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Made in America?: Poland’s Defence Industry

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Polish mobile artillery shown at International Defence Industry Exhibition 2008 in Kielce, Poland. Licensed under Creative Commons.

On 8 March, the Polish government released a statement indicating their eagerness to hand over the country’s entire MiG-29 fleet for use in Ukraine.[1] Warsaw intended to transfer the jets to Ramstein Air Base in Germany at the disposal of the U.S. government, in exchange for a purchase of similarly-capable American-made aircraft.[2] While the scheme is unlikely to go forward, Warsaw’s request reveals a two-pronged strategy for its own national defence: 1) bolstering Ukraine’s capabilities to contest Russian military power in Europe, and 2) accelerating Poland’s defence modernization efforts. The request also perfectly captures the limits of Poland’s domestic arms industry. Throughout the last decade of crises, the Polish government has struggled to invest in and reform its domestic arms industry, antithetical to its stated objective of not only modernising, but also autonomizing, its national defence.

Military transformation has defence industrial implications that require systematic examination.[3] In the post-Communist era, Poland’s defence industry remained geared towards the production of Soviet-type equipment that was exported to countries such as India well into the 2000s, despite those weapons becoming increasingly obsolete in the Polish military itself.[4] While some production of legacy systems needed to be sustained in order to maintain and modify the Soviet-era systems that the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) did use, it was also decided that industrial restructuring was needed to become a ‘labour-saving, capital-intensive professional fighting force’[5] inter-operable with NATO allies.[6]

The Polish government’s military modernization plans were defined along the lines of strengthening its territorial defence, becoming an exemplary member of the North Atlantic Alliance, and bolstering Polish defence industry capabilities.[7] While Poland maintains a Euro-Atlantic security posture and holds its relationship with the United States in the highest regard, both the current PiS-led government and its predecessor, Civic Platform, emphasised ‘Polishness’ in defence development.[8] Pandering to a domestic industrial base is on point for a populist government such as PiS, but there are pragmatic, material reasons for this emphasis as well. By relying on itself as much as possible for weapons procurement, Warsaw could prove its military prowess within NATO, increase its export of weapons systems, and fortify its territory against potential Russian attacks. Moreover, increased defence autonomy would provide insulation against shifts in American foreign policy, as well as the turbulence of Brussels’ attempts to develop the European Union’s own defence autonomy.[9]

Accordingly, Poland’s initial defence modernisation plans were designed to not only contribute more militarily within existing transatlantic security structures, but also increase Poland’s defence autonomy. The 2012 Armed Forces Modernization Plan (PMT) provided the structural roadmap for the country’s military procurement through 2022. The “Komorowski Doctrine,” named after then-President Bronisław Komorowski and outlined in the 2013 White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland, framed Poland’s own defensive potential as the “core”[10] of Poland’s national security system. A decade later Warsaw has fallen short of its goals with respect to domestic industrial development.[11]

Overwhelmingly, the Polish government has opted to expedite and/or expand foreign imports of weapons systems. In 2013, Tomasz Szatkowski declared this as inevitable, if not ideal, given that “the small or medium state does not create the conditions for a comprehensive defence industrial base.”[12] However, this position ignores the strengths of defence industries in other nearby countries that are similar to Poland in economic and technological terms, such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Furthermore, Szatkowski’s comment neglects the political power Warsaw has to utilise domestic scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities in order to boost the Polish defence industry. Indeed, the Polish defence industry has developed some formidable systems such as WB group’s Topaz integrated command system, the SAMOC and Łowcza-Reha anti-aircraft defence systems, the SCOT ship command system, and other communications and unmanned systems.[13] In 2016, Warsaw abandoned a deal with Airbus in order to pursue a contract with local producer PZL-Mielec, a Sikorsky Aircraft subsidiary, for Black Hawk helicopters.[14]

Despite these triumphs, there are both structural and political obstacles to increased contracts for Polish arms manufacturers. The Polish government has made clear its own quips with its defence industrial base, most notably structural inefficiencies, delays, high costs, and lack of funding.[15] These are co-dependent variables. By 2013, the remnants of the Cold War-era Polish defence industry came under an overarching governing entity, the Polish Armaments Group (PAG) which is state-owned and accounts for most defence production within Poland.[16] Some observers have noted that delays in development and delivery are the result of unrealistic timetables from political leadership and a lack of resources for the Polish military to collect equipment and that a lack of collaboration/communication between political leadership, industry leaders, research centres, and the military disadvantages both state-owned and private Polish companies against foreign competitors.[17] Moreover, many state-owned firms offer foreign licensed products, while some segments of the industry have been acquired by foreign entities, such as PZL Mielec by Sikorsky/Lockheed Martin, and WSK ‘PZL Świdnik’ by Augusta Westland.[18] These foreign subsidiaries perform reasonably well, as does the private segment of the Polish arms industry, which utilises available local technical talent.[19]

