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Italy’s Referendum: Another one bites the dust?

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By: Andrea Varsori

The Italian PM Matteo Renzi submitted his resignation in the aftermath of the referendum. (Franco Origlia/Getty Images)

On 5th December 2016, Italy voted in a referendum to decide whether to accept or reject a sweeping reform of the country’s Constitution. The constitutional reform was promoted by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who had come to power in February 2014 promising to bring much-needed change to the economy and the labyrinthine political system. While earlier media polls consistently argued that rejection of the reform was a likely outcome, the final results that arrived later in the night showed an emphatic refusal that was not foreseen - nearly 60 percent of the voters chose to reject the proposed reform. As a consequence, Matteo Renzi resigned briefly after 11pm GMT.

This vote has been the latest among a spate of electoral outcomes that have reemphasized a rising tide of populism in the West. The Brexit referendum was the first of these events, with British voters leaping into the dark by choosing to leave the European Union. At the end of a deeply polarising campaign, six months after Brexit, Donald Trump won the presidential elections in the United States, propelling into the most powerful political office on the planet. The rejection of the constitutional reform in Italy could signal the fall of another domino with similar populist movements gaining more thrust in France, the Netherlands, and Germany. However, this is a simplistic reading of the facts. First, the overriding success of populism is unlikely in the Netherlands and in Germany - both countries are parliamentary democracies where right-wing populism is not only far from a majority but can be easily isolated by the rest of the political system. Second, Italy’s referendum outcome and the fall of Matteo Renzi do not yet indicate an overarching victory for populism in Italy.

First, the end of the Renzi government does not mean that elections will follow suit. In Italy, the President can decide to dissolve the Parliament only if political parties cannot agree on a substitute. The current electoral law prescribes two turns of voting, with the two biggest political forces disputing a strong majority prize at the lower house in a second turn. Recent polls have consistently shown that the Five Star Movement (5SM), Italy’s main populist formation, would currently win the second turn against the Democratic Party (DP), Renzi’s left-of-centre party. The Democratic Party, who now holds a large majority in the lower house, is unlikely to place its bets on elections after such a crushing political defeat. The odds are now in favour of a new coalition executive, likely headed by Democratic Ministers Dario Franceschini or Graziano Delrio, or a caretaker government headed by a technocrat, such as Finance Minister Pier Carlo Padoan.[1] The new government will likely draft a new electoral law: the existing one, in fact, only applies to the lower house, as the upper house (the Senate) has ended up with an entirely different method. Every new electoral law will significantly lower the possibilities of the Five Star Movement taking control of the government in the future.

The rush to declare an end to Renzi’s political career should also be avoided. Renzi is still one of the foremost politicians in the country, and his political proposals still retain an appeal among that 40% of ‘Yes’ voters. At present, it is not clear if Renzi’s resignation as PM will entail his resignation as party leader. The minority of the Democratic Party supported the ‘No’ at the referendum and may be willing to trigger an internal leadership contest. Most of its leaders, however, have been marked by past political defeats (against Renzi himself, in 2013); anyway, that part of the political spectrum offers little appeal to the moderates who supported Renzi at the 2014 European elections. As for the other political forces, their unity in the referendum campaign was an exception. The radical-left remain in the margins and the centre-right is divided between Forza Italia, Silvio Berlusconi’s party, who still has no viable successor and lacks long-term political strategy, and the Northern League, which struggles to be at par with other right-wing European parties, such as Marine Le Pen’s FN.

Then, there is the Five Star Movement (5SM) that was born in 2008. The 5SM has reeled from its defeat in the 2014 European elections.[2] However, it pushed forth a few young political figures - the 30-year old Luigi Di Maio as vice-president of the Lower House. Earlier last year, the 5SM won the mayoral elections in the capital city of Rome, and in Turin, Italy’s fourth-largest urban centre. Building on these successes, and despite recent scandals, the 5SM is trying to gain credibility as a national force capable of governing the country. After last night’s results, the party’s founder, Grillo announced that the Movement will soon select the names for a future cabinet, and launched an internal discussion for a government programme on energy.[3]

The 5SM will profit in the aftermath of the referendum result, but prospects of gaining more power remain unclear. Elections could be postponed to late 2018 and the problems encountered by other populist movements in the West may choke popular enthusiasm towards the 5SM. Moreover, its current venture into local governance in Rome has been plagued by a resignations and an inability to handle them, signalling problems in the management of power.[4] The referendum has highlighted constituencies in which Matteo Renzi has relatively low popularity: early analyses show the distribution of ‘No’ votes among young people (81% among 18-34 year olds), students (79%), the unemployed (64%), and the highly educated (61%).[5] The widest margins regionally have been registered in the North-East and in the South - historically difficult regions for Renzi. The 5SM is likely to exploit these constituencies; however, it is not alone in doing so, as the radical left and the Northern League will try to dent into these groups.

