Warfare

Ethics for the AI-Enabled Warfighter – The Human ‘Warrior-in-the-Design’

June 13, 2019 by J. Zhanna Malekos Smith

by J. Zhanna Malekos Smith

14 June 2019

(U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Shannon E. Renfroe/Released)

Can a victor truly be crowned in the great power competition for artificial intelligence? According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, “whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” But the life of a state, much like that of a human being, is always subject to shifts of fortune. To illustrate, let’s consider this fabled ancient tale. At a lavish banquet King Croesus asked Solon of Athens if he knew anyone more fortunate than Croesus; to which Solon wisely answered: “The future bears down upon each one of us with all the hazards of the unknown, and we can only count a man happy when the gods have granted him good fortune to the end.” Thus, to better prepare the U.S. for sustainable leadership in AI innovation and military ethics, I recommend a set of principles to guide human warfighters in employing lethal autonomous weapon systems — armed robots.

Sustainable Leadership

By 2035, the Department expects to have ground forces teaming up with robots. The discussion on how autonomous weapon systems should responsibly be integrated with human military elements, however, is slowly unfolding. As Congress begins evaluating what the Defense Department should do, it must also consider preparing tomorrow’s warfighters for how armed robots will test military ethics.

As a beginning point of reference, Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics require: (1) a robot must not harm humans; (2) a robot must follow all instructions by humans, except if following those instructions would violate the first law; and (3) a robot must protect itself, so long as its actions do not violate the first or second laws. Unfortunately, these laws are silent on how human ethics apply here. Thus, my research into autonomous weapon systems and ethical theories re-imagines Asimov’s Laws and offers a new code of conduct for servicemembers.

What is a Code of Conduct?

Fundamentally, it is a set of beliefs on how to behave. Each service branch teaches members to follow a code of conduct like the Soldier’s Creed and Warrior Ethos, the Airman’s Creed, and the Sailor’s Creed. Reflected across these distinct codes, however, is a shared commitment to a value-system of duty, honor, and integrity, among others.

Drawing inspiration from these concepts and several robotics strategy assessments by the Marine Corps and Army, I offer a guiding vision — a human Warrior-in-the-Design Code of Conduct.

The Warrior-in-the-Design concept embodies both the Defense Directive that autonomous systems be designed to support the human judgment of commanders and operators in employing lethal force, and Human Rights Watch’s definition of human-out-of-the-loop weapons (i.e., robots that can select targets and apply force without human input or interaction.

The Warrior-in-the-Design Code of Conduct for Servicemembers:

“I am the Warrior-in-the-Design;
Every decision to employ force begins with human judgment;
I verify the autonomous weapon systems target selection before authorizing engagement, escalating to fully autonomous capabilities when necessary as a final resort;
I will never forget my duty to responsibly operate these systems for the safety of my comrades and to uphold the law of war;
For I am the Warrior-in-the-Design.”

These principles encourage integrating AI and armed robots in ways that enhance — rather than supplant — human capability and the warrior psyche in combat. Furthermore, it reinforces that humans are the central figures in overseeing, managing, and employing autonomous weapons.

International Developments

Granted, each country’s approach to developing autonomous weapons will vary. For instance, Russia’s military expects “large unmanned ground vehicles [to do] the actual fighting … alongside or ahead of the human fighting force.” Based on China’s New Generation Plan, it aspires to lead the world in AI development by 2030 - including enhanced man-machine coordination and unmanned systems like service robots.

So far, the U.S. has focused on unmanned ground systems to support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations. The Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is currently testing how AI can support the military in fighting fires and predictive maintenance tasks. Additionally, President Trump’s Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence encourages government agencies to prioritize AI research and development. Adopting the Warrior-in-the-Design Code of Conduct is a helpful first-step to supporting this initiative.

How?

