Strife

The Academic Blog of the Department of War Studies, King's College London

You are here: Home / Archives for Yemen

Yemen

Perim: the strategic island that never was

by

By: James A. Fargher

perim-map

Despite lying in the middle of one of the world’s most critical choke points, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait between Djibouti and Yemen, the island of Perim is a remote and often forgotten outpost. Perim is located in the midst of the waterway which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden – the connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Throughout history, Perim has been fought over as a prize by great and regional powers alike in the belief that the island can be used as a gateway to the vital Suez shipping lane. Nevertheless, due in part to the island’s small size and its harsh climate, Perim has proven to be only marginally useful to the regional maritime powers. This article reviews Perim’s modern history, exploring the series of occasions in which powers have attempted unsuccessfully to turn the island into a ‘Gibraltar of the East.’

Perim is a fragment of an ancient volcano, part of a chain of long-dormant volcanos stretching across Africa and Arabia.[1] It lies in the middle of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, three kilometres from Arabia and twenty kilometres from Africa.[2] Perim has no source of fresh water, aside from occasional rainfalls, and it is located in one of the hottest and driest regions in the world.[3]

Perim was first scouted as a possible site for a castle by the Portuguese explorer and admiral Afonso de Albuquerque.[4] The Portuguese had launched a fleet into the Indian Ocean in an attempt to seize control of the lucrative Indian spice trade and in 1513 Afonso led his ships through Bab-el-Mandeb into the Red Sea. Failing to discover sources of fresh water on the island, the Portuguese abandoned their plans for building a fortress on Perim. By the end of the 16th century the Red Sea had fallen under the control of the Ottoman Turks.[5]

The possibility of establishing a naval base on Perim was next explored by the British East India Company in 1799.[6] Lieutenant-Colonel John Murray, commander of the 84th Regiment, was despatched by the Company from India to Perim with a force of three hundred men.[7] Following Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, the Company was anxious to control the line of communication between the Red Sea and India, and to forestall any French assault on the subcontinent. Like the Portuguese, Murray discovered that there were no sources of water to supply his troops.[8] Moreover, the artillery pieces at that time did not have the range needed to hit ships sailing through the western side of the Strait, so Perim could not be used to prevent a fleet exiting the Red Sea.[9] Six months after landing on Perim, Murray withdrew his force from the island to Aden.[10]

Following Murray’s failed expedition Perim was left unclaimed for nearly sixty years. Interest in the island was only revived when in 1854 the French engineer Fernand de Lesseps announced his plan to build a canal connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, a revolutionary project which when it was eventually completed in 1869 transformed the Red Sea into one of the world’s great oceanic highways. In response to rumoured French interest in the island and driven by the urgent need to construct a lighthouse, the British government despatched a warship to formally lay claim to Perim in 1857.[11] The legend goes that Perim was seized hours before the arrival of a French expedition, the morning after the British consul in Aden had deliberately gotten them drunk, an episode which one Victorian statesman described as a ‘bright ornament in the history of British naval enterprize [sic]’.[12] Indeed, Perim would remain a British possession for over a century until it was ceded to the People’s Republic of South Yemen in 1967.

Despite its timely capture and notwithstanding its location on the most important shipping and communication line in the British Empire, Perim did not prove to be a strategic asset for the British. Although a small detachment of Indian troops was garrisoned on the island and a lighthouse constructed, no fortifications were ever built on Perim. As the War Office concluded in a report in 1882, ‘no advantage would be gained by fortifying the island, although it is doubtless necessary to hold in order to prevent any other power taking it and converting it into a fortress.’[13] Moreover, even the latest artillery was unlikely to have the range necessary to stop ships from slipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.[14] For Britain, Perim was only valuable in so far as that owning the island ensured that it was denied to other rivals; only once was it assaulted when in 1916 a small Ottoman force unsuccessfully attempted to storm it.[15] Whilst a small coaling station did operate on the island between 1883 and the mid-1930s, this was purely a commercial enterprise and Royal Navy ships continued to refuel at the nearby imperial fortress of Aden.[16]

