Yemen

Review: 'Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars' by Chris Woods

June 15, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Harris Kuemmerle:

Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars. London, UK: Hurst Publishers., 2015. Pages: 400. £20.00 (hardback). ISBN: 9781849044028.

The recent growth over the past decade in the scope and complexity of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in warfare is remarkable not only for the immense pace by which the technology and procedural practices have matured, but also for the open secrecy under which that process has been shrouded. While their existence is common knowledge, true transparency as to the use of drones remains limited. As a result, getting a firm understanding of the historical evolution and contemporary role of drone warfare is a challenging prospect. But that is exactly what Chris Woods sets out to do in his book, Sudden Justice, which attempts to present an accessible and engaging narrative outlining the history and use of drones in warfare, while also coming to terms with some of the most pertinent moral and ethical questions that the use of drone warfare poses for the 21st century.

The book begins with a description of the genesis of the drone technology. It’s a history that is inexorably linked to a pair of individuals called the “Blue brothers”, and one which poetically echoes the history of the birth of aviation a century earlier. The Blue brothers were Colorado siblings whose ambition and a fateful flight across Latin America set them on a path which would see them – in partnership with the “Moses of modern drones”, pioneering Israeli engineer Abe Karem – essentially start up the entire drone industry in their garage. In the process they saved the fledgling drone industry from the same perceptions of inadequacy by established interests that once haunted the fledgling civilian and military aviation industry in the 1910s and 1920s. It’s undeniably a great story and an excellent, almost light-hearted, place to begin the historical narrative.

However, it does not take long for the history of drones to turn darker with the move into the post-9/11 “War on Terror” and the drones’ transition into the new role of both spy and assassin. The book charts the initial failures of the drone programme at the onset of the Afghan war, to the eventual rise of the targeted killing programmes in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan during both the Bush and Obama administrations.

It is here that the book comes into its element; presenting a chilling tale of secrecy, bureaucratic infighting, ruthless pragmatism, and just what happens when humans are given the power to kill almost anyone on demand with only a few minutes notice. Indeed, the author seems almost in awe of the power and technical accomplishments of the drone programme; detailing their capabilities and clinical efficiency, yet also in equal measure presenting that path towards the modern state of drone warfare as a cautionary tale.

The chapter on the valuation of human life and the psychological impact on drone operators drive home the human consequences of drone warfare; with the description of the cold ‘boxes’ in which operators pilot their craft especially unsettling. Concrete rooms, lit bright by screen light, in which pilot and operator fight a cripplingly boring covert war against an unknown enemy on behalf of often equally unknown ‘customers’ who they communicate with via dedicated online chat rooms. In that space it becomes easy to see how the human life on the monitor can be reduced to a few words; words such as ‘target’, ‘rifled’, ‘kinetic’, ‘kill’.

To that end, it’s in its description of the behind-the-scenes workings of the programme where Sudden Justice presents its most interesting questions. Is assassination legal or justified? Are civilian casualties ever justified? What role should private military corporations be allowed to play? Are drones even legal? These are the critical questions that underlie many of the issues that Chris Woods tackles, and he generally succeeds in presenting these issues clearly and providing a fair judgement. However, the book does not really set out to give a final answer to any of these questions, which is both a limitation and a quality. Sudden Justice simply presents the issue as fairly and as completely as possible, leaving it up to the reader to decide. It’s a refreshingly honest and factual take on a muddled topic. Though one which may leave readers wanting more finality.

Furthermore, while Creech Air Force Base (from where the majority of the drones are piloted) is discussed in great detail, the author chose not to personally visit the site. The author felt visiting the site would not be necessary or in the interest of the work. However, I would argue that the decision not to go may have missed out on key first-hand insight into elements of the day-to-day processes of running the drone programme, which could have expanded upon our understanding. Although the decision not to go is not in itself a serious limitation, it is definitely a missed opportunity.