It would signal to private industry and international peers that the U.S. is committed to the responsible development of these technologies and to upholding international law. Some critics object to the idea of ‘killer robots’ because they would lack human ethical decision-making capabilities and may violate moral and legal principles. The Defense Department’s response is two-fold: First, the technology is nowhere near the advancement needed to operate fully autonomous weapons, the ones that could — hypothetically, at least — examine potential targets, evaluate how threatening they are, and fire accordingly. Second, such technological capabilities could help save the lives of military personnel and civilians, by automating tasks that are “dull, dirty or dangerous” for humans.

Perhaps this creed concept could help bridge the communication divide between groups that worry such weapons violate human dignity, and servicemembers who critically need automated assistance on the battlefield. The future of AI bears down upon each of us — let reason and ethics guide us there.

This article was originally published in The Hill

Jessica ‘Zhanna’ Malekos Smith, the Reuben Everett Cyber Scholar at Duke University Law School, served as a Captain in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Before that, she was a post-doctoral fellow at the Belfer Center’s Cyber Security Project at the Harvard Kennedy School. She holds a J.D. from the University of California, Davis; a B.A. from Wellesley College, where she was a Fellow of the Madeleine Korbel Albright Institute for Global Affairs; and is finishing her M.A. with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Europe’s Greatest Gamblers: Anticipating Wars of the Future and Why European Leaders Are Choosing to Ignore Such Possibilities

August 15, 2018 by James M R Thorp

Anticipating war is out of fashion, yet the potential destruction and impact on global society of a major war are huge.

By James M R Thorp

Soldiers from Poland’s 6th Airborne Brigade and the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, during The Poland-led multinational exercise Anakonda-16 (Credit image: KACPER PEMPEL/REUTERS)

Back in February, Elisabeth Braw wrote an article for POLITICO titled, ‘Europe isn’t ready to face modern threats’. Braw’s case is that NATO is ‘preparing for the wrong war’ and needs to ‘become more creative in defending against hybrid attacks’. ‘[H]ybrid’, a term coined by Frank Hoffman, is defined as incorporating ‘a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts… and criminal disorder’ acting at ‘all levels of war.’[1] Braw’s point that Russia and China have the will and ability ‘to bring a country to a standstill long before a conventional war takes place’ is one that is only just being heeded; for a start, the rate of cyber-attacks has increased dramatically in the last couple of years.[2] But Braw’s article misses the greater issue at hand: Western policies, economics, and its way of life all rely on the notion that war between the leading states of the world is no longer a real possibility. So, not only is the West unprepared for modern ‘hybrid’ threats, as Braw states, but it is almost entirely unprepared for any type of modern major conflict, even a conventional one.

But how likely is such a war and why has that possibility been ignored? Firstly, the world today is increasingly unstable: it faces a resurgent Russia, an unpredictable North Korea, and a ‘Thucydides Trap’ in the form of an increasingly dominant China, which is expanding its power and influence through measures such as building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Secondly, it may be that the US is globally dominant, and any major war would inevitably involve it, but it is rare to find someone who would solidly wager that such a major war (involving the US) would break out in the next five, or even ten, years. Yet, by looking at the case of the UK in the 1860-1910s – like the US now – the UK was globally dominant yet its share of global GDP was declining compared to its rivals, leading to a competition that culminated in the First World War - it is only rational to assume a similar situation could arise by the late 2020s.[3] Despite this, we continue to live in an age where the idea of ‘permanent peace’ is prevalent.

The moral, ethical, economic, and systematic structures that were formed after 1945, a world system dominated by the US and the West, has led to a decrease in conventional war and direct military confrontation; which in turn has led to a widespread global illusion – in the West especially – that the peace is prevalent and violence has been mostly eliminated. In reality, violence has been suppressed; human psychology has not changed enough since we formed as a species for us to have suddenly become incapable of violence. We have and always will be biologically and psychologically capable of both violence and peace, regardless of our moral and ethical systems.[4]

Europe unequivocally relies on the stability of this post-1945 order to remain safe and prosperous. Yet, with President Trump’s unpredictability, largely unknown agenda and open condemnation of NATO, Europe can no longer rely on the US to lead and remain a bastion of deterrence. The US itself stands highly divided, to the extent that the small, but genuine, chance of a second American civil war has become a talking-point amongst some security experts.[5] Similarly, Europe and the EU also stand divided, with waves of nationalism sweeping through, particularly in Austria, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. If one is to consider global issues that will greatly impact Europe, climate change is an existential threat that has the potential to violently destroy not just the post-1945 order, but our global society as we know it.[6] But, after the US pulled out of the Paris Climate Accord in 2017, neither can Europe rely on the US to lead us through that, nor is there much evidence to show that anyone in Europe is realistically stepping up to the challenge.