The international consequences of this referendum, like the potential spread of populism from Italy outwards, remain to be seen. The most probable outcome of Matteo Renzi’s resignation is the creation of a political or caretaker government, with the hope that the popularity of the 5SM and the Northern League dies down. Moreover, the main opposition to government parties is fractured and coping with problems of its own. Further, Renzi is still a figure to be reckoned with; if a provisional government is created in the next days, it is likely that he will try to come back as a leader at its end, which may coincide with the end of this Parliament (May 2018).

Economic matters will also prove more decisive: if the national banking crisis deepens as a result of political uncertainty, the whole nation will suffer, dragging down growth as a consequence. This may reflect itself on the new government and on the DP, which will most likely be part of it. If the next government tries to cope with financial woes, it will need to introduce unpopular measures, thus stoking the fire of anti-establishment anger. It is the cycle of lesser growth and political frustration that may make of this referendum the potential first domino to fall, in Italy’s spiralling into populism, instability, and polarisation.

Andrea Varsori is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, and a Senior Editor at Strife. He holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna, Italy. His research project focuses on organised violence in Southern megacities; his research interests include insurgency, urban terrorism, organised crime, and civil wars. You can follow him at @Andrea_Varsori.

Notes:

[1] Il Post, E adesso che succede?, December 5, 2016, available on http://www.ilpost.it/2016/12/05/conseguenze-sconfitta-referendum/ (retrieved December 5, 2016).

[2] In those elections, Renzi’s DP reached 40.82% of the votes, with the 5SM stopping at 21.16%. See the Ministry for Internal Affairs’s Historical Archive of Elections at http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=E&dtel=25/05/2014&tpa=I&tpe=A&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S (retrieved December 5, 2016).

[3] See http://www.beppegrillo.it/2016/12/il_programma_di_governo_del_movimento_5_stelle_lenergia.html (retrieved December 6, 2016).

[4] Gavin Jones, Italy’s 5-Star aims to reform as Rome fiasco threatens its future, Reuters, September 18, 2016, available on http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-rome-5star-idUSKCN11O0KF (retrieved December 5, 2016).

[5] SkyTg24, I giovani hanno votato No, December 5, 2016, available on http://video.sky.it/news/politica/referendum-quorum-per-sky-tg24-i-giovani-hanno-vitato-no/v314289.vid (retrieved December 5, 2016); Riccardo Saporiti, Referendum: a dire no sono stati giovani, disoccupati e meno abbienti, Il Sole 24 Ore, December 5, 2016, available on http://www.infodata.ilsole24ore.com/2016/12/05/referendum-dire-no-stati-giovani-disoccupati-meno-abbienti/?refresh_ce=1 (retrieved December 5, 2016).

Image credit: https://static01.nyt.com/images/2016/12/04/nytnow/05ambriefing-europe-slide-ZKJZ/05ambriefing-europe-slide-ZKJZ-facebookJumbo.jpg

Why Colombia’s Referendum Result Poses an Opportunity for Peace

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By: Charlotte Manson

The ‘No’ vote in Colombia should be viewed as an opportunity to secure an inclusive agreement for a durable peace.

Results from Sunday’s referendum in Colombia have been described as astonishing and disappointing that will potentially throw the country into tumultuous uncertainty. Many journalists leapt to compare Brexit and recent referendums in Hungary and Thailand with Colombia denouncing the use of referendums as “messy, dangerous and not as democratic as they may seem” and as political tools for leaders. Other commentators pointed out that despite their rising popularity, referendums are continuously producing an unexpected and unintended result due to the problematic nature of reducing complex issues to a binary choice.

Yes, there are risks with referendums but there is one essential difference in the Colombian conflict as El Pais points out, “there are weapons involved.” In other words, the rejection of the referendum in Colombia should not necessarily lead to a rejection of using referendums to make peace.

The result of the vote on Colombia’s peace process by 50.2% - 49.8% with a voter turnout of 37.4% on Sunday 2nd October is therefore a wake-up call. This outcome was a declination of the particular deal that emerged from the peace process. Mass demonstrations have taken place across the country since the vote results were announced, demanding that the peace be salvaged, preventing any return to war. Both the Government and FARC have repeatedly vowed to maintain the ceasefire and press on with negotiations. Yet Colombia’s former President and leader of the ‘No’ camp, Alvaro Uribe has made clear that he wishes to amend the existing deal but he has ruled out any direct participation in talks with FARC rebels. A large number of Colombians remain sceptical of the current terms in the existing peace deal, hoping that Uribe will push for a tougher stance on prosecution and punishment of FARC members. The guerrilla group’s leader Rodrigo Lodono - better known under his alias as Timochenko - has the added pressure of having to sell the peace accord to all FARC members in order to avoid dissident activity. However, can the setback of the ‘No’ vote thus pose an opportunity for peace?

