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Lessons from Israel’s Security Zone: from ‘Pumpkin’ to the Present

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By: Lauren Mellinger

Israel_Lebanon_Border

Ten years ago, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 brought the Second Lebanon War to an end. Almost immediately journalists, historians and policy analysts began grappling with the significance of the 34-day conflict. Yet to date, the pivotal events in the years that preceded that war – namely, the 15-year period between 1985 and 2000 in which Israeli troops maintained a security zone in southern Lebanon before unilaterally withdrawing all Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in May 2000 – have largely been overlooked.

In his recent war memoir Pumpkin Flowers: A Soldier’s Story, author Matti Friedman begins to fill this gap.[1] Friedman’s own experiences as an IDF solider serving in southern Lebanon took place in the final years of the security zone – at a time when there was a growing and vocal movement within Israel advocating for withdrawing from Lebanon.

During his service, Friedman was stationed at Pumpkin (Dla’at in Hebrew), one of dozens of fortified hilltop outposts that comprised the security zone.[2] The self-proclaimed first historian of the outpost, Friedman provides a unique account of this period in a memoir that is part a history of the war and part-political analysis, recounting the experiences of a generation who grew up under the promises of a ‘new Middle East,’[3] only to find themselves in southern Lebanon, observing as the seeds of twenty-first century warfare were planted. Yet, this period in Israeli – and for that matter, in the region’s history – remains incredibly relevant. Indeed, as Friedman argues in Pumpkin Flowers, ‘It is hardly possible to understand current events without understanding these ones [the Security Zone years], and yet they have been overlooked.’[4]

 

Israel’s troubled history in Lebanon: 1982 – 2016

Prior to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, cross-border incursions perpetrated by Palestinian terrorist organisations based in southern Lebanon were a frequent occurrence. Though Israel ultimately achieved the mission’s stated purpose of routing the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)[5] from its base of operations in southern Lebanon, in their place emerged a new, and ultimately more formidable adversary: Hezbollah.

Three years later, on January 14, 1985, then-Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced the cabinet’s decision to deploy IDF troops to maintain a 328-square mile buffer zone in southern Lebanon, to prevent the area from being used as a staging ground for acts of terrorism targeting northern Israel. For the next 15 years, those residing in northern Israel were able to maintain a relatively normal life, free of the fear of terrorist infiltration, (though they were still subject to occasional attacks from mortars and rockets launched from within the security zone by Hezbollah). Moreover, as a result of the relative quiet, residents in Israel’s north benefited from a thriving tourism industry during this period.[6]

But this improved quality of life came at a price. Between 1985 and May 2000, Hezbollah attacks on Israeli troops stationed in the security zone became the organisation’s raison d’être. The IDF lost an average of two dozen troops annually, which according to the army’s estimates amounted to 559 fallen soldiers, including 256 in combat operations.

When the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah proclaimed an Arab victory. Indeed in a now infamous speech, given on May 26, 2000 – Hezbollah’s declared ‘Victory Day’ – Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah remarked, ‘Israel . . . is feebler than a spider’s web.’

But following the withdrawal the newfound ‘quiet’ along the border would not last, and in July 2006, the Second Lebanon War broke out in response to a Hezbollah provocation. Since the 34-day conflict ended in August 2016, the security situation along the Israel-Lebanon border has been governed by mutual deterrence, with neither Israel nor Hezbollah eager for the next round of fighting, despite Hezbollah’s efforts to enhance its military capabilities in the interim.

Meanwhile, the events that took place in the security zone between 1985 and 2000 foretold the type of conflicts that the United States and coalition forces would soon find themselves immersed in following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

 

Why the security zone years are worth remembering

Visitors to Israel are familiar with the country’s painstaking efforts to memorialise its military history, especially the service and sacrifice of Israeli troops. Yet bookended by two wars, to date, the 15-year period in which Israeli troops were stationed in southern Lebanon still has no official name, and no official national monument. The ‘security zone’ era, as it is referred to, seems to have been largely forgotten. Yet, there are several reasons why the events that took place during this period are worthy of greater consideration.