Another problem for Poland’s defence modernisation program and industry is the current government’s focus on quantitative gains over technological development. The 2012 PMT prioritised technology over acquisition of large numbers of combat-tested systems, something the then-opposition PiS criticised as defence divestment. While some defence scholars have identified temporary cuts as indicative of modernisation programs that have long-term benefits, the PiS-led government emphasised the need for expedient procurement of high quantities of existing systems and a radical increase in personnel, increasing aggregate defence spending.[20] In order to accomplish this, the Polish government has heavily relied on the purchase of foreign licences and cooperation with international defence contractors.[21] Hundreds of millions of zloty are spent on research programmes, however these are largely theoretical programmes that have little immediate relevance.[22]

Poland’s defence industry struggles with a lack of investment, though there is not a shortage of dollars for defence in the state budget. Poland has long been one of the handful of NATO Europe members that spends over the bottom-line two percent of GDP on defence, and in March 2022 stated its intention to raise its defence spending to three percent of GDP in 2023.[23] The 2022 PMT runs a price tag of 524 billion zlotys (124.8 billion USD). Moreover, Poland has successfully acquired or is working towards acquiring high-tech weapons systems made in the U.S., including the U.S.-made F-35 Lightning II jet, the Patriot air-and-missile defence system, and the M1 Abrams tank.[24] These systems are certainly impressive compared to the Soviet-era systems the Polish military is still in the process of shedding, but rarely stipulate offset arrangements that would benefit the local industry.[25] Moreover, the preference for imported goods deters against resources being directed towards domestic arms makers that would use it to develop competitive products and modernise their production processes, making systems more affordable and attractive for export.[26]

A decade into its efforts, Poland has shown significant progress in modernising its military. Warsaw has deftly leveraged weapons procurement as an arm of its foreign policy, utilised crises to accelerate its modernization program, and has been explicit in its goals. But much work remains to be done, particularly in defence industry reform. Poland’s defence industry struggles with inefficiencies, coupled with and exacerbated by a lack of focus on research and development. Foreign imports appear politically expedient and can have lower upfront costs, but come with significant opportunity costs, including obstruction of Warsaw’s stated objective of supporting the domestic defence industry and increasing the state’s defence autonomy.

Poland’s hardline position towards Russia and its show of support for Ukrainians has inspired some observers to describe Poland as an emerging strategic player.[27] This is true regarding its role within the NATO alliance, as well as as an autonomous actor. PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski stated earlier this year that as a frontline state, Poland will need to be able to “sustain itself alone under Russian attack,” until NATO can help.[28] Poles are witnessing both the state’s growing strength within NATO, as well as the its potential vulnerabilities in this frontline position; some Polish observers have noted that the war in Ukraine makes apparent the difficulties large countries can face trying to receive equipment from abroad when it is needed most, even with strong and eager partners and allies.[29] Warsaw will continue to grapple with the opportunity costs posed by industrial reform and imported weapons systems, though it remains unclear whether the government will be able to find a balanced approach.

[1] “Oświadczenie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Związku z Wypowiedzią Sekretarza Stanu USA w Sprawie Przekazania Samolotów Ukrainie,” Oświadczenie Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w związku z wypowiedzią Sekretarza Stanu USA w sprawie przekazania samolotów Ukrainie § (2022).

[2] RFE/RL Staff, “Poland Ready to Hand over All MiG-29 Warplanes to U.S.. in Germany,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (Poland Ready To Hand Over All MiG-29 Warplanes To U.S. In Germany, March 8, 2022), https://www.rferl.org/a/poland-mig29s-handover-us/31743397.html.

[3] Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and Andrew L. Ross, “Military Transformation and the Defense Industry After Next: The Defense Industrial Implications of Network-Centric Warfare,” The Newport Papers, January 2002, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada421889, 2.

[4] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” in Economics of the Global Defence Industry (London, UK: Routledge, 2021), pp. 251-264, 256.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Paweł Wroński, “Błaszczak Chwali Się Modernizacją Armii. Jak Jest Naprawdę? [SPRAWDZAMY],” Wyborcza.pl (Wyborcza.pl, January 10, 2019), https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24347993,blaszczak-chwali-sie-modernizacja-armii-jak-jest-naprawde.html.

[7] Justyna Zając, Poland’s Security Policy: The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order (London, UK: Palgave MacMillan, 2018).; “Poland - Defense Industry,” International Trade Administration | Trade.gov (U.S. Commercial Service Poland, September 3, 2019), https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/poland-defense-industry.

[8] “Orędzie Prezydenta RP Andrzeja Dudy. ‘Świat z Podziwem Patrzy Na Polaków,’” Polsat News (polsatnews.pl, March 24, 2022), https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2022-03-24/oredzie-prezydenta-rp-andrzeja-dudy-czwartek-godz-20/?ref=slider.