The only time in modern history that Perim has been used to blockade the southern entrance of the Red Sea came shortly after it was granted to South Yemen in the 1960s. After failing to secure a UN resolution guaranteeing free passage of Bab-el-Mandeb, Britain had left Perim in the hands of South Yemen, then under the control of the National Liberation Front (NLF).[17] A radical faction of the NLF occupied Perim in December 1967, and attempted to impose a blockade on Israeli tankers passing through the Strait.[18] Armed with only short-range artillery, however, NLF militants were unable to interdict Israeli shipping,[19] and an effective blockade was only implemented once Egypt joined in hostilities against Israeli during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In October that year, Egyptian troops armed with Soviet artillery pieces were deployed to the island, backed up with naval units.[20] These forces were able to briefly secure the Strait and block Israeli tankers from reaching Eilat, but the blockade was lifted shortly afterwards following a ceasefire.[21]

Since the October War, Perim has not been used as a strategic base. Despite its location in the middle of one of the world’s busiest shipping lines through which 3.4 million barrels of oil pass per day,[22] no state has truly been able to utilise the island’s supposed strategic potential. The lack of water and harsh climate has hampered efforts to establish large garrisons on Perim, as does the island’s small size. Moreover, only modern artillery has sufficient range to engage ships passing through the western strait, and attempting to sever such a vital artery of world trade would likely result in significant political repercussions. With Yemen currently embroiled in a bitter civil war and lacking in naval hardware, it also remains unlikely that Perim will be used as a base for power projection in the short to medium-term.

James A. Fargher is a Doctoral candidate in the Laughton Naval History Unit in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, specialising in British naval and Imperial history.

 

Notes:

[1] DIJ Mallick et. al., ‘Perim Island, a volcanic remnant in the southern entrance to the Red Sea,’ Geological Magazine 127:4 (1990): 309-318.

[2] Ibid.

[3] ftp://ftp.atdd.noaa.gov/pub/GCOS/WMO-Normals/TABLES/REG__I/D1/63125.TXT.

[4] RS Whiteway, The Rise of Portguese Power in India, 1497-1550 (London: Archibald Constable, 1899), 153-157.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Kenneth Panton, Historical Dictionary of the British Empire (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 406.

[7] H. M. Chichester, ‘Murray, Sir John, eighth baronet (1768?–1827)’, rev. Roger T. Stearn, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19633, accessed 19 June 2016].

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Speech to the House of Commons, 10 March 1884, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, vol. 285 (1884).

[13] Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General of India, 18 March 1886, Letter. In Anita Burdett, The Persian Gulf & Red Sea Naval Reports, vol. 6 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), 55.

[14] Sir E. Hertslet, ‘Memorandum on French and Italian Designs in the Red Sea and its immediate Neighbourhood,’ Foreign Office, 6 March 1882. In Steven Smith, ed., The Red Sea Region: Sovereignty, Boundaries & Conflict, 1839-1967, vol. 1. Arabian Geopolitics 6 Regional Documentary Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 99.

[15] MD Fontenoy, ‘British Control of Red Sea is Due to Coup by Governor,’ The Washington Post, 22 July 1916.

[16] Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, ‘Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to the Senior Naval Officer in the Red Sea, 1894, Orders.’ In Anita Burdett, The Persian Gulf & Red Sea Naval Reports, vol. 6 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), 586.

[17] Robert Aliboni, The Red Sea Region: Local Actors and the Superpowers (Routledge Library Editions: Politics of the Middle East).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Michael Binyon, ‘Egyptians say that Suez is cut off from Cairo and Observers are Blocked,’ Times, 26 October 1973.

[21] Drew Middleton, ‘Israel Sees Peril in Arab Decisions,’ The New York Times, 1 November 1974.

[22] Mohammed Mukhashaf, ‘Gulf Arabs wrest strategic Yemen island from Iran-allied group,’ Reuters, 5 October 2015.

 

 

The limits of US security cooperation in Jordan

by

By: Peter Kirechu

Barack_Obama_and_Abdullah_II
President Barack Obama Meets with King Abdullah II of Jordan in the Oval Office on 26 April, 2013. Source: Wikimedia.

