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Pop Culture, Power, and Netflix

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by Zenia Duell

Photo Credit: Unsplash

The field of popular culture and creative arts fascinates me – in particular their overlap with or function as cultural diplomacy. Galia Press-Barnathan notes that there is a distinct lack of coherent research into the links between popular culture and international relations (IR). She attributes this to the divide between critical and positivist approaches to IR, and the interdisciplinary nature of popular culture.[i] However, Press-Barnathan also emphasises that popular cultural products have a unique and unparalleled capacity for capturing stories, messages and emotions, and transmitting them in a format that is easy to understand and enjoyable to consume.[ii] This makes them extremely powerful tools of influence. ‘Entertainment informs audiences and shapes minds.’[iii] One medium through which this influential communication happens is historical docu-dramas, currently experiencing a surge of popularity on Netflix.

During my career as a TV producer, I have worked on several historical docu-dramas – a programme that is a combination of scripted drama and non-scripted documentary segments. But it is not just history that these programmes are communicating – the history itself is wrapped up in a landscape of communications about power. Media scholars have long been aware of these popular culture products as political texts, but as Press-Barnathan and Lisel Hintz note,[iv] they are not always factored into discussions in IR. There is also difficulty with classifying these creative products as part of the field of ‘strategic communications’ – which, by definition, precludes some political intent to the communication. Popular culture does not always have a clear political motivation behind it. This article will therefore take a different approach to three historical drama-docs currently on Netflix, and will analyse them from the other end of the communications transmission,[v] reviewing not their intent, but their effect.

Roman Empire was produced by an American production company, Stephen David Entertainment. It tells the stories of three infamous men in Roman history: Commodus, Julius Caesar and Caligula. Having worked on a couple of series about the Roman Empire myself, I can attest to the fact that Roman history sells well. But is there something more to it? A recent New York Times article sparked a fiery discussion around how the field of Classics has fed into colonial attitudes, and how Classics in turn features in neo-colonial narratives. Roman Empire (the Netflix series) does not make any overt parallels between the modern world and the ancient, but perhaps there is a more subliminal message – after all, the majority of actors in the series were white Caucasian, when a historically accurate skin colour would be olive or brown. There is a long and at times unpleasant history of white actors playing roles of multiple ethnicities – not least Liz Taylor’s famous portrayal of the Macedonian-Egyptian queen Cleopatra. It would be unfair to make assumptions about the political sentiments of the producers of Roman Empire, but this casting choice is part of the communications landscape around colonialism, in particular, the ownership of history.

Rise of Empires: Ottoman was produced by a Turkish/American production company, Karga 7 Pictures. The founders of Karga 7 are American, but as Fatima Bhutto notes, there is currently in Turkey a concerted effort to promote the Ottoman ‘brand’ as part of the soft power strategy developed by former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in his book, Strategic Depth. This series may not be part of official Government policy, but it certainly fits within the narrative of Ottomania.[vi] It is in its own right a riveting story of conflict and conquest. The majority of the last episode takes place in the Haghia Sophia: the largest church in the world at the time of its construction in the 6th century AD, and the focal point of Constantinople. We see the Byzantine flags, featuring the double-headed eagle, being taken down from the building and replaced with the crescent moon of Islam. The final shot of the series is a close up of Mehmet II’s face as he looks directly down the camera lens and says: ‘and so…we begin’. Six months after the series launched on Netflix, the Haghia Sophia was turned from a museum back into a mosque, following a court decision. There is no discernible link between the Netflix series and the court decision, but this powerful sequence adds emotional force to ‘nation-branding through culture, rhetoric and broadcasting’.[vii]

Age of Samurai: Battle for Japan was produced by a Canadian company. Like Roman history, Japanese history – and particularly the samurai period – sells well. Once again, we find no links to Japanese investors or political agendas. This can be seen instead as the ultimate soft power success: Japan’s commemoration and promotion of their rich cultural history has proved a self-sustaining investment. Now others invest in promoting their culture on their behalf – because it is powerful enough to stand up as a brand on its own.