Then, in spite of these weaknesses among its members, NATO on the one hand is a powerful alliance with over three million troops and around ten thousand tanks, making it a force that is certainly to be reckoned with. But on the other hand, this force is significantly weakened by certain factors. As a fighting force weapons systems are disparate, for example 20 different types of fighter aircraft are used; in-theatre hierarchies and command systems are unclear [7]; and most importantly, there exists an adversary with capability to exploit NATO’s ‘Article 5’, by obfuscating whether a member state has been attacked by another state[8]. Then, despite NATO’s European Reassurance/Deterrence Initiative and the very recently announced ‘Four Thirties’ Plan, defence spending across member states has dramatically reduced over the past decade or two and it remains to be seen whether defence spending promises will be kept.

Perhaps most important of all is one of the key lessons taught to us by the father of modern military strategy, Carl von Clausewitz: that chance is an intrinsic feature of war[9], and because war is, in his words, a ‘continuation of policy with other means’, so too then is politics affected by chance[10]. If chance cannot be eliminated, it follows that the possibility of any type of war can never be eliminated from political interaction. On top of that, wars of a more ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey zone’ nature have become, and will continue to be, an even greater possibility.[11]

Some European leaders may have taken certain measures to prepare for a major modern war, including promises to achieve or come close to the two percent of GDP expenditure benchmark on defence. But are such promises little more than lip-service to NATO and the USA, with only four nations in Europe achieving the benchmark last year?[12] If one considers that the world’s population has grown faster than exponentially[13], leading to massive urbanisation – two-thirds of the world’s population in cities by 2040 –, it becomes entirely probable that a modern major war would be indiscriminate and catastrophic.[14] Then consider what this article has highlighted regarding the likelihood of such a war. Taking this combined consideration, it then follows that despite NATO’s usually significant efforts, defence measures by European leaders are not nearly enough, that most politicians are repeatedly betting on war not occurring and the European public are kept blissfully unaware of a perilous future. Meanwhile, the stakes remain high, and the gamble is at the greatest level.

James is a recent MA Intelligence & International Security candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He graduated in January 2018 and is currently based in both Suffolk and London. You can find him on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-thorp-280595/

Notes:

[1] Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21^st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington, Virginia: Potomac Institute of Policy Studies, December 2007), p. 8.

[2] Cyber-attacks increased by double in 2017, with Russia the main source of activity, see ‘Cyber-attack Volume Doubled in First Half of 2017’, Infosecurity, 11 August 2017.

[3] Look at the graph on page 335 and then go to pages 338-340, see Ian Morris, What Is War Good For: The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, from Primates to Robots, (London: Profile Books, 2015), p. 335 & pp. 338-340.

[4] Steven Pinker, in his seminal work, ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’, highlights this inner battle within humans, who ‘are equipped with five distinct motives of violence, and four faculties that allow them to inhibit or avoid violence’, see Steven Pinker, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined’

[5] See Chris Arkenberg, ‘What a new U.S. civil war might look like’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017 & Lt. Col. Robert F. McTague, ‘Some thoughts on how we might get from where we’re at now to a Second Civil War’, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2017.

[6] For the NATO special report on this, see ‘Special Report: The Importance of Climate Change for Transatlantic Security’, NAOC, 29 November 2017, also see Steven Jermy, ‘Perfect Storm?’, Russian International Affairs Council, 12 August 2013.

