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Interview with Jay Ulfelder, Former Research Director at the Political Instability Task Force

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by David Comley

Jay Ufelder is an American Political Scientist specialising in democratisation, civil unrest, state collapse and forecasting. Currently a Consulting Researcher, he was previously the Research Director at the Political Instability Task Force – a US government funded initiative to explore the causes of political instability and ‘state failure’.[1]

Jay Ulfelder (2008)

David Comley: Could you tell me about your background and how you reached this stage in your career?

Jay Ulfelder: I did my undergraduate at Duke University in North Carolina and was particularly interested in ‘nuclear annihilation’. This led me to focus on Soviet area studies including some language study in the USSR and I graduated in spring of 1991 just as the Soviet Union was collapsing. This caused me to shift my attention towards more generic issues of political instability and popular mobilisation which were affecting the region at the time.

I then undertook my graduate studies in Political Science at Stanford, focussing on ethnic and nationalist mobilisation in the Baltic republics during the Gorbachev era. From this, my interests broadened into democratisation and social moments. It was this point that I started to mix qualitative and quantitative research methods in my work.

Following graduation in , I moved back to Washington, DC with my wife, and found work with a small consultancy which did work on government contracts. A lot of this focused on intelligence work and attempted to forecast various forms of political instability.

In 2001, I became involved with the US government-funded Political Instability Task Force who were looking for a part-time research director. The focus of the task force was on forecasting and explaining a variety of forms of political instability, primarily using statistical models. This often involved using cross-national time-series data to try to think about where instances of civil wars, state collapse and coups etc. were going to happen. Interstate war has never really been a focus because it is so rare, but numerous other forms of political instability have been of interest to the task force at one time or another. This meant digging into the literature, working with models to help forecast these events and working with a lot of very interesting people in academia and government.

In 2011 I left to become a private consultant and I’m currently working full time under contract for the Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. We hope to soon be launching a public early-warning system for forecasting mass killing and genocide in countries around the world.

Does anything like this forecasting system already exist?

Although there are a few programs out there which generate warning reports, a lot of these are ad hoc and react mostly to incipient conflict. This new program will be more rigorous and systematic. It will also be public and freely available, unlike current programs which tend to be run internally by governments who do not make their findings available to the public or international organisations. It’s a very exciting project to be working on and I’m very much looking forward to having something to show for it! We’re looking at publicly launching the initial version in late March 2014.

I’d like to ask your insights on the challenging issues of political instability and state-building. Do you think academics and policy-makers have anything to gain by talking about ‘failed states’, and if not, why has the term become so pervasive in the academic and policy worlds?

I think the term ‘failed states’ has accumulated a lot of baggage which has made it less useful over time. It’s become associated with some specific ways of looking at political instability. In fact, the Political Instability Task Force used to be called the ‘State Failure Task Force’ and changed its name precisely for this reason. The value-laden connotations of what constituted ‘failure’ often got in the way of the substance of what the group was trying to work on. My view echoes that of Charles Call who talks about ‘state collapse’ rather than ‘state failure’, and specifically focuses on the collapse of an entity that is internationally recognised as a ‘sovereign government’. I think the term has stuck around because there are now various institutional investments in it. Although saying that, there are political ramifications if an ambassador were to say to president of another country ‘your state is about to fail’ due to the normative baggage that the term carries.

At the beginning of 2012 you wrote a blog post entitled ‘A Liberal Case Against Military Intervention’ which discussed the opportunity-cost of military intervention in Syria.[2] You argued that the resources required for a military intervention would save far more lives if used for humanitarian purposes. Was there ever a point in the conflict where a military intervention would have been preferable?

