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U.S. Energy, Placing Strategy ahead of Policy

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Conceptual photo of energy sources. Source: LovetoKnow

U.S. Energy Production – Politics vs. Strategy

U.S. energy policy is U.S. energy politics. The fight for energy-producing states this election season demonstrated this feature. President Trump made a calculated all-out blitz for these politically essential states in 2016 and 2020 by targeting his messaging of unrestricted energy production policies to critical constituents. [i] The Democrat Party, always in a more precarious political position due to a broader base, attempted to thread the needle, moving between abruptly ending the fossil fuel industry and gently progressing away. Finally, deciding on $2T in spending as a middle ground between its constituents.

This phenomenon deviates from U.S. energy policy’s historical role, where political leadership from both parties would equate energy policy with national security. President Nixon declared an emergency after the oil embargo and increased domestic production programmes. President Carter looked to secure supplies by removing pricing controls, establishing a strategic reserve, and initiated the U.S. military’s force increase in the Gulf region.[ii] The first war in Iraq was partially justified as preventing Saddam Hussein from controlling an even greater share of the global oil supply. Similarly, the reactivation of the fifth fleet and regional basing and partnerships stem from these strategic calculations. Even as recently as President Obama, achieving energy independence from international vagaries was a central talking point of his clean and renewable energy policies. Despite different political bases and inherent beliefs, each approached energy policy from the point of strategic national benefit.

Overton Window

When tackling climate change, America would be wise not to put policy goals before a strategic approach, as demonstrated in the U.S. removal of Saddam Hussain. Here, a rush to achieve a “safer world” through removing several threats and the spread of democracy, all in one swift policy, demonstrates that having a policy goal of global change without a feasible and sustainable strategy to reach that goal can invite catastrophe.

Fortunately, the U.S. energy-producing states’ current importance to any presidential bid, the 50/50 divided in domestic politics, and a split congress offer the opportunity to implement an energy strategy over an energy policy. This is due to the current political conditions preventing either side from implementing a strictly partisan policy. Furthermore, the diverse options under any multifaceted and long-term strategy allow political actors from all sides to claim a moral victory and deliver results to their constituents.

Strategic Dilemma

Climate change is real. Unfortunately, so is Chinese and Russian aggression. The kernel of this strategic dilemma is that most U.S. steps to reduce carbon use also reduces U.S. and global security. While climate change will continue to impose itself on the word with strategic repercussions, so will Russia and China. China’s ability to use threats about trade to compel the E.U. in times of stress was successful, as the E.U. backed down in its reporting on China’s response to COVID. China also produced similar threats to cut off medical and pharmaceutical supplies to the U.S. Furthermore, their use of salami tactics to control trade routes, energy sources, and commercial fishing in national territory and control pieces of Europe will continue independent of climate change.

Decarbonization will be costly to the U.S. Every effort to impose restrictions will decrease the strategic risk of climate change but will increase the strategic risk imposed by China and Russia due to reduced U.S. economic capacity, global economic influence, energy independence, and reduce the energy independence of its allies and partners. There is also no guarantee that enduring these costs will achieve the objectives of ending or significantly reducing global warming due to China’s continual expansion of coal power plants and occupation of oil and gas fields in the South China Sea for potential exploitation. Furthermore, projected growth across India and Asia could additionally counter any feasible reductions in the U.S.

Strategic Opportunities

Advantages of the Status Quo: In 2019, the U.S. attained a greater degree of energy independence as it transitioned from being a net importer to a net exporter of crude and refined petroleum products. This accomplishment provides an economic advantage in revenue derived through market share, integration of world-class U.S. corporations into economies around the world, sustains a robust and dynamic economy that absorbs millions of immigrants and develops everything from the P.C. to one of the first the COVID-19 vaccine, and fuels a military that maintains global security. It also provides a hedge in the event of a great power or sustained conflict. Similarly, U.S. production capacity secures European economies and militaries as it allows for an alternative to global supply chains and dependence on Russia’s energy exports.[iii] Since oil and gas trade in USD, current arrangements help solidify the USD’s strategic advantage as the reserve currency and global finance provider. This latter fact is beneficial for countering an economically ambitious China attempting to ensnare smaller countries, as revealed in Sri Lanka’s loss of Hambantota Port, by creating new trade routes and an alternate reserve currency and financing opportunities.