The most notable feature of President Barack Obama’s partnership-based counterterrorism doctrine­–roughly defined–is its central focus on training and arming local security services to independently deal with emerging terrorism threats. The President’s doctrine is unfortunately fraught with inconsistent performance of US-trained security services, especially among fragile states in the Middle East and beyond. Whether in Iraq, Yemen, or Afghanistan, singular focus on capacity building within the security sector has failed to remedy the governance failures that fuel instability within the region.

In Jordan, the United States (US) enjoys a long history of sustained political, economic and military cooperation which dates back to 1951. However, since the self-styled Islamic State established a cross-border presence in Syria, concerns with the contagion of trained militants across Jordan’s borders have led to substantial increases in US security assistance. In February 2015, the United States expanded its annual aid to Jordan from $660 million to $1 billion. The funds were directed towards core counterterrorism priorities (border protection, C4ISR, quick-reaction airlift capabilities) and also the immediate humanitarian demands incurred by the Syrian refugee crisis.

Though the US-Jordanian security relationship is less fraught with discord when compared with other states in the region, this assessment slightly deceives a growing angst within the Jordanian public. Since the brutal loss of Jordanian pilot, Muath al-Kasaesbeh, to the Islamic State in 2014, the public is increasingly apprehensive of its government’s support of US policy prerogatives. The pilot’s death stood as a stark reminder of the costs paid by the Jordanian military–and the public writ large–in small part due to the government’s role within the US-led anti-Islamic State coalition.

Despite this fomenting anxiety, the United States appears squarely focused on the more proximate security threats borne by the Syrian conflict. But as the Salafi-Jihadist landscape evolves throughout the region, Jordan will remain an attractive target due to the available reservoir of disenchanted locals eager for a brighter economic future and resentful of the government’s stunted reforms. Unless the United States adopts a more balanced security assistance approach, one that emphasizes comprehensive governance reforms, the current policy will remain inadequate to the underlying causes of domestic instability.

Jihadist entreaties on a vulnerable public

Since 2013, Jordan has served as the training and staging ground for Syrian rebels battling the Islamic State in Southern Syria. This training effort has slowly expanded and now includes the provision of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) to various US-supported rebel factions. This covert effort proceeded under limited public scrutiny until the Islamic State’s capture and subsequent beheadings of several western journalists and aid workers. These gruesome executions ultimately triggered the US-led aerial bombing campaign against the jihadist group in both Iraq and Syria.

The Jordanian government joined the US effort, viewing its participation as a necessary measure aimed at shoring up Jordan’s national security. At the outset, the public’s response was initially quite supportive but subsequent research polls conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Studies revealed that a majority of respondents viewed the campaign as more beneficial to the United States, Israel and Iran, rather than to Jordan’s security and stability. Though Jordanians expressed early support for their government’s role within the coalition, many did not consider the country’s security interests under direct threat.

But once Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh was captured and gruesomely executed, his death elevated formerly muted discontent with Jordan’s role within the coalition. Those who not normally involve themselves with the ebbs and flows of foreign affairs found themselves participants in a growing conversation on the merits of their government’s continued involvement in the US-led coalition.

Nonetheless, the participation of roughly 2,200 Jordanian citizens in active battlefronts in Syria and Iraq underscores the government’s concerns with the return of trained militants who may seek to undermine the current governing order. As such, the government’s participation in the US-led coalition appears to be a reasonable response to the rising threat of both domestic and foreign militancy.

On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have banned cleric that are sympathetic to the Islamic State from delivering public sermons. Other measures include the release of some prominent Salafist clerics with the intent of enlisting their assistance in combatting jihadist rhetoric within the public domain. The government has also adopted a more repressive approach to public dissent, detaining Muslim Brotherhood members and introducing new amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law. These changes have criminalized the criticism of foreign countries and their leaders while permitting the prosecution of journalists and activists for speech-related crimes–as widely interpreted by the State Security Court.