My starting point was, and still is, that Syria is an extremely difficult case to grapple with. There is huge uncertainty over what the consequences of various kinds of action would be. Therefore I realise that it is much easier to comment as a blogger then as the policymaker who has to make the decisions. However, in cases where you are not sure that the costly action you are taking will result in the beneficial actions that you are seeking there is a high chance that the intervention will have substantial negative consequences. In these cases the best course of action would be not to intervene, and I think this is the case in Syria. Historically, interventions of a similar to scale to what would have had to have taken place in Syria, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, have not stopped violence from occurring. These interventions have interacted with local actors who have their own interests. Therefore an intervention in Syria would probably have just caused the conflict to escalate in a different way. For this reason, I stand by my original recommendation for Syria. But in response to your question ‘do the potential costs of intervention always outweigh the benefits?’ – No, definitely not. I think Central African Republic is a very good example of this right now, as the CAR’s government isn’t opposing foreign intervention. In my mind, this is a case where the potential benefits of a military intervention almost certainly outweigh the consequences and that France is acting appropriately to the crisis. I think Libya is a bit more ambiguous.

Given that policymakers must be running similar cost-benefit analyses all the time, why do you think the executives in the UK and US were so enthusiastic to intervene in Syria in September, if those resources could have been used much more effectively for humanitarian rather than military purposes?

I truly can’t understand that. It seemed like a moment where everyone became caught up in a particular idea for the wrong reasons. It then became attached to other objectives such as ‘tipping the balance towards regime change’. My belief is that it wouldn’t have happened even if the Russians hadn’t offered their alternative deal involving chemical weapons disposal. In the event, this ended up being a nice face-saving opportunity for those who had been most enthusiastic in backing the strikes. It just goes to show that politics is not a contraption that produces optimal outcomes for the parties involved.

What advice would you give to students who are thinking about going into policymaking or academia? Broadly speaking, what should we bear in mind when approaching the study of ‘conflict’?

In a couple of words, I would say ‘humility’ and ‘curiosity’. The biggest problem in policymaking right now seems to be overconfidence in our ability to fix things. We need to get away from seeing state-building and nation-building as solutions to these kinds of problems and acknowledge where previous efforts have failed, but this doesn’t mean giving up. Recent work has showed how certain interventions can be hugely useful for some people, in some contexts, some of the time. We should therefore be looking for successes at the margins rather than big, grand solutions. However it’s important to remember that your work can still marginally improve our ability to understand these things and this has the potential to make the world marginally less-bad.

 

NOTES
[1] Interview conducted 9th December 2013. Please note that this is an approximation of the interview rather than a transcript. Published with the kind permission of Jay Ulfelder.
[2] http://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2012/02/08/a-liberal-case-against-military-intervention-in-syria/

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David Comley is a postgraduate student at King’s College London, currently reading for the MA in Conflict, Security and Development.

From Syria to Spain: Lessons from History?

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by Tom Colley

Guernica
(by René Iché, 1937)

The philosopher Hegel famously stated: ‘We learn from history that man can never learn anything from history.’ Others counter that since we cannot yet predict the future, it is only to the past that we can look to seek answers to the strife that we confront today. To that end, many have tried to identify the variables that cause civil wars or the conditions best suited to ending them. Their opponents caution that every conflict is unique, and any attempts to compare or generalise are doomed to failure.

It is in the context of this discussion that one is left reflecting on the future of Syria after another year of civil war. With UN talks in January imminent, interested parties may be wondering what meaningful lessons, if any, can be derived from history to resolve the Syrian conflict. There is a cornucopia of current conflict with which Syria could be compared - instability in Libya and Egypt, Syria’s neighbours Iraq and Lebanon, or the Middle East more generally. But, looking further afield, it is the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) that provides a number of striking insights into the nature of strife in Syria.

One could be immediately forgiven for asking what comparison can be meaningfully drawn from a conflict that began over 75 years ago. The geopolitical situation of the Arab Spring and beyond bears little comparison to 1930’s Europe. In Syria, for example, the incumbent Assad government battles a disunited rebel insurgency; the Spanish Civil War saw the opposite, with a disunited incumbent Republican government facing Franco’s insurgency. Despite such obvious differences, the Spanish Civil War nevertheless yields a number of worthwhile lessons for the future of Syria.

The Spanish Civil War has been viewed as the culmination of conflict between old and new, between the forces of reaction and reform. Initially, reform defeated reaction, as first the Spanish monarchy and then a military dictatorship under Primo de Rivera yielded to new democratic government in 1931. Five years of seesawing between governments of left wing reform and right wing reaction led in 1936 to the breakdown of the Republican state and an attempted military coup led by the Spanish colonial forces, for whom Franco emerged as leader. Following three years of bloody war Franco’s forces prevailed, largely due to an immense disparity in the level of international support received by the two sides.