Advantages of Opportunity: While the U.S. does maintain a current strategic advantage in the extraction-based world, this does not mean that a future of transition is devoid of similar strategic opportunities. The U.S. possesses several inherent strategic advantages, which it can lever in the quest to develop an answer to these problems. These include its capacity for research and development through its universities, defence and federal government initiatives, and iconic inventors in their garages. It also includes its business culture, cutting edge firm practices, entrepreneurship, and its flexible and dynamic investing ecosystem. Therefore, any path towards decarbonization can maintain some of the current advantages if it applies these strengths.

Strategic Pillars

Treat Decarbonization like Disarmament: To prevent a strategic nadir, the U.S. can treat decarbonization like disarmament. Agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords, on their own, will only hurt compliers while increasing relative gains of countries savvy or cynical enough to join and evade or ignore commitments. While Xi Jinping was producing statement after statement about reducing greenhouse emissions, his party brought more new coal plants into existence, nationally and internationally, than the accords can potentially overcome. Alternately, as U.S. efforts to decarbonize increase consumers’ and exporters’ costs, reduce U.S. multinational firms’ capacity, and reduce core industrial capability and small businesses vitality, America’s rivals continue to decrease energy production and consumption costs.

Therefore, as the Biden administration starts to adjust the Trump trade war, realigns relations with China, and builds U.S. manufacturing and the post-COVID economy, an opportunity exists to create agreements that can balance these concerns and embed reciprocal actions over blanket U.S. reductions.

Secure Supply Lines: Long-term movement away from carbon dependence requires a move towards reliance on rare earth elements. While the federal government has taken steps to increase its reserves of these elements, no efforts exist to secure continued supply, especially in a national emergency or sustained conflict. The fact that Russia and China together can possess or control up to 90% of global supply, depending on the specific element, adds another security challenge that requires a solution before relying on renewables.

Fortunately, the potential for new exploration exists in the U.S., Australia, Africa, and Latin America. Similarly, other Asian countries besides China can provide a low-cost option in making these materials usable. Malaysia being one, where China’s attempt to dominate its port facilities and transportation infrastructure demonstrates the need to secure these chains. Ambitious exploration and exploitation can reduce the costs of extraction and open new supplies. Part of securing this access, against China’s attempts, could include setting up ventures between U.S. and host nation companies to address the exploration, mining, extraction, and transportation required to bring these items to market while keeping the process partly in U.S. hands. As any return on investment would be long-term and risky, the U.S. Government would need to play a role in funding, guaranteeing profits, and technology exchange. This model could also deliver structured and spill-over entrepreneurial, technology, and educational benefits to local businesses and populations through additional loans, infrastructure development, educational opportunities, and access to both global and U.S. markets and companies. It could provide a local and grassroots development model and an alternate approach to China’s state-centered and state empowering One Belt One Road initiative. [iv]

Develop Comparative Advantages at Home: Within the U.S., opportunities exist that play to America’s strength and ensure that decarbonization supports U.S. economic advancement. As renewables and batteries depend on a significant amount of rare earth elements and minerals, the government can use U.S. universities to start programs that will create technology that can extract minerals with cheaper methods. The government can also promote STEM education in these fields through subsiding education. The importance of the production of these components to national security provides an opportunity to bring advanced manufacturing back to the U.S. Although, achieving this remains complicated as production in the U.S. is more expensive than in Asia. Still, the government should examine expenses, including the cost of not controlling production, including diplomatic and military, associated with securing overseas supplies and use them in a calculation on onshoring.[v]

Conclusion

In the U.S., the election cycle, which seemingly is an almost continuous street brawl these days, limits politicians’ ability to implement longer-term and incremental solutions. Instead, they must execute the immediate option to meet their short-term political demands. Although, as the President and Congress wade through a divided government and country, the opportunity exists to trade short-term paralysis for a long-term strategy and implement a far-sighted approach to battling climate change.

[i] Guliyev, Farid. “Trump’s ‘America first’ energy policy, contingency and the reconfiguration of the global energy order.” Energy Policy, vol. 140, May 2020.

[ii] Painter, David. “Oil and Geopolitics: The Oil Crisis of the 1970s and the Cold War.” Historical and Social Research, vol. 39, no. 4, 2014.

[iii] Henderson J., Mitrova T. (2020) Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia. In: Hafner M., Tagliapietra S. (eds) The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition. Lecture Notes in Energy, vol 73. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39066-2_5.

[iv] According to ideas proposed during conversations between Benjamin Flosi, Christopher Tynan, and John Huntsman (https://securitystudies.org/) from September-November 2020.

