Ukraine

Teasing the bear: NATO, Russia and the Baltic States

June 30, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Leyla Aliyeva:

Latvian tanks in operation during NATO Operation Sabre Strike, 2013. Photo: Gatis Diezins, RYC (CC 2.0).

Russia’s President Putin statement a fortnight ago made on a conference with Finland’s President Sauli Niiniste sent a signal that Moscow is aware of NATO’s recent activities near Russia’s borders in Eastern Europe, and in the case of an attack Russia will strike back at the source of the attack.

Eastern European states, such as the Baltic States Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, are looking to put their NATO membership to use as fears rise over further Russian expansionism. The Baltic authorities have expressed deep concerns over Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the recent Russian military activity in the Baltic Sea and Baltic airspace. In May 2015 the Baltic countries made a joint request for a permanent detachment of NATO troops within their borders to serve as a counterweight to Russia’s military activities. United States deployed troops to the Baltic region and Poland following the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Germany has promised to deploy rotating troops to Estonia in early 2016. Also, NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system drones will be used in Baltic airspace from 2017.

Indeed, NATO continues to ramp up its presence in the region. NATO allies are taking up air patrols for a four-month rotation in the Baltic region. Until the end of August fighter jets from Belgium, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom are on duty in the Baltic air policing mission against Russian aggression. Scores of ships and aircraft from 17 countries recently took part in Baltic Sea naval drills as part of exercise ‘BALTOPS’, involving 5600 servicemen between 5-20 June. The NATO and U.S Army Europe-led ‘Saber Strike’ operation in the three Baltic States and Poland wound down on 19 June. It is the largest such operation since 2010, with more than 6000 troops from 13 NATO allies^[1]. Indeed, the Baltic states seem determined to increase NATO’s presence in the area.

But should the Baltic States really feel threatened?

There is no doubt that Russia has increased its presence in the Baltic region. There has been an overall increase in Russian aviation activity in the international airspace and high military activity from Russia near Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian border and exclusive economic zones. Poland’s Minister of Defense Tomasz Seimoniak stated in 2014 that Russia’s military activity is a demonstration of strength and is a test of NATO.

This seems to be a view widely held by officials in the area. Lithuanian Defense Minister Juozas Olekas wants to station heavy US equipment in Lithuania, after Polish and Lithuanian governments stated that they are currently in discussion with Washington about a potential increase of US military presence in Eastern Europe.

In turn, a Russian Defense Minister official has said that the cozying up of the Baltic region with NATO has left Russia with no option but to seek military re-arrangements on its strategic Western front, such as Kaliningrad and Belarus. These standoffs do not help to build good relationships.

Background of NATO expansion: the Baltic States

The NATO enlargement in eastern Europe originally occurred in the absence of the threat that produced NATO in the first place. It occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russia was left weak and unstable.

NATO took cautious steps towards its expansion to the east of Europe. In 1999 the Alliance perceived the three countries out of the Visegrad group (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) as the most significant potential members in eastern Europe. The three former Warsaw Pact countries were left economically and military weak after the dissolution of the USSR; by joining NATO and then the European Union Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic established security, integration into the European community, and signaled the formal end of the Soviet domination which had lasted approximately half a century. None of the Visegrad group countries border Russia and therefore the 1999 expansion did not constitute a direct threat to Russia.^[2]

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all had aspirations to join NATO right after the break up of the Soviet Union. Since gaining independence in 1991 the Baltic Trio for more than a decade tried as hard as they could to move further away from Russia towards Europe and the West. They succeeded in 2004 by joining both the European Union and NATO.

Russia’s reaction to their joining NATO was anger. One of the most important issues was that NATO expansion in the Baltic region would inevitably increase the likelihood that the Alliance would station troops closer to Russia’s borders than ever before. Border disputes between the Baltic States and Russia added danger to the overall situation. Lastly, a particular concern was the large number of long-term Soviet citizens who are disenfranchised in independent Estonia and Latvia – to this day they experience problems with obtaining Estonian and Latvian citizenship.^[3]

NATO, the Baltics and Russia today

NATO activities in the Baltic States today is a demonstration of Western strength, rather than a response to a direct identified threat. The suspension of all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia, including the NATO-Russia Council, only contributes to further tensions between the Alliance and Kremlin.

Of course, the Soviet past plays a major role in the reaction towards Russia coming from the Baltic States. By looking at Ukraine’s fate, the Baltic trio feels threatened by Russia. The Ukraine conflict demonstrated that Russia believes that the existence of ‘ethnic Russians’ abroad can justify intervention in former Soviet states. The fears over Russia fomenting rebellion among ethnic Russians in the Baltic states has led to NATO shifting its focus from Russia’s military activities to its information war. Indeed, Lithuanian President’s Dalia Grybaiskaite and Latvia’s interior minister Mikhail Kozlovskis recently raised concerns that Kremlin may try to influence and form a pro-Moscow rebellion in the Baltic states, just as they did in Eastern Ukraine, by manipulating the media.