Parallels to the Arab Spring are noteworthy. Initial optimism for the installation of Spanish democracy in 1931 was followed by years of political turmoil, as the government struggled to reform the political system stuck between the forces of popular reform and reactionary elites wishing to maintain the status quo. Libya and Egypt at present look not dissimilar as early hopes of the Arab Spring fade.

Comparison with Syria is even more striking, most acutely in terms of the international dimension of the conflict. In the Spanish Civil War, Franco received vital military support from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany whereas dithering Britain and France, concerned above all to avoid another European war, failed to support the Republican government. In Syria, the same disparity is evident. Assad’s backing by Russia and Iran has contrasted with the lack of Western support for the Syrian rebels, concerned as they are to avoid another quagmire in the Middle East.

Both conflicts also share an interesting side effect of the disparity in international support: the extensive and high profile role of international fighters. This week’s Sky news feature on a British contingent fighting amongst Syrian rebel forces has put a human face on volunteers dismissed by the West as jihadist terrorists. The fighters strongly contest this narrative, explaining that their decision to fight is profoundly moral, based on the need to protect innocent Muslims from the Assad regime in the absence of action from the international community. The Spanish Civil War saw a similar and perhaps even more extensive influx of foreign fighters. These ‘international brigades’ came from all over the world, fought bravely and died in great numbers for the left wing Republican cause. In the face of the abject failure to intervene from great powers Britain and France, they felt they had to act. It was all too easy for Franco to label such fighters as supporters of communism, just as both Assad and the West have denounced the international fighters in Syria as terrorists. Thus in both conflicts, fear-inducing propaganda campaigns served to reinforce and legitimate Western reluctance to intervene.

So what lessons can be taken from the comparison of Spain and Syria? The most obvious is that given the unequal level of backing for the two sides in Syria, the Assad regime is the most likely victor. One-sided backing sped Franco to victory in a conflict that could have been far more prolonged. Secondly, if Assad does win, his regime will be further entrenched and, as with Franco’s Spain, repression and reprisal may well continue for decades thereafter.

Perhaps this final comparison is the most disconcerting. In failing to support the Republicans against Franco, Britain and France convinced Hitler that they would not oppose his expansionist agenda. Admittedly the West’s opponents today are vastly different. The cautionary tale though is that non-intervention is a sign of weakness that others may see as an opportunity to escalate their actions. Given the complexity of the Syrian war, intervention or even rebel support from the West is now extremely unlikely. So the West has made its bed, and collapsed into it in a state of exhaustion. As it was in Guernica, it is now in Homs. The Syrian people are still suffering, and may well continue to do so under an Assad dictatorship long after the conflict ends. War is being ‘given a chance’. This may well end it sooner than intervention would have. But the West should note that, as with Spain, the political outcome is likely to be distasteful for years to come.

‘There is something of the propagandist in everyone’: A Syrian Perspective

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As this week sees the 1,000th day of conflict in Syria pass, Muttahir Salim reflects on the role of propaganda in the conflict.

The Editor

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‘There is something of the propagandist in everyone’: A Syrian Perspective

by Muttahir Salim

“To plunder, to slaughter, to steal, these things they misname
empire, and where they make a wilderness, they call it ‘peace.”
Tacitus

You know it and I know it, ‘there is something of the propagandist in everyone’.[1] Human nature is, and always will be, bound by a jaded and prejudiced view of the world. No matter how we try, and without the proper checks and balances in place,[2] propaganda will always form an exceptional instrument of choice for galvanizing favourable public opinion, particularly in times of conflict. Indeed the notorious and brutal Syrian civil war is an exact proponent of this notion.

