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The Philippines Drug War and Duterte’s foreign policy

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By: Kanishka Lad

President Rodrigo R. Duterte shows a copy of a diagram showing the connection of high level drug syndicates operating in the country during a press conference at Malacañang on July 7, 2016. KING RODRIGUEZ/Presidential Photographers Division

On 30 January 2016, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Ronald dela Rosa announced a temporary suspension of the ‘drug war’ initiated by the incumbent President Rodrigo Duterte. The war has allegedly killed more than 7,000 individuals since it was initiated by the President following his inauguration in May 2016 and his landslide victory in the general elections. Notably, the President’s hardline stance has led to multiple foreign policy issues with its ally - the U.S. - and inadvertently resulted in the formation of new alliances with countries such as China.The Philippine Drug War and subsequent geopolitical developments have granted China a new ally in President Duterte as well as a political foothold in the South China Sea.

Drug War and human rights violations

Drug use and trafficking are endemic to the Philippines. Approximately 3 million people are dependent on a variety of drugs. While the drug war began as a means of stifling drug trade in the country by the utilization of the law enforcement agencies, it devolved into a spectacle where unaccounted vigilante killings were witnessed on a daily basis. Opposition lawmakers continued to blame Duterte for his call on every citizen to arm themselves against the rampant drug trade during the initial stages of his presidency. Several innocent civilians have reportedly fallen prey to police raids and vigilantism as security personnel allegedly used the drug war to settle personal rivalries with criminals and even civilians.

Duterte has earned himself a mass following even as the country witnessed thousands of targeted extrajudicial killings. Additionally, the terror attack witnessed at a night market in Davao on 2 September 2016 incited Duterte to declare a state of emergency, that still exists throughout the country. Concerned political observers have questioned the credentials of this emergency imposed, citing it as the first step for a declaration of martial law as seen during the 1970s regime of late dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Public disquiet over the implications of the emergency persists, with reservations regarding the potential use of the emergency to quell dissent and political opposition. What started out as a war against eradicating a social evil (in the eyes of Duterte), has devolved into a campaign in which the government is unable to exert any control on the rampaging anti-drug vigilantes. In mid-January, a South Korean businessman who was allegedly kidnapped three months earlier, was found dead on the premises of the headquarters of the PNP. This killing, which received considerable coverage from the international media, is said to have instigated President Duterte to call back his anti-narcotics units. The suspension of the drug war, however, remains temporary and might be reignited in the coming months given the temperamental nature of the President.

Drugs and Terrorism

Narcotics trafficking has been cited as a primary source of funding for terrorism and militancy operations in several regions across the globe. In the Philippines, militant group Abu Sayyaf has gained notoriety for utilizing drug trafficking as a source of funding for its operations. The complicity of transnational criminal networks with terrorist organizations, though not extensively documented in the Philippines, has been mentioned by several government functionaries. Linkages between narcotics trafficking and terror financing have grown over the years in the Philippines due to unchecked corruption and institutional weakness. In the recent past, alleged Islamist terrorists have perpetrated attacks across the country, including the Davao bombing as well as the attack on a church on Christmas eve in Midsayap, Mindanao.

From foes to friends: Philippines, China, and the US

The Philippines has been a major non-NATO ally of the U.S. However, the Obama administration had been a vocal critic of Duterte’s drug war. This criticism continued to sour diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the U.S. with President Duterte announcing a dissolution of ties between the allies. The future of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows the U.S. to station and rotate troops in the Southeast Asian country to protect it from external forces remains uncertain. Duterte has continued to publically project his intention of garnering new allies to reduce his dependency on the United States, which is one of the primary providers of financial aid to the country - although, he has since promised to work with the U.S. post the election of Donald Trump as President

