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Feature — Putsch-ed Out of Power: After Sudan’s Coup d’Etat Set the Board, Where will the Pieces Move?

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By Stephen Jones

7 May 2019

Part 1, with Analysis as of 13 April 2019

Omar al-Bashir during a 2011 visit to Juba (Al Jazeera English)

Following months of protests demanding the resignation of long-time Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir, he was removed from power by a military coup on Thursday, 11 April 2019. The coup, led by former allies of the President, is far from a complete regime change and Sudan is by no means on a certain and steady road to democratic governance. Complicated further by territorial disputes with Egypt, an unstable peace agreement with South Sudan which may yet collapse into fresh civil war, and the legacy of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur, the country has a difficult course to chart if the democratic vision of tens of thousands of protestors is to be realised. Amidst the ever-changing aftermath of the coup, this article will attempt the fool’s errand of predicting how the situation may develop in the medium- to long-term with regards to Sudan’s main players: former-President al-Bashir, the coup leaders, and the civilian protestors.

Who Mourns For al-Bashir?

So far, it seems, no-one. al-Bashir’s closest allies took part in the coup against him, led by the multi-tasking Defence Minister and Vice-President Ibn Auf, previously al-Bashir’s presumed successor. Even the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary force formerly loyal to the President has issued statements apologising for its role in the regime and pledging itself to “the protection of the Sudanese people”. As it is highly unlikely that any military or paramilitary faction will begin a civil war to return al-Bashir to power, his time as President is without a doubt over.

If no-one will champion al-Bashir against the coup, what lies in store for the former dictator? Indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) since 2009 for the ethnic cleansing and genocide that he oversaw in the western region of Darfur during 2003 and 2004, many civil rights activists around the world had hoped he would be extradited to face justice in the Netherlands. However, the coup leaders have made it clear that they do not wish to extradite him. This is likely because the coup leaders themselves are implicated in the same crimes through their roles in senior military leadership at the time, such as Ibn Auf’s position as head of Military Intelligence during the oppressive campaign. To set a precedent of holding those responsible to account would leave the coup leaders vulnerable to prosecution themselves. This reluctance to see justice administered through internationally recognised institutions and processes does not paint an encouraging picture for those hoping to see Sudan transition to a law and norm-abiding democratic nation.

Instead, al-Bashir faces two possible futures. For the same reasons as above, it is likely Sudan’s new leaders will refuse to prosecute him domestically, and instead exile him to a regional ally or neighbour such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt. It is a realistic possibility that al-Bashir struck a deal with military leaders, not calling on his paramilitary supporters to resist the coup in return for avoiding prosecution and retaining a comfortable life in exile. This would again avoid setting a precedent of accountability for the crimes against humanity committed fifteen years ago. Alternatively, it is also likely that coup leaders will use al-Bashir as a scapegoat, prosecuting him in an unfair trial with a forgone conclusion, likely ending with his execution in an attempt to gain favour with the anti-Bashir protestors. Either way, it is highly unlikely that the former President will receive a free and fair trial; not a good start for those hoping that strong, independent judicial institutions would flourish to form the backbone of a new democracy.

You Say You Want A Revolution? Keep Waiting, says the Army.

Ever since soldiers stepped in to protect protestors from Government-aligned militias on 8 April, a military coup seemed inevitable. Announcing the coup on state TV on 11 April, Defence Minister and putsch leader Ibn Auf declared a three-month state of emergency and a two-year transitional period before any democratic formation of civilian government could be held. A concern for many Sudanese protestors, who continue to sit-in at army headquarters, is that the coup will end up as a mere rebranding rather than a revolution, with one dictator simply replaced by another.

The initial indications, however, are reasonably promising for the protestors demanding democratic, civilian government. Ibn Auf, the coup leader and former close ally of al-Bashir, stepped down on Friday, 12 April after less than twenty-four hours in charge of the country, declaring veteran soldier General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan his successor. Similarly, another close ally of al-Bashir and leader of the coup, head of Sudan’s intelligence service the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Salih Ghosh resigned on Saturday, 13 April. Having orchestrated violent crackdowns on protestors since December, Ghosh was deeply unpopular with protestors despite his recent role in removing al-Bashir. In most military coups, the coup leaders declare themselves the new heads of government, usually after a brief power struggle between themselves. However, in Sudan we have seen former allies of the President first oust him, then — apparently voluntarily, although under large pressure from protestors — step down. It is unclear whether the resignations were driven by personal values, internal power politics, or fear of what angry protestors would do were they not placated. So far, no actor appears desperate to cling to power. While this is encouraging, protest movements should not drop their vigilance until their demands for democracy are enshrined in stable state institutions.