As was once a notion wholly utilised by 19th century anarchists,[3] select modern scholars have now coined this activity as ‘Propaganda of the Deed (POTD)’. The idea of POTD as suggested in Bolt and Betz’ 2008 Whitehall report[4] is that it is a form of mass media political marketing with the aim of forming sympathetic patronage by way of the patron’s representative client.[5]

In 21st century conflicts, POTD has shown to be an incredibly effective instrument for galvanising and mobilising public opinion. What has been especially remarkable in this rather unforgiving Syrian Civil War has been the prolific and successful use of POTD from all sides of the conflict including established media outlets. Indeed the swift media reaction and western governments’ spin, hastening affirmative military action over the chemical weapons attack on Ghouta in August of this year, was especially remarkable. Earlier claims relating to the use of chemical weapons declared Assad had crossed the ‘red line’ and claims of his irrefutable guilt, fed directly into a rapidly escalating western government media-blitzkrieg, mostly led by the US and the UK, for a ‘justifiable’ offensive on Syria.

While the UN has not yet established exact culpability, Syrian-allies Iran and Russia pointed the fingers at the rebels, and the US and its allies have blamed the Assad regime for the attack. Some could argue that the rebels had the motivation, the intent and plausible capability to gain the most from a POTD-related attack to mobilise favourable public opinion. However, uncertainty as to who carried out the Ghouta attacks remains.[6] What is sure though is that UN inspectors have confirmed that sarin gas was used on relatively large scale massacring hundreds of people. However, obtaining substantiated proof is fraught with difficulty, particularly when the issues of collection of verifiable hard evidence (i.e. chemical samples), human and image intelligence are complex and often gathered under ambiguous ever changing front lines.

According to UN reports, nearly 93,000 people have been killed, though current invalidated figures put the casualties much higher,[7] while millions have been driven from their homes due to the conflict. What began in March 2011 as an uprising against Bashar al-Assad that has now descended into a vicious civil war, where largely Sunni Muslim rebels are pitted against Assad’s forces (a Shi’ite Alawite). The onset of this is the potential to widen the conflict regionally (and to some degree it already has) and open up old cold war rivalries. Underneath the shadow of this forgotten Cold War contention,both sides have expertly utilised their patrons and have become connoisseurs in exploiting this rivalry to their distinct advantage.

As the civil war has gathered pace and both sides, the rebel forces in particular, have vied for international public opinion, it would seem that POTD ‘activity’ has become the mainstay tool of rebel fighters to correct deep-rooted grievances. By inference, when the resources of the protagonists differ significantly and there is no natural institutional outlet, POTD directive action looks at balancing the odds. Indeed, we know that the resources of the ‘belligerents’ differ significantly whilst both attempt to exploit each other’s weaknesses. The weaker of the two has attempted to use a strategy to offset deficiencies and given the lack of earlier unconvincing Superpower support (i.e. US Support) has arguably been left to the few ‘effective’ devices available to them, that being POTD.

There is still uncertainty as to which parties will be attending the UN-brokered Syrian conference scheduled for 22 January 2014 in Geneva, Switzerland. However one thing is for sure: in the run up to the conference there will be an upsurge of propaganda activity. Indeed, we expect the representatives that do attend the conference will be actively looking to optimise their preliminary negotiating position by way of mobilising the masses with a view to boosting favourable international public opinion. This may sadly involve further terrorist actions aimed at gaining support through their preferred choice of media outlets. It would seem that the protagonists of POTD acknowledge and agree that in ‘today’s fast changing political landscape where social and political agendas are being interpreted and shaped by global media’[8] it has become the latest vogue that which its protagonists expect rapid response times.

We would not want to overstep the mark here in terms of advocating responsibility of the use of such horrific weapons as there is yet no substantiated evidence to the fact. However, POTD would seem to be an effective asymmetric weapon of choice for the weaker of the two and the moral boundaries in which POTD is being used may have become inauspiciously blurred.

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Muttahir Salim is an MA postgraduate student (War in the Modern World) at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is currently the Middle East lead for Arup’s Resilience, Security and Risk practice based out of Abu Dhabi.