[v] According to ideas proposed during conversations between Benjamin Flosi, Christopher Tynan, and John Huntsman (https://securitystudies.org/)from September-November 2020.

Benjamin Flosi is a first year Ph.D. student at King’s College London and a Copy Editor at Strife.

 

Perceptions of Peaceful Transfer of Power: From the British to the American Empire

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by Mariana Vieira

The Battle of Manila Bay (1898) saw the defeat of the Spanish navy at the hands of the fledging American empire (Image credit: Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)

The transition from British to American hegemony, a shift that fundamentally shaped the post-1945 world order, is often characterised as peaceful. This is brought about by the choice of terminology and the analytical slippage between hegemony and empire. While there were no direct hostilities between the UK and the US as the former declined and the latter ascended, the study of empire highlights the conflict and violence of the two key processes of transition: the rise of the United States and the decline of Great Britain. Indeed, terminology matters because it enables scholars to consider the interactions and dynamics between metropole, the core territory around which power is centralised, and the extensive periphery of dominated areas.

The transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana did not happen immediately and the building blocks leading to it were hardly peaceful. Special mentions include the Spanish-American War (1898), the wars of decolonisation, and both World Wars. The absence of a typical hegemonic war between the dominant power and the rising challenger led experts to believe that a peaceful transition took place sometime in the early-mid twentieth century.

However, in determining a more precise timestamp, the most persuasive dates do follow a conflict that fits with the other main characteristics of hegemonic war: a total conflict involving major states that is unlimited in terms of political, economic, and ideological significance. Here, the Second World War epitomises the decay of the European international political order and the triumph of American power. Moreover, even proponents of the peaceful transition thesis highlight how the US became committed to enforcing order internationally after the ‘cataclysm’ of the Second World War.

US hegemonic ascendency accelerated after the annexation of overseas territories, the spoils of the American victory in the war of 1898. While these territorial acquisitions were unprecedented, the Spanish-American War and its consequences have been argued to represent a ‘logical culmination’ of the major trends in nineteenth-century US foreign policy. In removing Spain from the Western Hemisphere and increasing American’s reach in East Asia, the war was crucial in advancing the US’ status as a world power and a full-fledged member of the imperial club.

Analysing America’s colonial experience during the earlier period of transition as an empire, as opposed to as a hegemon allows for a more complex image that highlights the violence and day-to-day coercion intrinsic to how the American empire was built. Whereas hegemons are strictly concerned with influence over foreign affairs, empires seek to exert control over the political regime of the periphery, thereby encompassing both domestic and foreign policy spheres. As an empire, the US proceeded to transform Cuba into a neo-colonial economy built around cash-crops and closely tied to the US market, while the Philippines witnessed an especially brutal war of ‘benevolent assimilation’ furthered by ideologies of racial difference.

The following period of US hegemonic maturity and UK hegemonic decline was partly engendered by significant changes in the international context. As the US entered a global field that was already mostly colonized, it seemingly maintained international peace – or the existing level of colonial violence – by supporting its European allies and outsourcing territorial control. However, the emergence and proliferation of anticolonial nationalism in the periphery changed the global landscape. As the First World War brought to a boil the decades long-simmering tensions of militarism, alliances, imperialism, and nationalism, its aftermath witnessed the break-up of several empires on the losing side, the weakening of the victorious’ hold on their colonial possessions, and the widespread circulation of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

The diffusion of ideas of national self-determination in European colonies resulted in multiple movements against colonial rule, including in Britain. Crucially, the rise of nationalism and the eruption of conflict furthered the British hegemonic decline. The transition from British to American international systems was consolidating as the USA found other means to exert their – informal – influence, while the British could not meet their economic goals without the colonial – formal – dimension.

Partly distracted with crises in the Middle East, East Asia, and South Africa and partly constrained by the importance of American raw materials and markets, the British did not seek to actively oppose America’s rise in the Western Hemisphere. Arguably, if there was a shift from perceptions of competition to cooperation with the US, it was largely a result of British non-peaceful priorities laying elsewhere. The British operated a trading empire based on the exchange of European manufactured goods for the colonies’ foods and minerals, relying on imperialism to maintain its economic supremacy.

However, as empires became increasingly illegitimate, the cumulative effect of peripheral wars of decolonisation and the deterioration of the British industrial base undermined the productivity on which its power hinged. In the metropole, the devastating impact of the two World Wars added a further dimension of resource erosion, this disrupted the imperialist center and left the British Empire dependent on American economic and military power. Consequently, the British hegemonic decline was accelerated by interacting conflicts in the center and in the periphery.