  1. Fertile training ground for new techniques

In the first place, during this period, attacks on IDF troops stationed in southern Lebanon became Hezbollah’s raison d’être, and the organisation developed a series of tactics which they employed against Israeli troops in the security zone that presaged the type of counterinsurgency that would confront U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Friedman argues, ‘[s]uicide car bombs, roadside explosives, booby-trapped boulders, videotaped attacks, isolated outposts, hit-and-run, a modern military on hostile territory fighting a long, hopeless war against a weaker but more determined enemy for unclear and ultimately unattainable goals – before Iraq, before Afghanistan, there was this protracted affair in Lebanon.’[7]

Many of these tactics would eventually be exported outside of the security zone. After the Israeli government deported 415 members of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Lebanon in December 1992, they wound up receiving training in suicide terrorism from Hezbollah. Eventually they were allowed to return and in April 1993, Hamas carried out the organisation’s first suicide attack in the West Bank – a trend that would continue for much of the next decade. And it was Hezbollah’s claim of victory in May 2000 following Israel’s unilateral withdrawal that, according to Brig. Gen. (ret) Yossi Kuperwasser, served as ‘wind in the sails’ of Palestinian militant groups in the West Bank, when the Second Intifada broke out four months later.

That the Security Zone in essence served as an incubator for a range of innovative techniques – that only a few short years after Israel’s withdrawal would be employed by actors throughout the region, giving modern armies a run for their money – renders this period a worthwhile case study for the IDF and Israel’s political leadership, as well as for other countries who have already embarked on, or are contemplating, similar military engagements.

  1. Civil society v. the security establishment

A second reason why the history of the security zone era is relevant today, is that the decision to unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon remains a unique instance in Israeli history where a grass-roots movement (led by the Four Mothers Movement) held greater influence on national security policymaking than the military establishment, whose assessment on security policy is typically regarded as sacrosanct in Israeli domestic politics.[8] Indeed, prior to 1997 the Israeli public had largely been shielded from the day-to-day events in the security zone, for a host of reasons, including the fact that military reservists were largely not among those soldiers sent to Lebanon, a tight grip on the media (mainly by keeping the security zone off-limits to reporters), and the relatively low-level of casualties on an annual basis.[9]

The turning point came following an incident on the evening of February 4, 1997, where two IDF helicopters carrying troops bound for Lebanon crashed while still in Israeli airspace, resulting in the death of 73 troops. The helicopter incident, together with the emergence of the Four Mothers Movement almost immediately intensified the public interest surrounding the rationale of maintaining the security zone. As Avraham Sela argues, ‘the main achievement of civil society in this case [the security zone] was mobilising the media to develop a public debate which questioned the validity and necessity of the security zone and confronted the security establishment with an alternative rationale and discourse.’[10] Indeed, in the 1999 elections, Ehud Barak campaigned on a promise to ‘return the boys home’ within his first year of office.

It is the relatively short time in which Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon was accomplished, juxtaposed with the ongoing debate surrounding Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967 which renders the history of the security zone worthy of further examination.

  1. Poor decision-making on national security matters

Third, the security zone years were unfortunately not the last instance of the Israeli political leadership’s adherence to poor decision-making processes when it comes to national security issues. The 15 years in which the IDF was deployed in southern Lebanon uncovered a host of weaknesses in the political leadership’s decision-making and management of national security issues, a number of which have yet to be adequately resolved.

The security zone period was marred by the government’s failure to clearly outline objectives and goals. As Friedman writes, ‘[t]hat’s why this war never had a name – a name would suggest a decision . . . This wasn’t a matter of debate so long as the price wasn’t too high.’[11] This was compounded by the absence of reservists serving in southern Lebanon, and the tight media controls, which taken together impeded the flow of information from the security zone to the Israeli populace as to what exactly was occurring on a day-to-day basis in southern Lebanon.[12] Yet, the political leadership’s failure to state clear objectives and keep the cabinet apprised so as to enable them to make informed decisions occurred again in 2006, and during Israel’s three subsequent wars with Hamas.