On 12 July 2016, the tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled in favor of the Philippines and against China with regards to certain issues pertaining to the South China Sea, specifically China’s historical claims to the water body with respect to its nine-dash line theory. Further, the tribunal went on to confirm that the Law of the Sea convention applied to the case and that China had no claims on several islands scattered across the sea. While the landmark judgment was hailed by the international community, China refused to acknowledge it and reiterated its stance on the disputed sea. Surprisingly, the new Philippine government has refused to pursue enforcing the judgment and has rather demanded concessions from China with regards to fishing activities in the disputed waters. This can be attributed to a major foreign policy change implemented by the Duterte government with regards to China. This change by the Philippine government might be ascribed to the criticism of Duterte’s policies under Obama. Further, following the President’s diplomatic visit to China, the Asian giant agreed to cooperate with the Philippines on projects aimed at poverty reduction amounting to 3.7 billion USD, further indicating that the Philippines might be altering its diplomatic relations with regards to financial aid.

Prospects for 2017

While the drug war has been temporarily suspended, the flip-flops by President Duterte following his inauguration indicate that his rule is likely to be guided by populist sentiment. The backing provided to corrupt law enforcement agencies by the administration and the President himself is said to have emboldened them in carrying out extrajudicial killings. Keeping this in mind, further instances of disregard for human rights can be expected in the near term.

Additionally, the dependence of the President on personal vendettas to formulate foreign policies might be detrimental for the Philippines in the coming days. However, Donald Trump’s presidency and commitment to minimal interference in the domestic affairs of allied nations signals the possibility of improving relations between the strategic partners. However, the revival of cordial diplomatic relations between China and the Philippines could point to the formation of a newborn alliance in Asia.

Kanishka Lad (@kanishkalad) is an analyst at GRID91 (a security firm located in Mumbai) covering issues including militancy, civil unrest, and politics in South and Southeast Asia, specifically India, Bangladesh, the Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam.

Image source: https://www.cmc.edu/keck-center/asia-experts-forum/phelim-kine-on-president-rodrigo-dutertes-controversial-war-on-drugs-in-the-philippines

Organised crime and terrorism Part IV: Setting examples: Violence as communication in Mexico’s Cartel War

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This is the fourth, and final, piece in Strife’s four-part series exploring the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in a 21st century security environment. The first, second, and third parts can be found here, here, and here, respectively.

By: Joe Atkins

Fire engulfs a casino in Monterrey, killing 52 people. Source: BBC News.

Too often, some conflicts attract attention only when something abnormally brutal happens. This occurred in Nigeria, when the terrorist group Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls on 14 April 2014, shocking international audiences. This happened also, some months later, in Mexico. There, in the state of Guerrero, 43 students were kidnapped on 20 September 2014. Two weeks later, local police forces found a mass grave, with the charred and tortured bodies of 28 of them. Mexico’s Attorney General claimed that the former mayor of the town of Iguala ordered the massacre, in cooperation with the local cartel, Guerreros Unidos. A year after the fact, however, an international committee, appointed by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, expressed serious concerns regarding the Attorney General’s account of the event[1]. This sparked doubts about the reliability of this version, which affirms that members of the Guerreros Unidos killed the students, took them to a dump, and burned their bodies. Reports about the federal police’s monitoring activity of the students casted a shadow on this episode of brutality[2].

The massacre of the 43 students of Guerrero was a particularly notorious case, even for crime-ridden Mexico. It attracted international attention, constituting a major embarrassment for President Enrique Peña Nieto’s government. Outside observers, however, face a daunting task when they try to make sense of Mexico’s highly intense violence, made even more difficult given the complexity of the conflict itself. It is no surprise that some commentators simply dismiss violence as devoid of any rational meaning. Actually, the intricate character of the conflict is a problem also for cartels and state authorities themselves. Blurred allegiances and conflicting attributions of blame make communication very difficult. In this context, violence has become a tool to convey information and propaganda.

The Mexico drug war has been going on since 2006 and has caused among 30 and 60 per cent of the 120.000 homicides that occurred in the country between 2006 and 2013[3]. During the last ten years, eight cartels have been competing with each other for the control of the trade routes for cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine. Simultaneously, they have confronted the Mexican state, by corrupting or intimidating police and judiciary officials, by scaring local mayors, and by influencing elections. To add confusion to this already complex situation, allegiances and power relations have been very fluid. Local gangs, in fact, often switch loyalty, while some cartels have been effectively defeated, only to have rivals and offshoots rising in their place. Moreover, several anti-crime forces have been operating, including the Mexican Army and Navy, with various degrees of effectiveness and collusion. Local citizens, finally, have conjured up their own vigilante forces, which have often demonstrated as much brutality as the drug trafficking organisations[4].