It was not a white dove that brought about a new imperial center, but rather a murder of crows.

Finally, when contending the emergence of a ‘peaceful’ international order based on the convergence of Anglo-Saxon values, a study of empire may point in other directions. Both empires share similarities, as capitalist nation-states with an impulse to act imperialistically in ordering their respective international systems. The US gunboat diplomacy showcased its contempt for ‘lesser’ peoples, thereby placing America in the mainstream of Western imperialism. Here, the American elite followed the debates on empire in Britain, applying notions of racism and the white man’s burden to US expansionist imperatives. In hailing the intellectual, industrial, and moral superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, the sense of sameness legitimised and fueled more violence towards ‘backward’ people and ‘little brown brothers’ in the periphery during the initial phase of transition.

For centuries, the rise and decline of powerful empires characterised world politics and not the world of nation-states that is taken for granted in International Relations (IR). The perception of a peaceful hegemonic transition is based on the Westphalian terms of reference, but the framework of sovereign states occludes and distorts imperial relations.

Careful consideration of British decline and American rise showcases precisely these two antonyms of peace: war, on a global scale, and conflict, within their respective peripheries. In rendering the violence of the processes behind this ‘peaceful’ transition visible, the study of empire warns against Eurocentric celebrations of a successful model that rising – non-Western – powers should follow. It was not a white dove that brought about a new imperial center, but rather a murder of crows.

Mariana Vieira currently works as an Editorial Assistant for Chatham House’s magazine, The World Today. Her research interests span US foreign policy, critical security studies, and empire. After completing her bachelor’s in Politics, Philosophy and Economics at the University of Warwick, she pursued an MS in Empires, Colonialism and Globalisation at LSE, followed by an MA in International Peace and Security at KCL’s War Studies department.

Europe’s Options for the Boogaloo

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by Michael C. Davies

US Civil War redux? (Image credit: The Trumpet)

Moe: ‘Oh ho, an English boy, eh? You know we saved your ass in World War Two.’
Hugh: ‘Yeah, well, we saved your ass in World War Three.’
- ‘Lisa’s Wedding,’ The Simpsons, S6E19.

In the past few weeks, U.S. President Donald J. Trump, and the Republican Party more generally, have made it clear they are willing to do anything to remain in power in the aftermath of the 2020 election, including possibly starting a civil war. Both Trump himself and numerous Republican Party elected officials and apparatchiks have stated they will neither acknowledge the outcome of the election if they lose, an election Trump already decries as illegitimate, nor participate in it fairly. Even more concerning is that a contested result could light a spark many on the American right are hoping for. White supremacists groups have grown exponentially during his Administration, and declare any event other than a Trump victory to be grounds to start the Boogaloo—the white supremacists’ slang term for a second American civil war. The question therefore becomes, what will Europe do if America fractures? Should this happen, Europe, broadly, will have four options to consider.

The roots of a possible second American civil war have been identifiable since the end of the first civil war in 1865. While the Confederacy was military and politically defeated in 1865, it re-emerged soon after and took back control of the South, imposed Jim Crow laws and social regulations, and expanded into the West. Certainly not for the last time, the United States chose white supremacy and strategic failure rather than engaging in effective state-building to achieve a new birth of freedom. This time, with forty years of free-market fundamentalism having stolen $50 trillion from the American people and collapsing the American middle class, the lack of quality health care and student loans collapsing birth rates, and decades of sectarian media blaming it all on ‘others,’ a large percentage of the American populous is armed, ready, and willing to wash the country in a genocidal and politicidal cleansing fire, just as the Confederacy did during the Civil War.

In Donald Trump, the Confederate element of American society has found their saviour. Trump’s approval rating has rarely moved regardless of how many more failures pile up exactly because he treats politics as his favourite movie, Bloodsport. He antagonizes large swathes of the populous because they refuse to love him and treat him with the respect he believes he deserves. After all, this was the man who did not really care about the number of COVID-19 deaths until the virus started affecting ‘his’ people—citizens in Republican-leaning states. 225,000+ dead, ever-rising, and he is more than happy to say it ‘affected virtually nobody.’ To Trump, he is only the President of those who love him. And a pox on all others—now, literally.