Despite the significant part of the Baltic population that has ethnic Russian origin, the situation is different to Ukraine. Firstly, the ethnic Russian population is decreasing. From 1989 to 2011, the amount of ethnic Russians in Latvia decreased from 34% to 26.9%, in Lithuania from 9.4 % to 5.4%, and in Estonia from 30.3% to 25.5%. In comparison, the Russia-speaking population in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine makes up more than half of the population of Ukraine.

Secondly, modern Russian-speakers residing in the Baltic region are also different from their Russian counterparts. The Baltic Russian diaspora in each of the Baltic countries has its own characteristics. The Latvian Russian community is more or less united; the other two Baltic Russian communities are not. This makes it difficult for Russia to be able to formulate attractive policies or influence through propaganda for Baltic Russian-speaking communities, let alone to form a rebellion.^[4]

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the Baltic States are concerned with Russia’s military activity and capability. While conflict is still ongoing in Ukraine, the Baltic States will feel threatened by Russian expansionism and will use their NATO membership as much as they can. Despite the fact that Russia has repeatedly stated that it has no interest in invading the Baltic States.

Although the Baltic states are unlikely to follow Ukraine’s fate of becoming the battlefield of the great powers. The authorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania authorities are right to be wary. Russia may state that it has no interest in invading the Baltic States, but the 50-year long Soviet past, and the more recent actions of Russia in Eastern Ukraine play an important part in heightening the fear and suspicion of the Baltic States towards Russian bear, the bear that has been edging closer and closer in recent years.

Leyla Aliyeva studied International Politics at Middlesex University and is currently an LLM student at the same university. Her particular focus is on post-USSR and Eastern European countries with a specific focus on human rights and minority rights. She also worked at the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre as an intern and worked on serious human rights violations in former Soviet states.

For a more detailed look at the way that Russia’s relations with the world have changed since the Ukraine crisis, check out our recent 4-part series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine‘.

NOTES

^[1] Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States

^[2] (1995) NATO and the Baltic States, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 17:5, 22-22,

^[3] (1995) NATO and the Baltic States, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 17:5, 22-22,

^[4] Victoria V. Panova (2015) , Russia’s ‘Soft’ Policies towards the Baltic States Latvian Institute of International Affairs p.86

After Ukraine, Part IV - NATO in Scandinavia: Will Sweden and Finland join up?

May 19, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Sebastian Åsberg:

10622087786_30a10754e0_b — Swedish and Finnish forces joined NATO forces in 2013 to carry out the large-scale training exercise “Steadfast Jazz”. Photo: Polish army Master Sgt. Artur Zakrzewski/Poland (CC 2.0)

Following the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, an old debate has grown increasingly more heated in Sweden and Finland: should countries join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Having been non-aligned since the 19^th century, Sweden – after intense debate – chose not to join NATO following World War II. Since then, NATO membership has been something of a non-issue in Swedish politics. However, Russian aggression in its near-abroad in recent years has made the issue more pertinent. Although Swedish public opinion has long been against NATO membership, polls have progressively started to register a change since the war in Ukraine broke out in 2014. Some of the latest polling figures for the first time show that a almost half of the Swedish population, 48%, favour joining NATO. In addition, 73% were concerned about developments in Russia, a rise of nearly 30% since the previous year.[i] Meanwhile, the issue of NATO membership has become more a topic of debate in Swedish media. In October 2014, a foreign submarine believed to be Russian entered Swedish waters near Stockholm, spurring on the discussions about NATO even further.

Oscar Jonsson, a PhD candidate at King’s College London, who has written about the subject in the past, is certain that Sweden joining NATO is a realistic scenario: “Absolutely, support for NATO has never been larger”. However, he also noted that prior to the Ukraine crisis “a major problem with the NATO debate [in Sweden] is that it has not really been waged. The Moderate Party, which has in its charter to push for NATO membership, have been satisfied, along with the Social Democrats, to remain silent on the issue”.

Both Sweden and Finland have chosen to deepen their cooperation with NATO, participating in major NATO exercises such as “Steadfast Jazz” and “Baltops”. In September, Finland and Sweden signed a Host Nation Support Agreement, which is set to be implemented in 2016.[ii] The agreement means that NATO can station forces in both countries.[iii] The agreement has been seen as a major step towards NATO for the two countries, both of whom already have close cooperation with NATO through membership in the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. “You cannot get any closer to NATO than with the host country agreement” Jonsson says. “Considering that they agree to accept NATO stationing troops in both peacetime but also in times of crisis and war … It also reflects how little Russia would perceive Sweden and Finland as neutral”

One of the reasons why some Swedes might see NATO as a more sensible option is the belief that the Swedish military is wholly unprepared to deal with a potential Russian attack. Following the end of the Cold War, the Swedish military faced substantial budget cuts. In 2012 the Supreme Commander of Swedish Armed Forces, Sverker Göransson, stated that the Swedish military would be able to withstand a military attack no longer than a week.[iv] Due to the relatively weak state of the Swedish military, some worry that the Swedish island of Gotland may be at risk in the case of a conflict in the Baltic Sea region, due to the island’s strategic location.[v]