In this complicated context, it is often difficult to know who is ruling in a particular area. Thus, cartels and gangs have often decided to make their presence felt by way of cruelty and terror. This already happened during the outburst of drug-related violence in the 1990s, when beheadings became a frequent method to send messages to rival cartels. The new era of “high-intensity crime”, however, has renewed and expanded this function of violence.

Now, messages conveyed by violence reach multiple audiences. Politicians are the recipients, as well as police officers, journalists, the armed forces, and the public at large[5]. Violence has become a major communication tool, and its effect is different depending on the receiver. Cartels target members of particular categories to push them to cooperate or to make them neutral; violence, however, hits common citizens as well, sowing confusion among them and paralysing any attempt to revert the drug traffickers’ grip on society. Moreover, violence has become so widespread that it is actually possible to identify different types of violence, each of which conveys a particular message from drug trafficking organisations.

Mass killings are one of these types. If we look deeper into Mexico’s most dangerous states we can find other massacres like the one in Iguala. In most of them, survivor reports, CCTV videos, or victims’ reports pointed out at the Los Zetas cartel, formed by ex-members of Mexico’s Special Forces. In 2010, in San Fernando, Tamaulipas state, Los Zetas affiliates killed 72 immigrants from Central and South America, after their refusal to join the cartel or pay extra fees to enter the United States[6]. In 2011, in the same area, Zetas hijacked several passenger buses, raping the women and forcing the able-bodied men to fight among themselves, awarding the survivors with cartel membership[7]; in total, 193 people died. Only some months later, in Monterrey, Nuevo Léon state, a Los Zetas commando fired indiscriminately on customers in a casino, and then started a fire that destroyed the building, killing 52 people in total [8]. In the same area, the year later, 49 bodies were found dumped by a roadside on the Mexican Federal Highway 40[9]. The Los Zetas cartel seems to be responsible for all the mass killings above. The heightened rivalry between Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel over cocaine routes in North-Eastern Mexico is the most likely explanation of this series of indiscriminate violence. Massacres, however, are also a means to maintain the Zetas’ reputation as cold-blooded murderers with a taste for bloodshed[10]. It is a tool of psychological warfare. In an environment where violence is everywhere, the need to make its effect felt is even more pressing.

Violence as a communication tool, then, is the by-product of the rivalry among several cartels. This rivalry engenders a “competitive escalation of increasingly extreme and creatively violent acts”[11]. Most of this escalation, for now, resulted in the murder of single persons or of little groups. At its core, the murder in itself is always a message, as its perpetrators usually present it as a punishment, an act of justice. Since the beginning of the conflict, however, it has lost its symbolic strength, simply because there are too many of them[12]. Beheadings were an early method to convey a more forceful message and stun the audience, by showing that cartel members were capable of anything[13]. Even decapitations, however, have become increasingly commonplace, since a group of members of La Familia Michoacana threw five severed heads on a nightclub dance floor to publicise their “divine justice”[14]. With time, then, a whole set of forms of drug-related killing and treatment of corpses has formed, with its own lexicon. These words are quite common among different Mexican cartels and in the media coverage of the drug war. For example, enteipados are bodies wrapped in duct tape; descuartizados are bodies that have been quartered (as the victims of the 2012 Nuevo Leon massacre); encajuelados are bodies left in the trunk of a car; entambados are bodies crammed in barrels; encobijados are bodies wrapped in blankets. In addition, cutting off fingers means that the dead person was a snitch; cutting hands means that the dead was a thief; cutting the tongue means the dead was a police or rival cartel informer, while cutting the foot means the dead was a defector[15]. Finally, bodies are generally left on roadsides, usually half or wholly naked. This happens most often for women, as a means to deprive them of their honour, but also for men, in an attempt to demote their manhood[16]. In Mexico, drug-related murders are seldom a hidden act. On the contrary, narcos leave the bodies in public places, where everyone can see and read the messages on the corpse.

