt practices.

They also need to be given the support of the Pakistani government and people. The provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Tehreek-e-Insaaf, has been staging protests and sit-ins around the country’s major cities because of the grievances its leader Imran Khan holds against the Islamabad government (led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his political party, Pakistan Muslim League-Noon) for allegedly rigging the 2013 elections. Imran Khan has repeatedly grinded urban areas to a halt, demanding an end to corruption and electoral rigging, but has long kept a soft stance against the Pakistani Taliban.

It is high time the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa gets its priorities in order. Because of the endless media attention his political party and its tactics receive, Operation Zarb-e-Azb appears to have receded into the background when it should have been provided with constant coverage and analysis. The operation, many would argue, now needs to be expanded.

In the same vein, it is also time for the Pakistani establishment to abandon its policy of picking and choosing between the ‘good Taliban’ (those who support the Pakistani army and are supported by them in return) and the ‘bad Taliban’ (those who target Pakistani security officials and aim to overthrow the state). It needs to be accepted that any organisation that puts at stake the freedom and liberty of the people of Pakistan should not be tolerated or entertained. These policies have complicated and then terminated all previous negotiation processes between the government and the militant groups. They have also hindered counter-terrorism efforts by security personnel across the country.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, what is lacking in Pakistan’s efforts in countering terrorism, and that has been brought back in the news following the attack in Peshawar, is the lack of a policy or strategy on how to deal with these groups in Pakistan. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which was founded last year after much political bickering between different branches of the state claiming authority over it, has yet to become operational and formulate any strategy on countering militants in Pakistan. The importance of policy-making by NACTA has also been emphasised in Pakistan’s first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP), which was unveiled earlier this year.

The Peshawar attack is a clear demonstration that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan remains undefeated and is prepared for the long haul. It is also a grave reminder that this is Pakistan’s war and that civilians are still the primary targets for militants (between 50,000 and 60,000 Pakistanis have been killed since 2001). It is also critical to understand that this war is not about Islam, or any religion for that matter, as no faith can advocate the senseless massacre of innocent people. This is about revenge, intimidation and fear. Hitting security forces and government officials may strike Pakistan’s muscle; indiscriminately gunning down and slaughtering children in broad daylight targets the very heart of the country.

Zoha Waseem is a doctoral researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter @zohawaseem.

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