For Sweden to be able to join NATO, much hinges on the Social Democrats – the largest political party in Sweden – dropping their opposition to joining the alliance. According to Jonsson, “[neutrality] is very firmly rooted in the Social Democratic identity and self-image, which is something that hangs on from the Cold War”. But he adds that there is momentum for NATO membership within parts of the Social Democratic party itself: “The more it is discussed and debated, the more this self-image is challenged”. But for the time being the Social Democrats, who returned to power in 2014 after eight years in opposition, show no sign of changing their position. In the declaration of government following the 2014 election they affirmed continued Swedish neutrality.[vi]

But Sweden is not the only Scandinavian country debating the subject of NATO membership. The issue has also received more attention in Finland following the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict.

Following Finland’s defeat in World War II, the country was effectively prohibited from joining NATO by the Soviet Union through the 1948 Finno-Soviet treaty. Indeed, the term “Finlandization” stems from Finland’s forced non-alignment during the Cold War; not being able to join any pro-Western alliance in return for independence. Like Sweden, Finland chose to join the EU but not NATO following the end of the Cold War. But as the conflict in Ukraine has progressed, the Finnish public’s perception of Russia as a danger has increased.[vii] Finland has had its territory violated by Russian aircrafts and sea vessels several times since the start of the conflict.[viii]

Alexander Stubb, the Prime minister of Finland, who has been described as a “NATO hawk”, stated earlier this year that Finland should not exclude the possibility of seeking membership of NATO over the next four years.[ix] Jonsson pointed out that Finland has taken greater steps towards NATO membership than Sweden: “Finland has come a bit further in the public debate, they have investigated the question three times and have several former prime ministers and presidents who have expressed their support for NATO”. He adds that this is likely due to differing historical memories: “Finland remembers World War II and thinks ‘We don’t want to experience this again’, while Sweden thinks ‘our neutrality saved us, we should stay away’.”

However, unlike in Sweden, public support in Finland for joining NATO has not increased dramatically since the annexation of Crimea and remains relatively low, standing at 27% according to a poll conducted in January.[x] Having public backing for joining NATO would be essential for both countries as any application for membership would most likely be subject to a referendum. Finns may rely on their fairly robust territorial defence, consisting of some 250,000 personnel; yet critics note that the army suffers from problems of poor equipment and a reliance on conscripts.[xi]

According to Jonsson, Sweden and Finland would most likely be welcomed into NATO if they chose to seek membership, but given their close proximity to Russia, the question remains of what Moscow’s reaction would be. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in 2014, warning of “negative and dangerous consequences” if Sweden and Finland joined NATO.[xii] More recently, in April 2015, Russia voiced concerns regarding Sweden and Finland’s decision to deepen their defence cooperation with NATO countries Norway and Denmark through NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation).[xiii]

“Russia would be vocal and create a commotion about it, they really don’t want this” says Jonsson. “But at the same time they already view Sweden and Finland, especially Sweden, as a part of the West and NATO indirectly. It would give them an opportunity to stir trouble, but it would not change much in substance.”

It appears that the debate is set to continue for the foreseeable future in both countries. Russia’s future conduct may be the factor that determines whether or not Sweden and Finland take the final steps to joining NATO.

Sebastian Åsberg holds a BA in International Relations from Malmö University, Sweden, and is currently reading for an MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His main interests include European security and defence policy, security cooperation within the EU and NATO, and the transatlantic partnership, as well as in Russia’s foreign policy in the region and beyond.

This article is the final part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. The series has examined the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. In the first article of the series, Mike Jones discussed Britain’s handling of the Ukraine crisis and why it has not received more attention in the UK. In the second article, Conradin Weindl looked into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. In the third article, Andrzej Kozłowski analysed Poland’s approach to the crisis and its implications for Polish security.

NOTES

[i] Expressen, ”Nu vill de flesta att Sverige går med i Nato” 11 January 2015

[ii] Swedish Government, ” The government decides to sign Memorandum of Understanding on Host Nation Support”. 28 August 2015, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/18638

[iii] NATO, ”Finland and Sweden sign Memorandum of Understanding with NATO”, 5 September 2014, http://www.aco.nato.int/finland-and-sweden-signing-a-memorandum-of-understanding-with-nato-for-operational-and-logistic-support.aspx

[iv] Holmström, Mikael ” Försvar med tidsgräns” Svenska Dagbladet, 30 December 2012

[v] Shapiro, Ari “Sweden’s Gotland A Crucial Square In Europe’s Military Chess Board” NPR, 27 January 2015

[vi] Swedish Government, ”Regeringsförklaringen den 3 oktober 2014”, 3 October 2014. http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/3039

[vii] Sander, Gordon ”Could Putin’s Russia push neutral Finland into NATO’s arms?”, Christian Science Monitor, 15 October 2015

[viii] Witte, Griff “Finland feeling vulnerable amid Russian provocations” Washington Post, 23 November 2014

[ix] Rosendahl, Jussi “Finland should not exclude NATO application in next four years: PM”, Reuters, 22 January 2015

[x] Ibid

[xi] Dempsey, Judy “Should Finland and Sweden join NATO?” Carnegie Europe, 21 May 2014

[xii] de la Reguera, Erik ”Ryssland: Farligt om Sverige och Finland går med i Nato” Dagens Nyheter, 31 May 2014

[xiii] Gummesson, Jonas ”Svensk ubåt ska öva med NATO”, Svenska Dagbladet, 13 May 2015

After Ukraine, Part III - Polish security & Russian aggression: the return of old fears?