It is precisely because far right-wing groups praise him that Trump has allowed them to flourish under his Administration and reach the mainstream. Individually and collectively, they all pine for the Boogaloo. Groups like the Oath Keepers, the Boogaloo Boys, the Proud Boys, and now, the incredible rise of the mind-melting QAnon conspiracy, together with the ever-present militia movements that all have their basis in white supremacist violence, give form to the battle lines being drawn. Their goal, broadly, is to impose a right-wing anarcho-capitalist white supremacist state in America using extreme mass violence. Their intentions are so clear even establishment centrists who bemoan any act of revolt against these groups and their political handmaidens have finally begun to see the writing is on the wall.

The question therefore remains, what will Europe do should conflict break out? During the last US Civil War, because of America’s distance and Europe’s own problems, it largely left the war alone, preferring to see who emerged on top. This time, distance and impact are meaningless. Should the US divide into a years-long brawl, Europe’s own security blanket—conventional and nuclear via the NATO alliance—will be torn asunder with it. European states, individually and collectively, therefore have a direct stake in the outcome. The closeness of Trump to Russia, after all, regardless of the causation, is a daily worry for those who share a border with Russia and rely on NATO, especially American, military forces for deterrence. Without it, RAND estimates, they will last barely 60 hours.

Under the worst scenario of a breakout of a new civil war, Europe has four basic options: First, Do nothing. As scholar Edward Luttwak previously suggested, the option always exists to just ‘give war a chance’ and see what happens and adapt to the new circumstances at the end. Second, Lend Lease. As the US did during the Second World War before it engaged, it provided material for the war effort. Third, volunteers. Like the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, Eagle Squadrons of the Second World War, The Crippled Eagles in Rhodesia, or more recently as the ISIS and anti-ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, Europe could allow its citizens to fight in America. Whether it would allow fighters for both sides is another question altogether, however.

Or, finally, would the satirical epigraph at the start of this post prove prescient—would Europe mobilize to defeat this new Confederacy? Would it make a stand on its own values and strategic interests? Suffering under a long history of continual strategic failure, with Iraq and Afghanistan only being the latest examples, it would take a significant shift in elite, military, and popular imaginations to make this happen. Regardless of what choice could be made, each option comes with its own risks and rewards. But with greater risk comes greater reward. And choosing the lesser options can mean Europe will further erode its ability to secure itself, and perhaps fall (further) into its own pit of darkness once more.

As Cathal Nolan made clear in his estimable history of battle, ‘moral and material attrition’ are the ‘main determinants of outcome in wars among the Great Powers.’ Simply, those who mobilise the most usually win. Without a doubt, the right-wing in the US, both government and non-government, remains the most ready, willing, and able to engage in large-scale violence. But they are also the smallest demographically, weakest economically, and the obedience of large parts of the US Government to Trump can no longer be counted on, let alone in the event of a full outbreak of violence. Thus, the choices Europe makes early on matters. And the decision, to reverse Churchill’s hope, for the Old World to ‘step forth to the rescue and the liberation of the [new]’ might be required if it is to avoid conflagration on its own soil.

Michael C. Davies is a Ph.D. candidate in Defence Studies at King’s College London, focusing on the theory and practice of victory. He previously conducted lessons learned research at the U.S. National Defense University where he co-authored three books on the Wars of 9/11 and is one of the progenitors of the Human Domain doctrinal concept. He is also the Coordinating Editor with the Strife Journal.

The new Cold War: The birth of a resurgent conflict

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By: Kyle R. Brady

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The Berlin Wall may be gone and the Cold War over, but the old and familiar patterns are quickly returning.

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War and the associated collapse of the Soviet Union, an exceedingly probable conclusion may be drawn from the interactions of the United States and the Soviet successor state of Russia: a New Cold War has begun.[1]

Roughly since the turn of the 21st Century, the United States and Russia – a superpower state and a state seeking both superpower and empire status, respectively – have increasingly opposed each other’s efforts and interests. Notably, the Obama-Putin period has been more fraught and hostile than ever before, despite the so-called reset.[2] As of October 2016, a number of seemingly interconnected events have occurred that indicate an increasingly hostile disconnect, with Russia consistently opposing the increasing alignment of diplomatic and military relationships between the United States and Europe.[3]

Since the turn of the millennium, Russia has invaded a number of neighboring states – including Georgia and Ukraine – occupying several unrecognized foreign territories as a result.[4] Their military power has been projected abroad in foreign conflicts and is currently most visible in Syria.[5] Additionally, the Russians have also directly and intentionally engaged in nuclear destabilization efforts.[6] One of the unfortunate results of these developments has been the damaging of relationships between Russia and several member states of the European Union with close energy-security and resource dependencies with the federation.[7]

