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Colombia and the 'Small footprint' intervention illusion

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By Jorge E Delgado:

Photo: Juan Camilo Gomez (creative commons)
Photo: Juan Camilo Gomez (creative commons)

The challenge posed by ISIS has intensified debates in the West over the possibility of dispatching “boots on the ground” and has, yet again, brought to the forefront the search for alternative modes of military intervention following the recent disillusionment with “Big footprint” counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Recently practitioners have been advocating for “Small footprint” intervention – the dispatch of advisors and cash to bolster the efforts of indigenous forces. This is seen as a promising alternative in that it remedies two major shortcomings of “Big footprint” expeditions: the lack of cultural knowledge on the part of the invader, and opposition expressed in domestic public opinion with a small appetite for large expenditures and significant casualties in remote battle spaces. It is due to these weaknesses that Colombia is frequently invoked as a success story and model for “Small footprint” intervention. Take for instance the response offered by retired US Army Colonel Peter Mansoor, who served as General David Petraeus’ executive officer during the Iraq War, to the question of what victory in Afghanistan would look like:

“At this point the best the United States can hope for is to support an Afghan government that can keep the country together after 2014 and convince the Taliban that it cannot win the war in any conceivable time frame. […] For a view of what winning might look like, look at Colombia. A decade ago the country seemed on the verge of disaster with the FARC on the ascendancy,[…]. Good Colombian presidential leadership and U.S. support were the keys to victory.”[1]

While Mansoor rightfully points out the importance of good local political leadership and the assistance of allies in war in accounting for the alleged success of US intervention in Colombia, it is crucial to underline that how these two elements combined were peculiar to the country’s political context. In other words, key contingent factors make Colombia a poor case model of “Small footprint” intervention to inform Western policy options elsewhere. This article will argue for the unsuitability of making Colombia a case model.

According to supporters of the ‘Small footprint’ advising model, Plan Colombia - a US$6 billion program of US assistance to swell and restructure the Colombian military and police launched in 1999 - translated into an inter-agency effort that imposed exacting human rights standards, re-invigorated Bogotá’s relationship with its citizens, and received mutual endorsement from both the Colombian military and the government.[2] But beyond the quality and utility of the material support provided to enhance Colombian capabilities, the key to the Colombian military’s success against the rebel group FARC in the last decade has been legitimate and strong political leadership.

Alvaro Uribe was elected to the Presidency of an established functioning democracy – unlike most Middle Eastern and African countries – after a landslide victory in May 2002, and had sufficient legitimacy and political will to pursue an aggressive policy towards the insurgency. As a US Military Group officer recalled in 2010: ‘Uribe was the only president who realized that the FARC isn’t that competent. He kicked the military in the ass. It’s as if he said: “You’ve got popular backing, political support, and equipment – what are you waiting for?”’[3] Effectively, by imposing determined political control over his military, which had been historically absent in the country, President Uribe was able to strategically focus the operational and tactical enhancements enabled by the military support from the Bush administration, which had started to showcase Colombia as its ‘war on terror’ frontline in the Western Hemisphere.

The “Small footprint” approach is likely to be successful only when occurring along the host country’s “Big footprint”. Whereas the US army entered into a wide-ranging engagement with the Afghan national army, the US did not have to build up a new indigenous force in Colombia. The objective of US assistance in Colombia over the past 15 years was focused on improving clear-cut operational deficiencies of an established and strong military force capable of bearing the brunt of the responsibility. According to the US Southern Command, the assistance simply aimed for the Colombians to better shape ‘their operating environment to conduct decisive joint operations by virtue of improved training and modernization’.[4]

Moreover, in trying to understand the reasons why the Colombian military has been so receptive to US assistance more generally, it is necessary to take into account that the association between the countries goes far beyond Plan Colombia. In fact, the US Military Group has had an established presence in the country since 1942, when it actively assisted in the professionalization of the Colombian military to aid in the protection of the Panama Canal against a feared Axis - and later Soviet - attack. In addition, after having prepared the Colombian Army for its participation in the Korean War the US has been continuously promoting counterinsurgency practices up to the present day. This historical relationship has effectively influenced Colombia’s strategic outlook and its responsiveness to the latest package of assistance.