The communications landscape is busy with powerful messages like these that are hard to place. Other cultural products with political influence include the K-Pop band BLACKPINK, which has recently launched a campaign to raise awareness of climate change. The fan community of another K-Pop band, BTS, has normalised progressive discussions around mental health and masculinity, led by the example of the band members themselves. These feed into wider communications about South Korea as a progressive, democratic, and artistically creative country – but are not overtly linked to a political agenda or funding. The comic writer Sharad Devarajan embarked on a personal mission to export a pop culture narrative from India through his latest animated series Hanuman – but he is an independent creative, not a government diplomat. These creative messages are both influential and ubiquitous – but there is very little analysis of their direct implications, and where exactly they sit in the political sphere. They certainly have political power, but they are not always driven or funded by an overt political agenda. Ian Thomas’ recent publication has gone some way towards tackling these important questions of how much and what kind of influence creative products can have in the political sphere, but it is clear that there is plenty of scope for further research in this field.

[i] Press-Barnathan, Galia. “Thinking about the Role of Popular Culture in International Conflicts”. International Studies Review (2017), 19, p167.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Dogan, Taner. “Taner Dogan on ideology and charisma in Erdogan’s communication”. Turkey Book Talk #136 [Podcast], 2nd March 2021.

[iv] Discussed with Hintz in a private conversation, 9th March 2021.

[v] See Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois, 1972.

[vi] I deliberately use the term ‘Ottomania’ here rather than ‘neo-Ottomanism’, as several scholars and analysts have raised issues with the latter. For more on this, see Howard Eissentat’s comments in this interview with POMED https://pomed.org/conceptualizing-turkeys-foreign-policy-ambitions-a-conversation-with-howard-eissenstat/. The term ‘Ottomania’ I think characterises how Turkey is using the Ottoman brand without imitating the Ottoman Empire in terms of strategy or policy.

[vii] Dogan, Taner. “Taner Dogan on ideology and charisma in Erdogan’s communication”. Turkey Book Talk #136 [Podcast], 2nd March 2021.

Zenia is a documentary producer and part-time MA student in Strategic Communications. Outside of the office or the library, Zenia produces a podcast about ancient history, hosts dinner parties and trains at the gym.

You can follow her on Twitter at @Commsduell

A Matter of Survival: How the Trade War will Shape China’s Future

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By Francesca Ghiretti and Lloyd Yijue Liu

2 May 2019

The trade war between the US and China is just the tip of the iceberg of deeper differences that will have complex ramifications (Manufacturing.net)

 

The trade war between the US and China is more than what meets the eye, and this is not a mystery. In fact, besides the trade deficit, there are multiple aspects at stake: intellectual property rights, the opening of the Chinese market and most of all, the political-economic system of China. The economic aspects appear to be laden with heavy political values for both actors. For Trump the trade war is a political means aimed at reinvigorating his political message with the eye on re-election, while for Xi Jinping it is a matter of survival, both his and that of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Although negotiations are ongoing, the deeper political issues on the table risk triggering a mutation of the trade war. During the current state of affairs, an open armed conflict is highly unlikely. However, it is probable that the conflict between China and the US may spread to other countries and areas of interest, thus creating a complex matrix of entangled elements. The fight for technological advancement appears to be the most notorious battlefield, leading many to believe that in the near future the trade war could take on the shape of a technology war. The case of Huawei and the debate on AI are only two early examples of what such a conflict might look like. One wonders: why technology? Technological advancement is fundamental for the survival of the American primacy in the world and of the CPC in China. Both powers are aware that those who will lead the technological revolution that is unfolding under our eyes will lead the world in the coming years. After all, Britain would have hardly had the capacity to build an empire without the advantage of the first industrial revolution, and the West would have looked very differently and occuped a very different global position were it not for the industrial (and technological) revolutions.

Thus, both China and the US interpret the ongoing power struggle as a matter of survival, and technological development appears to be the main arena in which the battle is fought. In the long-run, instances for the US and China to face each other and present their contrasting models will not be lacking in number. However, in the short term, an agreement might be reached. It is for this reason that we propose three different scenarios each consisting of a possible outcome of the current negotiations between the two countries. In scenario one, an agreement is reached, and all tariffs are dropped. Scenario two describes the current situation– a state of limbo where some tariffs are in place but there is still space for communication and for a sudden turn in any direction. In the third scenario the US and China are unable to get a significant deal, leading to the prolonging and worsening of hostilities.