[7] This was displayed very clearly within ISAF in Afghanistan: ISAF was a coalition made up from NATO members and due to inequal commitments, cultural differences and (often) incompatible caveats a potentially unified command structure was fractured - information taken from lecture by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jonathan Riley, King’s College London, 17^th November 2016. See also Kathleen J. McInnis, ‘Lessons in coalition warfare: Past, present and implications for the future.’ International Politics Reviews, 1.2 (2013), pp. 78-82.

[8] Russia’s ‘little green men’ in Ukraine being a case in point, see Robert R. Leonhard and Stephen P. Philips, “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Special Operations Command, 2015), p. 3 & 43.

[9] Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 7. University Press

[10] ibid, p. 30.

[11] For “grey zone” see United States Special Operations Command White Paper: The Gray Zone, September 2015, p. 1.

[12] Only France, Greece, Poland and Romania spent over 2% of GDP on defence in 2017, see ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’.

[13] Simon Lewis & Mark Maslin, The Human Planet: How We Created the Anthropocene, (London: Penguin, 2018), pp. 6-7.

[14] ‘The Future of War: the new Battlegrounds’, The Economist, 25 January 2018.

Image Source: https://www.newsweek.com/europeans-are-quietly-preparing-war-russia-487307

The Challenge of Operational Assessment in Contemporary Conflict

February 19, 2017 by Noah Cooper

By: Noah Cooper

1990-91: General Norman Schwarzkopf talks with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a press conference regarding the Gulf War.

The immutable nature of war suggests that despite the form of warfare undertaken by the belligerents, conflict is a duel between opponents vying to subdue the other. The type of war dictates the character of the conflict and is subject to the myriad variables that influence its dynamics. For instance, there are characteristics of counterinsurgency that are distinctive to this form of warfare not typically present in conventional or violent conflicts waged between states or state-like entities (e.g., the demonstration of movement and maneuver techniques by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant [ISIL] employing captured Iraqi military equipment demonstrates that the execution of conventional warfare is no longer the purview of states).

A particularly prominent difference among the aforementioned styles of warfare is the methodologies employed to assess the progression of the military campaign. Logically, the use of quantifiable metrics dominates the assessment practices by entities engaged in conventional war. Commencing from the estimated enemy order-of-battle, or the assessed organization, disposition, and strength of its fighting forces developed through the intelligence process, battlefield commanders simply subtract the number of enemy assets destroyed or rendered inoperable. The practice of assessment in this type of environment, though iterative, ultimately seeks an end state consisting of the attrition of the enemy fighting force to a point that the opposing force renders it combat ineffective. In this scenario, the force focuses operationally on the attainment of military objectives and thus, operates relatively independent of the political goals of the campaign. Operation Desert Storm - the military means designed to respond to Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait - illustrates this assertion. The well-defined purposes of the U.S. strategy to contend with Iraqi aggression facilitated an approach to attack the enemy’s military centers of gravity (i.e. leadership, infrastructure, and military forces) and to thus, focus on the military objectives of the campaign. The decisive victory of U.S. and Coalition Forces and the assessed attrition of Iraqi forces, particularly along the termed “Highway of Death,” contributed to the decision to declare a cease-fire, 100 hours following the initiation of the ground campaign. In this instance, the quantifiable assessment of military action was the principal element guiding the decision-making processes.

In contrast, the assessment of progress in counterinsurgency or “hybrid” warfare, such as the conflict waged against ISIL, is more challenging, as the intertwining of the desired political and military goals complicates the evaluative process. Commanders, in conjunction with their political counterparts, must contrive means to assess simultaneously the attrition of enemy forces, the population’s allegiance, and the overall stability of provinces, districts, cities, etc. This includes the appraisal of various measures of effectiveness that are criteria that an organization employs to assess changes in a system, or in the case of conflict, alterations to the operating environment. Indicators of changes in a counterinsurgency or hybrid setting, similar to those analyzed in conventional warfare, are often quantifiable and thus, defined and measured in a straightforward fashion. For instance, efforts to effect an insurgent organization’s sources of financing might include the targeted destruction of oil and gas facilities to degrade the enemy’s financial networks. In this scenario, a commander’s staff would fuse operational and intelligence information to include the number of facilities, equipment, and personnel successfully targeted; the total number of hours of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets levied to identify these targets; and the enemy’s estimated reaction, ascertained from intelligence analysis, to determine if such an effort is contributing to a stated objective.