A more serious limitation is that while it is clear that Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan during the War on Terror served as the proving grounds for the concept of drone warfare as we know it today, their use has greatly expanded since 2003. By focusing on that area and time almost exclusively, Sudden Justice limits its applicability to a wider contemporary debate. For example, the author does not discuss in any great detail the implications for the further expansion of drone use outside of the US and UK to countries such as Russia, China, and Pakistan. Indeed, the limited scope of the book leaves some critical questions untouched: what are the implications for global security for other countries bringing online drone programmes? Will these countries use the legal framework developed by the US and UK during the War on Terror?

Likewise, the consequences of drone warfare in the context of inter-state global security more generally is not directly dealt with. While these issues are not within the aims of the work, their exclusion leaves the book somewhat unable to move beyond drones in the War on Terror and into the area of drones in contemporary global security. Though its discussions of the history, application, and legal and ethical aspects of drone warfare during the War on Terror remain excellent and widely applicable.

Sudden Justice is an excellent book which tells the story of the historical evolution of drone warfare, with only a few notable limitations. Sudden Justice is a must-read book for anyone interested in drone warfare. It effectively straddles the gap of being both clear and entertaining, while also offering insights for both experts in the field and the average reader.

Harris Kuemmerle is a PhD Researcher in War Studies at KCL. He received a BSc in International Relations from Plymouth University and a MSc from SOAS, University of London in Asian Politics. His professional experience includes working in journalism and US congressional elections. His areas of interest include; water politics, the impacts of water on state and human security, environmental security, health and security, US foreign and domestic politics, European politics, UK politics, UK foreign affairs, South Asia, and the domestic and foreign affairs of India and China. A native of the US, he has been based in the UK since 2008. Harris is a guest editor at Strife.

Operation Decisive Storm: when Riyadh calls on Islamabad

March 31, 2015 by Strife Staff

By Zoha Waseem:

With Iran-backed Houthi rebels advancing in Yemen, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has called upon its trusted and indebted partner Pakistan for support in so-called ‘Operation Decisive Storm’. There has been much speculation over the last few days as to what sort of support Islamabad is considering on providing Riyadh, with whom it has both a military partnership as well as an ideological relationship.

Reports from Saudi Arabia were quick to suggest that Pakistan may be joining the Riyadh-led coalition against Houthis. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif did all but deny this when he said, ‘Pakistan has pledged to defend Saudi Arabia in case of a threat to the territorial integrity and security of a friendly country’. Foreign Office spokesman Tasnim Aslam took the podium to ease tensions within the country, only to admit that such an option was still under examination. Following a high-profile meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, COAS Raheel Sharif, DG ISI Rizwan Akhtar, and Khwaja Asif, it was revealed that a ‘threat to Saudi territorial integrity would evoke a strong response from Pakistan’. To add to the confusion, it was also reported that Pakistani and Saudi forces have been conducting joint military exercises near the Yemeni border. Furthermore, a graphic of key players involved in ‘Decisive Storm’ released by Saudi media, suggested that Pakistani warships and air support have already been provided to KSA.

A delegation inclusive of the Defence Minister, the National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz and representatives of the Pakistani army, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 31 March. Last week, Khwaja Asif had backtracked on the gravity of the situation, stating that the government is still undecided and that the Parliament will be taken into confidence, all the while stressing Pakistan’s brotherly relations with Saudi Arabia. For its part, the Parliament appears to be leaning towards a ‘no boots’ stance.

At this stage, it is difficult to argue that Islamabad is leaning towards neutrality in the Saudi-Iran-Yemen nexus and it is being suggested that Pakistan may provide logistical support: training, weapons, and possibly aerial muscle, if it has not done so already. Given the history between both countries, neutrality seems highly unlikely. And it is because of this history that it is unsurprising that Saudis have called upon Pakistan to provide assistance.

There is a long-standing economic and military partnership between both states. Pakistan has been receiving aid from Saudi Arabia since as early as the 1960s, and the latter has supported Pakistan during its conflicts with India, as was seen most evidently during the 1971 war. In 1969, Pakistan Air Force fighters flew Saudi jets over South Yemen during the Battle of Sharoora. In the face of Ayatollah Khomeini’s growing power in Iran in 1979, Pakistani troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia. In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia (along with the US) provided funding for Pakistani madrassas and mosques to create and sponsor the Mujahideen to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. This led to the expansion of the Deobandi ideology and the rise of Wahabism in Pakistan, creating ideological ties between the two countries and mushrooming jihadi groups that Pakistan has utilised in Afghanistan and Kashmir. And in the 1990s, when Pakistan was slapped with economic sanctions following the development of its nuclear programme, it was Riyadh that provided barrels of oil to Islamabad free of cost.