The crackdown on public speech under the cover of combatting terrorism weighed heavily on Jordan’s decline from a ‘Partially Free’ to a ‘Not Free’ State according to the Freedom’s House Freedom in the World rankings. This ranking has endured since 2010 and is not likely to improve under current conditions. Unfortunately, the government’s embrace of these policy prerogatives harms the state’s long-term security by ignoring legitimate public grievances and broadening public apathy with stagnated reforms that were once viewed as a bulwark against domestic instability.

Crises of Socio-Economic Patronage

The Hashemite Kingdom’s most urgent economic ails are grounded in the patronage and subsidy system which secures the monarchy’s rule. Regime loyalty underscores the long-running history of generous welfare benefits accorded to East Banker tribes and the pervasive use of personal friendships and tribal relationships to secure professional positions throughout the government. The patronage system is particularly acute within some sectors of the security services, where political and personal relationships often supersede professional conduct and competency.

The unprecedented nine to ten percent increase of the overall Jordanian population as a result of Syrian refugees has pushed the import-heavy Jordanian government into further reliance on foreign financial aid. Through IMF, EU, and US financial support, the country’s budget deficits have narrowed though public debt remains at 90 percent and unemployment increased from 14 percent to 22 percent in 2014. Due to the government’s overdependence on a politically motivated patronage system, systemic reforms are anathema to those who have historically thrived under public benefits. Thus efforts to curb this reliance ultimately undermine the Monarchy’s ability to institute meaningful economic changes. Nonetheless, progress towards this difficult objective remains a worthwhile goal for Jordan’s overall security.

The international community’s traditional responses to Jordan’s precarious economic position often focus on broadening the country’s financial reserves through infusions of foreign aid. But as long as foreign direct investments serve as the preferred model of external financial support, the government should channel these funds towards economic activities that utilize the immense labor reserves offered by the refugee population and Jordan’s unemployed youth.

By adopting economic policies that target this readily available labor pool, the government can provide opportunities for a highly vulnerable population in the low-skill manufacturing, agriculture, and construction sectors. Due to the widespread destruction of Syria’s manufacturing output, and the slow disappearance of formerly productive commercial centers and trade routes, the Jordanian government has the opportunity to develop these lost capabilities within its borders. Such an approach similarly coopts the potential diversion of marginalized youths and refugees into criminality or radicalization.

This approach not only addresses the socio-economic grievances that threaten the government’s long-term stability, but also changes public perceptions of the government’s commitment to meaningful reforms.

Due to the inflamed crises that characterize the Jordan’s neighborhood, the opposition movement has so far restrained itself from overt agitation for regime change. This patient resolve is perhaps rooted in the hopes that meaningful change might emerge through cooperation with the monarchy, rather than the revolutionary violence that has resulted in widespread human suffering elsewhere in the region. Unlike other places in the region, the government has the unlikely benefit of a relatively subdued opposition movement. It should capitalize on this level of calm agitation for change and dedicate more of its foreign assistance toward addressing the full breadth of opposition grievances.

The Limits of Narrow Counterterrorism Approaches

It is likely that the more visible results of effective counterterrorism support occur on the operational theater. Local security services elevate their targeting, surveillance, and response capabilities and gain an operational edge against insurgents and terrorist networks through US training and equipment support. However, when partner states accept US assistance, these transactions are also de facto political decisions with immense implications on the governed.

Recipient governments that focus their enhanced counterterrorism capabilities on regime survival or personal enrichment, as seen in Iraq, are unlikely to survive in the long-term. For others, security assistance and cooperation becomes a publically poisonous symbol of US encroachment on state sovereignty as seen in Yemen and Pakistan. In these environments, security-centered assistance is commonly squandered and US national interests harmed in the long-term.

The United States must therefore balance its security-dominant engagement with the Jordanian government and dedicate more resources to the socio-political and economic factors addressed herein. Placing governance and economic reform conditions on US security assistance, is the first step towards changing the United States’ reception within the Jordanian public. These conditions also incentivize the Jordanian government to balance security-based expenditures with the socio-economic investments that target the governance roots of instability. Over time, it is these investments that build economic, political, and social resilience throughout the Jordanian public and prevent radicalization among the most vulnerable sectors of the general public.