Conversely, other indicators of change are not conveniently calculable, such as the enemy’s will to prolong the fight, the strength of the enemy’s narrative, and the level of entrenchment of the adversary’s ideology into the population, among others. These are challenging measures to determine, particularly in the current conflict waged against ISIL, in which the primary contributions of Coalition Forces are enabling assets (i.e., specialized military capabilities to include intelligence collection, precision artillery, and, most notably, aerial strikes), rather than ground forces to interact directly in the operating areas. Acquiring a knowledge of these elements will advance a commander’s knowledge of the effects of the campaign more effectively than transparent metrics.

Why then, do the assessments of progress reflect that of a conventional conflict (e.g., numbers of strikes conducted, enemy equipment destroyed, and territory regained)? Perhaps the obvious answer is the minimal presence of coalition ground troops, which marginalizes the coalition’s ability to develop a first-hand knowledge of the operating environment. However, this condition should not absolve those prosecuting the war from conducting a continuous and detailed analysis of the campaign’s progress that relies primarily on numeric facts. The appeal of employing quantifiable effects is the definitive nature of the data. For example, a quantity of enemy removed from the battlefield subtracted from the originally assessed number of fighters yields an amount that is easy to comprehend and thus, to incorporate in gauging the effectiveness of friendly force activities. Undeniably, the responsibilities of command are such that the availability of quantifiable metrics eases decision-making, as such, data, derived from mathematical calculations, acts to reduce ambiguity. However, the logic of such conclusions is not always concrete and metrics are often misleading. Were the fighters easily replaced foot soldiers or were they specialists (e.g., bomb-maker, sniper, financier, etc.), which are not replaced easily? Accurate assessments require the synthesis of such metrics with qualitative examinations of the enemy and friendly actions. Without such rigor, a commander and a war fighting staff will be unable to measure the mission accurately and that will undoubtedly affect the campaign’s outcome.

Noah Cooper is an MA candidate in the War in the Modern World Program at King’s College London. He received an MA from John’s Hopkins University and is an active duty U.S. Army officer. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Image source: http://www.achievement.org/achiever/general-h-norman-schwarzkopf/

Book Review: Belfast to Benghazi

October 10, 2016 by Andrea Varsori

Reviewed by: Andrea Varsori

Rupert Wieloch, Belfast to Benghazi: Untold challenges of war, (Cirencester: Mereo Books), 2016; ISBN-13: 978-1861515667

War is a notoriously complex event. It impacts the life of thousands of individuals, each of which with her own different perspective on the conflict. For this reason, personal records are invaluable in helping to grasp the multifaceted reality of war. Rupert Wieloch’s book, Belfast to Benghazi, is important in this respect. It is an account of contemporary conflict through the eyes of a British officer. The author aims at telling his experience, as he hopes that “this book [may open] eyes on some unheralded escapades”, as well as adding “colour to some historical events”^[1]. Thus, the book eschews the theoretical debates of academia as well as the short-term attitude of the daily news cycle. The book is a detailed account of Wieloch’s experiences. During his military career, he took part in some of the most important deployments of the British Army in the last thirty years.

Each of the six chapters focuses on a particular operation and, more briefly, on the years in-between. The first chapter relates Wieloch’s activity as a Rifle Platoon Commander in Belfast in 1981. The second deals with his deployment in Cyprus in 1989 and his involvement in the Gulf War, dealing with the logistical effort as well as with the actions of his men in Kuwait. The third chapter reports his squadron’s deployment in Maglaj, Bosnia, in 1995. The second half of the book is instead devoted to the post-9/11 world. Wieloch details his contribution in shaping the United Kingdom’s response to 9/11, in the frantic last months of 2001, as a member of the “concept team” that operated between Shrivenham and Whitehall for Operation Veritas. After experiencing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he volunteered for the role of Commander of the British contingent and Chief of Staff of the NATO Mission in Baghdad, serving in the place for six months in 2008. In his last role, he acted as Senior British Military Commander in Libya, starting some days before the death of Gheddafi until April 2012.