There is a perceivable division between the motives of President Donald Trump and those of the American strategists. The former needs a victory in view of the upcoming elections, even more so following the failure of the negotiations with North Korea. American strategists, on the other hand, appear to be seeking a more radical change in China’s way of doing business. Trump’s goal is to obtain an agreement which has the aspect of a victory for the US, with China expected to open its market to more American investments and firms, protect intellectual property and balance the trade deficit. Such objective seeks only a superficial change which would mean sizeable but not system-changing concessions by China.

The adoption of a Foreign Investment Law by China and the reform of the law on Intellectual Property suggests China’s propension to implement a few changes in order to find an agreement with the US, at least formally. On the other hand, the broader aims of the strategists seek deeper changes which ultimately would strip the CPC of its absolute centrality. This might be a real deal-breaker, should they be seriously pursued. In fact, Xi understands the importance of achieving an agreement for the sake of the Chinese economy. However, the survival of the CPC and its control over the entire Chinese society will always remain the first priority. All in all, what is to be expected is a temporary deal where China makes some quantitatively significant concessions but leaves structural changes to an unknown future.

Scenario 1. Trade deal (Tariffs at 0%)

In the first scenario the trade war ends with the US and China reaching an agreement which leads to the abolition of all the tariffs. However, this scenario envisages not a peace treaty but a regulated and extended truce. The deeper issue however, the nature of the Chinse political system, will not have been resolved. The basis of the Chinese government’s actions lays firmly with the doctrine of the ‘party leads everything’ (党是领导一切的) and is expected to remain. Here, the CPC would keep on centrally managing all aspects of China’s life, including areas which in the West are usually private or independent, such as academia and the judiciary. If the US is seeking a change in such approach, this issue is destined to come to the surface again at some point in the future and spur a conflict between the two.

In the short run, however, China will certainly be more collaborative with the US and the West. This would not mean a return to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘hide and bide’ paradigm, but a purely rhetorical switch to a more low-key and friendly campaign to present the ‘rise of China’ to the world, while creating more skillful ways of attracting foreign talent and importing technology and know-how from developed countries to develop China itself. Moreover, forging new strategic partnerships in the Western sphere would be easier with the blessing of the US and China’s renewed collaborative attitude.

Scenario 2. Further extending the deadline for a deal (Tariffs at 10%)

Currently, we are likely to be living the last moments of this transition scenario, which is probably advantaging China more than the US. The longer the negotiation lasts, the more uncertainty to the global economy and pressure on Trump’s credentials it will bring. The CPC is not immune to the political repercussions of a slowing economy, but unlike Trump, Xi does not have to face elections in a few months. Were it not for these looming elections, Trump too would have highly benefitted from a longer period for negotiations, as it would have allowed him to test whether China’s promises turned into reality. In such a scenario, a full-fledged deal (Scenario 1) would still be on the table, but China would have time to consider and perhaps test other alternatives. To force the Americans to reach a suboptimal deal and to protect their own economy from future repercussions, the Chinese might try to intensify their transactions with other trading partners. They might also try to explore possible fractures between the US and its allies, such as the EU, while exploiting the disruption of the global supply chain of goods manufactured in the country, such as tech components, to increase the pressure on the reaching of a deal and preparing for more negative alternative scenarios.

Scenario 3. No deal (Tariffs at 25%)

This is not the most likely outcome. However, with Trump and Xi, two stubborn leaders leading the discussions, this option cannot be ruled out. In this case, China and the US would become more assertive in implementing their own plans and fulfilling their geopolitical interests. Thus, multiple actors and areas of interests, such as technology, geopolitical claims and multilateral settings, would be involved in the disputes which is likely to take place simultaneously in different arenas, an example of which was the run for technological advancement previously mentioned. If the conflict becomes further politicised; China will make it difficult for the US to reach its goals in any international issues which China has influence on (such as in North Korea, the South China Sea or instances presented to the UN Security Council). At the same time, China would actively strengthen its already existing alliances, seek new allies and leverage any possible dispute between the US and its allies.

At home, the CPC would further devalue the Renminbi (RMB) to maintain China’s competitive edge while promoting stronger nationalism. In fact, it is believed that after 1979, the way in which the CPC maintained the level of legitimacy it needed to govern has slowly shifted from a nationalistic rhetoric to a more pragmatic promise of future wealth for Chinese people. Now that growth is slowing, and the West is becoming more hostile to China’s economic power, the CPC is attempting to transform the public’s economic grievances into a nationalistic feeling of an imminent external threats, which would grant the Party more space of maneuver. Interestingly, although often thought otherwise, it has been shown that the younger generations are at the same time materialistic and nationalistic, the use of an emergency rhetoric might override their materialistic need and help them endure economic difficulty in time of perceived external threats.