 

 

Peter Kirechu is a graduate student at the Mercyhurst Institute for Intelligence Studies where he focuses on civil strife, insurgencies and counterterrorism. Mr. Kirechu was also a 2013 Boren Scholar to Jordan where he studied the security and humanitarian effects of Syria’s civil conflict. Twitter: @PeterKirechu

International Women’s Day: The impact of conflict on parity

by

Author’s note: Much of the reference to Yemen was drawn from the recent publication: “Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges”[1] (2015).

By: Joana Cook

DSC_2464
Source: National Yemen

Today marks the 2016 International Women’s Day, where the year’s theme “Pledge for Parity” promotes areas extending from helping women and girls achieve their ambitions, calling for gender-balanced leadership, and encouraging respect and value of difference.

It is perhaps fitting then to highlight what was for many a key struggle to achieve parity. Five years have now passed since the 2011 Arab Spring swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The protests were largely driven by populations seeking an end to corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes, who demanded dignity, equality and justice in their societies. Women and youth were foremost amidst these, participating in protests in Libya and Tunisia, occupying Tahrir Square in Egypt, and challenging the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (amongst others).

While countries such as Tunisia have been able to emerge from these protests with fragile, transitional democratic governments, others such as Syria and Libya have descended into states of chaos, destabilizing the surrounding region and creating vacuums currently filled by groups such as the so-called ‘Islamic State’. Yemen, perhaps the most overlooked of these Arab Spring participants, deserves special recognition for the roles that women were able to carve for themselves in the early days of the Arab Spring, and the gains they were able to advance. Yemen too, perhaps highlights what is most at stake for the parity of women with the failure to solidify these ambitions.

Yemen was always going to be a challenging country to advance parity. Yemen is currently ranked on the UN Human Development Index as 160 out of 188. It’s gender equality rating is the worst in the world – the World Economic Forum’s Gender Equality Index places Yemen 142 of 142 countries. Prior to 2011, Yemen only featured a single woman in parliament and three in the Shura council. Despite these long-standing poor rankings however, women such as Tawakal Karman and others from diverse backgrounds initiated and led protests across the country which eventually led to the transition of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Karman later won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts and brought attention to the significant efforts of many other brave and dedicated women across the country.

The subsequent National Dialogue Conference (NDC) contained nine working groups that addressed key transitional issues such as military and security, development and transitional justice. While an imperfect process, the NDC was deemed a success by many around the world, and significantly 27% of participants in the conference were women. The outcomes of the NDC were forwarded to the constitutional drafting committee and a draft constitution was completed in January 2015. This constitution, which had not yet been ratified, was extraordinary in the advances it guaranteed for women.

The draft constitution highlighted the representation and support of women in areas ranging from leadership and participation in political bodies, to supporting their roles in the security sector (police, military and intelligence) and ensured the State would “eliminate negative cultural and social norms that demean the dignity of women” (Article 57). Article 76 went so far as to state, “To give effect to the principle of equal citizenship, the State shall enact legislation and take measures, to achieve effective political participation for women to ensure access to at least 30% in various authorities and bodies.” While the substance of such articles needed to be further articulated, and the constitution was set to be debated prior to ratification, the leaps and bounds inherent to the protections and promotions of women in this document were incredible.

However, due to a number of avoidable factors and failures,[2] this transition was interrupted and the situation for women has never been more dire. The constitution in its current format also seems unlikely to move forward and the very status of the state is currently in question. In March 2015, Operation Decisive Storm began in an effort to stop Houthi rebels from seizing power in the country has in many respects shattered the country - the War in Yemen has now stretched almost a year and the country is on the brink of the abyss. 21 million of the countries 24 million now need some form of humanitarian aid and over 3,000 have been killed, many in coalition air strikes (though this figure is expected to be much higher). Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the so-called Islamic State continue to make advances in the country, and have historically installed harsh interpretations of sharia law over the populations they control, including severe restrictions on the rights of women.