Lastly, the lack of sufficient debate within the government is another attribute of the political leadership’s national security decision-making process, prevalent during the security zone years, that has endured. In his account of this period, Friedman argues that prior to the February 1997 helicopter accident, (and apart from brief military operations in southern Lebanon in 1993 and 1996), the security zone had not been a matter seriously debated by the government, and in fact, that ‘there had never quite been a decision to create it in the first place.’[13] Following Operation Protective Edge in 2014, similar claims regarding the lack of sufficient debate on Gaza – and as to what precisely was known to members of the security cabinet prior to the start of the war regarding Hamas’s offensive tunnels – have been brought to light.[14] According to MK Ofer Shelah there was only one meeting discussing Gaza during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s third term, prior to the June 2014 kidnapping of three Israeli teenage boys in the West Bank, the event that precipitated Operation Protective Edge.[15] Similar claims as to the lack of proper discussion of the threat from Gaza have been made by others in the Israeli national security establishment.

 

Conclusion

For decades, successive commissions of inquiry have reported deficiencies in the government’s decision-making with respect to national security and have called for improvements to the quality of the discussions in the government. But, problems are still endemic. The political leadership has failed to adequately implement these recommendations. Moreover, the years following Israel’s initial invasion of Lebanon in 1982 have challenged the country’s traditional security concepts of deterrence and military decision – core pillars of the national security doctrine that has existed since Israel’s founding in 1948. During the security zone years, the threat facing the IDF evolved from that of conventional armies on traditional battlefields, to the threat posed by hybrid politico-military organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Yet, in the years since the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the army has utilized reservists, and incorporated more liberal policies regarding media access when engaging in hostilities with these new, formidable adversaries. As a result, when military operations are underway, the Israeli public is now kept abreast of most developments, often as they are unfolding in real time. Yet, the political leadership has done an inadequate job at coordinating the public’s expectations with respect to how the concepts of deterrence and military decision have evolved in this new era dominated largely by asymmetric warfare - a change that began with Israel’s earlier experiences in Lebanon.

The adoption of a new military strategy in August 2015 seeks to remedy a number of these deficiencies. Yet the problem remains that the military does not operate in a vacuum – it remains subject to the decisions handed down by the political leadership. Therefore, it is imperative that building on the publication of the IDF’s new strategy that the political leadership takes the opportunity to reform its decision-making processes in accordance with the recommendations of previous commissions, and enacts a national security strategy that includes coordinating the public’s expectations with the new concepts of deterrence and military decision, while implementing the requisite reforms to its decision-making process on matters of national security. Until that happens, the security zone years should serve as a cautionary tale.

 

 

Lauren Mellinger is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and a senior editor of Strife’s blog and journal. Her research specializes in Israeli counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security decision-making, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You can follow her on Twitter @Lauren_M04

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Matti Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers: A Soldier’s Story (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 2016).

[2] Per Israeli military jargon at that time, it was common to name things after produce — hence a range of hilltops in southern Lebanon with names such as Red Pepper, Basil, and Crocus. Floral code words were popular as well – if the code word ‘flowers’ was sent over the radio, that meant there were wounded soldiers. Id, p. 24.

[3] Id; See also Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1993).

[4] Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers, p. 20.

[5] At the time, the PLO was classified as a terrorist organisation by the Israeli government.

[6] See Gal Luft, “Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon – A Tragedy?” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 7, no. 3 (September 2000), pp. 13-20.

[7] Id, p. 20; 30-35.

[8] Avraham Sela, “Civil Society, the Military and National Security: The Case of Israel’s Security Zone in South Lebanon,” Israel Studies, Vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 53-78. See Also Yagil Levy, Israel’s Death Hierarchy: Aversion in a Militarized Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 2012), p.71-81.

[9] Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers, p. 179-180. At the time, the rate of casualties in the security zone was on average around two dozen per year.

[10] Sela, p. 54.

[11] Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers, p. 100.

[12] Id., p. 179-180.