With a smaller public profile, little involvement in the Darfur genocide, and few direct links with al-Bashir, Sudan’s subsequently appointed leader al-Burhan was a less controversial figure than Ibn Auf; the military likely hoped his appointment would calm protestors’ demands for civilian governance, but the gambit did not worked and the sit-ins continued. A relatively unknown character, he had the support of the paramilitary RSF after fighting alongside them in Yemen against Houthi rebels, and it is likely that this support was a primary reason for his appointment over other candidates. Should the RSF yield significant influence over al-Burhan, many in Darfur will rightly become nervous, as the RSF is a direct descendant of the Janjaweed militias that committed the bulk of atrocities in 2003 and 2004.

Overall, following the coup, Sudan’s new leaders have attempted to placate protestors with resignations and promises of democracy after a two-year transition, rather than resorting to oppressive measures. While encouraging, there is a realistic possibility that military leaders are simply playing for time, waiting for international interest and attention to fade before reneging on promises of democracy and returning to violent oppression of protestors. The international community, particularly democratic nations and liberal bodies such as the United Nations (UN), must continue advocating for democratic reform. Coup leaders must be prevented from using this two-year transitional period as a chance to consolidate their personal power.

At Present, The Revolution Must Remain Televised

Protestors continue to sit-in at army headquarters in Khartoum demanding democratic civilian government. To get even this far since December, ordinary civilians, mobilised and organised by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), have endured brutal oppressive measures from NISS forces and government-aligned militia groups. As discussed above, that oppression has largely been put on hold for now, although isolated incidents of protestors killed by stray bullets or attacked by NISS forces continue to be reported. It is highly unlikely that the protestors will end their calls for democracy until a civilian government has been formed; therefore, if Sudan’s new leader al-Burhan decides to hold onto power, he will need another way of dispersing these protestors. al-Burhan reportedly already enjoys the support of the RSF, Sudan’s largest paramilitary group, and he will likely have the loyalty of the military due to his rank of Lieutenant General and his reputation as a professional soldier. With the resignation of NISS head Ghosh, al-Burhan is now likely able to appoint a loyalist to lead the intelligence service. With all branches of Sudan’s security apparatus loyal to him, al-Burhan will easily be able to oppress and disperse the unarmed protestors should he so wish.

The most effective protection the protestors currently have from such oppression is the eyes of the world. With global media fixated on the developing situation, international bodies racing to help support a transition to democracy, and writers tripping over their editors to publish op-eds on each new event, the SPA-led protests have a rapt global audience. With the world watching, it is unlikely that al-Burhan will resort to oppressive measures for fear of international isolation, and even UN intervention as in Darfur. However, should news cycles move on, and international advocates for democracy be placated by vague promises of a transitional period, the protestors will lose their watchful shield. International actors must therefore not turn away from Sudan until a peaceful transition to democratic governance has been realised.

Protestors One, Dictators Nil; But It Is Only Half-Time

Overall, al-Bashir is gone for good, although he is unlikely to face justice for his oppressive policies in government and crimes against humanity in Darfur. The generals who replaced him have, so far, appeared to resist the temptations of seizing personal power and continuing al-Bashir’s brutal measures. The restraint, however, is likely due more to the intense pressure generated by the SPA-led protest movements that tirelessly continue to demand civilian governance. Should international attention waver or the protests falter, there is a realistic possibility this revolution will stumble in the second-half of this dramatic Sudanese tale, succumbing to yet another medalled dictator in uniform.

Stephen Jones is a Master’s student at Kings’ War Studies Department, following an MA in Psychology from the University of Edinburgh. His main research interests involve the psychological causes of inter-group conflict and violence, as well as the cognitive processes that allow disinformation campaigns and terror recruitment strategies to succeed. Before joining King’s, he worked for the UN in New York, observing the positive effects of diplomacy and international collaboration in conflicts large and small around the world.

The Difficulties of Reconciliation: The Case of South Sudan

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By Akshay Sevak

South Sudan soldiers (Credit Image: AP)

Reconciliation plays an important, if not understated, part in conflict and post-conflict settings, carrying the hopes and expectations of many. The term refers to a reinstatement of peaceful relations between individuals and communities previously in conflict.[i] However, “Reconciliation” lacks a universal definition, and by extension what is, and can, be expected of Reconciliation varies. As a result, it is easy to stretch the concept and assume that reconciliation will reinstate interpersonal and inter-community trust, address historical grievances, impose moral accountability upon perpetrators, all whilst not alienating a nation’s different communities.

It is clearly highly ambitious, if not unrealistic, to expect a singular effort of reconciliation to achieve all these outcomes. Recognising that the process is somewhat Herculean is perhaps obvious; but what are the specific difficulties that the reconciliatory process might face? The case of reconciliation in South Sudan highlights some important pitfalls reconciliation efforts may face. Thus, this article invites and calls for a nuanced approach to reconciliatory approaches, which focus on the context within which violence has been experience and the specific victims who have faced post-conflict trauma.