Actual violence, then, has evolved from simple murder, by differentiating into different types, according to quantity, treatment of the body, and ritualized display of it. Another dimension, however, is particularly important in the current inter-cartel war: the broadcasting of violence. Brutal acts committed by cartel members, in fact, are not only important as a local display of strength. With the diffusion of Internet, in fact, their reproduction has become as much a tool of psychological warfare as an integral part of the narcocultura. In the past, cartels had also profited from traditional channels, by devoting attention to timing to guarantee that specific time slots of local television news cover the murders.[17] The online presence of drug trafficking organisations, however, is increasingly important. The Internet has become a major battlefield in the information war, with its own offensives and counter-offensives[18], and cartels and vigilante groups have become its major actors, with the Mexican state present in a lesser degree[19].

Cartels, however, still do not have a vertically organised propaganda strategy, with a coherent graphic style, formalised structures and technical sophistication[20]. Most of the output consists in self-proclaimed cartel members and, in large part, in young men attracted by drug trafficking myths. Cartel online presence, then, is scattered, grassroots, and spontaneous. It is, thus, also more difficult to tackle. This is particularly true for social networks, with reports of cartel activity on Myspace, Youtube[21] and Facebook[22]. Cartel members have used all these online channels to convey threats of violence or pictures and videos of murders and massacres. Apart from mainstream social networks and media sites, moreover, cartel-specific news sites have sprung up, to avoid the self-imposed censorship of local newspapers and to capitalise on narcocultura’s increasing success. The foremost example is blogdelnarco.com, which, since its inception in 2010, has become one of Mexico’s most visited sites. Blog del Narco broadcasts gruesome pictures of murders and, most famously, videos of interrogations, usually featuring the torture and homicide of the hostage[23]. In this way, cartel members humiliate the victim, as well as the rival cartels; they spread fear among their affiliates and show how the government is weak, if the victim is a police officer.

Outside commentators often define violence in the Mexican cartel war as “meaningless”. This assertion, as we have seen, is hardly true. Violence, first, serves as a way of settling disputes and punishing. This is not its only function, though. From the cartel’s perspective, violence is most effective when rival cartels, government forces, and the local population get to know that cartel justice has stricken. The communication of violence, thus, is an essential part of the act of kidnapping, torturing, or killing. As drug trafficking organisations lack the communication strategy and hierarchy that terrorist groups retain, every affiliate or group of affiliates participates in the larger information war, by acting, by leaving messages, and by broadcasting them via television or the Internet. The combined effect of this phenomenon is to sow confusion among those who fight the cartels and to establish a climate of constant, ever-lasting fear among a paralysed population.

 

Joe Atkins is an MA student in Latin American Studies. His interest in the Mexican drug war stems from an older fascination for Mexican culture and literature. He is also studying welfare and politics in the Central American countries.

 

Notes:

[1] Paulina Villegas, Experts Reject Official Account of How 43 Mexican Students Were Killed, New York Times, Sep. 6, 2015. Available on http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/experts-reject-official-account-of-how-43-mexican-students-vanished.html, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[2] Ed Vulliamy, One year ago, 43 Mexican students were killed. Still, there are no answers for their family, The Guardian, Sep. 20, 2015. Available on http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/20/mexico-43-killed-students-, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[3] Brianna Lee, Mexico’s Drug War, Council for Foreign Relations, March 5, 2014. Available on http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[4] George W. Grayson, Threat Posed by Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute, Sep. 2011.

[5] Howard Campbell, Narco-Propaganda in the Mexican “Drug War”. An Anthropological Perspective, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 195, Vol. 41 No. 2, March 2014, p. 64.

[6] Randal C. Archibold, Victims of Massacre in Mexico Said to Be Migrants, New York Times, Aug. 25, 2010. Available on http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/world/americas/26mexico.html, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[7] Adam C. Estes, Mexico’s Tales of Bus Passengers Forced to Fight to Death, The Wire, Jun. 14, 2011. Available on http://www.thewire.com/global/2011/06/gladiator-death-fights-mexico-drug-war/38812/#disqus_thread, accessed on February 4, 2016.