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NOTES

[1] Eugen Hadamovsky (1933), Propaganda und nationale Macht: Die Organisation der öffentlichen, Meinung für die nationale Politik (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling).
[2] http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Anarchism_and_violence.html
[3] Neville Bolt, David Betz & Jaz Azari (2008), Propaganda of the Deed 2008 Understanding the Phenomenon, Whitehall report 3-08, pp. 2, (The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies)
[4] Ibid. pp. 2
[5] ‘United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013’
[6] UN Report - http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45162 (accessed on 27 November 2013,-13:17hrs)
[7] Neville Bolt, David Betz & Jaz Azari (2008), Propaganda, pp. 1.

Why failures in American leadership endanger peace

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by Avram Lytton

The UN Security Council in session
(photo by Pete Souza)

Whether we like it or not, we live in a relatively stable time thanks to the presence of a single hegemonic super-power - the United States. Its political, military and economic power (current political dysfunction aside) remains unrivalled in its totality. It is therefore disheartening to see this power and clout squandered by the current administration in its failures and capitulations over Syria and Iran.

In Syria, what started as a protest movement against the corrupt and oppressive Assad regime has escalated into a chaotic civil war. Rather than attempt to support moderate rebel factions, the Obama administration dithered and misrepresented the extent of aid it was providing. Even worse, it effectively vetoed additional aid from regional powers who, in the absence of a more concerted effort, have had great difficulty coordinating actions or even agreeing on a strategy. The result has been an ever worsening, and widening war that has not only devastated the Syrian state, but has also radicalised the opposition to an alarming degree and provided safe havens for jihadist groups. The Assad regime, with substantial aid from its ally, Iran, has even regained the momentum it was once thought to have lost.

When the Assad regime began using chemical weapons on a small scale, the Obama administration did nothing. When it deployed those weapons on a larger scale on August 21, it seemed that, at last, the President would respond to the crossing of his ‘red line’. Instead, the world was treated to a darkly comic series of missteps and blunders. When it appeared that no action would be taken, a deal was brokered by Russia. This deal, however, is not the happy ending it appears for two key reasons. First, as it relies on the Syrians to do most of the work, overseen by personnel from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), it is predicated on the survival of the Assad regime for however long it takes to complete. Secondly, because of the nature of the agreement, it will be relatively easy for the regime to retain some of its CW deterrent through deception. Thus, the United States has been removed as a player in Syria, split from its allies and discredited. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin has emerged as the world’s leading statesman.

On the Iran front, the United States looks poised (at the time of writing) to strike a bad deal that could see Iran given an economic lifeline while the international community receives nothing meaningful in return. The heart of the problem is that diplomacy relies on there being room for a deal to be made that is acceptable to both sides. The ultimate objective of the international community, in particular Israel and Saudi Arabia, is the cessation and rolling back of the Iranian nuclear program. However, the Iranian regime has made it clear that it will never cease enriching uranium, even if its people suffer for it under sanctions. Negotiations for the sake of negotiations simply obfuscate the issue.

Yet, in all this, it is the Americans who seem the most keen to reach a deal, any kind of deal, as quickly as possible. Sanctions are hurting the regime and, if drawn tighter, may lead to its collapse. The White House, however, seems more interested in removing itself from the region than in regime change and is even opposed to tighter sanctions, lest they hurt diplomacy. To the United States, Iran is a distant and theoretical threat, but to countries in the Middle East it is a very real menace. No wonder then that the Israelis are furious; no wonder that the Saudis, already angered over American inaction in Syria, are threatening to break ties with the United States.

Unending war in Syria and a massive regional mobilisation of radical elements is in no one’s interest. Also unappetising is an advancing Iranian nuclear program, bolstered by better and more numerous centrifuges while the regime is strengthened by weakened sanctions. Let us not forget, that not only does this regime have a long history of sponsoring terrorism in other countries, but it also relies on its hostility to Israel and the West to legitimise its governance. The United States, by negotiating for a compromise with Iran and avoiding influencing the proxy war in Syria, is simply punting these security issues to the next administration.