May 12, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Andrzej Kozłowski:

A Leopard II tank from the Polish Army during Exercise Steadfast Jazz, a joint training operation for NATO forces, November 2013. Photo: Cpl. Madis Veltman / Estonian army (CC 2.0) — A Polish Leopard II tank takes up a position during Exercise Steadfast Jazz, a joint training operation for NATO forces, November 2013. Photo: Cpl. Madis Veltman / Estonian army (CC 2.0)

A history of difficult relations

Polish-Russian history is one of the most complex and difficult among all nations in the world. Polish troops were some of the only troops to have captured and occupied Moscow - in 1610 – and the day of ousting them from the Kremlin is celebrated as a national holiday in Moscow. Poland itself was occupied by Tsarist Russians for 123 years from 1795, and then again after 1945, when Poland was ruled by the puppet communist government controlled by Moscow.

This heavy historical burden has been reflected in bilateral relations since the beginning of the 1990s, primarily because both sides have used history for political purposes.

After the collapse of the USSR, Poland feared Moscow revisionism and warned against it. Even joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 did not change this attitude. Because of this stance it was commonly viewed as the most anti-Russian country in both NATO and the EU.

This situation was eventually addressed by the Civic Platform, which won election in 2007; one of the main points of foreign policy of its Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski was rapprochement with Russia. They made several political gestures to show their changing attitude. Sikorski also announced a new doctrine of foreign policy, more focused on joining the EU leadership and less focused on an active role in Eastern Europe. He even claimed that Russia could join NATO.

They ignored the signs from Moscow that it was not going to abandon its aggressive foreign policy, like the military drills in 2009 that simulated an invasion of Poland, which was imagined as the ‘aggressor’, or Russia’s failure to properly investigate the plane crash that killed the Polish President in 2010 over Smolensk.

Indeed, the Polish military and defense experts stopped seeing Moscow as a threat. In “Vision of Polish Armed Forces in 2030”, published in 2008, they concluded that in 20-25 years there would be no possibility of military aggression of one country against another in Central-Eastern Europe[i]. These opinions were repeated in Poland’s White Book of National Security, where again the authors suggested that the main challenge in Central-Eastern Europe would come from the non-military threats[ii]. At the same time, Poland ended conscription and focused on a small, professional army with a strength of 100,000 soldiers, aimed at conducting interventions abroad but not sufficiently strong to defend its own territory. These political and military movements have now been recognised as great mistakes in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.

Poland as peacemaker

Since the beginning of the Maidan clashes, Poland has been among the most active countries engaged in the Ukraine crisis. Politicians from both the ruling party and the opposition travelled to Kiev to support protestors and find a compromise between the Victor Yanukovych Regime and the opposition. Polish citizens were also involved in supporting those people protesting against the Ukrainian President at Maidan and in other Ukrainian cities. They sent packages with medicine, food and other necessary things.

What’s more, young people from Poland and Ukraine created a human chain on the Polish-Ukrainian border checkpoint to show their support for the signing of an association agreement with the EU. Eventually Radosław Sikorski took part in negotiating a deal between the opposition and the Ukrainian President, which finished with Yanukovych’s escape.

But what seemed to be the end of the crisis turned out to be just the beginning. The Russian Federation reacted aggressively to the change of government in Kiev and accused Western countries, among them Poland, of training the opposition. The aftermath of the annexation of Crimea was then hybrid warfare in Eastern Ukraine.

At the same time Russia increased the frequency of its military exercises and their rhetoric became much more aggressive. The Ukraine crisis started to be perceived as a potential threat to Polish security, which, according to the authors of the previously mentioned strategic document, was almost unimaginable.

Changes in security policy after Crimea

The Polish authorities had two main tasks in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine. The first was to increase the military power of its army. The second was to guarantee that members of NATO would fulfill their obligations in case of an armed attack. This was at a time when more and more people were becoming skeptical about the readiness of the Alliance to defend Poland.[iii] The best option to gain security assurance was to persuade its allies to send their military forces to Poland.

To increase the military power of its army Poland adopted a New National Security Strategy, which described Russia and its unpredictable behavior as a key danger for Europe and stated that regional conflicts could not be excluded. These changes have also been made in the minds of the main policymakers. The Head of the National Security Bureau, Generał Koziej, clearly warned against the hybrid warfare conducted by Russia. Also, according to survey polls done by all-Poland research center Ariadna, more than half the population feared Russian invasion. This perceived threat has allowed the government to increase military expenditure and buy new equipment without significant opposition.