[8] Simon Rogers, Mexico’s drug war visualized, The Guardian, Jan 31, 2012. Available on http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/graphic/2012/jan/31/mexico-drug-war-visualised, accessed on February 5, 2016.

[9] BBC News, Mexico violence: Monterrey police find 49 bodies, 13 May 2012. Available on http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18052540, accessed on February 5, 2016.

[10] Ioan Grillo, Special Report – Mexico’s Zetas rewrite drug war in blood, May 23, 2012. Available on http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mexico-drugs-zetas-idUKBRE84M0MF20120523, accessed on February 5, 2016.

[11] Campbell, p. 64.

[12] A facilitating condition of the increase in cartel-related deaths has been the diminishing costs of killers-to-hire. Estimates of a killer’s pay for a single murder in 2001 were in the range of $12.000; in 2011, cartels paid from $500 to $650 per month for indeterminate killings and other acts of violence. Paul Rextor Kan, Cartels at War, Washington, D.C., Potomac Books, 2012, p. 26.

[13] Kan, p. 29.

[14] BBC News, Human heads dumped in Mexico bar, 7 September 2006. Available on http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/5322160.stm, accessed on February 5, 2016.

[15] America Y. Guevara, Propaganda in Mexico’s Drug War, Journal of Strategic Security, 6, no. 3, 2013, p. 138.

[16] Campbell, pp. 65-66.

[17] Campbell, p. 65.

[18] Robert J. Bunker, The Growing Mexican Cartel and Vigilante War in Cyberspace, Small Wars Journal, Nov. 2011, pp. 1-4.

[19] Guevara, p. 150.

[20] Sarah Womer, Robert J. Bunker, Sureños gangs and Mexican cartel use of social networking sites, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21:1, 2010, pp. 91-92.

[21] Womer, Bunker, pp. 86-89.

[22] Juan-Camilo Castilo, The Mexican Cartels’ employment of Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) as tools of Asymmetrical Warfare, University of Kwazulu-Natal, 2014, p. 4.

[23] Campbell, pp. 68-70.

It's time for Colombia's President to stop poisoning his people

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By Victoria Fontan:

Papaya damaged by glyphosate. Photo by Orlando Velez
Papaya damaged by glyphosate fumigations in Policarpa. Photo by Orlando Velez

President Santos has championed a change in strategy in the ‘War on Drugs’, yet he continues to allow glyphosate fumigations in parts of Colombia.

Since he came to power in 2010, Colombia’s President Santos has been a strong supporter of a change in the international strategy against drugs. Up till now the strategy has been the so-called ‘War on Drugs’ that was initiated by the United States throughout Latin America in the early 1970s. Taking advantage of the debate surrounding the use of marijuana in the US, Santos was the first serving Latin-American president to call for an international dialogue on how to re-orient the global strategy against drugs away from the criminalisation of farmers, users, and small dealers. In a famous speech in December 2012, he said that if his son were to become a drug addict, the last place he would want him to end up would be in prison. For him, drugs are a public health issue that needs to be addressed systemically: at home, regionally and internationally. Santos’ questioning of the War on Drugs was soon followed by other leaders in the region, who also expressed the urgent need for a change of strategy.

Santos has also been committed to building sustainable peace in Colombia. Negotiations with the country’s largest guerrilla force, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), were initiated in 2012, and the potential for negotiations are currently being explored with the Army of National Liberation (ELN). This willingness to negotiate marks a clear break from the Presidency of ultra-conservative Alvaro Uribe, who was the strongest supporter of US policies in the region, as well as the arch-enemy of the FARC. Many were favourably surprised by Santos’ reopening of the peace process, since Santos was originally believed to be one of Uribe’s biggest supporters as his Defence Minister.