[9] Justyna Zając, Poland’s Security Policy: The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order, 104.

[10] Ibid, 119.

[11] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence,” Notes From Poland (Notes From Poland, February 19, 2021), https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/02/17/what-next-for-the-polish-defence-industry/.

[12] Tomasz Szatkowski, “Polish Defense Modernization in the Era of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing,” CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis, March 1, 2013), http://cepa.ecms.pl/index/?id=40d4415f72e9b4896ac2406b4a458d64.

[13] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

[14] Marek Strzelecki, “Poland to Boost Own Defense Industry as Airbus Chopper Deal Axed,” Bloomberg Quint (BloombergQuint, October 11, 2016), https://www.bloombergquint.com/amp/onweb/poland-to-boost-own-defense-industry-as-airbus-chopper-deal-axed.

[15] Maciej Kucharczyk, “Modernizing Poland’s Armed Forces,” Warsaw Institute (Warsaw Institute, March 1, 2017), https://warsawinstitute.org/modernizing-polands-armed-forces/.

[16] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” 257.

[17] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

[18] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” 257.; Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

[19] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” 262.

[20] Drew Hinshaw, “Poland Backs Large Increase in Military Spending,” The Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company, February 26, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news/card/poland-approves-large-increase-in-military-spending-YbPmtbmDlhlxSyXcY04a.

[21] ​​Kaija Schilde and Lenka Wieluns, “European Defense Budget Cuts, Defense Posture, and Reform,” Conference proceedings (2015), http://aei.pitt.edu/79661/, 21.; Maciej Kucharczyk, “Modernizing Poland’s Armed Forces.”

[22] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

[23] Ana-Roxana Popescu, “Poland to Increase Defence Spending to 3% of GDP from 2023,” Janes.com (Jane’s, March 4, 2022), https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/poland-to-increase-defence-spending-to-3-of-gdp-from-2023.

[24] Jen Judson, “$6 Billion Tank Deal to Poland Cleared by State Department,” Defense News (Defense News, February 18, 2022), https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/02/18/state-department-clears-6-billion-sale-of-tanks-to-poland/.; Andrew A. Michta, “Polish Hard Power: Investing in the Military as Europe Cuts Back,” American Enterprise Institute (American Enterprise Institute, December 19, 2013), https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/polish-hard-power-investing-in-the-military-as-europe-cuts-back/.

[25] Marek Swierczynski, “Making Poland’s Military Great Again,” Balkan Insight (Balkan Insight, February 8, 2022), https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/08/making-polands-military-great-again/.

[26] Stefan Markowski and Antoni Pienkos, “Polish Defence Industry,” 262.

[27] Michal Kranz, “How the Russia-Ukraine Crisis Is Turning Poland into a Strategic Player,” Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy, February 23, 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/23/poland-ukraine-russia-crisis-nato-strategic-role-military-diplomacy-war/.

[28] Marek Swierczynski, “Making Poland’s Military Great Again.”

[29] Eugeniusz Chimiczuk, “Poland Must Develop Its Defence Industry to Achieve Strategic Independence.”

Polska Walcząca: Poland and the United States at NATO

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By: Jackson Webster

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Source: Reuters, via Voice of America

On July 8th, heads-of-state and government figures from the 28 member-states of the world’s strongest military alliance will meet in the Stadion Narodowy in Warsaw, Poland. The NATO Summit occurs on an ad hoc basis and acts as a steering conference where the alliance’s leaders meet, discuss and decide on NATO’s new initiatives and primary goals. While recent Summits have focused on either the War in Afghanistan or on alliance expansion, this year’s Summit will likely concentrate on the status of NATO’s conventional forces in Central and Eastern Europe. This shift in alliance policy will likely amplify the role of NATO in European security, in line with changing American assumptions about the European relationship with Russia since the outbreak of the Ukrainian Crisis.

While the eleven NATO Summits held during the Cold War focused entirely on the threat to Western Europe posed by the Warsaw Pact, the fifteen summits held since the fall of the Soviet Union have reflected NATO’s steadily broadening mandate. The alliance has moved away from conventional and nuclear deterrence to anti-piracy, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and cyber warfare. Furthermore, the alliance has expanded to encompass many former Warsaw Pact member-states. Unsurprisingly, time at each NATO Summit is scarce, and heads-of-state are very busy people. Thus, the summit agendas have become crucial, directly reflecting the changing balances of power within the alliance. There is usually a single issue around which each summit revolves, such as defense spending ‘burden-sharing’ in the case of 2014’s Wales Summit. Two governments are likely to be key players in this year’s agenda-setting process: Poland and the United States. Warsaw and Washington have both indicated renewed interest in Eastern European security under their current administrations. Additionally, these states each possess, in their own ways, important roles in the new power balance within NATO. This shifting balance has seen Western European states with ailing defense budgets begin to lose influence to Eastern member-states who face direct threats to their territory and have accordingly invested in their militaries. Washington’s role in the alliance has remained the largely same, with the Americans possessing the final word on most alliance policy given their outsized contribution to NATO forces. Polish interests, or more accurately the Baltic region’s interests, will come to define the NATO of the coming decade, and that the United States would benefit from investing time and energy in these newly loyal Eastern partners.