Regardless of the outcome of the trade war, the Chinese government could use its tax policy and the control of property price to encourage consumer spending. Furthermore, the CPC is likely to implement more large-scale infrastructure construction projects to keep the economy running in an attempt to mitigate the impact of the trade war and the slowing economy. An excellent example of this is the outcome of the recent Belt and Road Forum where China has strongly reaffirmed its commitment to the realisation of the project, robustly responding to the increasing skepticism towards the feasibility of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In China, more openness of the market has oftne been followed by a tightening effort for societal control to avoid a Soviet-style system collapse, this is likely to remain the case in the foreseeable future. Abroad, as in Scenario 2, China would seek new allies. However, according to the outcome of the trade war, the degree of assertiveness used by China to pursue such goal will change.

In conclusion, none of the scenarios presented rules out a future clash between the US and China, as the power struggle between the two will endure even after reaching a potential agreement. Their embodiment of different, and in certain aspects antithetical, models of governance and development will impede the complete appeasement between the two, leaving the world politics and economy in an uncertain state of affairs. In the long-run, this is likely to end with a drastic change in one of the two actors and the subsequent victory of one and loss of the other.

Francesca Ghiretti is a doctoral candidate at department of War Studies and European and International Relations at King’s College London where she has been awarded the Leverhulme scholarship ‘Interrogating Visions of a Post-Western World: Interdisciplinary and Inter regional Perspectives on the Future in a Changing International Order’. The focus of her thesis is the political response of the EU to Chinese foreign direct investments. Follow her @Fraghiretti.

Lloyd Yijue Liu is currently working as a research assistant for the China part of the research project Mapping Elite Networks and Governance in the 21st Century at the Department of Political Science at VU University of Amsterdam. He holds an advanced master’s degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from Leiden University and previously studied History and Modern European Studies at the University of British Columbia.

Strife Feature, Abstract - Small but Mighty: The critical importance of Singapore in contemporary geo-political, technological and international security landscape

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By: Cheng Lai Ki; Full-Lieutenant (Reserve), Singapore Armed Forces

‘…don’t you see that the lion is silent and yet feared…’ – Iman Shafi’i

Abstract:

In Strife’s long-form feature piece for January, Cheng Lai Ki examines the importance of Singapore in the emerging geopolitical landscape.

The ‘Little Red Dot’, the ‘Lion City’, the ‘Garden City’, the ‘Smart City’ - over the last 50 years, the small nation-state of Singapore has been given several names reflecting its status or national characteristics. In 2015, Singapore marked its 50th anniversary since its independence on 9th August 1965 through showcasing its advanced military capabilities, cohesion amongst its large ethnic diversity, and strong national pride. Consistently mentioned and revered for its financial and technological prowess, the tiny city-state has sailed by several of its last 50 years without becoming significantly involved in any major conflicts or incidents – until recently. Primarily known as an economic powerhouse and financial hub within the region, the small city-state has slowly increased its presence within the realms of intelligence, international security, geopolitics, and technology. Today, the ‘Lion City’ has become a key player for diplomatic, security and commercial developments within the region – and the world. Singapore maybe a small nation-state with a population of 5.61 million people, but it carries a mighty roar that rumbles throughout the Asian region. With the global status-quo in flux, Cheng argues that Singapore is fast emerging as a critical component of an otherwise global machine.

Cheng Lai Ki is a reservist military officer with the Singapore Armed Forces. He possesses degrees in Criminology, Intelligence and International Security respectively from the University of Leicester and King’s College London. Formerly the Managing Editor for Strife Blog and Journal, his work has also been featured by IHSJane’s Intelligence Review and Cyber World. His feature article will be published on 26th January 2017.

Image Source:

‘A soldier in a Singapore Army uniform and integrated load bearing vest (iLBV)’, Flickr, 12 October 2012, Available from: http://www.flickr.com/photos/spiritualize/8292835517/, (Accessed January 2017)

Feature image source:

http://passionread.com/the-lion-city-singapore/

The Hizbullah Phenomenon

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By Mohammad I. Aslam:

Lina Khatib, Dina Mater and Atef Alshaer, The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication, Published by Hurst, 2014. New from £18.84 (Amazon paperback). ISBN: 1849043353.