The world’s youngest state has been embroiled in a civil war, between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO), that began in December 2013. More specifically, the conflict erupted following political disagreements between President Salva-Kiir of the Dinka tribe and former Vice President Riek Machar of the Nuer tribe. High levels of ethnic, sexual and gender-based violence, as well as forced recruitment of child soldiers and civilian fatalities, have been tragically common features of the civil war thus far.[ii] Consequently, it is unsurprising that conflict trauma has been experienced across different levels of society. The widespread and seemingly indiscriminate nature of the violence has led to high levels of trauma being experienced both personally by individuals, and more broadly at the community level, particularly following ethnic violence.[iii] As a result, South Sudan’s already weak national identity, not least due to its infancy, has been further weakened as different communities, particularly Dinka and Nuer, grow further apart from each other.[iv] In a nation with over 60 different ethnic identities,[v] such division poses a heady challenge for any reconciliatory effort.

In this scenario, the work of Daly and Sarkin, which outlines that reconciliation is often needed at the three mutually reinforcing levels of society upon which trauma is felt, is particularly instructive. [vi] Focusing on the impact of conflict-trauma upon the personal, community and national levels helps illuminate the specific reconciliatory needs of a society – and the inevitable difficulties of delivering on these. As outlined above, violence in South Sudan has led to high levels of personal trauma, alongside a deeply fractured sense of national unity. It may initially be assumed that a broad reconciliatory programme can be instituted to address these experiences in one fell swoop. However, the shortcomings of reconciliatory efforts in other national contexts demonstrate that this is generally not possible. Fostering a sense of national unity is often made much easier if there is a background of commonality between different communities, historical or otherwise, which can be relied upon in any attempt at national reconciliation.[vii] For example, faced with limited similarities between communities in post-Apartheid South Africa, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission tried to use a common history of human rights abuse under Apartheid as a common foil upon which both victims and abusers could share experiences.[viii] Such an approach necessarily leads to the creation of a “national story” which often will not be reflective of individual conflict experiences. Indeed, during the nation-wide “hearings” run by the Commission, this approach led many participants to feel as if the “national story” did not adequately resonate with their experiences. As noted by the residents of Duduza, whilst most of the victims in the community of the apartheid regime were committed to reconciliation, they were at the same time ‘not simply willing to move ahead as if nothing happened.’[ix]

When extrapolated onto the South-Sudanese context, the Commission’s approach certainly attracts sympathy. National unity in a fractured society cannot create itself, without a “guiding story” that is essentially centrally driven. South Sudan has fought two separate civil wars (1955-1972; 1983-2005) against the North (now Sudan) during which the primary binding factor between the discreet South Sudanese communities was a desire for independence from the North.[x] With independence granted in 2011, there has been a notable lack of a binding factor upon which national unity can be built. This notwithstanding, adopting a centralised reconciliatory approach to foster such unity does not afford individuals the necessary space to reconcile with personal traumas, and to essentially make sense of their personal perceptions of the violence. Worse still, such a centralised approach can lead to a general branding of one community as victims and the other as perpetrators; as was the case in the Rwandan experience.[xi]

The reaction to this conundrum may then be to adopt a reconciliatory approach that is not state-driven, but rather guided by civil society organisations (CSOs), as done in Northern Ireland. This approach relied upon a central fund from which different CSOs could draw resources to facilitate varying and decentralised reconciliatory programmes.[xii] While this has led to notable levels of personal and community reconciliation, with individuals and groups afforded time to formulate their own perception of the conflict[xiii], there is a notable lack of national reconciliation. Segregated housing and education are still prevalent within Northern Ireland.[xiv] Further, the Northern-Irish reconciliatory experience has heavily benefitted from the strong infrastructure, the established presence of CSOs and available funding in Northern Ireland. South Sudan, however, has a far weaker developmental foundation. Not only does the South Sudanese government not have a nation-wide monopoly on the use of force but less than 30% of the national road network is useable throughout the year, given the extreme weather conditions.[xv] This impedes the reach of security services and is a significant barrier to the inter-group contact between communities that is essential for reconciliation. Further, only 8% of households in rural areas (where 83% of the population resides[xvi]) own a mobile phone[xvii] and many communities are organised in a decentralised fashion, migrating each season on account of cattle grazing.[xviii] Any decentralised reconciliatory effort, then, may well serve to further separate discreet communities, and is unlikely to meaningfully contribute to national reconciliation.

This brief consideration of reconciliation in the South Sudanese context may well reveal a host of potentially inevitable problems. Yet it also reveals that “Reconciliation” is not a silver bullet for post-conflict societies. This should not discourage any reconciliatory effort. Rather, the analysis of reconciliation across different societal levels highlights that particularly in the South Sudanese context, reconciliatory efforts must be nuanced. They may often be unable to address the whole complexity of trauma experience. However, in a post-conflict scenario, the question of how to reconcile conflicting communities can easily illicit a template-based approach, drawing on successes from other national contexts. Rather, a frank and sober consideration of the specific difficulties and opportunities at hand may better serve any reconciliatory effort.