Recently, China has become increasingly aligned with Russia, visible through the publicly acknowledged military, security, and cyber joint-initiatives.[8] Russian intelligence services have frequently engaged in cyber-espionage and cyberwarfare in attempts to covertly influence domestic politics and the internal functions of targeted states, including the United States.[9] Moreover, Russia regularly undertakes every opportunity to denigrate, degrade, and destabilize the reputation, interests, and abilities of both the United States and the rest of the Western world.[10] Shockingly, Russia may have even poisoned American diplomats, a clear precursor to the resurrection of the KGB, a Soviet-era intelligence agency.[11] When considered both in total and in context, these do not seem to be the behaviors of a non-aligned or internationally participatory state – much less a friendly one. Rather, these are the behaviors of a state with little respect for its own pacts and agreements, a disdain for international institutions, a contradictory approach to foreign affairs, and a great desire to force itself onto the international stage.[12]

Throughout the original Cold War, the Soviet Union employed military and sociopolitical efforts – also known as hard power and soft power – in an effort to spread communism, expand Soviet territory, create a buffer-zone along its borders, and counter-balance Western efforts. Modern Russia has since resurrected strategies and practices of its Soviet past through the use of propaganda, aggressive, escalatory rhetoric, and dangerous flirtations with its Western enemies – strategies easily traced from the post-war period of the 1940s through the USSR’s collapse in 1991.[13] If there was a way in which to extend influence or oppose the West, the Soviet Union was more than willing to make an attempt.

This aggressively anti-West, self-interested, and consolidated approach has seen a remarkable resurgence in Putin’s Russia.[14] While frustrating to diplomats and those who seek the normalization or improvement of relations, the rise of Putin’s Soviet-esque state is not entirely unexpected. Putin was a former KGB agent who rose to political power only to praise the fallen Soviet Union and instill his former coworkers in positions of power. [15] As such, his consistent efforts to retool, rebirth, or wholesale replicate Soviet attitudes, behaviors, methods, and institutions seem only appropriate. Moreover, this New Cold War has not suddenly appeared but has rather been part of a slow but predictable process that began years ago.[16]

It seems unlikely that Putin will voluntarily relinquish power in the future, regardless of his formal title or relevant Russian law. Therefore, it should be assumed that Russia will proceed down the authoritarian, confrontational, and domineering path that was established long ago. In order to address several realities – military, social, political and economic – of the New Cold War and avoid repeating mistakes of the past, Western states need to acknowledge and formalize their devolving relationship with Russia. The lack of an open or nuclear conflict in the twentieth century’s Cold War does not preclude the outbreak of one in the New Cold War: this an important difference to understand when comparing between the two periods. The New Cold War need not be a zero-sum conflict across all realms and theatres. Both history and modern experience can provide substantial insight on how to redress differences and grievances, without threatening the safety of the entire world.

 

Note: Any opinions expressed are directly and expressly the author’s own; they do not represent — unless stated — his employers (past, present, or future) or associated/affiliated institutions.

 

 

Kyle R. Brady is a postgraduate student at King’s College London in the Department of War Studies, holds a Masters in Homeland Security from Pennsylvania State University, and has primary interests in terrorism, law enforcement, and contextualizing security concerns. Previously, he graduated with Departmental Honors from San Jose State University’s undergraduate Political Science program, where he focused on both international relations and political theory. All of Kyle’s work can be found online through http://docs.kyle-brady.com; he can be reached by email at [email protected] or [email protected], on Twitter as @KyleBradyOnline, or on Facebook as /KyleBradyOnline; and he occasionally blogs at http://blog.kyle-brady.com.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Jones, Sam. “Dmitry Medvedev Warns of ‘New Cold War.’” Financial Times, February 13, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/a14e8900-d259-11e5-829b-8564e7528e54.

[2] Kelly, Mary Louise. “Amid Deteriorating U.S.-Russia Relations, Questions Grow About Cyberwar.” NPR, October 4, 2016. http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/10/04/496543317/amid-deteriorating-u-s-russia-relations-questions-grow-about-cyberwar;

Mankoff, Jeffrey. “The Tricky U.S.-Russia ‘Reset’ Button.” Council on Foreign Relations: Grand Strategy, February 18, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/grand-strategy/tricky-us-russia-reset-button/p18551.

[3] Kramer, Andrew E. “Russia Calls New U.S. Missile Defense System a ‘Direct Threat.’” New York Times, May 12, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/world/europe/russia-nato-us-romania-missile-defense.html.