First, if peace negotiations are not inclusive, they will not produce a positive result. As negotiations in Northern Ireland prior to 1998 proved, excluded voices will find alternative ways to espouse their opinion. Uribe has thus far been exempt from all peace negotiations despite leading the “No” camp with support from millions of Colombians. His voice, along with his supporters who reject the current peace process, came to the fore through the referendum result.

Within days of the ‘no’ vote, President Santos and the FARC rebels announced that Uribe needs to be at the negotiation table. Speaking in the Senate, Uribe said his party “has the will for dialogue”, while President Santos has selected three negotiators for bilateral talks with Uribe’s Democratic Centre party. Going forward with the peace process, the inclusion of members of Uribe’s party will allow for more hard-line opinions, much of which the charismatic Uribe represents, to be represented in the negotiations. Still it remains to be seen whether Uribe sustains the willingness to enter talks with FARC.

However, President Santos has managed to make strides in re-engaging with the country’s second largest left-wing, rebel group the National Liberation Army (ELN). Earlier this week, he announced that the Government-ELN formal talks will begin on 3 November 2016 in Quito, Ecuador after three years of stalemate. Earlier negotiations with the 2000-strong ELN were markedly different to talks with FARC as high-profile ELN-kidnapping activities forced the Government to cut off all discussions in May of this year. Although the rebel-group still hold a number of prisoners captive, recent prisoner releases - including Spanish journalist Salud Hernandez Mora - are viewed as a signal of the ELN’s desire to be involved in the peace negotiations. Thus it is the inclusivity of all future negotiations that is the deal-breaker. The referendum result provides the chance to correct this mistake.

Second, peace is not automatic even if overwhelming support is secured. Imagine the result of the vote had been different and the majority (50.2% based on the results of the recent referendum) of people voted ‘Yes’ - would it be fair for the peace agreement to be ratified despite 49.8% of voters rejecting the terms of peace plus more than 50% abstained voters?

In Northern Ireland, 71.1% of people voted ‘Yes’ in the Good Friday referendum of 1998. Despite significant changes that have occurred since, the power-sharing government in Belfast still faces serious challenges and 98 physical peace walls exist in Belfast today. In South Sudan an overwhelming majority of 98.8% voted for independence in 2011 ending Africa’s longest running civil war. Yet five years on, the euphoria of peace has perished as the country is embroiled in civil war, with millions of internally displaced persons and chaotic power-sharing governance

Remarkably, a minimum of 13% of the 4.4 million registered voters was required for the accord to be ratified. For such a decision after 52-years of conflict, the people need to have their say on a peace accord negotiated by the few. But the task of securing peace in any post-conflict society is formidable, even when majority support for peace is secured.

Third, finding out why people voted as they did is very important going forward, besides cumbersome weather conditions. Abstention in Colombia’s elections is usually higher than 50% - recent presidential elections saw 59.9% turnout - and the 37.4% turnout on Sunday is lower than was widely expected.

As Annette Idler correctly pointed out a substantial part of the Colombian population demonstrated with their votes they are ready to join ‘Pact of Reconciliation’ - it was just not enough to constitute a peace deal for all Colombians. But what about those who abstained, and did not put forward their opinion on the peace deal?

Civil society should organise, promote open dialogue and establish an equitable presence in the media. Uribe has the advantage of securing consistent media coverage due to his political machine and negotiations between the Government and FARC are rigorously followed by both Colombian and international media. There are diverse opinions in Colombia and as the high-level negotiators discuss the most contentious points, so too should civil society take part in the conversation.

Fourth, when analysing the geographic distribution of the vote, there is a large rural-urban divide in Colombia. Those further away from the zones of FARC activity, and those residing in urban areas voted ‘No’, with the exception of voters in Bogotá. In stark contrast, the country’s peripheries include many of the hardest hit provinces hardest hit by the ongoing FARC violence – for example those whom experienced bombings, hostage-taking and murders. Colombian newspaper La Silla Vacia reported that 67 of the 81 municipalities most affected by the conflict voted Yes in the referendum. In the town of Bojayá, where one of the FARC worst massacres was carried out in 2002 - after a rocket hit a church where more than 117 people sought refuge, all of whom were killed - the Yes vote won by 96%.

Colombia is highly divided on the issue of negotiating the conditions for peace, and it’s no wonder. The scale of the task towards reaching peace is immense: demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration, options of transitional justice, acceptance of FARC in everyday society including holding elected public office, scaling down the lucrative $30bn cocaine trade and the vast criminal networks associated with FARC.