Throughout the book, Wieloch consistently delivers a detailed report of the events in which he was involved. However, care in relating his activity may at times seem excessive, as the author is keen on including several small, isolated episodes in his narration. These episodes are sometimes hardly necessary, other than for completeness’ sake. Yet, those who are interested in the campaigns in which Wieloch was involved will surely be drawn to understanding how his regiment contributed to each particular operation. For instance, with regard to Northern Ireland, the account covers such important aspects as the organisation of patrols in West Belfast^{^[2]}, the importance of collecting intelligence from the population^{^[3]}, and the reaction to terrorist attacks^{^[4]}. Besides the less important anecdotes, a positive aspect of the book lies in avoiding becoming a romanticised autobiography or an overly ambitious reflection on abstract concepts. Opting instead for sharing with the reader the real tasks and options for a British officer in conflict.

The completeness of Weiloch’s account includes not only the facts, but also a heathy degree of criticism, whose object changes depending on the areas and activities narrated. In chapter 3, he reveals the corruption and vanity of Bosnian politicians^{^[5]}; in the chapter on the post-9/11, he notes the reluctance of British policymakers in accepting changes to potentially wrong decisions on which their minds are already set (for instance, the importance of capturing Osama Bin Laden^{^[6]}). The overwhelming influence of the United States on Whitehall’s stance since late October 2001 is also duly noted^{^[7]}. In the chapter on Iraq, the inadequacies in managing post-conflict reconstruction take centre stage^{^[8]}. While Wieloch underlines the positive results in providing military training to Iraqi security forces, he also consistently points out the inefficiency and setbacks of the British presence in Basra^{^[9]}. Finally, in the chapter on Libya, the author explains how the government’s choice of not recognising the presence of British troops on the ground (choice on which the author does not express any judgement) nonetheless meant that the British contingent was formally without budget or mail deliveries.

Weiloch maintains a clear, coherent writing style with a critical drive. Despite covering a varied range of activities, such as managing humanitarian operations, shaping policy response, or coordinating entire military missions. As a result, the book equally reveals a view from the inside of policy-making and military management. The attempt to translate policy or mission objectives into a set of actions and practices clashes often with the reality on the ground. Wieloch has thus to face the need to take into account local powerbrokers (as in Bosnia^{^[10]}), to request vital new equipment for his soldiers (as in Iraq^{^[11]} and Afghanistan^{^[12]}), or to consider the role of culture and religion in engaging with the local elites and population (as in Libya^{^[13]}).

This last point is particularly emblematic. In the chapter on Libya, the author underlines how essential for him was the familiarity with local culture, religion, and political practices. In this way, Wieloch effectively conveys the fundamental importance of knowing the people that are involved in conflict. The book emphasises this stance and supports it with real examples, leading us to forgive its several small digressions. By doing this, Wieloch also gives an advice that will be helpful for many commanders in the wars to come. As for the book on its whole, another aspect of its importance lies in the disclosure of the complex work of those who operate between politically-dictated strategy and action on the ground. As the wide range of operations of the British Army goes often unrecognised, Belfast to Benghazi may raise the public’s awareness of the difficult work of officers and of the multifaceted role of the armed forces in the world today.

Andrea is an MPhil candidate at the Department of War Studies. His research project focuses on security issues in mega-cities of the Global South: in particular, he is interested in understanding the role of the urban environment in shaping organized political violence. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus from the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include the evolution of insurgency, urban riots, the crisis of classic state sovereignty, civil wars and, generally, all forms of global mayhem.

Notes:

^{^[1]} R. Wieloch, Belfast to Benghazi. Untold challenges of war, Cirencester, Mereo Books, 2016, IV-V.

^{^[2]} Ibid. pp. 6-8, 11-12.

^{^[3]} Ibid. pp. 9-10. Interestingly, a similar point is raised later in the chapter on Bosnia. Talking profusely with the local population is presented as paramount in securing the inhabitants’ respect and ensuring the regiment’s freedom of movement. ibid. p. 109.