Eastern European member-states, particularly Poland, have a strong argument to make in favor of increased NATO involvement in their region at this year’s Summit. This argument is rooted in the emerging military strength of the Polish state, and in the willingness Poland has shown to cooperate with Brussels and Washington on intervention and conventional deterrence over the past decade. “Polska Walcząca,” or “Fighting Poland,” was first used as a slogan of the Polish resistance (Armia Krajowa) during the Second World War. The symbolic acronym “PW” has become a part of Polish nationalism and military culture since the fall of the communist government in 1989, and the significance of this national legacy of resilience is not lost on the current right-wing Polish government which seeks to portray Poland as a rising military and economic power. For the past decade, Warsaw has occupied, perhaps for the first time in two centuries, an enviable position in the European balance of power. Poland has been one of the only major European Union member-states which has raised its defense spending since the 2009 Eurozone debt crisis. This spending is directed at a massive modernization process which will replace Cold War-Era hardware manufactured in communist Poland and the USSR with modern equipment, procured both domestically and from foreign contractors, namely American and German defense companies. In 2009, Poland made the transition from a conscription-based army to a smaller, more nimble professional force of around 70,000 personnel. This expensive modernization process is possible because Poland essentially avoided the Eurozone’s financial crisis due to a savvy national banking strategy, a robust commercial banking sector, and the free-floating Polish Złoty. Additionally, public support for increased defense expenditure remains high, and more importantly the Polish public has one of the highest approval ratings of NATO of any alliance member-state at 70%.

Poland seeks to use its new capabilities to push for a greater NATO footprint in Poland and her Baltic neighbors. Polish President Andrzej Duda has repeatedly indicated in speeches and interviews that Warsaw seeks a stronger conventional presence for NATO in Eastern European member-states. Stemming from fear of Russia’s increasing military assertiveness, Duda’s statements reflect the desires of NATO’s Eastern members for the alliance to engage in stronger territorial defence. Russia’s so-called ‘hybrid warfare’ techniques have worried NATO’s eastern flank since the 2007 attacks on Estonia’s Internet infrastructure, and these fears multiplied exponentially after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Both Poland and its Baltic neighbors are concerned over the vulnerability of the “Suwałki Gap”, a small stretch of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border running between Belarus and Russian’s Kaliningrad exclave. Kaliningrad, formerly the Prussian city of Königsberg, is home to Russia’s Baltic Fleet and is one of the most heavily militarized areas in Europe. NATO military planners believe that exploitation of this gap to cut off the Baltic states from the rest of Europe, followed by the Baltic Fleet denying NATO access to the Baltic Sea, would be the first Russian move should a conventional shooting war break out in Eastern Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War, as Western European states have become reliant on the US military for European territorial defense, Washington has held somewhat of a veto power over decisions in European security policy. The European community’s largely unsuccessful experiments in defense planning over the past two decades have resulted in the EU’s Security Policy naming NATO as the organization responsible for European territorial defense, not the EU itself. This status quo is unlikely to change, given that two of NATO’s largest contributing members —Turkey and the United States— would likely not support transferring defense responsibilities over to the EU, an organization in which they have no treaty rights. While American politicians often publicly decry European states for ‘free-riding’, the United States will remain committed to NATO for the foreseeable future because the (albeit very large) American contribution to the alliance guarantees American influence in European security strategy. This logic applies to Turkey as well, which has little continuing hope for EU membership. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu indicated in remarks given to a NATO conference in Antalya that Turkey remains committed to NATO’s role in conventional defense and even discussed the possibility of enlargement, likely as a jab at Russia given Ankara and Moscow’s recent divisions over Syria.

The United States has the unique position of being able to pick its winners in regional power struggles. This ability, courtesy of the unrivalled depth of American military and economic power, is the primary tool used by American administrations in building alliances. Washington, particularly the State Department, has been wise enough in the past to use this ability to fundamentally overhaul previously problematic states. The liberal world order has been remarkably effective at bringing rising powers into the fold of the international community. In the 1950s, the United States took two devastated former adversaries —Germany and Japan— and turned them into both economic powerhouses and loyal allies.