 

Akshay Sevak is Trainee Solicitor, and recent graduate from the King’s College Department of War Studies where he studied on the Conflict, Security and Development Masters programme. His research interests include peacebuilding during and after civil wars, the nature of violence and atrocity within civil wars, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. His research focuses on the East African and Middle Eastern regions.

Notes:

[i] For example, Herbert Kelman (1999), ‘Transforming the relationship between former enemies: A social-Psychological Analysis,’ in R. L. Rothstein (ED) After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Aletta Norval (1999)., ‘Truth and Reconciliation: The Birth of the Present and the Re-Working of History.’ Journal of African Studies. Vol 25: pp 499-519; Daniel Bar-Tal (2000)., ‘From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis. ‘Political Psychology. Vol 21: pp 351-365.

[ii] Human Rights Council, 23 February 2018, Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, Thirty-seventh session, A/HRC/37/71. Accessed 12 March 2018. Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_37_71_0.pdf

[iii] Amnesty International, 2016., ‘South Sudan. “Our hearts have gone dark” The mental health impact of South Sudan’s conflict.’ Index number: AFR 65/3203/2016. Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr65/3203/2016/en/

[iv] See Hilde Johnson, South Sudan: The untold story – From Independence to Civil War. (IB Tauris and Co Ltd).

[v] United Nations Mission In South Sudan (2014)., ‘Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report.’ United Nations, p. 14. Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/conflict-south-sudan-human-rights-report

[vi] Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin (2007)., Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground (UPen Press).

[vii] John Armstrong (1982), Nations before Nationalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 292-293.

[viii] Richard Wilson (2001)., The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge). This was encapsulated by the driving notion of Ubuntu. Broadly defined this refers to one’s humanity and well-being being connected to the humanity and well-being of others: Cathy Bollaert, 15 February 2013, ‘Everyone’s a victim – the problem of Ubuntu.’ Language in Conflict. Accessed 10 March 2018. Available at http://www.languageinconflict.org/90-frontpage/136-everyone-s-a-victim-the-problem-of-ubuntu.html

[ix] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (1998), volume 5, chapter 9, s. 130, p. 426.

[x] Wolfram Lacher (2012), ‘South Sudan: International state building and its limits.’ German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Berlin: Stiftung, Wissenschaft und Politik. p. 9

[xi] In this instance, blame for the Rwandan genocide was largely apportioned to Hutu communities through use of the gacaca courts in a state-driven and controlled reconciliatory process. See, Rene Lemarchand (2009), “The politics of memory in post-genocide Rwanda” in Phil Clarke and Zachary D. Kaufman, eds., After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond. (Hurst & Company: London).

[xii] Nevin T. Aiken, (2010), ‘Learning to live together: Transitional justice and intergroup reconciliation in Northern Ireland.’ The International Journal of Transitional Justice. Vol 4: 2, pp: 166-188, p. 183-184.

[xiii] Miles Hewstone, Johanne Hughes and Ed Cairns, (2008). ‘Can contact promote better relations? Evidence from mixed and segregated areas of Belfast.’ Belfast: Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.

[xiv] Miles Hewstone, E Cairns, A Voci, S Paolini (eds), (2005), Intergroup contact in a divided society: Challenging segregation in Northern Irelant. London: Psychology Press.

[xv] World Bank (2011), Project information development document: South Sudan rural roads project. Report No. AB6832. Washington: World Bank.

[xvi] UNDP (2017). ‘About South Sudan.’ UNDP in South Sudan. Available at http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/countryinfo.html

[xvii] Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation (2011). Key Indicators for Southern Sudan. Available at http://sitresources.worldbank.org/INSUDAN/Resources/Key-Indicators-SS.pdf

[xviii] Jonah Leff (2009), ‘Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region.’ International Journal of Conflict and Violence. Vol 3:2, pp 188-203.

 

 

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Strife Series on United Nations Peacekeeping, Part IV – Lessons Through a Gender Lens: The Efforts and Failures of UNMISS

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By Caitlyn OFlaherty

UN peacekeepers control South Sudanese women and children before the distribution of emergency food supplies in a PoC site in Juba (Credit Image: Adriane Ohanesian/Reuters)

Shockingly gruesome violence has defined South Sudan since civil war broke out in 2013, only two years after it gained independence. Over 50,000 people have been killed since, including tens of thousands of civilians. Over 4 million have been displaced.

The United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established in 2011 to foster development but has faced broader responsibilities. The evolution of UNMISS’ role presents an opportunity to understand the changing demands and challenges facing peacekeepers today. UNMISS grapples constantly with the difficulty of operationalizing its mandate to protect civilians—especially women. Its presence has been controversial but has brought the needs of and the need for women to the forefront of peacekeeping efforts.

Women and girls are disproportionately affected by violent conflict, and this civil war is no exception. One in four women in South Sudan experience some form of gender-based violence on a daily basis. Thousands of women have been raped by government and opposition forces.