One can say that there are two Colombias within one territory: first, there is the Colombia of the big urban centres such as Cali, Medellin and Bogota. There, the armed conflict is hardly present: it has been steadily replaced by rising urban violence issues. In those important cities, President Santos’ policies have been met with enthusiasm. In the other Colombia, the rural and disenfranchised one, the reality could not be more different. In fact, some are asking if there has even been a change of government since Uribe, because their reality has not changed on the ground.

In the village of Policarpa, in the Nariño province bordering Ecuador, the population says it is living in a time capsule of the Uribe years. There, the golden years of the infamous Plan Colombia are still in effect. Originated in 2000 by the Clinton administration, Plan Colombia was supposed to eradicate the coca plantations using a powerful herbicide agent supplied by US company Monsanto: glyphosate. As soon as the campaign started, then president Pastrana transformed it into a counterinsurgency campaign that climaxed during the Uribe years, displacing thousands of farmers and killing hundreds. Last September, after a five-year interruption, the fumigations of glyphosate started again. Colombia is now the only country in the world where fumigations against illicit crops are still taking place.

In October, the farmers of Policarpa decided to organise themselves against what they refer to as government persecution, which often has nothing to do with illicit coca plantations. Eusebio Ramirez Caicedo calls it a crime against nature and people. On October 18th, the police came to his farm armed to the teeth, shot at people with real bullets, forcing them to flee. He stayed nonetheless and was fumigated soon after, with his crops of sweetcorn and beans. Displaying white scars over his face and arms, he explains that he has since had difficulty breathing and eyesight problems.

The fumigation was carried out by US-based company Dyncorps, infamous for its staff’s involvement in human trafficking in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its supplying of child dancers to officials in Afghanistan. The chemical agent that was used against Eusebio’s farm, glyphosate, is renowned for the detrimental effects it has on public health. Studies have demonstrated that glyphosate alters the process through which cellular division occurs, causing cancer and congenital malformations among the populations it touches.

The occurrence of congenital malformations since the last fumigations five years ago have dramatically increased in and around Policarpa. Children are born without functioning legs, without brains, with cardiac malformations, crystal bones, or without limbs. Adults are suffering from cancer, and respiratory diseases. They know that the effects of the current fumigations will be felt for years to come. Just over a month ago, eighty-year-old Maria Eugenia Acevedo Aguilar was fumigated with all her family. After they all ran in different directions, she lost them. Since then, she has been searching for them throughout the region. She lost sight in one of her eyes and has difficulty breathing, she feels completely lost and does not understand what her bean plantations had to do with Plan Colombia. She is now homeless and lives in the streets of Policarpa.

Plan Colombia has been controversial for this very reason: by combining fumigations with counterinsurgency it leads to the victimisation of the population through death, injury or displacement. In fact, legal scholars and practitioners are increasingly arguing that it violates International Humanitarian Law, potentially making Colombia liable before the International Criminal Court.

It is true that illicit coca plantations are also being fumigated, yet the effects it has on local populations could be averted if the eradications were carried out by hand. This particular point was negotiated with the FARC at the peace talks in Havana, and announced as being resolved on May 16th 2014. Since this particular point has been ‘resolved’, why did the fumigations resume in September?

On the day when the local farmers decided to organize themselves last month, the local mayor was nowhere to be seen. He had even invited the population to attend another meeting, where they would allegedly be able to register for compensation as victims of the armed conflict, something they had been waiting for since the Law of Victims came into effect in 2012. Despite this political move, more than 650 farmers attended the meeting, looking for answers from both the local and the national government.

What they want is to get out of the Uribe-years time capsule. They want the fumigations to stop as soon as possible, the eradication of coca to be by hand, and, when it applies, to be offered alternatives to the cultivation of coca. It is time for Plan Colombia to stop victimising local people, and for President Santos to treat the plight of alleged coca farmers as a public health issue. The people of Policarpa should be granted the same rights as Santos wants for his son.

Damaged plantain. Photo by Orlando Velez
Damaged plantain in Policarpa. Photo by Orlando Velez

Dr. Victoria Fontan is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Pontificia Javeriana Universidad Cali, Colombia; and Director of the MA Program in Human Rights and the Culture of Peace. She is also currently a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.