In Hizbullah: Politics and Communication, a trio of authors endeavour to shine light on the evolutionary transformation of arguably the most powerful sub-state political and military movement in the Middle East, Hizbullah. They do this by dissecting its sophisticated political communications strategy.

The authors, evidently aware that most previous studies on the Hizbullah movement have tended to focus on its cultural, ideological, military and political paradigms, attempt to bridge a gap in the analysis of the movement by focusing on how the dexterous use of mass communication goes hand in hand with its nearly 30 years of exponential growth.

The main gist of the narrative is therefore designed to furnish readers with a corollary of descriptive examples demonstrating how the movement was able to not only successfully remain relevant through turbulent times, wars and civil upheavals, but to propagate into a global movement in the process.

The authors attempt to accomplish this by analysing and connecting segments of Hizbullah’s elaborate interplay of culture, image, language and self-presentation on the one hand, and spectacular military and political campaigns on the other.

In addition to this, a sizeable and crucial concentration is given to the movement’s most successful propagator of political communication, its Secretary-General, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, whom the authors quite rightly view as giving the movement a sense of exaltation and infallibility.

Other essential factors which are given credence are the movement’s central messages of “victimisation”, a successful penetration into archenemy Israel’s political and military establishment, and Hizbullah’s emphasis on nationalism, which is aligned with the group’s political progression.

The book has many strengths. Firstly, the authors are all Middle Eastern with expertise in media studies, and are thus able to provide readers with a better understanding of the complexities and emotions that are inherent in Arab audiences – and for that matter confessional groups in Lebanon of which the Hizbullah-supporting Shiites happen to be the largest.

Secondly, and despite generally appearing to be complimentary of Hizbullah’s communicative efforts, all three authors are clearly scholars with no personal interest or stake in the movement’s message. This is vital to ensure a balanced and concise view of its communicative success and failures.

The final chapter of the book keeps audiences aware that despite an impressive run of communicating its political message across the country (and even internationally to a certain extent), apparent shortcomings and weaknesses in this otherwise very successful strategy have become more noticeable. In particular, the movement’s media strategy designed to justify its support of the incumbent regime in Syria has not been selling well with Arab audiences.

Overall, the book is a diligent piece of media analysis and one that deserves the attention of those interested in the nonlinear communicative strategies of powerful sub-state actors like Hizbullah.

Mohammad I. Aslam is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the institute of Middle-Eastern Studies, Kings College London. His research analyses the Political and Military dynamics of Lebanese Hezbollah.

 

 

 

 

Holbein’s ‘Ambassadors’ and International Politics

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By Deniz Solmaz:

The Ambassadors is a full-length double portrait of two French Diplomats, Jean de Dinteville (29), and Georges de Selve, bishop of Lavaur (25), painted in London in 1533. The two ambassadors are shown obviously confident of their importance. Jean de Dinteville, is the French ambassador to England and his friend, the Bishop of Lavaur, acted on several occasions as ambassador to the Venetian Republic and the Holy See (Wyld, 1998; The Art Book, 2010). The two sitters are shown on either side of shelves laden with a variety of objects: globes, astronomical and scientific devices, books, and musical instruments, all of which symbolize their learning and power. The sundial sets the scene precisely at 10:30 AM on 11 April.

Holbein shows that all this magnificence and arrogance must end in the grave, however, by adding to the sitters’ splendid richness symbols of death: the broken string on the lute and the distorted skull yawning before them which can be fully seen only if standing to the right of the picture. The background is a green damask curtain, turned back at the top left corner to reveal a silver crucifix at the very edge of the panel. The two men stand on a floor inlaid with an elaborate geometrical design. In the lower left corner in the shadowed part of the floor is the artist’s signature in Latin: Joannes Holbein Pingebat, and the date, 1533.

Without a doubt, Holbein’s work contains many mysteries, tricks and symbols, much like any event in international politics does. Therefore, in this analysis, an analogy will be used, the work of art will be seen as an analogue and international politics as a target. For mapping this cognitive process of transferring assumptions, it is necessary to start with drawing a simple, coherent, consistent and accessible theoretical framework for IR with respect to actors, order, method, and language.