Poland started a 10-year program of army modernization (2013–2022) worth $35 billion USD and has already bought JASMM cruise-missiles to have an ability to reach Russian bases in Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast. The next purchases covered 32 new attack helicopters, 70 medium-lift utility helicopters, 97 drones, new tanks and armored vehicles, three submarines and an anti-missile system.[iv] Poland also contacted the United States to inquire about buying Tomahawk cruise missiles[v].

Polish authorities have considered different options to try to increase the number of people who have military training, given their concerns over the small size of their army and their inability to create a reserve system.

One option is compulsory military service, although there is little chance this will be restored. The idea is still unpopular in Poland and, with presidential elections this month, followed in 5 months by parliamentary elections, politicians will be wary of such bold reforms.

Yet 600,000 Poles have received military training in volunteer paramilitary organizations. Indeed, the private sector has expressed an interest in this issue and has announced that 100 companies are ready and eager to set up their own paramilitary organizations; half of them have also declared an eagerness to fund the creation of volunteer fighting groups.[vi]

Since it first joined NATO, Poland has tried to persuade the other members to set up military bases on Polish soil. However, limited by the agreements with Russia from 1997[vii] and afraid of provoking Moscow, Poland’s proposals were rejected. In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, Poland strengthened diplomatic pressure on its partners; it even invoked Article 4 of the Washington Treaty[viii] for only the fourth time in NATO’s history.

The result was not what Poland were after: instead of setting up permanent military structures on Polish territory, NATO decided to send additional airplanes, organized more military drills, and setup a rotational presence of ground forces until the end of the crisis. The United States also organized a march of its cavalry brigade to show solidarity with the citizens of the Eastern Flank of NATO.

The results of the NATO Wales Summit also left Poland somewhat disappointed, although the decision to create a spearhead headquarters in Poland was acclaimed by experts and politicians. In fact, it seems that NATO, and particularly the United States, took Poland’s anxiety seriously and have made several steps to assure Poland that it can count on NATO in case of an attack.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian crisis was profoundly significant for Poland and its security. It is a reminder of the darkest part of Polish history, when Russia attacked and captured Poland. It also shows that Polish rapprochement with Moscow has collapsed completely. The changes in military expenditure and the increasing pace of military buildup only confirm that Polish politicians and society do care about their own security and remember their own history. The only question is whether it is too late for such military reforms.

Poland still has time. Russia has cooled its activity in Ukraine and, even if it decides to continue the offensive, the next probable target would be the Baltic States. More importantly, no one in NATO will now claim that Polish demands to strengthen the military presence of the Alliance in Poland stem from Polish Russophobia. The policymakers in NATO have slowly come to accept this reality. The Ukraine crisis may ultimately contribute to increasing the security of Poland by resulting in a significant NATO presence on Polish soil.

Andrzej Kozlowski is a PhD candidate at the Department of Transatlantic Studies and Mass Media in the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz. He is an expert at Polish think-thanks Kosciuszko Institute, the foundation of Aleksander Kwaśniewski Amicus Europae, and The Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is vice-chair of the Security Section in the Polish newspaper “Stosunki Międzynarodowe” (International Relations). His area of interests include cybersecurity, the South Caucasus region, and the foreign and security policy of the United States. He was an intern in the European Parliament, the Polish embassy at the Hague, the National Security Bureau, and the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. The series has examined the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. In the last part of the Series, Sebastian Åsberg will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine. In the first article of the series, Mike Jones discussed Britain’s handling of the Ukraine crisis and why it has not received more attention in the UK. In the second article, Conradin Weindl looked into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine.

NOTES

[i]Vision of Polish Armed Forces 2030 , p. 10,

[ii]The White Book of National Security of Republic of Poland Polish Security, November 2013,p. 7 – 17.

[iii] More than 30% of people claims that NATO will not help Poland.

[iv]Details of this program you will find in this article.

[v] The only country, which is using this weapon expect the United States is Great Britain.

[vi]More on this issue in this article.

[vii] On the basic of NATO Russia Founding Act in 1997 NATO pledged not to deploy significant military forces to former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union members.

[viii] „The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”-The North Atlantic Treaty.

After Ukraine, Part II - Russian great power vs. EU normative hegemony: What is at stake in Eastern Europe?

May 6, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Conradin Weindl:

Demonstrators at a Euromaidan pro-EU rally in Kiev, Ukraine, 26 November 2013. Photo: Ivan Bandura (CC 2.0)

Since the start of the Ukrainian conflict, Russia’s determination to maintain a sphere of influence within the former Soviet Union has been the subject of an intense debate. Russia’s need for regional predominance is frequently attributed to the country’s great power identity. However, Russian domination of its ‘near abroad’ is not primarily an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to regain Russia’s position as a European great power. The battle over conflicting norms and values is central in this context.