[4] Kofman, Michael. “The Crimean Crisis and Russia’s Military Posture in the Black Sea.” War on the Rocks, August 19, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/the-crimean-crisis-and-russias-military-posture-in-the-black-sea/

[5] Roth, Andrew. “Syria Shows That Russia Built an Effective Military. Now How Will Putin Use It?” Washington Post, March 18, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-shows-that-russia-built-an-effective-military-now-how-will-putin-use-it/2016/03/17/aeaca59e-eae8-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html?tid=a_inl

[6] “Russia Deploys Nuclear-Capable Missiles in Kaliningrad.” BBC News, October 8, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37597075;

“Russia Suspends Weapons-Grade Plutonium Deal with US.” BBC News, October 3, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37539616.

[7] Henderson, Niall. “A Literal Cold War: The EU-Russian Struggle Over Energy Security.” Council on Foreign Relations: Politics, Power, and Preventive Action, October 6, 2016. http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2016/10/06/a-literal-cold-war-the-eu-russian-struggle-over-energy-security/.

[8] Ide, William. “China-Russia Drills Highlight Converging Interests; Undercurrents Remain.” Voice of America, September 19, 2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/china-russia-drills-highlight-converging-interests/3515350.html.

[9] Limnéll, Jarno. “The Use of Cyber Power in the War Between Russia and Ukraine.” Council on Foreign Relations: Net Politics, January 11, 2016. http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2016/01/11/the-use-of-cyber-power-in-the-war-between-russia-and-ukraine/.

Gonzales, Richard. “U.S. Accuses Russia Of Election Year Cyber-Meddling.” NPR, October 7, 2016. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/07/497093001/u-s-accuses-russia-of-election-year-cyber-meddling.

[10] Burns, Robert. “Ash Carter Blasts Russian Aggression.” U.S. News, September 7, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-09-07/ash-carter-clear-ambition-by-russia-to-erode-world-order.

[11] Eckel, Mike. “Two U.S. Diplomats Drugged In St. Petersburg Last Year, Deepening Washington’s Concern.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 3, 2016. http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-u-s-diplomats-drugged-st-petersburg/28028782.html. Soldatov, Andrei. “Putin Has Finally Reincarnated the KGB.” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/21/putin-has-finally-reincarnated-the-kgb-mgb-fsb-russia/.

[12] Lucas, Edward. The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2009.

[13] Courtney, William, and Christopher Paul. “Firehose of Falsehoods:” U.S. News, September 9, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-09-09/putins-propaganda-network-is-vast-and-us-needs-new-tools-to-counter-it.

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[14] Sanger, David. “What Is Russia Up To, and Is It Time to Draw the Line?” New York Times, September 29, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/world/europe/for-veterans-of-the-cold-war-a-hostile-russia-feels-familiar.html.

[15] Applebaum, Anne. “How He and His Cronies Stole Russia.” New York Times Review of Books, December 18, 2014. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/12/18/how-he-and-his-cronies-stole-russia/.

[16] Tisdall, Simon. “The New Cold War: Are We Going back to the Bad Old Days?” The Guardian, November 19, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/new-cold-war-back-to-bad-old-days-russia-west-putin-ukraine;

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Find the money-pot: Interagency budgetpolitik and American foreign policy

by

By Jackson Webster

Gee, I wonder how much partner capacity we can build with the gold at the end of that rainbow!

 

In policymaking, as in politics, it’s usually wisest to ‘follow the money.’ This famous tagline of All the President’s Men was of course referring to corruption within the Nixon administration, but the key role played by money-matters in policymaking nonetheless finds its way into the conduct of American foreign policy.

The White House has three main tools at its disposal when dealing with the outside world: The Department of State (DoS), USAID, and the Department of Defense (DoD). Traditionally, State deals in diplomacy, USAID deals in development, and Defense deals in war, however these roles are becoming increasingly intertwined in today’s dynamic environment abroad.

Since the authorization of military assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1948, a process which has come to be known generally as ‘security cooperation’ has, through both accident and design become a mainstay of America’s presence abroad. This ‘security cooperation’ has been authorized by Congress on a piecemeal basis over the decades, and it currently consists of over 80 separate legal ‘authorities’ for delivering assistance to various parts of foreign countries’ security services. Each of these authorities has a separate pot of money from which it receives funding, and the amount of congressional control over each operation varies greatly. Over the past two administrations, this set of programmes has been included in a broader diplomatic initiative which has become a cornerstone of American foreign policy: ‘building partner capacity,’ or BPC. This process is intended to allow “like-minded regional partners” to share the burden of international security in an era of fiscal tightening in the United States.