Those who oppose strengthened ties with Poland often cite the current Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) government’s authoritarian tendencies and its stances against refugees, but the short-term political implications of this party’s power needn’t be confounded with the long-term viability of the Polish state and its contribution to collective defense. While the economic and military benefits for Washington of investment in geopolitically key partner states are obvious, the secondary benefit has been a transfer of values. Though it took decades, the market pressures caused by by increased trade brought down the authoritarian government of South Korea and replaced it with what is now one of Asia’s most robust democracies. South Africa’s reliance on the American financial sector was eventually used as leverage over the apartheid government, and the pressure of financial boycotting helped bring about the transfer of power and the end of racial segregation in that country. Though economic connectivity does not always bring about democratization —Saudi Arabia is the obvious example— these exceptions often have more to do with the characteristics of rentier states than with the given state’s relationship with Washington. This pattern, where the United States finds a given country is vital to its geo-strategic interests, invests in a military and trade relationship with this country, and turns it into a significant regional actor with liberal democratic values is likely to repeat itself in the case of Poland. As Washington redeploys conventional ground assets to the Baltic to balance Russian deployments in that region, American interests will be best served in the long-term by building up the capacities of Eastern European NATO members, namely Poland.

The United States and NATO will increasingly look to their emerging partners. Estonia has built formidable cybersecurity infrastructure since 2007 and is now the home of NATO’s cybersecurity think tank, Poland is poised to become a major conventional military player in Eastern Europe, and Turkey has maintained high defense spending due to the proximity of threats to its security. By contrast, the investment of Western European states in their own continent’s security has weakened dramatically in recent decades. So, too, will their influence within the alliance continue to fade. The three major Western European states —Germany, France, and the United Kingdom— are either distracted by security commitments out-of-theatre, or have cast themselves into isolationism. Today, the French are largely uninterested in Eastern European territorial security, the Germans are largely uninterested in their military, and Britons appear increasingly uninterested in the rest of the world altogether. Eastern European states, largely supportive of American interests in balancing Russian influence in former Soviet states, are the most viable partnerships for Washington given the current political situation in Europe.

What the rising influence of both Poland and Turkey likely means for NATO, given recent antagonism between both of these states and Russia, is a more assertive alliance stance in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Summit provides, both practically and symbolically, the best venue to discuss this new focus on deterrence. The restraint and political engagement NATO sought under Western European influence in the 1990s are likely a thing of the past. Warsaw 2016 is set to see a second re-imagination of the alliance’s role in Europe, one which prioritizes the territorial defense sought by NATO’s newly-influential Eastern members.

 

 

Jackson Webster, a native of Los Angeles, is in the final year of a degree in International Relations at King’s College London, and will be continuing on to a master’s degree in International Security at Sciences Po, Paris. His dissertation research focused on Turkey’s relationship with NATO under President Recep Erdoğan.

 

 

After Ukraine, Part III - Polish security & Russian aggression: the return of old fears?

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By Andrzej Kozłowski:

A Leopard II tank from the Polish Army during Exercise Steadfast Jazz, a joint training operation for NATO forces, November 2013. Photo: Cpl. Madis Veltman / Estonian army (CC 2.0)
A Polish Leopard II tank takes up a position during Exercise Steadfast Jazz, a joint training operation for NATO forces, November 2013. Photo: Cpl. Madis Veltman / Estonian army (CC 2.0)

A history of difficult relations

Polish-Russian history is one of the most complex and difficult among all nations in the world. Polish troops were some of the only troops to have captured and occupied Moscow - in 1610 – and the day of ousting them from the Kremlin is celebrated as a national holiday in Moscow. Poland itself was occupied by Tsarist Russians for 123 years from 1795, and then again after 1945, when Poland was ruled by the puppet communist government controlled by Moscow.

This heavy historical burden has been reflected in bilateral relations since the beginning of the 1990s, primarily because both sides have used history for political purposes.

After the collapse of the USSR, Poland feared Moscow revisionism and warned against it. Even joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 did not change this attitude. Because of this stance it was commonly viewed as the most anti-Russian country in both NATO and the EU.

This situation was eventually addressed by the Civic Platform, which won election in 2007; one of the main points of foreign policy of its Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski was rapprochement with Russia. They made several political gestures to show their changing attitude. Sikorski also announced a new doctrine of foreign policy, more focused on joining the EU leadership and less focused on an active role in Eastern Europe. He even claimed that Russia could join NATO.

They ignored the signs from Moscow that it was not going to abandon its aggressive foreign policy, like the military drills in 2009 that simulated an invasion of Poland, which was imagined as the ‘aggressor’, or Russia’s failure to properly investigate the plane crash that killed the Polish President in 2010 over Smolensk.