No peace process allows for winners and losers, it is a compromise. Therefore all Colombians, particularly those at the negotiating table, are being tested on their commitment to ending the violence. So the setback from the referendum can be turned into an advantage. Reconciliation does not occur overnight and this referendum setback is part of the long process.

Therefore trust is key right now. Trust in the process, in the negotiators, in FARC sticking to their word, and in Santos and Uribe placing their personal and political differences aside and instilling confidence in the public, so that all parties are committed to moving forward. The potential for the peace process to ultimately result in an agreement that all sides can adhere to remains, despite the setback in the recent referendum. Indeed, when the Nobel Peace Prize Committee handed out the Prize to President Santos on Friday 7th October the Committee stressed “the fact that a majority of the voters said No to the peace accord does not necessarily mean that the peace process is dead”.

Colombia held a peaceful referendum ending in a disappointing result. Yet there are so many opportunities for Santos, Timochenko, Uribe, civil society and all other stakeholders to get a better deal in which the majority of Colombians can accept. The ‘No’ vote should be viewed as an opportunity to secure an inclusive agreement for a durable peace.

 

 

Charlotte Manson is a conflict resolution specialist having worked on peace-building and reconciliation projects in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Bahrain, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories. She obtained a MA War Studies from KCL and is a Graduate of Sciences Po Paris and the University of Glasgow. Charlotte is currently a Policy Advisor in the European Parliament working on the Brexit negotiations following the UK’s referendum on the EU. You can follow her on Twitter @cemanson27.

Notes:

[1] ‘Why Referendums Aren’t as Democratic as They Seem’ New York Times October 4 2016; http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/world/americas/colombia-brexit-referendum-farc-cameron-santos.html

[2] ‘Colombia, like the UK, just sabotaged itself through a referendum The Independent, October 4 2016; http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/colombia-farc-brexit-referendum-sabotaged-itself-a7344866.html

[3] ‘Why Referendums are problematic yet more popular than ever’ The Guardian, October 6 2016; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/political-science/2016/oct/06/why-referendums-are-problematic-yet-more-popular-than-ever

[4] ‘Embattled Colombian government fights to save FARC peace deal’ El Pais, October 4 2016; http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/10/04/inenglish/1475582361_630819.html?rel=mas

[5] ‘Why the Colombian peace agreement failed, and what we can expect now’ The Washington Post, October 4 2016; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/04/why-the-colombia-peace-agreement-failed-and-what-we-can-expect-now/

[6] ‘Thousands march for peace in Bogotá and throughout Colombia’ The City Paper Bogotá, October 6 2016; https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/massive-peace-march-takes-over-bogota/14834

[7] ‘Colombia’s peace deal in limbo after shock referendum’ Reuters, October 3 2016; http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1230BH

[8] Colombia’s Santos rival Uribe willing to work on peace deal’ Reuters October 6 2016; http://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-idUSKCN1251MX

[9] ‘Colombie: la paix, les FARC et la <<théorie du genre>>’ Le Monde October 6 2016; http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2016/10/06/colombie-la-paix-les-farc-et-la-theorie-du-genre_5009083_3222.html

[10] ‘Defeat of FARC pact puts focus on Alvaro Uribe’s next step’ The Financial Times October 5 2016; https://www.ft.com/content/26149bda-8ac8-11e6-8cb7-e7ada1d123b1

[11] ‘Colombie: Santos et Uribe tentent de sauver l’accord de paix avec les FARC’ France 24 October 6 2016; http://www.france24.com/fr/20161006-juan-manuel-santos-alvaro-uribe-accord-paix-farc-guerilla-referendum

[12] ‘Colombia to begin formal peace talks with ELN in November while salvaging deal with FARC’ The City Paper Bogotá October 11 2016; https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/colombia-to-begin-formal-talks-with-eln-in-november/14912

[13] Colombia ELN rebels free Spanish journalist Hernandez Mora BBC News May 28 2016; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36403957

[14] Results of the Referenda in Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland, Friday 22 May 1998, Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) Ulster University; http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ref1998.html

[15] Official Southern Sudan Referendum 2011 Results, ; http://southernsudan2011.com/

[16] ‘Colombia’s president rushing vote on deal with rebels’ The Washington Post August 25 2016; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombia-farc-rebels-reach-deal-to-end-half-century-war/2016/08/24/3d15425e-6a5b-11e6-91cb-ecb5418830e9_story.html

[17] ‘Colombia’s Referendum: Low Turnout and Activist Minorities’ Security Praxis October 3 2016; http://www.security-praxis.eu/article/colombia-referenda-low-turnout-activist-minorities/