Russia’s status as a great power stands at the heart of its identity and mandates an equal and independent role among the other major powers in Europe.[i] Such a role can only be pursued if accepted by Russia’s peers on the continent.[ii] Yet there are no longer any great powers in the traditional sense in Europe. In fact, the United Kingdom, France and Germany have to an important degree joined forces with the vast majority of European states within the structures of the European Union.

The EU has elevated liberal norms and values such as democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights to form the very core of its identity as a normative power.[iii] Even if it lacks the will and capacity to offer membership to all European states, the EU’s identity is pan-European in nature. Consequently, the EU is pursuing “normative hegemony in Europe”[iv]. It follows that all relationships between the EU and other European states, regardless of their size, are by definition asymmetrical.[v]

Thus, Russia has two options with regard to Europe. First, it can adopt the established norms through a process of integration. This was the intention of both Russia and the EU after the break-up of the Soviet Union, formalised in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement based on ‘common values’ concluded in 1994.[vi] Yet full EU membership and hence a real say for Russia on European matters was never seriously considered.[vii]

Second, Russia can refrain from playing a role in Europe. After Russia had abandoned the path towards normative convergence, and the gap in values became increasingly difficult to ignore, the EU offered Russia the title as one of its strategic partners alongside other major powers such as the US, China, Japan and India. Although this did some justice to Russia’s need to be officially recognised as a great power, it made it into less of a player within Europe itself.[viii]

Ultimately, both alternatives are irreconcilable with Russia’s self-perception as a European great power. The result has been a deadlock in Russia-EU relations for two decades, despite sincere efforts on both sides for engagement.

Since the return of Putin to the presidency in 2012, Russia has sought to resolve the impasse by breaking the EU’s monopoly on defining the ‘rules of the game’ in Europe, by challenging the Union’s hegemonic normative power. One tool has been to reinterpret many established norms, such as sovereignty, democracy and self-determination, in a fashion that is in line with the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy objectives.[ix] The Russian leadership’s decision to raise the stakes in the Western new independent states (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the three Caucasus states) is closely related. These are the only states in Europe – apart from Russia itself – where the EU’s claim to normative predominance has not yet been fully realised.

Russia’s instrument of choice was to gather these states under the umbrella of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and thus prevent their path towards integration with the EU within the Eastern Partnership framework. Russia hopes that its alternative normative agenda might be more appealing to some of the states concerned, at least the ones where autocrats are eager to secure their positions.[x]

However, establishing an alternative regional grouping is not primarily an end in itself and the EEU is not a tool for the separate economic integration of its members. Indeed, the economic case for the EEU is rather weak.[xi] Instead, as Putin himself argued in an opinion article in 2011, the EEU will give Russia and other EEU member states better bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, and an ability to formulate new European norms between equals.[xii] The bet is that additional geopolitical weight on the European continent will strengthen the case for Russia’s desired equal and independent role in Europe. Once the EU’s normative hegemony is broken, Russia can make a legitimate “claim [to] an equal role in collective leadership and decision making”[xiii].

How will the EU respond to this challenge? Prior to the Ukraine crisis, the EU chose to largely ignore the EEU. Subsequent events have since forced the EU to acknowledge the challenge to its normative hegemony. The EU has responded in the familiar manner of strategic ambiguity.

Russia’s disrespect for national sovereignty and the inviolability of national borders has prompted the EU to impose political and economic sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, the EU has reaffirmed the right of Russia’s Western neighbours to choose the path of European integration by signing the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. At the same time the EU has been eager to keep Russia engaged by suddenly welcoming a future pan-European trade agreement between the EU and the EEU.

The EU will have to perform a delicate balancing act if it does not want to jeopardize its normative credibility and ultimately the entire normative foundations of the European governance mode in the process. The review of the Eastern Partnership and the European Security Strategy in the coming months should provide an indication of where we are heading.

Conradin Weindl is an MA student in International Relations at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. His main focus is on EU and Russian foreign policy.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. Over the next couple of weeks Strife will feature two more articles about the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. Next, Andrzej Kozłowski will analyse Poland’s approach to the crisis and the implications for Polish security. Then, Sebastian Åsberg, will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine. In the first article of the series, Mike Jones discussed Britain’s handling of the Ukraine crisis and why it has not received more attention in the UK.

NOTES

[i] Dimitri Trenin, ‘Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence’, The Washington Quarterly, 32:4 (2009), p. 4

[ii] Iver Neumann, ‘Russia as a great power, 1815-2007’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 11 (2008), pp. 128-151

Hiski Haukkala, ‘A Norm Maker or a Norm taker? The Changing Normative Parameters of Russia’s place in Europe’ in Russia’s European Choice, edited by Ted Topf (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)

[iii] Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40:2 (2002), pp. 235-258

[iv] Hiski Haukkala, ‘From cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU-Russia Relations’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 23:1 (2015), p. 36

[v] Hiski Haukkala, ‘Explaining Russian Reactions to the European Neighbourhood Policy’ in The European Neighbourhood Policy in perspective context, implementation and impact, edited by Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.162

[vi] Haukkala 2015, pp. 25-28

[vii] Arkady Moshes, ‘Russia’s European Policy under Medvedev: How sustainable is a new Compromise?’, International Affairs, 88:1 (2012), p. 25.