Though women only represent three percent of soldiers and ten percent of police deployed to UN missions worldwide, the numbers are slightly higher in South Sudan. As of August 2017, four percent of UNMISS’ military forces—14 percent of police personnel and 26 percent of civilian personnel—were women. From inception to 2014, the mission was led by a woman, Hilde Johnson. Two women have been contingent commanders: Adzo Sowlitse, the first woman to command a Formed Police Unit, and Lt Col Katie Hislop, Commander of the UK Engineering Task Force.

UNMISS has grown to include 16,987 troops but still cannot seem to control the chaotic growth of PoC camps. Over 200,000 internally displaced civilians are sheltering in UN bases turned into “Protection of Civilian” (PoC) sites. The mission’s quick growth has perhaps outstripped its capabilities, exacerbating anti-UN sentiment among civilians, and the strained relationship with government.

Although arguably innovative, the PoC sites cannot guarantee residents’ safety. Four PoC sites have been overrun or shelled, over 180 internally displaced persons have been killed during attacks on the sites, and hundreds of women have been raped on or near UN-protected territory. Doctors Without Borders found that three-quarters of those surveyed living in PoC sites had lost trust in UNMISS. Safety in PoC sites has been unreliable, and site management has demanded a majority of mission resources. This has prolonged the time women spend surviving—and raising families—in tents, in such persistent states of vulnerability.

Notably though, UNMISS was the first UN mission to deploy Women’s Protection Advisors across the country. UNMISS former gender adviser Major Bettina Stelzer emphasised women peacekeepers are able to access communities in ways men cannot. To capitalise on this, UN police train women leaders in community watch groups to gather sensitive information about sexual abuse in the camps. Along with serving as mentors and role models, it is critical to understand how women peacekeepers can provide necessary support and open up channels of communication that could inform UNMISS activities.

There remains a deficient connection between UNMISS and the community. This was placed in stark relief during an attack in July 2016. Over 300 people were killed in the capital city, Juba, with foreigners and locals assaulted alike. The UN compound, less than a mile away, refused to respond. Peacekeepers abandoned posts, according to the UN’s fact-finding mission. Retired Major General Patrick Cammaert, who led the investigation, concluded that troops were risk-averse and inward-looking—regularly staying in camp rather than going out on foot patrols.

Another incident exemplifying deficiencies of response and diffusion of accountability came in February 2018, when 46 UNMISS peacekeepers were recalled following allegations of sexual exploitation of sheltering women. Without prosecutory mechanisms, the UN cannot effectively prevent or punish misconduct. Complaints of sexual assault by government soldiers in or near camps are also common. Growing resentment among residents towards the UN mission is evidence of slow and inefficient action by authorities. A small, wooden “jail” has been established in a PoC in Malakal to hold alleged rapists awaiting investigations that may never occur.

Even without systematic reforms to the Department of Peacekeeping, creative efforts to make environments safer could mitigate threats. These should include the reduction of masculine military tactics and the expansion of desecuritised peacekeeping—strategies like digging nearby wells to prevent unguarded walks to distant water or developing 911 numbers for civilians and providing cell phones. These must also include purposeful recruitment of women into peacemaking, -keeping, and -building efforts.

In terms of policy, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for more women involved in peace agreements and peacekeeping operations. However, according to a 2015 review, fewer than three percent of signatories to peace agreements are women, and women are frequently kept out of high-level negotiations. Judging from the consistently low levels of participating women, the UN has not taken seriously recommendations to incentivise the appointment of more female troops.

Embedded in these simple suggestions is a danger of further burdening women by essentialising them as inherently peaceful. Such justification for women’s participation is laden with specific expectations rather than based in their fundamental right to participate.

Evidence shows that security efforts are more successful when women are included in peace processes. Involvement of women’s organisations makes peace agreements 64 percent less likely to fail. Peace agreements on the African continent which failed to maintain peace for even a single year—in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan—all had in common a complete lack of women at the negotiating table.

The UN should focus on protection strategies for women made vulnerable in PoC sites. PoC sites are, as evidenced by the number of IDPs who continue to voluntarily reside within them, an important, if imperfect, tool. Along with strengthening practical protections for civilians, UNMISS should continuously increase involvement of female troops, whose nuanced perspectives are a necessary part of peacekeeping. Their unique access will allow for the equally necessary elevation of the experiences of local women, whose participation, safety, and empowerment are critical to the sustainability of peace.