^{^[4]} Ibid. pp. 18-23.

^{^[5]} Ibid. pp. 95, 103, 118.

^{^[6]} Ibid. p. 151.

^{^[7]} Ibid. p. 159.

^{^[8]} Ibid. p. 194.

^{^[9]} Ibid. pp. 198-199, 207-208. A point emphasised by Wieloch in these pages is the effect of the high turnout of soldiers in the city, which “prevented the British forces from developing the meaningful relationships” that would have avoided a hike in insecurity and insurgent attacks.

^{^[10]} Ibid. pp. 99-100, 104-105, 107.

^{^[11]} Ibid. pp. 199-200.

^{^[12]} Ibid. pp. 203-205.

^{^[13]} Ibid. pp. 247, 249-250, 288-89.

Image Credit: US Army Europe (2014), Available from: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usarmyeurope_images/14445596924 (Accessed Oct 10 2016)

PROXY Capabilities - A Renewed Strategy of the 21st Century

April 4, 2016 by Cheng Lai Ki

By: Cheng Lai Ki

Photo credit: Diaz,J. ‘Russia is developing a drone army – including amphibious models’, SPLOID, January 16, 2014.

This is the first of a series of articles we will be featuring on Strife in the coming week looking at the role of Proxy Warfare in the 21st century by Series Editor Cheng Lai Ki.

The technological advancements over the last decade have allowed for the development of new tactics and strategies for security, intelligence and warfare options. These ‘advancements’ have undoubtedly augmented multiple state capabilities within those domains. In his book, War Made New, military historian Max Boot charts the technological developments supporting warfare throughout human history.[1] Through the lens of the book, an argument can be made that mankind has consistently improved at one thing, warfare. However, a second consistency can be identified. This is an increase in the operational distance and capabilities of states. This phenomenon can be identified through modernised versions of traditional strategies or emerging technology centric methods. Regardless of the method employed, the warfare strategy for states to use either a willing third party actor or remote control ordinance can be categorised under the broader term: ‘proxy warfare’. This series explores this exact phenomenon and the collaboration between a state and its utilisation of non-state (or remote control) actors.

The term ‘proxy’ possesses multiple definitions depending on its associated strategy, tactic and theatre. Within the context of warfare, ‘proxy’ capabilities can be analysed against the three overarching levels of: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.[2] Expanding on the concept of ‘proxy’ capacities of both state and non-state actors has raised several debates over the decades, mainly around the areas of impacts, accountability, effectiveness and oversight. However, the objective here is not the deliberate these considerations but more to explore the broadening scope of ‘proxy’ capabilities themselves; which would range from large state level proxies to small individual private contractors or unmanned ordinances. When applied effectively, ‘proxy’ capabilities could provide benefits such as plausible deniability, increased distance from harm and the augmentation of existing skills. The utilisation of ‘proxies’ is however, not a new phenomenon and has been around for centuries. Its earliest form can be represented by mercenaries. Mercenaries were (and still are) groups of ex-soldiers who contract out their skills to lords and kings with a force-limitation in a certain domain.[3] The trend has only continued to expand and broaden in scale and associative categories through the years, leading to the development of the Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) and probably one of the most classic examples of ‘proxy’ warfare.[4] There are of course other forms, as mentioned, these can be in the forms of a remote control ordinance.