[viii] Haukkala 2010, p. 166

[ix] Ruth Deyermond, The uses of sovereignty in 21st century Russian foreign policy, Europe-Asia Studies (2015) [forthcoming]

[x] Hiski Haukkala, ‘The Russian Challenge to EU Normative Power: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy’, The International Spectator, 43:2 (2008), pp. 40-42

[xi] Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, stagnation or Rivalry?’, Chatham House Briefing Paper (REP BP 2012/01), (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2012)

[xii] Vladimir Putin, quoted in Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012, p. 15

[xiii] Derek Averre, ‘”Sovereign Democracy” and Russia’s Relations with the European Union’, Demokratizatsiya 15:2 (2007), p.183

After Ukraine, Part I - Sleepwalking into crisis: Britain, Russia and the Ukraine

April 29, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Michael Jones:

David Cameron meets Vladimir Putin in Moscow, September 2011. PA copyright (CC 2.0) — David Cameron meets Vladimir Putin in Moscow, September 2011. Photo: Number 10, PA copyright (CC 2.0)

Britain’s Defence secretary Michael Fallon said in February that the Russian Leader Vladimir Putin presented as much of a threat to Europe as ISIS[i]. It seems strange that to assert the seriousness of the threat from Russia – a major nuclear-armed power in Europe – Fallon had to compare it to a rebellion on another continent. Fallon was suggesting that people were seriously underestimating Russia’s power and misunderstanding its nature.

This is suggestive of both how the crisis in Ukraine arose and why our reaction to it has been so muted. The House of Lords said as much in a new report, stating that Britain, NATO and the EU had “sleepwalked” into the crisis with Russia in the Ukraine. Britain (as well as NATO and the EU) has consistently misread Russia’s perceptions and actions, and even now they seem confused over how to react to the Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and the subsequent confrontation.

Fallon’s comparison of Russia to ISIS reflects the relatively minor attention this war in Europe has received in Britain. With the exception of the downing of MH17, the Ukraine conflict has generally garnered less media or public attention than ISIS or the threat of terrorism at home. Parliament has debated the subject several times but action has been limited to sanctions in line with the US and EU, sending one company of non-combat troops and a large amount of high-flying but ultimately hollow rhetoric.

Why the lack of interest?

The reason for this seems to be that Britain has had more immediate problems. It is easy to forget that seven months ago Britain came close to splitting up, which would have thrown the government, economy and military of Britain into uncertainty and crisis. Thus, for most of 2014, while the Ukraine crisis blew up into civil war, Britain was not sure if it would make it to Christmas in one piece (it did, unlike Ukraine). Britain could hardly commit to radical sanctions or military pressure when it was not sure if its treasury and armed forces would be split with an independent Scotland.

The haunting figure of the Londoner “Jihadi John” personifying the “Islamic State” (IS) on our TV screens hooked our attention and dominated debate. Horror reminiscent of the dark ages in a country we recently invaded, with large numbers of our (erstwhile) countrymen running enthusiastically to join in was hard to ignore. IS has not only stolen the headlines with its sweeping conquests and brutal TV executions, but it has provoked a serious debate about the role of extremism within the West. Radical Islam seems to be a brutal and terrifying enemy that is hard to understand and is at work amongst us, an impression fuelled by the Charlie Hebdo and Copenhagen attacks.

Finally, in the face of economic crisis, potential dissolution and domestic terrorism, Britain’s public has become reluctant to sanction actions abroad and the government has been duly circumscribed. The 2013 defeat in Parliament of David Cameron’s proposed intervention in Syria has made government reluctant to commit forces abroad; indeed, we have fewer aircraft fighting IS than Denmark. This all suggests that Britain’s government is preoccupied and its people unwilling to act.

Britain is involved, whether we like it or not.

With all of these distractions and weaknesses, perhaps conflict in Ukraine is a troublesome irrelevance. But Britain is involved, whether we like it or not. Britain is an EU and NATO member state, both of which are being challenged by Russia. Even without NATO and the EU, we are one of the three guarantors of the Budapest Agreement of 1994, which promised Ukrainian sovereignty would be inviolate in return for abandoning the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR.

The UK supported NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, with seemingly little consideration of what the implications would be. NATO expansion brought with it Article V of the NATO treaty, meaning that an attack on one state is an attack on all. Britain is therefore bound by treaty to defend the states of Eastern Europe as much as it is bound to defend the Falklands. Russia’s consistent and vocal opposition to this expansion should not have left us under any illusions about what might happen. The states of Eastern Europe that joined NATO expected the protection of NATO’s Article V, because they did not want to be treated like Ukraine. Despite seeking and accepting these numerous responsibilities, we seem surprised that they should cost us anything. Sleepwalking is an apt description.