Indeed, the Polish military and defense experts stopped seeing Moscow as a threat. In “Vision of Polish Armed Forces in 2030”, published in 2008, they concluded that in 20-25 years there would be no possibility of military aggression of one country against another in Central-Eastern Europe[i]. These opinions were repeated in Poland’s White Book of National Security, where again the authors suggested that the main challenge in Central-Eastern Europe would come from the non-military threats[ii]. At the same time, Poland ended conscription and focused on a small, professional army with a strength of 100,000 soldiers, aimed at conducting interventions abroad but not sufficiently strong to defend its own territory. These political and military movements have now been recognised as great mistakes in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.

Poland as peacemaker

Since the beginning of the Maidan clashes, Poland has been among the most active countries engaged in the Ukraine crisis. Politicians from both the ruling party and the opposition travelled to Kiev to support protestors and find a compromise between the Victor Yanukovych Regime and the opposition. Polish citizens were also involved in supporting those people protesting against the Ukrainian President at Maidan and in other Ukrainian cities. They sent packages with medicine, food and other necessary things.

What’s more, young people from Poland and Ukraine created a human chain on the Polish-Ukrainian border checkpoint to show their support for the signing of an association agreement with the EU. Eventually Radosław Sikorski took part in negotiating a deal between the opposition and the Ukrainian President, which finished with Yanukovych’s escape.

But what seemed to be the end of the crisis turned out to be just the beginning. The Russian Federation reacted aggressively to the change of government in Kiev and accused Western countries, among them Poland, of training the opposition. The aftermath of the annexation of Crimea was then hybrid warfare in Eastern Ukraine.

At the same time Russia increased the frequency of its military exercises and their rhetoric became much more aggressive. The Ukraine crisis started to be perceived as a potential threat to Polish security, which, according to the authors of the previously mentioned strategic document, was almost unimaginable.

Changes in security policy after Crimea

The Polish authorities had two main tasks in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine. The first was to increase the military power of its army. The second was to guarantee that members of NATO would fulfill their obligations in case of an armed attack. This was at a time when more and more people were becoming skeptical about the readiness of the Alliance to defend Poland.[iii] The best option to gain security assurance was to persuade its allies to send their military forces to Poland.

To increase the military power of its army Poland adopted a New National Security Strategy, which described Russia and its unpredictable behavior as a key danger for Europe and stated that regional conflicts could not be excluded. These changes have also been made in the minds of the main policymakers. The Head of the National Security Bureau, Generał Koziej, clearly warned against the hybrid warfare conducted by Russia. Also, according to survey polls done by all-Poland research center Ariadna, more than half the population feared Russian invasion. This perceived threat has allowed the government to increase military expenditure and buy new equipment without significant opposition.

Poland started a 10-year program of army modernization (2013–2022) worth $35 billion USD and has already bought JASMM cruise-missiles to have an ability to reach Russian bases in Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast. The next purchases covered 32 new attack helicopters, 70 medium-lift utility helicopters, 97 drones, new tanks and armored vehicles, three submarines and an anti-missile system.[iv] Poland also contacted the United States to inquire about buying Tomahawk cruise missiles[v].

Polish authorities have considered different options to try to increase the number of people who have military training, given their concerns over the small size of their army and their inability to create a reserve system.

One option is compulsory military service, although there is little chance this will be restored. The idea is still unpopular in Poland and, with presidential elections this month, followed in 5 months by parliamentary elections, politicians will be wary of such bold reforms.

Yet 600,000 Poles have received military training in volunteer paramilitary organizations. Indeed, the private sector has expressed an interest in this issue and has announced that 100 companies are ready and eager to set up their own paramilitary organizations; half of them have also declared an eagerness to fund the creation of volunteer fighting groups.[vi]

Since it first joined NATO, Poland has tried to persuade the other members to set up military bases on Polish soil. However, limited by the agreements with Russia from 1997[vii] and afraid of provoking Moscow, Poland’s proposals were rejected. In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, Poland strengthened diplomatic pressure on its partners; it even invoked Article 4 of the Washington Treaty[viii] for only the fourth time in NATO’s history.

The result was not what Poland were after: instead of setting up permanent military structures on Polish territory, NATO decided to send additional airplanes, organized more military drills, and setup a rotational presence of ground forces until the end of the crisis. The United States also organized a march of its cavalry brigade to show solidarity with the citizens of the Eastern Flank of NATO.

The results of the NATO Wales Summit also left Poland somewhat disappointed, although the decision to create a spearhead headquarters in Poland was acclaimed by experts and politicians. In fact, it seems that NATO, and particularly the United States, took Poland’s anxiety seriously and have made several steps to assure Poland that it can count on NATO in case of an attack.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian crisis was profoundly significant for Poland and its security. It is a reminder of the darkest part of Polish history, when Russia attacked and captured Poland. It also shows that Polish rapprochement with Moscow has collapsed completely. The changes in military expenditure and the increasing pace of military buildup only confirm that Polish politicians and society do care about their own security and remember their own history. The only question is whether it is too late for such military reforms.