In 2013, Pakistan and KSA entered into an unofficial nuclear agreement, with Saudis allegedly investing in Pakistan’s nuclear projects, and in return Islamabad pledging nuclear support to Riyadh should it be needed. Last year, a 17-member Saudi defence delegation travelled to Pakistan to strengthen bilateral cooperation.

Nawaz Sharif’s relationship with the Saudi royal family is even more personal. In 1999, when Sharif was sent into exile after General Pervez Musharraf’s coup, it was Saudi Arabia that provided him with shelter. In return, the PM is indebted to the Kingdom and has made frequent visits over the past few months. Sharif visited the late Saudi King Shah Abdullah when he was unwell, then again to attend his funeral, then on 5 March when he was personally received by King Salman at the Riyadh airport with a red carpet reception. It was during this last visit that talks of Saudi demands for military troops from Pakistan began surfacing, but had probably been brainstormed for some time.

That said, the Pakistani state appears to have very little clarity on the matter – or so it has been portrayed. Updates on the situation suggest that possibilities of supporting Saudis are being ‘examined’, ‘considered’, and ‘assessed’. This has created an atmosphere of panic and frustration within the country where the consensus – barring certain religious groups – is to stay out of Yemen. Social media is roaring with opinions and analyses with very little information at hand. Since last week, most analysts, columnists and political commentators – regardless of their stance on the Pakistani army and its operations – have advised against interfering in the Middle East. It is because of this confusion – will they, won’t they – that 500 Pakistanis in Yemen boarded the first flight back home, with over 170 awaiting their turn.

On the civilian side, political parties including Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), and Awami National Party (ANP) have all advised against deploying Pakistani troops in Yemen. Shia groups such as Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM) and the Shia Ulema Council (SUC) took out separate rallies in Karachi against Saudi Arabia’s decision to attack Yemen. At the same time, the notorious Jamaat-ud-Dawa, led by Hafiz Saeed, staged demonstrations in Lahore and Islamabad, declaring their support for the Kingdom. According to one report, Ahle-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), a Sunni political party with alleged links to the terrorist group Lashker-e-Jhangvi, has also backed Saudi Arabia’s operation in Yemen. On the other hand, Sunni political organisations such as Sunni Tehreek and Sunni Ittehad Council have called for peaceful resolutions.

More importantly, ISI’s media-arm, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), has been silent on the matter. Ultimately, it is the military that will be calling the shots and they will bear in mind that Pakistan and KSA are not just ‘brothers’; this is an intimate business relationship. While it has been suggested that within the Pakistani army there are talks of not getting involved in the Middle East because of Pakistan’s own internal and regional security dynamics, Pakistan could see an alliance with Saudi Arabia financially beneficial. It is unlikely that the Army will agree to providing assistance to KSA without a hefty package in return and this might be on military terms.

In 2015, KSA is expected to spend an estimated US$9.6 billion on importing defence equipment. According to IHS’ annual Global Defence Trade Report it has already surpassed India to become the world’s largest importer of defence equipment, as well as the USA’s top trading partner. KSA’s budget and defence spending has increased dramatically since the Arab Spring. In fact, the Middle East is reported to be the world’s fastest growing defence market with the US being ‘the biggest beneficiary of this market’. It could be that Pakistan is considering contributing to the defence market, for which Saudi Arabia would be a generous consumer and buyer.

But this is still early speculation. The only opinions expressed in agreement across the board concern the repercussions that interferences in the Middle East could have on Pakistan’s growing sectarian polarization. The sectarian conflicts of the Middle East have never been detached from Pakistan. Indeed, the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry, that has found a new front in Yemen, has been playing out in Islamabad’s neighbourhood for some decades now. The primary concern within the country is the exacerbation of Shia-Sunni violence. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal database, 210 people were killed in 92 incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan in 2014, and over 140 have died this year (until 22 March 2015).