The process of determination of the actors is about the disclosing of agents who use force either to preserve the ruling paradigm or to change it. That is to say, the actors who really matter for any analysis must either have capacity to keep the status quo or to cause a paradigm shift. Therefore the status quo or paradigm is the remarkable point on which the researcher should focus in order to evaluate the actors’ role and significance. However, actors are rarely if ever opposed in a binary, zero-sum game, which means, agential capacities of these two actor types are incommensurable to each other, with the exception of continuity of sovereignty of political unities. The problematic point in this two-level analysis of actors stems from their context of discovery. Both of the actor types are not taken for granted, on the contrary, they are in a circulation in which countering the one who aims to change the paradigm would become the ruling one who aims to preserve this new paradigm.

Keeping aside the context of discovery, the context of justification is related to explanatory power of the order in international politics per se. Order refers to the consistency of particular positions of actors vis-à-vis each other, which points to the circulation model of the two level actors. Another aspect of the order is its formal integrity, that is, order consists of micro orders. Although micro orders are subjected to change in the course of time, any change in their constitutional forms is not competent enough to change the order. In order to change the paradigm which is the base for order, a revolution is needed with its principles, like in the case of the Peace of Westphalia.

The argument that the performing of the agential capacities of the actors in a particular order requires particular methods is an illusion. Primary interests of the actors are executed via order itself. Therefore order has already concealed the interests of the actors. There is a mutually assured benefit which enables us to name the international order as ‘order with benefit’. Apart from order itself, the other ways and tactics to gain profit are ad hoc, that is, actors always have control over the hardened assumptions of the order. Hence, while a possible new order will seem as a shift in the problématique, during the hegemony of that order it disguises the scientific research programme in which ruling actors argue that growth of knowledge exists.

Lastly, the language of the order has an important influence on the attitudes of the actors within the order. There is more than one true interpretation of the assumptions of the order. In other words, particular stances of the two types of actors enable them to read the virtues of the order differently. In order to perpetuate the order, ruling agents need to provide an exclusive language. The more exclusive the language is, the more its impact on counter-actors spreads.

After mapping transference, it is possible to apply indications to Holbein’s Ambassadors. There are four questions that need to be answered with regards to this work of art before implementing a theoretical framework on it. To enumerate: (1) What is the order? (2) Who are the actors? (3) What are the aims of the actors? (4) What is the power – order – actor relation?

Like any other work of art, Holbein’s painting too offers a particular order. The direction of the shadow of the ambassador Jean Dinteville is quite clear in the picture, and enables us to determine the location of the source of light. This place presents the angle which is the only point where the skull in the picture can be seen. Therefore, one can argue that the order in the picture suggests only one interpretation of the text, that is to say, in order to realize the truth which is the distorted object in the bottom of the picture in this case, one should preserve the position that order proposes. Any other angle cannot allow the observer to recognize the situation in the order.

There are also two shelves in the picture. While the upper shelf is full of objects used for measuring time and understanding the heavens, the objects in the lower shelf are related to affairs of the world. This incommensurability reveals the idea that ruling actors and counter actors in international politics cannot be compared or even contrasted. Thus, the two types of actors will behave differently. Moreover, neither of them is capable of foreseeing the behaviours of the other. Therefore, it is possible to argue neither cooperation nor conflict between two types of actors.

The age of Bishop is written as ‘AETAT/IS SV Æ 25’ on the book in the upper shelf among the other objects that do not belong to our world. Considering that this book belongs to the Bishop, de Selve, it would not be illogical to claim that upper shelf represents the Bishop. On the other side, there is a dagger in Dinteville hands on which his age is written as ‘ÆT. SVÆ 29’. We are not in a position to analyse the power that objects in the upper shelf symbolize, but it is clear that Dinteville’s dagger signifies power. When it is taken into consideration that the position of the source of light which forms the shadow of Dinteville and the angle which enables the observer to recognize the distorted skull are, indeed, the same; then, one can argue that power comes from the angle per se, or in another words, from the dagger. Thus, in every particular order, there are key objects or methods which bring power.

 

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Deniz Solmaz is an MSc student in International Relations at Middle East Technical University in Ankara Turkey. You can follow him on Twitter @denizsolmaz_

 

 

REFERENCES

The Art Book, 2010, ‘The Art Book’, New York: Phaidon Press Inc.
Wyld, M., 1998, ‘The Restoration History of Holbein’s Ambassadors’, in National Gallery Technical Bulletin, vol. 19, London: National Gallery Publications.