[18] ‘Colombia Referendum: Voters reject FARC peace deal’ BBC News October 3 2016; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252

[19] ‘Así es el país que votó No’ La Silla Vacía October 5 2016; http://lasillavacia.com/hagame-el-cruce/asi-es-el-pais-que-voto-no-58201

[20] ‘Colombia War Brings Carnage to Village Altar’ New York Times May 9 2002; http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/09/world/colombia-war-brings-carnage-to-village-altar.html?pagewanted=all

[21] ‘Colombia’s proof that democracy doesn’t work’ New York Times, October 7 2016;http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/opinion/sunday/colombias-proof-that-democracy-doesnt-work.html

[22] ‘The lessons of Colombia’s extraordinary peace process’ BBC News, September 29 2016; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37498940

[23] ‘Nobel Peace Prize for Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos’ BBC News, October 7 2016 ; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37585188

[24] Image Source: http://topsy.fr/hashtag.php?q=%23PazColombia

Scottish independence: fiscal identities and the wealth of nations

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By Pablo de Orellana and Claire Yorke:

As Scotland goes to the polls tomorrow to determine its future in the United Kingdom, a number of contending identities have been at play in the referendum campaign over the past few weeks. The idea of self-determination is an emotional calling. It speaks of the need to achieve state-level independence, it speaks of freedom, and therefore it also refers to the hope of a better future free from the constraints of a dominant other. The dynamics of identity that make this such an unusual independence campaign should be explored. This analysis argues that claims about national narratives and identities are conspicuous for their absence, and have been replaced by the newly dominant logic of Western politics: fiscal solvency and economic imperatives.

* * *

The debate about the independence of Scotland has been marked by the rationale that dominated of the 2010 UK General Election: fiscal responsibility and sustainability. In keeping with the dominant battlegrounds of British politics since the 2008 financial crash, debates centre on questions about how Britain can “pay her way in the world” and whether the current level of state spending is sustainable or not. Remarkably, arguments based on historical narratives of injustice and emotional appeals to emancipation from repression are mostly absent from the Scottish referendum campaign. The contestable political space has been reduced to only one area worth considering – that of the most effective route to economic success. This, however, is part of a wider trend and an all-British problem.

The dominant narratives that have emerged in the Yes campaign are of a stagnant Westminster that (by intent or accident) is content or incompetent in the face of rising inequality and unable to offer progressive alternatives. Alex Salmond, the head of the Scottish National Party (SNP), speaks of a Scottish desire to progress and protect welfare, redistribute wealth, and adhere to a model of social democracy akin to that found in the Nordic countries. These components form a defining vision of Salmond’s Scotland and Scottish identity - one that can only prosper under independence. Even in 2012 he spoke of Scotland as closer to the Scandinavian countries, sharing a consensus on progressive politics and social democracy that is destined to remain unfulfilled due to Tory recalcitrance. Independence, he argued, is the means ‘by which Scotland can take its rightful place as a responsible member in the world community; and by which the Scottish people can best fulfil their potential and realise their aspirations.’ In short, Salmond posits a narrative of prosperity against stagnation. It is marked that the debates have focused on areas that in other national struggles would appear of lesser importance: the longevity of North Sea oil, the affordability of the NHS, higher education, and business prosperity.

Contrast this to more common discourses of identity at times of emancipation. Examining other claims to independence, comparisons would draw on the Corsican, Breton, Basque or Kurdish experiences. In these cases, each respective group’s native languages are actively repressed or banned from schools –in no case are they considered a first language. Their culture –and by extension a key part of their identity is actively repressed. Mustafa Kemal, the first President of modern-day Turkey, sought to cultivate the belief that Kurds did not exist, they were “Mountain Turks” and as such, were not recognized by the state. In Scotland the bases of Scottish identity and nationality have not been actively repressed in recent history. Indeed, in the last hundred years, they have largely been embraced by the collective identity of the British Isles. Scots can be Scots in Scotland and the UK. This might account for the surprising lack of appeal to historic narratives of repression and resistance in the current campaign.

In the Scottish debate, the identity in danger is not cultural, linguistic or traditional; indeed those aspects of identity can coexist according to Salmond, who proclaimed in his 2012 speech that ‘the social union which binds the people of these islands will endure long after the political union has been ended’. There remains, however a kernel of emancipatory claims; they are, after all, why one would have an independence referendum. The case put forth is that a progressive Scottish political identity (permanently progressive) is stifled by a (permanently conservative, stagnant, unequal) UK political identity.