In terms of concrete action, Britain has joined EU sanctions against Russian banks, energy and defence companies, although the government policy states it has merely left its economic relations with Russia “under review”[ii]. British troops help form the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps, which has drilled in Poland and the Baltic states, while the RAF and the Royal Navy intercept Russian ships and jets near the UK.

Britain did unilaterally send 75 troops to Ukraine to help train the government forces, a move that no other EU states matched. But this was a gesture, nothing more, as it was too late to affect the training standards of troops already engaged in combat and the ceasefire of February has effectively created a frozen conflict already.

These lacklustre actions mean that at home and abroad we are perceived to lack the will to act. A growing chorus of generals, politicians and journalists are drawing attention to our underwhelming reaction. Generals are using the menace of Russia as an argument to stop or reverse defence cuts. So far in this election campaign, none of the UK’s main parties have pledged to maintain the commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence required of NATO states. This has drawn warnings from our American allies and will not have been missed in Moscow.

The Prime Minister was notably absent from the Minsk talks and has generally allowed Angela Merkel and Obama to lead the Western diplomatic efforts. Politicians have talked tough on Russia but musings about cutting Russia off from the SWIFT banking mechanism were quickly silenced by Medvedev’s claim that this would be an act of war. Russia has achieved escalation dominance and they are prepared to do more in Ukraine than we or our allies are prepared to do to prevent them.

The implications of sleepwalking.

The implications of this are considerable. Our actions here will affect our interests globally. First, Russia has redrawn European borders at gunpoint, a move that we have not prevented (although NATO also did this in Kosovo in 2008). The fact that the UK was unable to prevent the violation of the Budapest Agreement means that our ability to uphold our obligations will be called into doubt. This will mean our enemies show less respect for our interests or those of our allies. Our allies will view the UK as a less credible ally and think twice before admitting us to the negotiating table. If Russia feels emboldened by our weakness and NATO is indeed undermined by Russian actions, the security of the UK will be undermined because the reliability of NATO as a pillar of UK security will vanish.

The second issue is nuclear weapons. As Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons based on the promise of the protection of its sovereignty in 1994, what message does that send to Iran, North Korea and other would-be nuclear powers? Arguably it shows them that a nuclear weapon is more necessary than ever, that their sovereignty can be violated without it. This impression was exacerbated by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Powers like Israel and Pakistan are nuclear states that, despite many threats, remain intact; while non-nuclear Ukraine and Iraq have both suffered invasion. The logic behind nuclear non-proliferation will be irrevocably damaged.

What can the UK do?

It is easy to highlight problems and not proffer solutions, and clearly the UK has made some efforts in Ukraine which other states have not. It is extremely unlikely the UK would ever fight a war over Ukraine, whatever its treaty obligations. But what can the UK do?

First, the crisis in the Ukraine has taught us that we need to think carefully about taking on burdens we cannot support, specifically in terms of the implications of signing up to treaties and expanding alliances. Renewing our commitment to spending 2% of GDP on Defence would improve the means to act and signal to the rest of the world that we are not shirking our responsibilities.

Second, we should play Russia at its own game. Since Russia has violated the Budapest accords by invading Ukraine, we could, in turn, stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. This Act stated that there would be no permanent NATO bases in Eastern Europe, only temporary deployments. Estonia’s president has called for NATO troops to remain in Eastern Europe on more long term deployments in violation of the act. By stationing troops in Eastern Europe for as long as Russia is in Ukraine, the UK and NATO would show that they are prepared to support and honour their obligations to their allies and that Russia would not be able to hide behind treaties if it was itself reluctant to honour them.

Whatever the wisdom or morality of NATO and EU expansion, and whether or not we have provoked Russia, the damage to UK-Russia relations is done and Russia cannot be appeased. We are now bound to support our allies. We cannot salvage our failure to keep to the terms of the Budapest Agreement by withdrawing from Eastern Europe, acknowledging a Russian sphere of influence and thereby forsaking our NATO responsibilities.

The world is shaped by powers that act. If we don’t, it will be shaped by someone else, quite probably to our detriment.

Michael Jones has a BA in History from the University of Oxford. He is currently reading for an MA in War Studies at King’s College London. His particular areas of interest include modern Russia and great power rivalry.

This article is part of a Strife series entitled ‘Russia and the World following Ukraine’. Over the next couple of weeks Strife will feature three more articles about the global reaction to the crisis in the Ukraine. Next, Conradin Weindl will look into the relationship between the European Union and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. Then Andrzej Kozłowski will analyse Poland’s approach to the crisis and the implications for Polish security. Finally, Sebastian Åsberg, will examine the debate regarding NATO membership in neutral Sweden and Finland, which has intensified significantly as a result of the war in Ukraine.

NOTES

[i] I Magazine pp.4 20/02/2015

[ii] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/doing-business-in-russia-and-ukraine-sanctions-latest

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