None of the above is leadership; it is risk avoidance. War is a last resort, to be sure; it is a last resort in Syria, not least because of the greatly uncertain outcome, and it is a last resort with regards to the Iranian nuclear program. However, broadcasting one’s lack of seriousness about the use of force, whether through an evaporating red line or through a rushed and dubious deal with the untrustworthy Iranian regime, does not avoid war. Indeed, by horse trading with Iran rather than dictating, the international community has given the regime in Tehran a legitimacy it does not deserve and a sense of power it has not earned. It has also left the final say to a number of regional powers who feel far more threatened than Washington does, and may not feel as restrained when they react to that threat.

Approaching the 100th anniversary of an infamous act of terrorism in the Balkans, one should reflect on what events a small power can set in motion when tensions are left to simmer in a multi-polar environment. It is the power of the United States that underwrites and maintains the current international system and restrains the behaviour of the smaller powers. If the US is retreating from its position as de facto world policeman, then I fear that the peace we enjoy may soon disappear with it.

Syria: A Proxy Battleground

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By Pezhman Mohammadi

Almost two years after unrest began in Syria, not only has the ‘popular revolution’ not borne fruit, but also many of the ‘freedom fighters’ have turned out to be non-Syrian, foreign-funded terrorists. What made Syria a target of a foreign-backed insurgency? And what could be the solution to the crisis?

Since 2011, Syria has become a target of indirect foreign intervention to topple the Assad’s regime. Various motives have been suggested for such aggression against the secular state. First, Syria is strategically important for many countries, including the United States, Israel, Iran and Russia. Second, Syria is Iran’s strongest ally, Israel’s long-time adversary, and a channel for Iranian arms transport to resistance organisations in Palestine and Lebanon.

Has a new ‘Cold War’ emerged in the Middle East? Putting Russia aside for the moment, Syria can be argued to have become a battlefield for a clash between Iran and the United States. The US, assisted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA) terrorists against Assad. Meanwhile, Iran is providing financial assistance and military know-how to the Syrian President through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) shadowy Quds Force, hence the reason the Syrian President is still standing.

To some analysts, the current Syrian turmoil is as part of a US plan to contain and further isolate Iran by removing Islamic Republic’s only Arab ally in an era of increasing Arab-Iranian regional rivalry. Assad’s regime is considered as a fundamental pillar in Tehran’s policy approach towards Israel and hostile Arab states. Clearly, in his absence, Iran loses significant influence in that arena. In this context, Michael Hanna of Century Foundation in New York stated that “Syria is a central player in Iranian power projection”. Nevertheless, this would be an attempt to correct an earlier American miscalculation, namely the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which significantly strengthened Iran’s position in the region. This is a textbook proxy conflict scenario in which the laws of war appear to be absent, causing mass civilian casualties.

Some believe that Syria without Assad would be an ideal state, a liberated society. But this is wrong. Syria is currently witnessing a sectarian clash, thanks to the emergence of extremist Wahhabi ideology in the Free Syrian Army. According to this ideology, other religious sects, whether Jewish, Christian, or Islamic factions such as Shiites, are all considered as ‘infidels’ and must either accept the fanatic organisation’s ideology or be persecuted and killed. In the absence of Assad, a once secular country is likely to disintegrate as sectarian conflicts intensify. This provides an explanation for the loyalty of the Alawite-dominated Syrian army to President Assad: they prefer his rule to that of the FSA.

The solution to the Syrian crisis is far from straightforward. I would suggest that bilateral talks between Iran and the US would be a step in the right direction. Improved US-Iranian relations would contribute to improved regional stability.

Moreover, in late-2012, Iran proposed a ‘Six-Point Plan’ to solve the Syrian Crisis. The Plan’s steps include immediate cease-fire; initiation of a ‘national dialogue’; establishment of a united government which; humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Syria; freedom for all prisoners who have not committed a crime against the country; and full and unbiased media access to Syria. Although this has been widely rejected by the ‘anti-Syrian coalition’ for obvious reasons, Russia and China may be able to enforce the Plan using their influence in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Further, states must stop arming the terrorists in Syria. In this context, the United Nations (UN) is obliged to issue a firm resolution against the terror-sponsoring bodies. After all, these are the same gang of radicals that the West is fighting against in different corners of the world. A related practical, but extremely difficult, measure would be to place punitive economic sanctions on countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar that financially and militarily sponsor such groups.