What is also being discussed now is the rise of sectarianism in urban areas like Karachi, where sectarian attacks claimed 100 lives last year alone. Karachi has been recognised as one of ‘four sectarian hotspots’ and the province of Sindh, which has a history Sufism and deep respect for Shias, is routinely subjected to sectarian violence. Earlier this year, on 30 January, over 60 Shias were killed in Shikarpur, six hours north of Karachi. With Karachi police and paramilitary forces already engaged in operations against ‘crime and militancy’, the city will suffer greatly from increasing sectarian divides.

For the time being, Pakistan does not appear to be in a position to send boots on the ground, both because of militancy at home - for which it needs troops and resources to continue counter-terrorism operations - and also because there can be no easy exit strategies following such a deployment. It further needs to keep its focus on the instability at its western border with Afghanistan, and hostility on the Line of Control. But events are still unfolding and Nawaz Sharif is likely to be under tremendous pressure to cooperate with the royal family. How this cooperation will be justified in the face of Pakistan’s internal security concerns remains to be seen.

Zoha Waseem is a doctoral candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, researching urban security and policing in Pakistan. She tweets at @zohawaseem.

Drones series, Part IV. ‘May you die in a drone strike’: Yemen, AQAP and the US drone program

April 18, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Dr Victoria Fontan:

Drones are slowly making their way into our modern lives. They can now deliver books, medical marijuana, or beer to sailors at sea. In the next few years, drones will dramatically change our lives. Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemeni youth activist, explains how they have already changed the social fabric of his country.[i] ‘May you die in a drone strike’ has now become people’s favourite curse, and when a parent wants a child to behave, he/she only needs to threaten to ‘call the drones,’ and the child will comply with any request. In the Global North, drones bring modernity to your doorstep. In Yemen, they deliver death.

Competing numbers of casualties

The exact number of drone strikes in Yemen cannot be fully ascertained, due to the covert nature of US operations in the region. While the first strike was carried out in 2002, all others have taken place after President Obama took office in 2009.

The table below summarises the data collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New America Foundation, the Long War Journal and the Government of Yemen on drone strikes in the country.

In Yemen, drone strikes are only part of the story regarding the targeted killings performed by the United States government against, allegedly, Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP). Other types of attacks can be launched from US Navy warships or army bases in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, whose fighter planes also participate in the US war on AQAP in Yemen.[ii] The public is being reassured that targeted killings are all carefully regulated, and that only terrorists are dying, minus a few collateral deaths that outweigh the potential civilian deaths resulting from an actual act of terrorism.[iii]

Grounds for targeted killings

On what grounds can a targeted killing take place? Al-Muslimi has had a lot of time to reflect on this. His village, Wessab, was targeted by a strike on April 17^th 2013.[iv] Six days later, he testified before the US Senate on the attack. An anti-drone activist since then, he explains that two are types of killings. Under the first type, the United States Department of Justice provided three clear conditions for a killing to take place: the person has to be designated as a person of interest and he or she must represent a direct threat to the US; the target cannot be captured; and, finally, the operation must not target civilians.[v] The other type is the ‘signature strike’, whereby any high-ranking military officer can order the death of anyone displaying suspicious behaviour.[vi] There lies a rather complex problem for any civilian: ‘What is suspicious behaviour in the US is completely normal behaviour here,’ explains Farea. ‘It can represent every single Yemeni in Yemen. If I am with you, going to a wedding outside Sana’a, we will obviously be between the age of 15 and 65, we will be carrying guns [they are part of the Yemeni dress code], and we will be a group, [that’s] enough! It is not even intelligent criteria anymore.’