On the one hand, Salmond is playing within the goalposts of the dominant discourse of British politics since 2008, that financial responsibility is the only major legitimate political game. On the other hand, he is creating the possibility of an independent Scotland that is better off than hitherto, all whilst remaining within the narratives of progressive politics and financial responsibility. This is an identifying characteristic of the Yes campaign – it is empowering and positive, but hardly uniquely Scottish. One reason many Britons are frustrated by this referendum is that these questions apply to all in Britain. Newcastle, Bradford, Leeds, Sheffield, Portsmouth, Cardiff can equally claim that the Tories have left them out in the cold since the 1980s, and that they are marginalised by London elites. This points to concerns regarding the limited redistribution of wealth from the capital to other parts of the country, rather than a need for independence.

The clash of these economic identities does not justify a referendum taken as a business proposition, a divorce that could be either costly or prosperous. There is little passion to be found in financial arguments. Most importantly, these arguments entirely fail to provide a coherent vision beyond the opportunity of breaking free from an economically unequal and unsatisfying state of affairs. To change the plight of so many on this island who no longer or have never ‘had it so good’ is a cause with which many would agree, and would have as a national debate, not a question for which nationalism has an answer.

What the current debate is missing (besides some folklore) is an articulation of how the last three centuries have constituted a new society, brought new opportunities, and benefits, in spite of its problems and past tribulations. The Better Together campaign would have been well advised to celebrate the positive developments enabled by this symbiotic relationship. Finding clear evidence is easy: the Scottish Enlightenment set the tone for Western thought for centuries; it was David Hume that provoked Immanuel Kant into his most famous text. The rise of progressive politics, led by the intellectual revolution of Hume and Adam Smith, was birthed in Edinburgh and nurtured throughout the UK. Scotland’s industrial and engineering past are mythical, with the Clyde producing a vast fraction of world shipping for over a century. Scotland is an undisputed cultural powerhouse, yet the festivals are as British as they are Scottish and benefit and indeed depend on the common political, social and also cultural space provided by the Union. These examples show how difficult it is to separate British achievements over the last three centuries into Scottish and English ones.

Nationalism (of various degrees of hostility) as a response to economic crises is by now a traditional response in European politics to insecurity, poverty, and financial instability. In the late 1800s nationalism helped Bismark’s generation scupper liberal dreams of democracy on the continent by focusing on the birthrights of the mythical Germanic volk. In the 1920s and 30s identities returned as the ultimate mark of segregation between those with rights and those without. National birthright again determined the economic rights of a people. In both cases identity was linked to birth, to a narrative of origin and history, and to claims about the present and future. It is a mistake to return to the concept of a nation and the rights of its children (literally and figuratively in the case of the Yes Campaign) as the basic determinant of economic future.

Instead, this entire island sorely needs political, social, and economic progress. The debate about a better future at the heart of the referendum is one for all the countries of the Union to have. If this referendum can spark a discussion about how Britain can be more fair and prosperous, and can scare all political parties into engaging with the public on this, then this campaign would have served a grand purpose. Let it not be at the expense of a most successful partnership.
_____________________

Pablo de Orellana is an Editor at Strife, as well as a Doctoral researcher at the War Studies Department, King’s College London. His interests include diplomacy, critical theory, nationalism, partaking in democracy and contemporary fine art.

Claire Yorke is a Doctoral researcher in the War Studies Department at Kings College London and a member of NATO’s Young Leader’s Working Group. Prior to her PhD Claire was programme manager of the International Security Research Department at Chatham House in London and worked as a Parliamentary Researcher in the House of Commons. You can follow her on Twitter @ClaireYorke.

No guts, no glory

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By Matthew Bell:

scotland

Would an independent Scotland be missing some essential body parts?

How do you create a new country? Not a question many of us have had to ask, but one surely on the minds of thousands of Brits worrying what independence would mean for the security we have all come to take for granted.

The Scots now join an exclusive club of peoples who have found themselves charged with picking a course separate from that of its closest neighbour – in Scotland’s case, one it has been bound to for over 300 years.

Devolution has given Scotland a taste of independence, and much debate has understandably focused on whether Scotland could afford to lose the pound and many of the businesses that may prefer to be based across the border.

But the White Paper[1] published by the Scottish government last November also shows the scale of the task it faces in setting up new structures for defence and security.[2]

Or rather, it doesn’t. Because virtually every statement made on defence raised new questions without answering the multitude already posed.

Scotland’s future membership of the EU is far from certain, while the Scottish National Party has gently retreated from an absolute ban on nuclear weapons in its territory, reflecting just how much it values membership of NATO - an alliance underpinned by nuclear deterrence.

Vital organs

But even without descending into those uncertain waters, an independent Scotland would plainly have a plethora of problems to address, with few solutions clear.