Poland still has time. Russia has cooled its activity in Ukraine and, even if it decides to continue the offensive, the next probable target would be the Baltic States. More importantly, no one in NATO will now claim that Polish demands to strengthen the military presence of the Alliance in Poland stem from Polish Russophobia. The policymakers in NATO have slowly come to accept this reality. The Ukraine crisis may ultimately contribute to increasing the security of Poland by resulting in a significant NATO presence on Polish soil.

Andrzej Kozlowski is a PhD candidate at the Department of Transatlantic Studies and Mass Media in the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz. He is an expert at Polish think-thanks Kosciuszko Institute, the foundation of Aleksander Kwaśniewski Amicus Europae, and The Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is vice-chair of the Security Section in the Polish newspaper “Stosunki Międzynarodowe” (International Relations). His area of interests include cybersecurity, the South Caucasus region, and the foreign and security policy of the United States. He was an intern in the European Parliament, the Polish embassy at the Hague, the National Security Bureau, and the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. The series has examined the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. In the last part of the Series, Sebastian Åsberg will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine. In the first article of the series, Mike Jones discussed Britain’s handling of the Ukraine crisis and why it has not received more attention in the UK. In the second article, Conradin Weindl looked into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine.

NOTES

[i]Vision of Polish Armed Forces 2030 , p. 10,

[ii]The White Book of National Security of Republic of Poland Polish Security, November 2013,p. 7 – 17.

[iii] More than 30% of people claims that NATO will not help Poland.

[iv]Details of this program you will find in this article.

[v] The only country, which is using this weapon expect the United States is Great Britain.

[vi]More on this issue in this article.

[vii] On the basic of NATO Russia Founding Act in 1997 NATO pledged not to deploy significant military forces to former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union members.

[viii] „The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”-The North Atlantic Treaty.

Poland’s troubled Independence Day – a stumbling block to democratisation?

by

by Mateusz Zatoński

Polish Independence Day celebrations
(photo by Patryk Matyjaszczyk)

 

Each nation celebrates key dates in history its own way. On the Fourth of July, Americans gather at hot-dog eating contests and firework displays. Britain’s Remembrance Day is a more solemn affair, with the omnipresent poppy, and parades of war veterans applauded by crowds of tourists. Other countries opt for body paint, historical re-enactments, and countless other ways of celebrating national unity and pride.

Meanwhile, the Poles seem to have developed a habit of celebrating November 11th, their Independence Day, with a free-for-all rampage on the streets of Warsaw. Over the last three years images of burned cars, riot police in full gear, and pervasive neo-fascist symbols dominate the media coverage of the proceedings. This article lays out the history of the commemorations of the Polish Independence Day, and suggests a number of explanations for why in the last years they have become increasingly appropriated by the radical right.

The Polish Independence Day commemorates the re-establishment of independent Poland in 1918, after 123 years of oppressive rule by Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary. For 50 years following World War II, honouring Polish Independence Day was forbidden by the Polish governments steered from Moscow. Communist authorities saw the anniversary as a nationalist legacy that Marxism sought to supersede. After the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989 the Independence Day was restored as a national holiday. However, the state’s commemorations were often poorly organised and widely viewed as support rallies for whichever political party was in power at the time. The Polish nationalists, for decades denied an opportunity to celebrate their ideology, were not satisfied with what the successive governments offered.

And then came the Independence March.

The March first attracted public attention in 2008. Organised by the National Radical Camp (ONR), an organisation openly invoking the heritage of a pre-WWII anti-Semitic political organisation, it attracted a few hundred people who did not attempt to hide their extreme views, and a similar number who came to oppose them. Most mainstream media were quick to condemn the marchers, but treated the event as a minor episode, a desperate attempt of the dying breed of Polish right-wing extremists to draw the public’s attention.

The journalists were wrong. In the next years it became clear that the Independence March has become a fixed part of the political calendar of the country. The numbers of nationalists from around Poland rallying for the March increased every year, from hundreds to tens of thousands. The small-scale brawls characterising the first editions of the March turned into skirmishes involving hundreds of people. In 2011, the nationalists were opposed by an ad hoc collective of left-wing organisations who attempted to block the marchers. The tally of the day was nearly 70 injured, 210 arrests, burning cars, and a devastated historic square in the city centre . In 2012, in a gesture of supra-national solidarity not normally characteristic to those fiercely anti-EU groups, the marchers were joined by nationalists from Hungary, Italy, Serbia, and Ukraine. The outnumbered left-wingers avoided confrontation and this time it was the policemen securing the march who bore the brunt of the violence.