 

Caitlyn OFlaherty is an M.A. candidate in Ethics Peace and Global Affairs at American University. Her particular research interests center on issues of migration, displacement, and human security. She is a freelance journalist and a member of the administrative support team for the Out of Eden Walk Project. You can follow her on Twitter @COFlaherty44

Image Source: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/09/failed-peacekeepers-sudan-160908091206526.html

South Sudan peace talks need to return home

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By Josephine Chandiru Drama:

Sudan picture

South Sudan gained independence on 9th July 2011 after decades of armed struggle with the Sudanese government. On 15th December 2013, fighting that began as a political dispute between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar broke out and turned into ethnic violence. On 23rd January, 2014, a ceasefire agreement was reached after three weeks of talks in Ethiopia. Just a month after signing the cease-fire, fighting resumed in the major towns of Malakal and Bentiu. Within the 4 months of conflict, several people are believed to have been killed; over 870,000 others have fled their homes, 145,000 of them to neighbouring countries and 75,000 to UN Mission bases in South Sudan. Peace talks hosted by Ethiopia with support from Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are staggeringly going on with periods of recess.

Peace talks are interactions expected to respond to conflicts. The response demands for mutual bilateral bargains to reach an amicable agreement between the warring parties and restore normality in the conflict zone and its neighbours. The loud call for peace talks by various conflicting factions, regional bodies, the international community and people of good will stems from the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians from unnecessary harm.

When parties agree to build a consensus for peace talks, the venue is an important factor that will determine the outcome of a negotiation. Venue determines who participates and who does not. When citizens attend to the affairs of their country, they get their concerns included in the agenda of the negotiations, and influence public support for them. It allows them to closely monitor the implementation of the outcomes and commit to long-term peace process.

Apart from South Africa, Kenya and a handful of other African countries that have hosted their own peace talks, the majority have held these in a foreign country. Some agreements reached during these periods have been adhered to, several others have not. Well aware that foreign states offer neutral, quiet and peaceful grounds for peace talks, there is a complete disconnect with what happens on the ground. It limits participation of other stakeholders who have a say in the matter. It further complicates consultations since on many occasions, the leaders of the warring factions are busy fighting on the ground, and the representatives need to reach them. Foreign countries seem to be comfort zones, displaying traits of people on holiday, luxury and laxity are part and parcel of their commitments. This makes them easily forget the plight of those they have gone to represent.

The South Sudan peace talks taking place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia can take place in any other state in the country that is relatively peaceful. Of the 10 states in South Sudan, the conflict is visible in 4 states. Thus the conflict taking place in selected parts of the country offers an opportunity to community leaders in the safe states to mobilise their people to lay down their arms as a call for peace and giving feedback to their warring allies. After all, the people have trust and belief in their community leaders. This way the same objective of negotiating peace could also be reached. Dialogues with the people as opposed to military interventions improve political power negotiations with political commitments.

If round table talks to broker peace were initiated in countries affected by and going through conflict, in this case South Sudan, the ordinary citizens would participate, the negotiators would become messengers of the people, costs of hotels and other facilities would be minimal. There would be immense pressure on warring parties by the citizens to find a solution plus other demands from the people, the brokers and representatives of both parties would be in position to feel what it means to be in the scene of conflict, thereby reaching durable peace agreements and also enforcing them. This would make negotiations achieve more. The venue also prepares a fertile ground for lasting political settlements through holding of dialogues between parties.

Historically, ethnic, religious and women’s groups have been excluded from offering negotiated efforts to conflict resolution despite being experts in mediation among their communities and homes. Furthermore, if peace talks are brokered in places that are thousands of kilometres away, how can we utilize the capabilities of such people?

Citizens can be a driving force to achieve a desired goal if conditions such as proximity to venues of peace talks and an open platform are set to allow citizen participation in whichever form. For instance, during the Liberia peace talks in neighbouring Ghana, women were a driving force through their pressure groups. At one point, those in negotiations demanded the doors of the building where the talks were taking place to be shut. The women then surrounded the building and refused to let the delegates leave until a settlement was made. This placed increased pressure on the negotiating parties to reach a decision. Such groups and many others who have non-violent capabilities should be encouraged to offer their free time and service to end violence against the people and participate in the state building processes.

Addressing the grievances of those who are excluded from the peace process is an incomplete process. People who are affected by conditions that are uncalled for should be allowed to tell their stories and name their perpetrators. Meeting of minds as opposed to meeting of weapons should be a strategy employed to resolve issues. This is the road map to achieve sustainable peace. This can only be viable when devolution of such agendas is brought to the people as soon as they materialize.

The way forward is for “Peace grounds with zero violence” to be established in South Sudan, deliberately used for peaceful negotiations, civic engagement and sanctioned by every leader to respect such grounds that are meant for discussions. They are to be violence free zones that accord the respect of all citizens to the exclusion of no other.

The neutral role of the external mediators during peace talks cannot be understated. In such a case, it takes great courage and sacrifice to volunteer their lives and that of their family to accept to broker peace in situations where negotiations take place in a conflict zone. The government on its part should be able to offer a secure ground to ensure deliberate safety of the external actors.

IGAD, the East African regional bloc spearheading the South Sudan peace talks should consider the said option so as to encourage full participation and monitoring of the implementation of the agreements. This would also minimize costs on their part and keep their presence in South Sudan longer ensuring conscious implementation and hold accountable those who fault their own agreements.