Furthermore, displaced populations face significant challenges, and women in particular face an increased risk of sexual assault and abuse (even within their families, as public pressures grow and manifest themselves in the private sphere, increases in domestic violence often occur). There has also been a noticeable increase in the number of child brides amongst fleeing populations, with families unable to care for their children. Education, employment and other key activities to ensuring the advancement of women in the country is attainable have been interrupted or ceased all together. Perhaps most critically, negotiations to end the conflict have reflected a notable absence of women, particularly from the government side. In essence, it appears as though the significant opportunities that once appeared for women in Yemen have all but vanished.

As highlighted by the case of Yemen, it is clear that women in these societies have been integral to significant social, economic, cultural and political achievements before and during the Arab Spring. It is also clear that for many of them, advances to their rights and aspirations to parity have never been at such risk.

This International Women’s Day, it is perhaps worthwhile then to remember then that while parity in general is as worthy a focus as any, such considerations must be reflected in the very fabric of conflict mediation, resolution and reconstruction that will be required in places such as Yemen, Syria and Libya.

Joana Cook is a PhD Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Her PhD analyzes the roles of women in counterterrorism practices post-9/11. Her broader academic interests revolve around extremism and terrorism, with a focus on Canada, the US, UK and Middle East. She is also a researcher for the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook.

Notes:

[1] Joana Cook, ed. “Our Main Concern Is Security”: Women’s Political Participation, Engagement in the Security Sector, and Public Safety in Yemen, Rebuilding Yemen: Political, Economic and Social Challenges (Gerlach Publishing, 2015).

[2] For a good background on this, see: Adam Baron, “Civil War in Yemen: Imminent and Avoidable,” in Policy Memo, ed. European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) (23 March 2015).

A war on humanitarianism?

by

By: Mélanie Thienard

GBU-38_munition_explosions_in_Iraq.jpg
Source: Wikimedia

 

Is the United States waging a war on humanitarianism?

On 26 October 2015, a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Northern Yemen was struck by airstrikes, allegedly conducted by the US-supported, Saudi-led coalition, who have denied any implication in the destruction of the hospital. Earlier that month, on the 3rd of October, another MSF hospital was destroyed by the sustained fire of a US Air Force AC-130U gunship in Kunduz, Afghanistan.

In a series of press articles, French academic Gilles Dorronsoro claimed that these attacks in fact reflect a criminalisation of humanitarianism. According to him, former US Secretary of state Colin Powell tried to use humanitarian organisations in the War on Terror. It is the refusal of MSF to become ’essential contributors to the United States’ “combat team”’ which, according to Dorronsoro, led the organisation to become a legitimate target for the US army in what he described as a ‘war on humanitarianism.’ Whilst this remains speculative, other matters arose from the Kunduz bombing and the US justifications: a lack of verification of targets and/or a disregard for the core International Humanitarian Law (IHL) principle of proportionality.

International humanitarian law, hospitals, and the principle of caution

The body of law governing the conduct of hostilities is clear on the status of hospitals:

’Directing an attack against a zone established to shelter the wounded, the sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities is prohibited[1].’

The UN General Assembly reaffirmed this principle with a resolution: ‘places or areas designated for the sole protection of civilians, such as hospital zones or similar refuges, should not be the object of military operations’.[2]

To uphold their protected status, hospitals set up by humanitarian organisations, such as MSF, must communicate their geographical position to all fighting parties on a regular basis. MSF is well aware that it is crucial to ensure the relative safety of both staff and patients. In fact, the GPS coordinates of the Kunduz hospital were last communicated to the coalition forces only days before its destruction.

Military necessity and proportionality

Only a few hours after the first US statements attributing the attack to a ‘mistake’, US commander in Afghanistan General John Campbell hinted that the attack on the Kunduz Trauma Hospital was justified by military necessity after Afghan forces allegedly came under Taliban fire. In this approach, the hospital was engaged deliberately rather than ‘mistakenly struck.’ Is that legal? In certain circumstances, yes.

‘The “principle of military necessity” permits measures which are actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict the only legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other parties to the conflict.[3]’

The surviving MSF staff in Kunduz however strongly denied the presence of active combatants in their facilities at the time of the attacks.