[13] Friedman bases his claim on the language used in the cabinet decision from January 1985 that announced a three stage unilateral withdrawal plan for the IDF. According to the cabinet decision, the withdrawal was to occur in three stages, with the timeframe for the latter two stages to be set based on conditions inside Lebanon. Stage 3 called for the army to “deploy along the Israeli-Lebanese international border while maintaining a zone in southern Lebanon where the local forces – the South Lebanon Army – will operate with Israeli army backing.” See Friedman, Pumpkin Flowers, 99. [emphasis added] See also Thomas L. Friedman, “Israel Announces Three-Stage Plan to Leave Lebanon,” The New York Times, January 14, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/15/world/israel-announces-three-stage-plan-to-leave-lebanon.html.

[14] Amos Harel, “This Lawmaker Won’t Let the Gaza War be Pushed Under the Rug,” Haaretz, April 24, 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.653167.

[15] Ofer Shelah, HaOmetz LeNatzeach (The Courage to Win) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2015), p. 34. [Hebrew]

Image Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Israel_Lebanon_Border.JPG

Book Review: ‘A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict and Convergence’

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Reviewed By: Kate Dinnison

D. Davis, D. Kilcullen, G. Mills and D. Spencer, A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict and Convergence, (London, UK: Hurst&Co. Publishing), 2016; ISBN-13: 978-1849046282

Colombia Book

Since its liberation from Spain by Simon Bolivar in 1819, la Republica de Colombia has been perpetually at war, almost 150 of its 195 years. Colombia, for a long time, was synonymous with weak institutions, crime, terrorism, and, above all, the cocaine that perpetuated the conflict. This country, however, is now one of the greatest success stories of countering insurgency in the 21st century, and A Great Perhaps sets out to investigate both the efforts made by the Colombian government and the international community, as well as analyse the adaptive nature of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s left-wing guerrillas.

The authors, Dickie Davis, David Kilcullen Greg Mills and David Spencer, have crafted a comprehensive and holistic account of the long effort by the government to beat back the guerrillas, reduce the dependency on the illicit economy, and improve perennial issues like social exclusion. More than this, A Great Perhaps is a book that asks one of the most fundamental and puzzling questions in the study of conflict and counterinsurgency (COIN): What, in effect, is victory?

The historical background in Chapter 1 divides the conflict into six phases, from La Violencia in 1949 to the official establishment of FARC, then following the ebbs and flows of insurgency through the latter half of the 20th century, up to the groundwork for today’s bilateral ceasefire. Each author then delves into different components of Colombia’s protracted struggle – guerrilla warfare, the security-economy nexus, FARC’s transformation, concluding by putting the conflict up against other modern day insurgencies and outlining Colombia’s ‘prospects for peace.’[1] While there are small noticeable differences in writing style between the four authors, there is a consistent organisation throughout that allows for readers to take away a laundry list of issues as well as remedies.

The efforts in previous and ongoing COIN operations such as Malaya and Afghanistan, while helpful in contrasting to the more civil situation in Colombia, provide limited insight into defining victory for the Colombian government and for their people. As the authors establish, the interplay of narcotics and insurgency, international and domestic actors, and civilians and the military are entirely unique to Colombia but can be useful for drawing parallels to those African nations undergoing similar security challenges, which they address in the final chapter.[2]

This incredibly detailed account of Colombia’s ‘long war’ goes far beyond much of journalism about the conflict, providing insight into the grievances that gave birth to the insurgency, the influence of ‘conflict entrepreneurs,’ the complex role of narcotics in the economy, and how war serves as a means for a higher end – credible peace.[3] Even without any background knowledge on this often side-lined current affairs topic, any reader will come out with a clear understanding of the military campaign on the wider political and strategic levels, down to the tactical and operational details from both the government and guerrilla perspectives.