Questions of effectiveness

These criteria raise many questions. First, if anyone can potentially be targeted, how effective can the strikes be in relation to weakening AQAP in the region? Moreover, are the conditions highlighted by Barack Obama ever being met? Several attacks come to mind, some of them involving drones, others both drones and missiles sent from US Navy ships. The first one is that of al Majaala, on December 17^th 2009, portrayed in Jeremy Scahill’s 2013 documentary Dirty Wars.[vii] The target of this attack was Mohammed al-Qazimi, a former alleged al-Qaeda associate who had spent five years in a Yemeni jail, and had been released shortly before the strike. Since he had returned to Maajala, he had been passing by an army checkpoint morning and afternoon to go and buy his daily bread and khat.[viii] He could easily have been arrested and tried at any time for any crimes he was accused of. Did he represent a known threat to the Yemeni government? It is unlikely that he would have ever been released from prison if he did. Fifty-five people died on that day, including 14 women, seven of which were pregnant, and 21 children.[ix] A second attack of interest is that of Qawlan, on January 23^rd 2013.[x] On that day, a known opponent of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Rabieh Hamud Labieh, was travelling by car. Labieh was a democratically elected local councillor who had turned against former President Saleh during the 2011 Arab Spring-related demonstrations. Labieh was notorious for having denounced the smuggling of government weapons between Sana’a and Saleh’s countryside stronghold right after his demise. He had been an opponent to the new regime, arguing that the country was still a dictatorship. Once again, why should he be targeted by the US government, except to contribute to a Yemeni government purge? Eight people died on that day, all civilians with no connections to AQAP.

AQAP, the ‘moderates’ and anti-US sentiment

Al-Muslimi remarks that the strike against his own village in April 2013 has increased anti-US sentiment throughout the region, hence boosting the local support for AQAP by default. The fact that AQAP now occasionally compensates villagers after drone strikes is a politically savvy move, clearly winning local hearts and minds in the process and also undermining the Yemeni government, which rarely offers compensation after strikes. Abdul Rahman Ali Barman, director of HOOD, a Yemeni-based Human Rights NGO, makes a more disturbing assertion regarding AQAP.[xi] Barman argues that moderates within the organization have been purged to the benefit of hardliners, all thanks to drone strikes. He mentions the recent killing of two moderate al-Qaeda officials by a strikes, Fadel Qasr and Mohammed el-Hamda. According to him, Qasr and el-Hamda were members of the AQAP council, the Shura, which decides on operations across the country. They both had withdrawn during the vote on several operations, which they did not agree with. Their names and locations were conveniently given to the Yemeni government, which then forwarded them to the US.[xii] According to Ali Barman, AQAP’s military leader, Qasm al-Raimi, is actually very close to the previous and current governments. If this is indeed the case as Ali Barman alleges, then indirectly, the US government would be aiding and abating AQAP, helping it purging its moderates. Of importance here is the idea that moderates within AQAP and other al-Qaeda related organizations seem to be more inclined towards addressing social justice issues, rather than directly challenging the State into the formation of an exclusive Caliphate.[xiii]

Drone strikes and targeted killings in Yemen are a very complex affair, much more so than the US government would like to admit. All parties involved, except the local population, seem to be benefiting from them. Ali Barman recalls the funeral of the Al-Maajala victims with emotion, especially an old lady who pleaded, referring to the US: ‘They even have laws that protect animals, why can’t they just consider us like their animals?’ Drones and the protection of animals in the US are two great signs of progress. In Yemen, they bear a sinister meaning. If the drone program continues in Yemen, the support from the population towards AQAP is likely to become much stronger, this due to the fact that many more civilians die in strikes than AQAP operatives, and that when AQAP members are targeted and killed, there are many candidates to replace them, often being more radical than their predecessors. Since it is public knowledge that the Yemeni government provides its US ally with the necessary intelligence before a strike, popular support can only go one way, that of AQAP.

_____________________

Dr. Victoria Fontan is an MPhil Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She carried out research on drone strikes in Yemen in January 2014. This article is based on a series of stories published on her blog, which can be found at www.victoriacfontan.com. In July 2014, with some families of drone victims, she will contribute to the establishment of a network aimed at the systematic compilation of evidence after new strikes.