Strategically, ‘proxy’ capabilities can refer to the involvement of entire organisations (state or non-state) as an extension of power to influence distant geopolitics. Although the utilisation of a weaker state by a global super-power could be situated as a ‘proxy’ capability. Such partnerships could not just influence national security policies but also potentially the strategic considerations of other states. Operationally, ‘proxy’ capabilities would refer to the involvement of private organisations as either an extension of power or augmentation of existing capabilities. Traditionally, this can be represented by the involvement of corporate or non-state actors who provide security, intelligence or consultancy services to government agencies that would enhance existing capabilities. Within ‘operational’ domains, ‘proxies’ are fundamentally used to empower existing state-capabilities. For example, consider a state that wants to increase its capabilities to gather intelligence in inaccessible regions, they could deploy unmanned aerial vehicles or commonly referred to as drones for the conduct of surveillance operations.[5] Finally, on a tactical level, the effects of ‘proxy’ capabilities would have been the most evident. This can primarily be represented by the application of unmanned ordinances to tactically support military operations through the provision of critical and live battlefield information or fire support (i.e. Russian Uran-9 Ground Combat Drone).[6] More recently, the world has experience a surge in cyber augmented scenarios attributed to either supporting existing warfare capabilities or espionage operations conducted by states.

Despite the technological augmentations currently available to states, the concept of ‘proxy’ capabilities as explained earlier is not a new phenomenon. However, the number of capabilities that can be encompassed under the concept has now broadened; evident from efforts of awareness initiative such as the Remote Control Project – a project hosted by the Oxford Research Group stationed in London.[7] It is advisable that we under the notion and expansion of what can be considered ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. State-actors are obtaining more effective ordinances to arm their unmanned systems to conduct more effective information gathering and strike missions. Cybersecurity companies and security/intelligence agencies are collaborating with skilled non-state agents to empower their existing capabilities to tackle advanced persistent treats.

This series explores this consistently broadening cope of ‘proxy’ capabilities within the 21^st century and various associated issues towards their respective categories through a three-part series entirely written by Master students currently studying under the King’s College London, War Studies Department. Part One of the series addresses the most traditional form of ‘proxy’ capabilities of involving a third non-state actor to support existing state activities in conflict or contested zones. Gregory Wilson will kick off the series by exploring the role of Russian Private Military Companies and their involvement within pro-Russian activities within recent theatres.

Part Two of the series takes a further step back and explores the technologically enhanced hardware dimensions of ‘proxy’ capabilities through an analysis of surveillance techniques by Saher Naumaan; and followed by a study of the application of unmanned ordinances by various countries by Rian Whitton.

Part Three of the series finally embarks into the most recent form of ‘proxy’ capabilities available to states. Elmer Hernandez first bridges the gap between the physical and cyber realms by analysing how state agencies are collaborating with non-state ‘hackers’ to support their ongoing counter terrorist operations. Finally, this series wraps up with an analysis of the current Investigatory Powers Bill in the United Kingdom and the involvement of private telecommunication companies by Mustafa Batuhan Albas.

The objective of this series is to reveal the broad – and expanding – capabilities for state-actors to have their existing powers augmented through ‘proxy’ capabilities. With modernisation and technological advancements, the world in locked into a cycle of consistent change. These trends slowly distance the capability of states away from symmetrical and more towards asymmetrical strategies. It is therefore vital that we understand these expansive dimensions before it completely redefines state strategies in warfare, intelligence and geopolitics.

Formerly with the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng is currently reading for an MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s College London where his academic interest revolves around private military and security companies and their roles as security by proxy in the contemporary security theatre. During his military service, he was a senior tactical and operational instructor for the Armour Formation. He was the researcher and coordinator for the 2016 King’s College London Crisis Simulation that replicated tensions in the South China Sea.

[1] Boot, M. War Made New: Weapons, Warriors and the Making of the Modern World, (New York: Gotham Books), 2012.

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the Untied States, (25 March 2013).

[3] Singer, P. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized Military Industry, (New York: Cornel University Press), 2003.

[4] Kinsey, C. Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (New York: Routledge), 2006.

[5] Kreps, S & Kaag, J. Drone Warfare, (Cambridge: Polity), 2014.

[6] Mizokami, K., ‘The Kremlin’s Tiny Drone Tank Bristles With Weapons’, Popular Mechanics [Online], Available from: http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a18948/russias-new-ground-combat-drone-uran-9/, Accessed 26 March 2016.

[7] Remote Control Project, (London: Oxford Research Group) [Online], Available from: http://remotecontrolproject.org/about/, Accessed 12 March 2016.

Warfare

Footer

Contact

Recent Posts

Tags