Since the publication of this book, Colombia is one step closer to a peace agreement with FARC with the signing of a ‘A Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire, Cessation of Hostilities, and Laying Aside of Weapons.’ This is an important step defined as victory, toward ending the violence and criminality that has plagued Colombia for decades. Like any country enduring civil conflict, Colombia is skating on thin ice - the successes made since the turn of the century could easily be derailed by a round of failed peace talks, lack of popular support, a crippling economic recession, or budget cuts in defense, as the authors remind us.[4] Davis, Kilcullen, Mills and Spencer dissect the roots of Colombia’s protracted war in order to celebrate the successes of the campaign since 2002.

 

Kate Dinnison is an American undergraduate student of International Relations in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follow her on Twitter: @katedinns

 

 

 

Notes:

[1] Davis, Dickie, David Kilcullen, Greg Mills, and David E. Spencer. A Great Perhaps?: Colombia: Conflict and Convergence. London: Hurst, 2016. pp. 179.

[2] Ibid., pp. 68.

[3] Ibid., pp. 2.

[4] Ibid., pp. 80

Image Credit: https://www.amazon.com/Great-Perhaps-Colombia-Conflict-Divergence/dp/184904628X

Image Credit: http://doralnewsonline.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ejercito-colombiano.jpg

The future of European defence: An interview with Daniel Keohane

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Daniel Keohane interviewed by Annabelle Vuille

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Leaders gather for a photo at the February 2016 meeting of the European Council. Source: Wikimedia

Annabelle Vuille: What would you say are the most pressing security challenges faced by Europe today?

Daniel Keohane: Let me answer this question slightly differently, as there are numerous security challenges to be listed – from Russia to ISIS, failing states in the Middle East, the refugee challenge, and terrorism etc. What is more interesting, is to think about which challenge is a priority for whom. I have been struck on recent travels by the level of diversity; in Berlin at the moment, the priority is the refugee crisis; in Paris, the priority is terrorism; in Warsaw, the priority is Russia; and in the UK, the government is consumed with the Brexit referendum debate. Added to this is the fact that everybody is still recovering and, indeed, still suffering from the economic crisis, which is also a security challenge in a way as a healthy, growing economy is requisite to deal with other pressing security challenges. No doubt, there is an incredibly complex confluence of crises at the moment. So, rather than prioritizing, I prefer to understand which challenge is a priority and for whom.

In the 2016 Strategic Trends Report published by CSS, you argued that European defense cooperation is no longer primarily driven by the EU and NATO, but rather by the interests of national governments. To what extent does this dilute the strength of Europe’s collective security environment?

Well, this is a good question and I should start by explaining the reasoning behind my argument. Of course, there are some people that would say that my argument is not very new and that defense policy in Europe has always been driven by national governments. The point I am trying to make is that during the 2000s, even if you just look at operations, governments cooperated and acted mainly through the EU and NATO. The difference today is that they are doing it in a whole host of ways, be it bilaterally, regionally or ad hoc like the coalition against ISIS. Of course, governments still act through the EU and NATO, but these two institutions are no longer the central option and this is a major change from five to ten years ago. Let’s take France as an example: in Congo 2003 and Chad 2008 France acted through the EU, but since the 2011 Libya intervention, the government has mainly acted alone or as part of an international coalition, i.e. anti-ISIS. This is a change that I find quite interesting because it is not the renationalisation of policies, it is a renationalisation of cooperation; making it more complex, more messy, more widely driven by the national governments and hence, all the more interesting.

With the ‘Big 3’ (France, UK and Germany) making up the bulk of European defense expenditure, how can we expect their national interests to shape the operational priorities of NATO?