Chief among these is how to create the public bodies that will look ahead, gather information, make plans and execute them to ensure Scotland stays safe and secure. All the boring stuff that in reality comprises the vital organs of a country, helps animate its spirit and keeps everything working properly.

The UK government estimates Scotland would need to create over 200 public bodies after independence,[3] including about a dozen that would be essential to secure its borders and protect the new nation.

The Scottish government countered that the list proved how “cluttered” the UK’s public sector had become, and said it would absorb many of the required roles into pre-existing departments and agencies.[4] Even so, the list of essential defence bodies is formidable.

This should not be too surprising for a country vying to break away and go it alone. But astonishingly, the SNP seems to have given little or no thought on how to pay for it.

Settling on an annual defence budget of £2.5 billion is all very well, even if many of the SNP’s stated expectations – including a fleet of at least 12 Typhoon fighters – seem more than a little unrealistic.

But factor in the costs of setting up a sprawling network of highly skilled military and civilian staff to carry out a bewildering array of highly specialised jobs, and you wonder how much money would be left.

At the risk of burdening illumination with detail, this is how the list stands. Bear in mind this is not an exact science, and much of what is currently done in UK hands could indeed be shuffled around quite a bit, as the SNP suggests – but the sheer scale of the challenge is eye-watering:

MI5 – spying for protection of the homeland
MI6 – foreign spying for protection of the homeland and overseas interests
GCHQ – data and signals monitoring
Ministry of Defence – strategic planning, co-ordination and command, troop recruitment and training, essential liaison with other armed forces
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory – scientific and technical research on technologies too sensitive or specialised for the private sector
Defence Nuclear Safety Committee – expertise on nuclear programmes, sites and operations
Defence Scientific Advisory Council – expertise on other areas of engineering and technology
Defence Support Group – essential maintenance of land and aerial vehicles
Advisory Group on Military Medicine – advice on the use of medical treatments on operations
Armed Forces Pay Review Body – independent advice on military salaries

The list does not include the following bodies, whose roles are carried out within the MoD but are significant enough to warrant separate mention:

Defence Intelligence - strategic defence intelligence for the military
Defence Equipment & Support – buys all the MoD’s equipment, annual budget £14 billion

The Scottish government has at least tackled part of the conundrum, settling on the creation of a Security and Intelligence Agency to replace the work currently done by GCHQ, MI5 and MI6.[5]

But even here the strategic planning and costing is woefully inadequate, according to the Royal United Services Institute.[6]

An effective agency would take years to build from scratch, and would probably have paltry access to data and signals intelligence to properly identify and track security threats, says RUSI.

To add to its woes, an independent Scotland would not have automatic access to the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence pool – shared by the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – and could also be left out from the Club of Berne, which enables intelligence sharing between European agency heads.

A familiar new friend

These challenges may push an independent Scotland towards close intelligence co-operation with the remainder of the UK, but the UK would not be in a position to share sensitive information garnered by others without their permission.

All things considered, the rest of the UK would have to decide how secure it would be with the country on its border shorn of useful intelligence and the means to understand it. In defence too, the UK and Scotland may prefer intimate collaboration to ensure the joint security of the island.

This is perhaps the nub of the issue: the extent to which UK co-operation would be desirable or even essential for Scotland in any number of areas, from defence and intelligence to finance and business.

The problem will hit both countries hard, at which point the politicians will really have to earn their pennies by striking acceptable compromises across the board.

Of course, both sides already know what could be coming and are busy installing leverage for what would be hugely important separation negotiations.

But in a worst case scenario, could Scotland really get by on its own if the political battle was lost, and it received minimal aid in defence and intelligence from the remainder UK?

Those working in defence and security already face a sea of uncertainties in their daily toil. Independence without proper planning could bring a whole lot more.

______________________

Matthew Bell is author of ‘Making the Break’ (November 2013) and ‘Separation Anxiety’ (June 2012), articles on Scottish independence and defence published by IHS Jane’s.
www.Matthew-Bell.com
@MatthewAlBell

NOTES

[1]Scottish government White Paper: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/0
[2]Scottish government White Paper - international relations and defence: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/10
[3]List of 200 public bodies Scotland would need to establish after independence: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-public-bodies-that-operate-in-scotland
[4] BBC coverage of public bodies serving Scotland: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-22993752
[5] Scottish government White Paper - security and intelligence: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/11
[6]RUSI on the proposed Scottish security and intelligence agency: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201403_BP_Scotlands_Blueprint.pdf

A lack of cosmopolitan substance: Considerations about the Swiss referendum to impose curbs on immigrants from the EU, a German perspective

by

By Sarah Katharina Kayß:

Swiss voters have narrowly (50.3% voted in favour) backed a referendum proposal to bring back strict quotas on immigration from European Union countries in February 2014. Even though Switzerland is not a member of the EU, it has adopted large sections of EU policy. The decision to impose curbs on immigrants from EU countries has not only reignited the debate on freedom of movement in Europe, but also boosted Eurosceptic anti-immigrant movements across the continent. In March 2013, Timothy Garton Ash argued that ‘with the exception of neo-fascist parties such as Golden Dawn in Greece, European rage has not been turned against immigrants, minorities, and imagined fifth columns’ – seven months later he added that ‘2014 is not 1914, but Europe is getting increasingly angry and nationalist’ - with a look at Europe at the beginning of 2014 he proved to be right.