Military necessity is, however, not unlimited. It is in fact bound by another essential component of IHL: proportionality. In terms of IHL, proportionality ‘seeks to limit damage [to civilians and civilian objects] caused by military operations by requiring that the effects of the means and methods of warfare used must not be disproportionate to the military advantage sought’.[4]

Considering the above IHL principles, let’s imagine that Taliban combatants were indeed using the hospital to target coalition forces.

Two questions remain unanswered. On a tactical level, was Taliban fire sustained enough to justify the call of an air strike on a civilian building? Strategically, would razing a perfectly functional hospital to the ground – killing 30 staff and patients and depriving thousands of civilians from accessing medical treatment – be critical to regain control of the city of Kunduz after it had been seized by Taliban fighters? If the answer to both is yes, the strike could be legally justified. If, however, the answers are uncertain, so is the legality of the attack.

An intelligence failure and the role of the Afghan forces

A final question, potentially the most important one, remains. Did the Afghan forces deliberately provided flawed intelligence to the US forces to justify the call of the airstrike?

As mentioned previously, the Afghan forces have claimed the presence of Taliban fighters in the hospital’s main compound, which prompted a muted, even sympathetic Afghan response to the attack.

A military coalition must be based on a certain degree of trust. It is doubtful that the US forces in Afghanistan possess the capability of double-checking every action of their Afghan allies. Such a policy could furthermore create a hierarchy between US and Afghan forces, which could undermine the coalition as a whole. If it turns out that the Afghan forces indeed provided flawed intelligence, drastic measures need to be taken to ensure the verification of targets by US operatives before a strike.

However, let’s not forget that, in the end, US forces pulled the trigger. Communication transcripts show that the gunship’s crew questioned the legality of the airstrike, but were nevertheless ordered to engage the hospital. General Campbell also admitted that ‘the decision to provide aerial fires was a US decision, made within the US chain of command.’ No one forced the US forces to take Afghan intelligence at face value. To the General director of MSF, it is clear that the attack constitutes a war crime as well an attack on the Geneva conventions.

Claiming that a ‘war against humanitarianism’ is being waged is in this case far-fetched and misleading. Such claims however show that, when it comes to foreign military intervention, the US is walking on eggshells and faces grave accusations of disregard of IHL and civilian lives.

The destruction of the Kunduz hospital shows two worrying trends at the operational level: a flawed chain of command, and the dissemination of flawed intelligence by Afghan forces. Whilst the advancements in targeting technology led some to argue that only the US army was capable of conducting warfare in accordance with the principles set forth by IHL, incidents such as the Kunduz bombing show a critical lack of communication between units with regard to the selection of targets. This makes the US army vulnerable to embarrassing ‘mistakes’ and war crime accusations as well as putting humanitarian NGOs working in active combat zones even more at risk.

The only way to address these issues in a constructive manner is for President Obama to answer the calls of MSF and consent to an independent and impartial investigation of the Kunduz attack.

Even war has rules.

 

 

Notes:

[1] Article 15, Fourth Geneva Convention, § 3, available at https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter11_rule35

[2] UN General Assembly, Res. 2675 (XXV), §6 available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ares25.htm

[3] https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-glossary.htm

[4] https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/proportionality-glossary.htm

 

 

Mélanie is a 3rd year IR student specializing in the Middle East, human rights and humanitarian law, president of the Amnesty International Society at King’s and has worked at Amnesty International UK since 2014 as a national student representative. Prior to coming to King’s she studied law and economics in Marseille, France.

Wahaishi is gone, but AQAP will thrive in absence of political solution

by

By Joana Cook:

Al-Wahaishi, leader of AQAP, was reportedly killed this morning in a drone strike in Yemen. Photo: EPA
Al-Wahaishi, leader of AQAP, was reportedly killed this morning in a drone strike in Yemen. Photo: EPA (published under fair use policy for intellectual non-commercial purposes)

News broke this morning of the death of Nassir al-Wahaishi, the second in command of al-Qaeda, and the leader of its strongest affiliate group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula (AQAP). Wahaishi was reportedly killed in a drone strike, said to have taken place in the port city of Mukallah, Yemen. While this strike is certainly significant, especially in its symbolic value, it is unlikely to quell the threat AQAP poses as long as a political solution in the country remains out of reach.