First off, it is important to note the difference between the three states. Traditionally, France and Britain have an interventionist culture with a global outlook. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and as nuclear-armed powers, both have a certain sense of responsibility for global security and, as such, are more willing to carry out external military interventions unilaterally or as part of a coalition. This is quite different from Germany. Whilst comfortable pursuing ad hoc, bilateral or mini-lateral cooperation on capability projects, as with the Dutch, Germany is much more hesitant when it comes to operations and the use of robust military force. In such instances, Germany prefers to act in conjunction with the United States, NATO, or the EU, even as it has come to take on a more active, and central role in European politics and foreign policy. Not only has Angela Merkel led the European response to the Ukraine Crisis but also, in a surprising response to the Paris attacks, Germany sent a relatively robust support team, including frigates and reconnaissance aircraft to the anti-ISIS coalition. Whilst no full-blown combat role, I think that Germany has come a long way since its abstention on the Libya intervention in 2011 and that, in contrast to the assessment by some German experts, it may slowly assume a more advanced leadership role. Additionally, Britain and France cannot do it alone; with their resources reduced, they need Germany’s help diplomatically and militarily even if only in a beefed-up role. Consequently, these three states have come to cooperate closely and this has provided some potential for convergence: All three are supporting NATO to deter Russia in Eastern Europe. All three have deployed forces to fight ISIS and other Islamists, whether in Syria, Iraq or Mali. And all three are keeping a close eye on what is going on in Libya. However, the potential for divergence still exists, particularly concerning the EU referendum in the UK. At the end of the day it is about politics and if the UK votes to leave the EU it could cause a major rift that could negatively impact defense cooperation. Another possible divergence exists over operations in the Middle East and North Africa. If in the future Britain and France are required to step up their anti-ISIS campaigns and Germany is unwilling to contribute, there could be a rift on burden sharing over who is doing what against Islamists in southern neighborhoods. Elements of both convergence and divergence are in play.

What role will Poland play in shaping NATO’s future priorities?

Poland’s main concern is Russia and territorial defense. It has long wanted a beefed-up NATO, and particularly American presence on Polish soil and things are moving in that direction. I think where Poland could come to play an interesting role is in NATO’s southern strategy, which will be discussed at the NATO summit in Warsaw in June this year. Whilst it is relatively clear on what measures need to be taken to deter Russia, it is much less clear what role NATO has in fighting ISIS, stabilizing Libya etc. If Poland demonstrates its willingness to contribute to these efforts, it would suggest a mood of, and desire for coherence among the NATO allies. If, on the other hand, Poland proves unwilling then I fear that there will be some divergence; some southern countries, such as Italy, will expect more engagement from Poland in return for supporting the deterrence efforts against Russia.

A 2016 RAND wargaming study showed that Russia could reach the capitals of Estonia or Latvia on NATO’s eastern flank within 60 hours. How well equipped is the Alliance in responding to possible Russian aggression?

That’s a good question because in strictly military terms, so far, the NATO efforts would not be enough in terms of conventional deterrence. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is relatively small, compared to the Russian forces on the other side. Additionally, whilst the United States is quadrupling its Reassurance budget and investing more resources into deterring Russia and beefing-up NATO’s defense, it’s still a relatively small amount; less than 1% of the Pentagon’s entire budget, which is nothing compared to the money that Russia has been investing into its military structure over the past few years. However, whilst there is more that NATO could, and even should do, that would be to miss the political and strategic point. The reason why NATO is not doing more is mainly because the United States does not want to push too hard. It is highly unlikely that Putin would attack a NATO member state and it would be unwise on his part to try and test NATO’s and U.S. resolve. Thus, I think the feeling in Washington is to strengthen deterrence and signal an alertness of a possible military threat from Russia, but at the same time, to avoid provocation or any move that would provide Russia with an excuse to attack; essentially, it is about striking a delicate balance between deterrence and détente. So, in strictly military terms NATO’s efforts are not so impressive, but in strategic terms it might be the wiser course.

In the 2016 Strategic Trends Report you also discussed the UK security and defense review of November 2015, and mentioned that its ‘main political message’ was that ‘Britain is back as a serious military power’. Additionally, Britain is NATO’s strongest European military power. Therefore, if the referendum on EU membership did result in a ‘Brexit’, what impact would this have on European defense and, more specifically, on the internal cohesion among NATO member states?