What these trends amount to is a marked difference in the character of American foreign policy, particularly in terms of the agencies involved in its execution. Immediately following the Second World War, and well into the 1950s, the focus of American foreign policy outside of Korea was the reconstruction of Europe and the extension of Washington’s trade influence through strong Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.). Much of this was a ways-and-means issue. The Department of State had a great deal of money in its pockets due to the implementation of the Marshall Plan, as well as the burden of postwar diplomatic initiatives, and had a great degree of federal —especially congressional— attention paid to it as a result.

Since 9/11, the counterterrorism initiatives of the Bush and Obama administrations have caused funding to flow into the Department of Defense. State, on the other hand, has not received an authorization for its operations in 14 years, and thus its budget and responsibilities have remained relatively stagnant. The last time the purse strings for State were examined there was no Facebook, Saddam Hussein was still in power in Iraq, and Donald Trump was only a mediocre businessman without a reality TV show. Broadly speaking, this trend has caused significant mission creep away from the Pentagon’s traditional role and into what the armed forces call “military operations other than war.” The idea of the American arms industry being leveraged as a tool of diplomacy is nothing novel, however what has been a revolutionary change in our foreign policy is the centralization of a major part of our interaction with our allies overseas under the DOD rather than under the diplomatic bureaucracy at Foggy Bottom. While State was once America’s primary instrument abroad, this role has moved across the Potomac into the Pentagon, and DOD has now assumed much of the day-to-day work of maintaining our global network of alliances, in part due to its significantly larger piece of America’s budgetary pie.

The US Senate is currently entertaining a defense authorization bill, sponsored by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), to reform security cooperation and assistance programmes. The reforms contain a near-ludicrous 92 pages of legal jargon which, among other things, diverts a significant amount of money to the direct control of the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of ‘security cooperation’ with our allies. The current estimate is $10 billion for 2017, but during future appropriations and authorizations processes, that number will probably increase.

What this means in terms of US foreign policy is, as noted, an issue of ways-and-means. Should an administration wish to strengthen relations with a given country, solve a diplomatic problem, or confront an adversary, it will use the tool with the most resources at its disposal. In today’s budgetary climate, that’s the DOD, which means the military will continue to be America’s leading method of interaction with the outside world, not State and its civilian foreign service. This disconnect between what the military and its bureaucracy are designed to do and what they’ve recently been asked to accomplish both reinforces and is symptomatic of the funding prioritization of Defense over State. This effects all levels of Defense’s activities, from the Marine asked to “shoot with one hand and pass out aid with the other” to the 4-star combatant commanders asked to accomplish what were once considered diplomatic or development goals with the often blunt instrument of the military. Congress is giving the DOD a lot of money to execute a set of responsibilities of questionable effectiveness for which the military was not designed and which the military itself doesn’t necessarily want to do.

While debate continues inside the Beltway over the strengths and weaknesses of the Senate’s proposed reforms, the most important takeaway from describing this process is the key role played by the congressional appropriations and authorizations process in the conduct of foreign policy. After all, a programme or policy without a large pot of money attached, for all intents and purposes, does not exist. Regardless of whether President Obama chooses to veto this year’s authorization bill or not, the fierce nature of the debate and its eventual consequences for policy are telling of the impact of budgets and bureaucracy on America’s foreign relations. Every programme needs a pot of money, and the politics behind agencies getting their hands on these funds are worthy of study for those wishing to understand why and how the United States does what it does overseas.

 

 

Jackson Webster is a graduate of the Department of War Studies and is currently based in Paris where he is reading for a master’s degree in international security policy from SciencesPo.

 

 

 

Notes:

1) All the Preseident’s Men, Alan J Pakula,1976. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kq_4Zlhoj4k

2) Aftergood, Steven. “Assessing “Security Cooperation”, 2015. https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2016/04/security-cooperation/

3) “What is ‘Building Partner Capacity'”, 2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf

4) De Long, Bradford, and Barry Eichengreen. “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program,” National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991. http://www.nber.org/papers/w3899

5) Vinik, Danny. “The State Department Hasn’t Been Authorized in 13 Years.” Politico, Sept. 2015.

6) Graham, David. “The Many Scandals of Donald Trump: A Cheat Sheet.” The Atlantic, Jun. 2016.

7) The bill can be accessed here: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2943

8) Schubert, Frank. Other Than War. NSC Joint History Office, Washington, DC, 2013.

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