Officially formed in January 2009 from Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda, AQAP is often cited as the most lethal branch of the organization, largely due to the bomb-making skills of Ibrahim al-Asiri. Al-Asiri has been the key figure from AQAP linked with the many threats that have emanated from the country in recent years. These have included the 2009 underwear bomber who attempted to detonate a device on a commercial liner over Detroit on Christmas Day, as well as the 2010 cargo plane plot which saw explosives hidden in US-bound printers. Most recently, AQAP had claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris.

The death of Wahaishi follows on from other significant blows for the organization in recent years, such as the death of Anwar al-Awlaki, the US-born English-speaking cleric who was killed in a drone strike in September 2011. Even post-mortem, Awlaki has continued to be one of the most influential figures in encouraging Westerners to travel abroad and engage in violence – through recordings of his speeches and his writing – and is cited by many traveling to Syria and Iraq to fight today. Drone strikes have also consistently cut down AQAP leaders like regional leader in the Baitha province Qaed al-Thahab in August 2013, and more recently this year Nasr Ibn Ali al-Ansi, who announced the Charlie Hebdo attack.

However, such deaths have not reduced the strength of the organization, which has only continued to grow in capacity and membership. AQAP has proven its ability to thrive in Yemen, where the central government has been unable to provide basic governance and accountability to its citizens.

In 2011, now ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh recalled troops from areas such as Jaar and Zinjibar to secure his position in the capital against peaceful protestors when his position came under threat during the Arab Spring. The removal of government forces in this period left a power vacuum that AQAP filled, quickly installing their own version of law and order when the government proved unable to do so.

AQAP was able to hold these positions for just over a year, allowing it plenty of space to regroup and strengthen. In March 2015, the failing security situation in the country left an open opportunity for AQAP to seize a significant foothold in the important port city of Mukallah, in Hadhramaut province. Here, they released over 300 prisoners from the city’s central prison, including other important members of AQAP such as Khalid Bartafi. The advance into Mukallah was another case of the organization capitalizing on the unrest in the country, and the additional strength it has been able to gain in such situations.

Drone and air strikes targeted at the organization, which are often used as band-aid solutions, have also severely impacted local populations. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, hundreds of civilians have been caught up in these strikes and killed, often perpetuating a cycle of resentment for the government and its partners, and driving further recruitment for AQAP.

AQAP has been shown to thrive in periods when the reach of the central government has been restricted, and in periods when discontent with the government has risen. What’s more, local recruitment has not always been premised on individuals who aspire to attack the West, but is often driven by grievances against the government; AQAP has been seen to step in at times of vulnerability and provide services, law and order, and accountability for victims and frustrated parties that the central government has been unable to provide.

While the death of al-Wahaishi will certainly provide some short-term interruption for the organization, they have already named Qassim al-Rimi as the group’s new leader. However, like the many strikes before it, Wahaishi’s death will not provide a lasting solution to depleting AQAP in the country. To ensure lasting stability in Yemen, current initiatives like those in Geneva that have brought the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels to the table, are the primary hope for peace and stability in the country.

The country’s population is increasingly suffering from a desperate humanitarian situation that has left upwards of 80% of the population reliant on humanitarian aid. Tens of thousands have been internally displaced, while fighting and air strikes continue across the country, overshadowing the great hope that the National Dialogue Conference once presented to the country.

To challenge groups like AQAP in Yemen, and ensure others such as ISIL do not also try and gain a foothold in the country, only national peace and unity in the form of an inclusive, political solution will provide the necessary remedy.

Joana Cook is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of War Studies. She is also the current Editor-in-Chief of Strife and a Research Affiliate with the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). Her work more broadly focuses on women in violent extremism, countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism practices in Yemen, Canada and the UK. Her PhD thesis specifically examines the role and agency of women in security practices in Yemen. She has been featured on BBC World News and in the Telegraph, the Washington Post and Radio Free Europe, amongst others. You can follow her on Twitter @Joana_Cook.