NOTES
[i] Interview with Farea Al-Muslimi, Sana’a, Yemen, January 7^th 2014.
[ii] See http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/americas/article3647656.ece
[iii] See Barack Obama’s remarks at the National Defense University (NDU): http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama
[iv] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtQ_mMKx3Ck
[v] See the US Department of Justice White paper for more information: http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf
[vi] President Obama stated in the NDU speech referenced above that this type of strike would be examined. The Wedding Party strike of December 2013 suggests that ‘signature strikes’ are still active, since the wedding convoy was mistaken for an AQAP convoy: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/us-drone-strike-wedding-party-yemen_n_4434127.html
[vii] For a detailed account of the US government involvement in Yemen and the Majaala attack, see: http://www.thenation.com/article/159578/dangerous-us-game-yemen?page=0,2
[viii]Khat is a locally grown leaf that is chewed daily for its stimulant properties.
[ix] See Al-Karama and HOOD’s report on drone strikes in Yemen for more details: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:zixkp3osuKQJ:en.alkarama.org/documents/ALK_USA-Yemen_Drones_SRCTwHR_4June2013_Final_EN.pdf+Al-Karama+and+HOOD’s+report+on+drone+strikes+in+Yemen&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari
[x] Interview with Mohammed al-Qawli, Qawlan, Yemen, January 8^th 2014.
[xi] Interview with Abdul Rahman Ali Barman, Sana’a, Yemen, January 9^th 2014.
[xii] In December 2013, the Yemeni parliament almost unanimously called for an end to drone strikes in their country. The vote was a clear disavowal of Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s support for and collaboration with the drone program. See: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/15/world/meast/yemen-drones/
[xiii] The author has recently initiated a research on the issue of moderate al-Qaeda affiliates in Fallujah, Iraq. For preliminary results, see: V. Fontan, ‘Out beyond Occupy Fallujah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, there was a field’, in Harmonie Toros & Yannis Tellidis (eds.), Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, Synthesis and Opposition (Routledge, forthcoming in August 2014).

The good, the bad, the drones: A Strife 5-part series

April 7, 2014 by Strife Staff

By Joana Cook,
Managing Editor, Strife

BAE-Taranis-UAV-(Model-on-d — BAE Taranis UAV, Model on display at Farnborough Airshow 2008 (Photo by Mike Young)

By 2025 it is estimated to be an industry worth $82 billion USD and responsible for the creation of more than 100,00 new jobs in the US alone. It will target commercial and civil markets, and be used in applications ranging from precision agriculture and public safety, to niche areas, such as battling poachers in wildlife reserves. It is, however, their use in security operations which will be the focus of this Strife series.

The controversial use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), more widely known as drones, has been recently highlighted by a UN Special Rapporteur examining their use in counterterrorism, news stories of victims of drone attacks testifying before US Congress, as well as recent documentaries such as Jeremy Scahill’s Dirty Wars. There are even iPhone apps, such as Metadata, which have tracked and mapped drone attacks since the first known incident on November 3, 2002 in Yemen. Since then, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that upwards of 4,172 people have been killed in strikes across Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan, 1,032 of which were civilians. Afghanistan has seen at least 59 civilian deaths under ISAF, while the number in Iraq and Libya remain less clear. Organizations such as UK-based Reprieve call for international accountability for what they refer to as ‘the new face of state-lawlessness in the name of counterterrorism.’

The use of drones, however, has been supported by some as an option which has left the forces using them safe, reduced the amount of potential civilian casualties, and eliminated key targets in areas often referred to otherwise as ‘terrorist safe havens’. The use of drones has also been viewed by analysts like Clint Watts, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, as the latest piece of the US counter-terrorism package which has traversed from ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, detentions and renditions, to the ‘clear, hold, build’ policies seen in Afghanistan, and most recently focusing on drones as the most effective and publicly accepted counterterrorism policy.

Over the coming weeks, Strife will be featuring a five-part series on drones, expanding on the ways by which drones are commonly framed. We will reexamine the roles drones play in shaping how we think about, and engage in, security from a number of diverse approaches. Zoha Waseem will survey how the current drone program in Pakistan is affecting everything from militant propaganda by the TTP, to rural-to-urban population displacement. David Hofmann will discuss why, as traditional battlefields give way to insurgent campaigns, drones are necessary and effective. Dr. Jack McDonald will be analyzing the legal implications of drones in a field not yet internationally defined. “May you die in a drone strike” is becoming a favourite curse in Yemen, and Dr. Victoria Fontan will discuss both the social implications of drones in Yemen, and how this may not be weakening AQAP as intended. Daniel Møller Ølgaard will be taking a unique look at drones through the lens of biopolitics, and at how the use of drones may be transforming the very nature of war and governance.