Two other final factors illustrate the unsuitability of the ‘Small footprint’ approach in Colombia to inform what is happening in the Middle East. First, there is a clear absence of ethnic or religious divisions in Colombia. As in most of Latin America, Colombia is in essence a Catholic/Christian state where the majority of the population subscribes to Western values, and thus the Colombian people were not patently resistant to Washington’s political goals when it extended Plan Colombia from a counternarcotics program to one of counterterrorism: ‘the overall goal of helping Colombia become a prosperous democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law, free from narcotrafficking and terrorism’.[5] Having said this, a final point to keep in mind is that the objectives of the US in Colombia have always been limited. Even at the height of the ‘drug war’ in the mid 1990s or in the wake of 9/11, the FARC has not been recognized by Washington as an existential national security threat.

Different US administrations through the decades have made it clear that Colombians are the ones who have to assume primary responsibility for the financing and maintenance of their own security. This was the basic assumption behind the formulation of Plan Colombia in 1999. So given the political context and the unique circumstances of the conflict, the only policy option for Washington in terms of Colombia has been ‘Small footprint’ advising. It is an illusion to consider it a model that can be used elsewhere.

Jorge is a PhD researcher at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is currently in the ‘writing-up phase’ of his dissertation on the evolution of counterinsurgency thinking in Colombia.

[1]Quoted in: Paul Szoldra, ‘The Most-Fascinating Insights From The Man Closest To General Petraeus During The Iraq ‘Surge,’ Business Insider, 3 January 2014, < http://www.businessinsider.com/peter-mansoor-reddit-ama-2014-1#ixzz3HREoiChh>
[2] Examples include: Stephen Watts, et.al, The Uses and Limits of Small Scale Intervention, RAND Co: Santa Monica,2012; Linda Robinson, The Future of US Special Operation Forces, Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report No.66, April 2013, Dana Priest,“Covert Action in Colombia. U.S. Intelligence, GPS bomb Kits Help Latin American Nation Cripple Rebel Forces,”The Washington Post 21 December 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/12/21/covert-action-in-colombia/. >
[3] Quoted in: Douglas Porch and Jorge Delgado, “Masters of Today: military intelligence and counterinsurgency in Colombia, 1990-2010”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 21:2, June 2010, 277-302
[4] ‘USSOUTHCOM Operations Order for Plan Colombia’, Secret Cable, Excised Copy, 5 December 2000, Accessed via Digital National Security Archive. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/marketing/index.jsp>
[5] Department of State, ‘Developing a Colombian National Security Strategy’, Unclassified Cable, 4 July 2002. Accessed via Digital National Security Archive.

Drones series, Part II: Daring to use drones. Why targeted killings are a necessary component in modern counter-insurgency campaigns

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By David C. Hofmann:

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Fuelled by the global ‘war on terror’ that emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, Western democracies have been steadily increasing their use of drone strikes to kill key operational and ideological members within insurgent groups in Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The state-sanctioned and strategic targeted killing of terrorists/insurgents is a controversial topic, and raises numerous moral and legal issues.[i] However, the realities of war are changing. For the most part, traditional battlefields have been replaced by insurgent campaigns conducted by hardened Islamist groups like the Taliban and al-Shabaab. In order to adapt to the realities and characteristics of this genre of conflict, drone strikes have become a crucial component within larger counter-insurgency strategies, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

Why Drone Strikes are Necessary

Despite valid concerns over the ethics and legality of drone strikes, targeted killings remain one of the best coercive options currently available to combat well-entrenched insurgent movements in lawless areas. The inability and/or unwillingness of local government forces to combat or apprehend insurgent operatives necessitates outside intervention in order to ensure continued international and local security. Counter-insurgency options, however, are limited within this particular context. Traditional military assaults on guerilla fighters who have superior knowledge of the landscape are tactically unsound, as seen in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Non-coercive methods are also limited (but not impossible) due to the ideological, apocalyptic and fanatical nature of most Islamist insurgent groups. The human and material costs of a ‘boots on the ground’ intervention are often prohibitive, and alternatives such as scorched earth tactics are wildly disproportionate and unethical.[ii] Furthermore, many insurgent groups enjoy broad public support. Traditional military invasion provides ample time for important operatives to go ‘underground’ and avoid apprehension. As a result of these and other factors, drone strikes emerge as one of the more practical and tactically sound options within theatres of war such as certain portions of the Pashtun region of Pakistan, the regions of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, and other similar locales.