The dangers caused by armed conflicts cannot be endured forever thus an end to violence should be a priority. Conflict causes civilians to become homeless and thus displaced. With no shelters, dry seasons may prove manageable for some, but during the rainy season, with children and mothers forced to live under trees not knowing when their plight will end, a further motivation for peace talks to return home is established. Negotiators should be able to see the plight of those that they are negotiating for. The creation of an opportunity to re-build relations between citizens and their governments can only be achieved by opening spaces that are accessible to the citizens. This helps leaders rebuild confidence amongst the population and attract those in the diaspora to return, and external actors to faithfully contribute to positive state building and peace building. It ensures leaders exchange influence with the citizens. It makes people negotiate what is best for them, as the leaders cannot do it alone. The population also further owns negotiations held at home. Outcomes established in home countries end up building institutions that are internal as opposed to external. Let us give a chance for peace talks to return home.

 

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Josephine is a woman fellow at the African Leadership Centre at Kings College London, UK. She has worked with STEWARD women’s organization and facilitated dialogues between security operatives and media houses, as well as community dialogues for Payam (District) authorities, traditional chiefs, police, religious, youth and women leaders in various parts of South Sudan.

 

A Rapid Escalation: Violence in South Sudan

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By Christian Stensrud:

South Sudan Soldiers (Flickr/Steve Evans)
South Sudan Soldiers (Flickr/Steve Evans)

According to US Secretary of State John Kerry, the risk of genocide in South Sudan is horribly real. Over one million people have been displaced from their homes in South Sudan since December 2013.[i] While the short time frame is chilling enough, these displacements run parallel with large scale human rights abuses, increasing inter-ethnic conflict, and rampant arms proliferation. Civilians bear the brunt of the fighting, with 4.9 million needing some form of humanitarian assistance.[ii]

Media coverage has presented the situation as a conflict between President Kiir and Vice President Machar, or as a tribal conflict between Dinka and Neur. The battle between the two men is one catalyst for the conflict, however the reasons for the dramatic escalation in violence, to the point where large scale genocide is possible, is more enigmatic. Not only does this view simplify the intricate political environment of South Sudan, but ignores the increasing divisions within the army (SPLA) and the role it has played in the conflict.[iii]

Events Leading to the Violence

The political hostility between President Kiir and Vice President Machar is one of the primary causes of the conflict in South Sudan. Both disagree over who should head the party in 2015; each favouring themselves. The fallout stems from a Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) meeting in March 2013, which discussed many issues including how the upcoming election in 2015 should be conducted. Machar and Pagan Amum announced previously their decision to run for President. In July 2013, President Kiir reshuffled the party; dismissing Vice President Machar alongside most of his cabinet. Dismissed politicians sought to counter the President through decision-making bodies within the SPLM. Kiir retaliated by disabling these institutions.[iv]

During the meeting of the National Liberation Council on December 14th,tensions exploded at the main military command centre at al-Qayada, southwest of Juba. Members of the National Guard turned on each other, exchanging fists and then bullets. The cause of the battle is unclear. President Kiir accuses Machar of attempting a coup; Machar denies this, rebutting that Kiir is guilty of inciting ethnic violence and has publicly called for his overthrow.[v]

What is clear is that Kiir assured the public that the perpetrators would be dealt with. On the night of December 16th the Presidential Guards were given control of the city to root out the perpetrators. Instead of only rounding up political rivals, they targeted Nuer neighbourhoods, rounding up young men and killing them in cold blood; some eyewitnesses claim 1,000 Nuer were massacred in three days.[vi] Many Neur reacted to their families and friends being killed, which spread the fighting all over the country and gave the political conflict an ethnical dimension.[vii]

The Complex Political Reality and Ethnic Tensions

Historically conflicts in Sudan can be categorized in three ways: the liberation wars where the south fought the north for independence; ethnic feuds over resources; and rivalries between political leaders.[viii] The current conflict can be seen as an interlinking of the last two.

The political infighting of 2013 is not new to the SPLM, which has a history of competition for political power. The SPLM first split into two warring factions in August 1991.[ix] Rich Machar, a Nuer, was involved in these very first fallouts, and alongside other SPLA officers broke away from their commander-in-chief John Garang, a Bor Dinka. The political rift resulted in military confrontation between Nuer and Dinka, the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan, for the next seven years. Both sides are guilty of human rights abuses, and Machar himself committed atrocities against the Dinka in Jonglei state. The North vs. South dimension of the conflict eroded, and southern groups became increasingly hostile to each other. Southern Sudanese have been blighted by ethicised, South-on-South military violence ever since, and the political turmoil that came to a head in 2013 reopened these old wounds.[x]

The violence during the first split was extremely destructive to ethnic relations, but was swept under the rug in the interest of keeping focussed on the common goal of liberation from Khartoum. The crimes committed have never been addressed and no one has been held accountable. No victims have been offered recompense or justice. The lack of accountability for previous atrocities was one factor in the escalation of the current crisis, with many civilians and militiamen either seeking revenge for previous crimes or scared of what violations may yet be committed. The immunity from recriminations has also created a type of politics where political ambition can be achieved through the use of force.