This year the police decided to step back as well, leaving the organisers to field their own security personnel. This did not prevent violent outbreaks. First, several hundred hooligans engaged in a pitched battle with the residents of a squat located nearby to the route of the demonstration. Later, a giant rainbow-coloured flower display in the centre of Warsaw, accused by right-wing politicians of promoting homosexuality, was burnt down. Finally, some of the marchers launched flares at the Russian embassy, attempted to climb its fence, and burnt a guard booth outside its gates. This promptly sparked a brief diplomatic crisis with Russia, and culminated a few days later when Russian nationalists reciprocated and launched flares against the Polish embassy in Moscow.

What surprises Western commentators is that those recurring, blatant manifestations of radicalism are occurring in a country that is widely viewed as one of Europe’s success stories. Poland weathered the economic crisis better than most EU member-states. Euro-enthusiasm still remains the norm rather than the exception among Poles. Most importantly, the country enjoys a stable government and a Parliament that, while significantly slanted to the right, has been free of extremist and populist political parties since the 2007 election. Where do the Marches fit in this picture?

First, while the sea of right-wing symbolism makes for spectacular TV coverage, it is important to understand that in societal terms the March is little more than a side-effect of the democratisation process of a post-Communist state. The March provides a once-a-year opportunity for fringe nationalist youth leaders and politicians whose star has faded to show their faces in the media. One characteristic that unites the March’s organisers, a motley crew ranging from monarchists, through republicans, to neo-fascists, is that they have been unable to obtain any meaningful electoral results in any of the country’s recent elections. The movements they lead have a minuscule membership base, but their highly ideological and organised nature allowed them to be noticed by the media.

The stellar rise of the March could be seen as a political miscalculation of the Polish conservative opposition, the Law and Justice (PiS) party. After the lost elections in 2007 PiS attempted to hijack the March from the extremists and turn it into a vehicle of protest against the ruling liberals of the Civic Platform (PO). The conservative press chose to overlook the radical legacy of its organisers and praised the March as a beacon of healthy patriotism in an increasingly post-ideological world. This was above all an attempt to spite the mainstream liberal media outlets that condemned the March. It quickly became clear that the radicals do not want anything in common with PiS, who they saw as part of the system they were trying to dismantle. Nonetheless, the damage was done. The March became associated with PiS and, even though the party was never involved in its organisation, the subsequent events were bloated by its supporters. Thousands of conservative families with children, often blissfully unaware of the extremist nature of the March’s organisers, helped build its legitimacy. Despite the attempt of PiS leadership to distance themselves from the March after the violent incidents, much of the conservative grassroots has already become emotionally bound to the initiative. Every year they accuse the media of overstating the levels of violence that accompany the March and blame the government for employing the police forces in a way that provokes incidents.

While the participation of conservative families provides a social license for the initiative, and the radical right constitute its brains, the core of the participants is comprised of football hooligans from across Poland. These are simply ‘adventure-seekers’ for whom the March provides the group anonymity needed to cause trouble with impunity. With its football chants and club banners the March could be confused with a rowdy crowd heading for a game. The hooligans have a bone to pick with the ruling Civic Platform who in the run-up to last year’s European Football Championship co-organised by Poland cracked down on organised hooligan groups and introduced a series of security restrictions on football fans. While undoubtedly xenophobic and anti-systemic, there is little evidence that this group could be attributed with a conscious understanding of, not to mention an engagement with, the complex, and often contradictory extremist ideologies of the political movements organising the March.

Many other variables helped facilitate the growth of tension accompanying the March. One is the proliferation of conspiracy theories and intensification of Russo-phobia after the crash of the Polish Presidential airplane in Russia in 2010. Another is the cultural liberalisation that followed Poland’s EU accession in 2004. In traditionally Catholic Poland large groups are vehemently opposing any change that could bring about same-sex marriage, or the marginalisation of the Church, polarising society over those issues. Finally, the growing gap between the country’s wealthy and poor is also of growing concern, especially that it is occurring in a post-Communist country in which modern capitalism is a brand-new phenomenon.

The lack of viable solutions to the annual bouts of violence in the Polish capital lies in the political tensions between the country’s two dominating parties, the Civic Platform and PiS. Both sides of the conflict blame each other for inciting the aggression, while at the same time distancing themselves from the acts of violence, leaving no one to answer (or pay) for the riots. The Polish political elite effectively leaves the country without answers for why this phenomenon is recurring every year, and how to avoid a similar scenario playing out again in the future. As the events in neighbouring Ukraine have so poignantly demonstrated, such by-products of party politics are a small price to pay for Poland’s successful democratisation and integration with Europe.

 

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Mateusz Zatoński is a postgraduate student of Public Health at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and a Research Assistant in Polish History at King’s College London. His interests range from ethn0-nationalism in the inter-war period, to health policy in modern Europe. He is currently researching the role of Communist regimes in covering up evidence of tobacco harm in Eastern Europe.