The ability to strike at key players within insurgent groups without the mobilization of large-scale ground forces also has significant domestic and international political ramifications. The evidence suggests that drone strikes are popular with domestic audiences, who want and often demand a proportionate retributive response to terrorism without the need for mass deployment of troops.[iii] Within the international context, the legacy of the post-9/11 invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have created an environment wherein large scale Western military efforts can be perceived as an illegitimate invasion, an attempt at colonization, or as an economic exploitation of the invaded country (e.g., ‘blood for oil’). The use of targeted killing strikes a balance between these two pressing political concerns by assuaging domestic audiences’ desire for retribution while simultaneously allaying some, but not all, concerns of Western imperialism by avoiding a long term ‘boots on the ground’ conflict.

Why Drone Strikes are Effective

Drone strikes have also proven to be effective at hampering insurgent groups and in hastening the end of their larger campaigns. Recent empirical evidence suggests that when used as a part of larger counter-insurgency strategy, targeted killing decreases operational capabilities, decreases professionalism, and increases the likelihood of organizational death.[iv] The prevailing argument is that repeated strikes against operational and ideologically important members of insurgent groups erodes long-term capabilities to plan and execute attacks by denying them the specialized skillsets of trainers, bomb makers, and ideologues. Furthermore, the use of drone strikes can lead to a deterrent effect by increasing the physical and social costs associated with engaging in armed conflict.[v] Lastly, efforts expended to remain ‘underground’ out of a fear of being targeted by drones diverts energies that would normally go towards the planning and execution of terrorist attacks.

The Future of Targeted Killing and Drone Strikes

As long as belligerents remain entrenched in locales that inhibit practical non-coercive or legal approaches to counter-insurgency, the best option is the proportional and strategic removal of operatives via drone strikes. However, the practice of targeted killing remains generally misunderstood by the public. If targeted killing is to stay as a cornerstone piece in Western counter-insurgency campaigns, efforts must be made by practising governments to address some of the moral and legal concerns surrounding the tactic. This will require the adoption of policies that add elements of transparency, legal review and comprehensive guidelines that determine when, where and how targeted killing can and should occur.[vi] To do otherwise risks sinking to the level of indiscriminate violence practised by many insurgent and terrorist groups.

 

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David is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo, Canada, as well as Editor in Chief of the ‘Canadian Graduate Journal of Sociology and Criminology’ (http://cgjsc.ca). His research focuses on the social dynamics of charismatic authority in terrorist groups, and how relationships between leaders and followers affect the formation, operation, and eventual demise of terrorist organizations. He can be reached at [email protected]

 

NOTES
[i] For a summary of both sides of the debate on drone strikes and targeted killing, see: Daniel Byman, ‘Why Drones Work’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92 (July/August 2013), pp. 32-43; Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Why Drones Fail’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92 (July/August 2013), pp. 44-54. For a discussion of the moral and ethical debate on targeted killing, see: Steven R. David, ‘Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.17, (2003), pp. 111-126; Alan Dershowitz, ‘Targeted Killing Vindicated’, Huffington Post, 2 May 2011, onine at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-dershowitz/targeted-killing-vindicat_b_856538.html; David Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, (2005), pp. 171-212; Yael Stein, ‘By any Name Illegal and Immoral’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 14 (2003), pp. 127-137.
[ii] Byman, ‘Why Drones Work’; David, ‘Fatal Choices’, p. 19.
[iii] Byman, ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’, p. 102; David, ‘Fatal Choices’, pp. 7-8.
[iv] See: Patrick B. Johnston, ‘Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns’, International Security, Vol. 36 (Spring 2012), pp. 62-68; Bryan C. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism’, International Security, Vol.36 (Spring 2012), pp. 37-42; Alex S. Wilner, ‘Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol.33 (2010), pp. 316-323.
[v] David, ‘Fatal Choices’, 6-7; Wilner, ‘Targeted Killings in Afghanistan’, pp. 314-316.
[vi] Daniel Byman, ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85 (March – April, 2006), pp. 110-111; Byman, ‘Why Drones Work’; David, ‘Fatal Choices’, pp. 21-22.