Drones will not be exiting the security scene anytime soon. Instead, we hope this series will provoke more thought and debate in a field that will play a significant part in all our lives in the coming years. We leave you to be the judge in “The good, the bad, the drones.”

Film Review: Dirty Wars

December 3, 2013 by Strife Staff

by Zoha Waseem

The Guardian described it as one of the most important political films in two decades, while The Independent called it the most effective film since All the President’s Men. Jeremy Scahill’s script for Dirty Wars, based on his book Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, peels apart layers of secrecy and unaccountability shrouded under cloaks of expensive national security measures in order to expose America’s covert operations and the increasingly notorious Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The film depicts how the US directs conflicts around the world in a war that seemingly ‘has no end’. Dirty Wars is not an easy watch, and it leaves you more than a little uncomfortable.

The film opens in Kabul, Afghanistan, narrated by Scahill, an investigative reporter and author of the book of the same name. It takes the viewers through warm hues and sepia tones to Gardez, in the province of Paktia, where in February 2010 US-trained Police Commander Mohammad Daood and two pregnant women were gunned down late at night during a family gathering celebrating the birth of a new-born. NATO said the women killed were victims of Taliban honour-killings, but Daood’s family members, also attending the gathering that night said the shooters were men from the US forces who had later also assaulted survivors. In response, one American General simply stated that these civilians just happened to be ‘in the wrong place at the wrong time’.

Scahill’s investigation into what one survivor of this raid called the ‘American Taliban’, leads him to uncover the then little known JSOC. The then commander of JSOC, William McRaven – who later tried to offer a sheep as compensation for the deaths – was ultimately suspected to be involved in the raid on Gardez that night. Under US President Obama’s orders, JSOC has been given unprecedented authority for covert military operations. Formed in 1980 in the aftermath of Operation Eagle Claw, the failed hostage recovery mission in Iran, JSOC was the very unit responsible for the coordination of Operation Neptune Spear which led to the Abbottabad raid of 1 May 2011, killing Osama Bin Laden.

By Scahill’s estimates, US special operations and interventions have expanded the Global War on Terror to 75 countries. During the course of this film, we are taken into Yemen where Anwar al-Awlaki, the one-time go-to Imam for the United States and an advocate of democracy turned rogue (following the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)), became the first American civilian placed on the drone kill-list. Voice recordings of Awlaki and Obama are played simultaneously, and repeatedly, during the coverage of this operation. ‘Mirror images of each other’, Scahill narrates them to be.

While Scahill’s investigations may be met with dubious voices and harsh criticisms, and his efforts undermined in the same manner as those of other activists, it goes without saying that Scahill’s script succeeds in breathing morality into even the most critical observer. The soul of his film rests in testimonies gathered from families of victims such as members of Awlaki’s family who suffered the loss of his 16-year-old son in a simultaneous drone strike. This second attack seemed to have been a preventive strike, in case the son was to grow up and take on his father’s role. Further, interviews with former warlords of Somalia, supposedly on US payrolls and Scahill’s own conscience which remains at the centre of his storytelling strengthen the script of this film.

Though depicting the human side of war and violence, Scahill makes no half-hearted attempts of providing solutions to the war on terror. Instead, he solemnly voices the concerns of the masses, in that it is likely to go on for a very long time.

‘Our job is to go to the other side of the barrels of guns and the other side of missiles and talk to the enemies. Our job is not to be nationalists. Obama’s administration has targeted more whistle-blowers under the Espionage Act than all his predecessors combined’, said Jeremy Scahill while addressing an audience following a screening of Dirty Wars at Birkbeck University in London. ‘Mr Nobel Peace Prize Winner’, he mocks, ‘is presiding over a global assassination programme’.

Dirty Wars (dir. by Richard Rowley) premièred in the UK 29 October 2013.

Zoha Waseem is a PhD researcher in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. You can follower her on Twitter @ZohaWaseem.

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