My own view is that, in theory, from a military standpoint a Brexit should not change that much for European defense cooperation as Britain will remain a member of both NATO and the UN Security Council, and it will remain a major military and nuclear-armed power. In practice, however, it might all be a little bit different. Certainly, it will make political alignments with France and Germany more difficult, which will directly impact defense policy. It has been a longstanding dream of many in Paris and Berlin to have separate EU military structures – by that I mean operational headquarters – and until this point, the UK has always been able to block such efforts. However, if Brexit were to take place, there would be nothing to stop France and Germany from doing so and would, at the very least, throw the gauntlet to them. There is another aspect to the Brexit business that has not been widely covered: the damage that it could have on the UK’s military ambitions. I think that Brexit could have the same impact on the UK defence budget as the economic crisis of 2008; diminishing government revenue and hence, taking a toll on defense expenditure. If you look at the forecasts, such as the one provided in last week’s issue of The Economist, none of them are particularly positive on the outlook for the UK’s economy if there was a Brexit. Consequently, if the UK economy suffers badly then the government’s budget will suffer badly, and this will have a negative effect on defense spending. Even if Britain sticks to 2% nominally, in real terms, it could really hurt their military ambitions as the cost of advanced equipment rises by 5% a year. The other impact of Brexit is that Britain would be diminished as a diplomatic player because it would lose its voice in guiding EU foreign and defense policy. Britain would simply matter less, particularly to the United States. Essentially, Brexit could potentially damage relations with the United States, make Britain less valuable at the UN and NATO, and it could hurt the UK’s own defense ambitions. I think the consequences are quite serious.

Could it make Europe more vulnerable?

It would – at least psychologically. Primarily because there is already a perception that Europe is frail and struggling to cope with the various crises ranging from terrorism, Russia, and ISIS to the refugee crisis. If Britain did indeed vote to leave the EU, it would create a whole host of questions: Will other countries, particularly non-Eurozone countries hold their own referendums? Will they subsequently want their own special relationship with the EU? Will the original founding members – or some of them at least – come to pursue a strategy of selective integration? In other words, you could end up having a very introverted debate about the future of European governance at the very moment when everything is falling apart around us; potentially akin to shifting the deckchairs while the Titanic is sinking. So from a psychological standpoint I think it would have a dreadful impact. Yet, it is difficult to make any definitive assessment. Some people believe that Brexit could drive France and Germany toward more integration. It might, but it might not because it could legitimise the arguments of populists and nationalists including Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. Ultimately, although there is much uncertainty as to what will happen, I am pretty sure that the effects will not be positive.

Is there any other aspect of European defence and security you would like to touch upon?

This isn’t directly a question for European security, but rather for global security. I think that the military aspects of the U.S.-China relationship will constitute the big question for the 21st century and for the international system as a whole. Europe, I believe, is only just starting to wake up to this reality because, understandably, we have been focused on the immediate crises at our doorstep. The other issue will concern what happens next in Libya and Syria. The Syrian war, we hope, will not go on forever and we will have to ask ourselves how we will remedy the situation and rebuild the Syrian state. Additionally, what will we do about Libya? Are we prepared to invest the military resources necessary to stabilise the state? These are questions that will confront Europe relatively quickly. From a long-term perspective, say 20 years, it is clear that Europe will be occupied in the broad neighbourhood; not only are there so many weak states that could potentially become beacons of instability, such as Egypt, but who knows how the situation in the Caucasus and the Sahel will develop. My experience, to paraphrase Macmillan, is that there is no certainty in predicting future events and their impact on international politics. As a consequence, political leaders across the globe will have to remain relatively flexible whilst being able to distinguish between the urgent and the important. What is urgent will not always be the most important issue at hand.

 

 

Annabelle is currently based in Switzerland and in her final year of the MA programme in International Relations and Contemporary War at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Having studied International Business in Rome, she is specifically interested in applying her economic background to the sphere of conflict and security. Her main research interest is the interplay between geopolitics and energy security, particularly in the maritime domain.

Daniel Keohane is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich. He previously held positions at the Foundation for International Relations (FRIDE) in Brussels and Madrid, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the Centre for European Reform in London. His work has been published in journals such as Survival and the Journal of Common Market Studies, and he has conducted studies (both alone and as part of consortia) commissioned by the European Union and NATO.