The Role of the SPLA

The structure of the SPLA offers little security in South Sudan, allowing the violence to escalate.[xi] The current SPLA is an amalgamation of several previously warring factions that were integrated into a national army through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. This union involved incorporating militiamen into the SPLA that were never disciplined enough to be involved in a national defence force, compromising the army’s professionalization and ability to reform.[xii] The result was an army with no shared ethos or centralized command. This loose structure encourages ethnic divisions, with key commanders often remaining loyal to their former militia leaders. During the outbreak of the current crisis many soldiers chose to fight without commanding officers, not wanting officers to direct them or hold them back.[xiii]

Before the signing of the CPA in 2005, the SPLA was not only a guerrilla force, but also conducted civilian law enforcement. One problem with the CPA is that it transformed the SPLA into a national army, based in military encampments, without replacing it with any other form of law enforcement. Civilians have no protection and there is no way to prevent disputes or reduce weapon ownership. This lack of law enforcement twinned with 30 years of war have made the nation awash with accessible weapons.

While it is true that the SPLA is not responsible for causing the violence currently underway, it has contributed to its escalation. The integration by Kiir of militias in 2006 was undone by the first shots fired in December 2013, and the SPLA is unravelling under the new political fallout with militias starting to splinter away and fight each other.

Conclusion

There were roughly 228,000 refugees in late November 2013[xiv] before the political engagement in December, compared to 1.05 million in March 2014. While the fracture within the ruling party has been the catalyst, the causes for its rapid escalation are complex: the lack of recriminations for past atrocities; the security vacuum in rural areas; the ease of acquiring small arms in South Sudan; as well as the lack of a coherent or unified command structure in the SPLA are all relevant factors.

Since the outbreak, violence has escalated dramatically. US Secretary of State John Kerry has warned against the possibility of genocide, and it is becoming clear that some form of international intervention is needed. Before any action is taken, the international community must acknowledge that the conflict is not simply ethnic groups fighting each other; it is more precise to see the violence as politically based; as political leaders mobilizing their military resources and personnel along ethnic lines.

 

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Christian Stensrud has a M.A. in Public Policy from King’s College London. He has also worked at Alive and Kicking, a social enterprise that aims to alleviate unemployment, poverty and promote health awareness in Kenya, Zambia, and Ghana.

 

NOTES

[i]Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (2014). South Sudan Crisis: Situation Report No.30 (April 2014). [pdf]. South Sudan: Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South_Sudan_Crisis_Situation_Report_30_as_of_3_April_2014.pdf
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Jok, J.M. (2014) South Sudan and the Prospects for Peace amidst Violent Political Wrangling. South Sudan: The Sudd Institute. [Online] Available at: http://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/south-sudan-and-the-prospects-for-peace-amidst-violent-political-wrangling/
[iv] Gal, K. (2014) The Root Causes of the Current Conflict. South Sudan News Agency. [Online] Available at: http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/the-root-causes-of-current-conflict
[v] International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (2014). The Crisis in South Sudan. New York: International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect [Online] Available at: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-south-sudan
[vi]Gal, K. (2014) The Root Causes of the Current Conflict. South Sudan News Agency. [Online] Available at: http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/the-root-causes-of-current-conflict
[vii] Human Rights Watch (2013) South Sudan: Soldiers Target Ethnic Groups in Juba Fighting. [Online] Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/19/south-sudan-soldiers-target-ethnic-group-juba-fighting
[viii] Jok, J.M. (2014) South Sudan and the Prospects for Peace Amidst Violent Political Wrangling. South Sudan: The Sudd Institute. [Online] Available at: http://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/south-sudan-and-the-prospects-for-peace-amidst-violent-political-wrangling/
[ix] Hutchinson, S.E. (2001) A Curse from God? Religious and political dimensions of the post-1991 rise of ethnic violence in South Sudan. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39(2): pp. 307-331.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Crisis Group. (2013) South Sudan Needs Respected Outside Mediation. [Online] Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/africa/south-sudan-needs-respected-outside-mediation.aspx
[xii] Waal, A. Mohammed, A. (2014) Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong, and How to Fix It. Foreign Affairs. [Online] Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140617/alex-de-waal-and-abdul-mohammed/breakdown-in-south-sudan
[xiii] Jok, J.M. (2014)
[xiv] Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (2013). South Sudan Crisis: Situation Report No.25 (November 2014). [pdf]. South Sudan: Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs. Available at:http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20South%20Sudan%20WHB%2025%20Nov-1%20Dec%202013.pdf