The original version was written in German. You can read it here: https://sarah-kayss.squarespace.com/mangelkk

A lack of cosmopolitan substance

we have it too: only hiding it far better (because of the past)
apart from this, we are all Europeans now (even the children understand this)
because being German, other than being Swiss, comes along with A LOT of rules
they say: a real Swiss is a proud Swiss
we say: a real German is someone who knows what he’s allowed to say and what not
that’s hardly connected to pride though, one knows that pride might easily lead to the gallows
(that’s also because of the past, even the children understand this)

even the Austrians want to be Swiss (at least the majority of the people in Voralberg)
of course. and why? because the Swiss are allowed to say things which are politically incorrect -
(without anyone mentioning the past)?? …NO. Because:
Switzerland is like a referee: you think they are neutral, but one knows neutrality doesn’t exist
like: we won’t join the mission in Iraq, we just donate money for it. of course. Desert Storm.
let’s try to define the word “participation”:

the Americans clear the fields with their bullets
the Brits do what the Americans want them to
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are also there, somehow
and the Germans finance the whole thing (et al.)
and the Swiss. What are the Swiss up to?

(maybe they observe? reconnoitre? watch? spy?) NO. They only whisper from the sidelines.
and then they kick out all foreigners. All who are not Aryan-Swiss-blooded (perhaps)
the Confederation does not put up with that.

someone says: that’s the French share of the Swiss: The French are all nationalists …
someone says: these are the intellectuals in Switzerland, the rest do not vote anyway …
someone says: they never wanted to have anything to do with the others, I’m not surprised …
someone says: Europe, the overall idea is embarrassing, at least they still have their Swiss franc …
someone says: Switzerland and Austria could become states 17 and 18 and the problem of the European hegemon would be dissolved
someone says: the Swiss do not mean this in a racist sense, they mean this in a critical sense
someone says: I thought that Switzerland was a voluntary nation, I don’t get it
someone says: Unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno – these times are over: now it’s everyone against everyone

what? ( 1 ) Alps. ( 2 ) chocolate. ( 3 ) money = Sounds cool. I wanna go there.

In my canton all people voted with “yes”. We all agreed on this.
And all Swiss abroad have cast absentee ballots. Sure.
…transnational cheers of the right-wing populists. Un pour tous, tous pour un. My arse.
the new motto is not going to be mi casa es tu casa but, there’s the door!
too bad, the surrounding environment isn’t too inviting either -

In Germany too close to Bavaria where they protest against Syrian asylum homes already -
and Austria? Haider is dead, but the Freedom Party of Austria isn’t -
In France they demonstrate against homosexuals, doesn’t sound too open minded -
Liechtenstein is really short of space -
and in Italy the corpses of those who wanted to get in pile up in Lampedusa, also not good -

where to go? …and who came up with the entire idea of open borders in Europe anyhow?
Was it Europe’s Queen Merkel or a majority vote (for a change)? Although.
German citizens are hardly asked for their opinion.
We vote for them. They make the decisions.
Regardless of whether they were on the menu before.
I ordered salmon on brown rice with
elderberry sauce and vanilla ice cream. I got:
fish fingers with brown potato wedges

- the rest is off the menu

Thought experiment:
Germany backs a referendum proposal to bring back strict quotas for immigration
what would happen? Third World War, perhaps. Out of the question.

Something like this only the Swiss can presume to do.
In a week’s time we will stop dealing with it anyhow. Then the Chrysi Avgi is back in the news

There are people who think that Europe has learned from its past.
With certainty.
Yet the question is WHAT?

___________________________
Sarah Katharina Kayß is an internationally published author and recipient of the Austrian-VKSÖ Prize (2012) , winner of the manuscript-award of the Literaturwerk of the county of Rhineland-Palatinate and the German Writers Association (2013) for her poetry and essay collection “Ich mag die Welt so wie sie ist” (I like the world the way it is). She is currently a PhD student in the War Studies Department of King’s College London where she is working on a comparison between British and German officer cadets, researching the relevance and understanding of the national past to their motivation to enlist.

You can visit her website at http://www.sarahkatharinakayss.com