‘O Hush the Noise Ye Men of Strife’

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by Thomas Colley

As the centenary of the start of the First World War approaches (2014), thoughts will likely turn this holiday season to the uplifting Christmas football match that supposedly occurred during a truce between Germany and the Allies on the Western front. Such a heart-warming episode provided a symbolic reminder that humanity could stand morally above the awful conflict in which Western civilisation was embroiled. That sworn enemies agreed a truce and celebrated a mutual religious festival together is one of the most emotive mythologies of war at Christmas.

Perhaps surprisingly, honouring the religious festivals of others is not as commonplace as one might think. For centuries, the Jews across the Christian world experienced persecution at Easter. Half a century before the First World War, the American Civil War saw continued fighting over Christmas, with the festival used for a major propaganda battle. At this time of joy, happiness and perhaps a little sober reflection for those who are less fortunate it may not readily occur to us that, for some, religious festivals are not sacrosanct. Instead, they are a strategic opportunity to press their agenda, be it ideological indoctrination, the incitement of fear or military victory.

Wars are fought on a physical and a symbolic level. On a physical level, religious festivals provide a strategic military opportunity to take advantage of the distraction of one’s opponent with a surprise attack. That may sound controversial. But if moral considerations are removed from the equation in line with strategic theory, the use of a religious festival to attack opponents at their moment of greatest distraction is a rational decision. The Yom Kippur War was one such example, when an Arab coalition used the holiest Jewish day of the year to launch an attack against Israel in 1973. The Tet Offensive of 1968 was another notable example, when the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong used New Year celebrations to launch surprise attacks against the US and their allies during the Vietnam War. Militarily, whilst both offensives eventually faltered, they achieved strategic surprise, and both attackers made significant early gains that had previously eluded them. In Vietnam of course, the Tet offensive was seen as the pivotal catalyst for US public opinion to turn against the war, a spectacular success for North Vietnam in the long term.

However, it is on the symbolic level that using religious festivals for strategic gain is most significant. Of all strategies concerning the use of force to achieve political objectives, terrorism relies most on the effects of symbolism. US embassies in Yemen and elsewhere in the Arab world were closed this year due to the threat of Islamist terrorist attacks on Eid. Some commentators in the US excoriated the terrorists being so immoral as to choose their own holy day to launch attacks. Yet clearly such an attack could have great symbolic impact, potentially galvanising the support of those sympathetic to the terrorist cause. Though one speculates whether other Muslims would feel the same way about the use of their day of celebration for such ends. An Eid attack might minimise Muslim casualties as more people may be at home with their families. On the symbolic level though it might backfire, alienating more Muslims than it would attract.

As well as military and terrorist acts, Christmas has also been instrumentalised for the projection of soft power. In 2011, North Korea was fuming at South Korea’s construction of several giant Christmas trees along the border with the demilitarised zone. A Christmas tree could symbolise welcoming, celebration, family, an invitation. Yet to the North it could be seen as a cultural threat; a Christmas tree could also symbolise plenty, feasting, religious freedom (let alone a consistent power supply), all things that are rarely experienced by the people of North Korea. Indeed the North Korean government was so upset as to threaten to shoot the trees down, such were their symbolic power. Actually this could perversely be seen as cause for optimism. If North Korean elites feel that threatened by the propaganda effect of a Christmas tree, then North Korea’s cultural borders must be more open than one might think.

This sense of optimism is important at Christmas. Much of the world is not free from strife. Peace on Earth remains an ideal rather than a reality. But let us hope that, regardless of faith, this holiday season brings as many people together as possible in togetherness rather than suffering. We should not have to look back a hundred years for poignant examples of when enemies come together, even briefly, in peace and goodwill. As the popular Christmas Carol ‘It Came Upon a Midnight Clear’ proclaims: ‘O hush the noise ye men of strife and hear the angels sing.’