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It’s Time to Reconceptualize the American War Hero

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By Mary Hood

U.S. Army Cyber Operations at Fort Meade, Maryland (Copyright: US Army)

Today’s stereotypical war hero – drawn largely from dramatised media portrayals – looks much like his historical predecessors. While the uniform, kit, and weapon may be different, the generic image of a tall and rugged white man valiantly risking his own safety in some far-off land remains. However, if the US intends to continue in being equipped with the best soldiers to fight on the battlefields of the new century, that approach needs to change.

A 2016 Pew Research Study found that more Americans have ‘a great deal of trust’ in their military than in any other public institution, a finding that parallels previous reports. This trust has remained high since the Second World War, only faltering during the Vietnam War before quickly recovering. Prizing its claim to the oldest surviving Constitution in the world, the United States’ survival relies on positive civil-military relations marked by a successful system of military subordination to civilian control and a distinct absence of the military in domestic law enforcement.

This dynamic, combined with the current cultural-political landscape, results in two outcomes. First, the U.S. military abides by the will of its civilian leadership, and more diffusely, the American public. The Vietnam War demonstrated just how disastrous a military operation can become when public opinion turns against it. Research also shows that public opinion directly influences military spending, sometimes more so even than the actual conflict. Second, limited domestic presence of the military and the absence of existential conflicts since the Second World War have created a military largely aloof from the American public. Fewer and fewer Americans personally know an active duty service member, which experts argue translates to an increased reliance on media sources for an understanding of the military.

Herein lies the problem. According to a recent academic article on media portrayals of the military, ‘research shows that military service members are often framed as stoic, heroic, patriotic, dedicated, hypermasculine, or even superhuman.’ The article goes on to discuss how this perpetuates a “warrior myth,” in which every service member is a combat hero of epic proportions. Perhaps this was truer during the Second World War, when 61.2% of all U.S. military enlisted personnel served in combat roles. Indeed, a website entitled ‘The Art of Manliness’ allows you to compare your physical fitness to that expected of WWII soldiers, thus proving that you are as ‘manly’ and ‘tough’ as your grandfathers before you.

Moreover, ‘The Art of Manliness’ is not alone. It is evident that a historic nostalgia for the time when millions of young men braved the dangers of war with nothing but a rifle and a rucksack combined with the media glorification of combat via content such as ‘Black Hawk Down’ and ‘American Sniper’ have led to an American public firmly entrenched in their ideas of who and what the United States military should be.

The depth of this problem was painfully illuminated by the debacle that was the proposed Distinguished Warfare Medal in 2013. Days before retirement, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the creation of a high-level service medal for those military members demonstrating ‘extraordinary achievement’ not involving acts of valour. The award was designed to acknowledge outstanding achievement by cyber warfare and combat drone operators – individuals often overlooked for recognition due to the distinct lack of risk of bodily harm inherent in their duties.

The American public would have nothing of it. A Fox News article on the subject, harkening yet again to the historically rooted, stereotypical ideal of a soldier, opened with, ‘There was a time in our nation’s military history when a service member actually had to earn their medals.’ Fox News was joined by a cacophony of other voices, who if not upset purely by the medal’s existence, then decried its order of precedence being ahead of some combat awards. A House of Representatives bill banning the medal from being rated equal to or above the Purple Heart rapidly gained 124 cosponsors. Such was the outcry that the medal was deemed ‘unnecessary’ by new Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and subsequently cancelled in its entirety less than two months after it was first introduced.

The public’s stubborn determination to cling to outdated ideals of what it means to be a war hero limits the military’s ability to modernise and inherently weakens American security in the face of 21st century threats. Today, less than thirteen per cent of servicemembers are assigned combat rated positions. This is reflective of a broader shift in the nature of warfare, where many ‘battles’ are now fought in the space and cyberspace domains. December 2020 marked the one-year anniversary of the U.S. Space Force. Revolutionary in that it will likely never send a single troop into combat, its creation serves as a stark reminder that wars are no longer won or lost by 18-year-olds with rifles.

Yet a public still mired in this perception shackles these efforts at modernising the military. While the creation of the Space Force marks a step forward, an inability to fill its ranks with competent and motivated individuals is likely to be an issue, as it has already proven to be with regards to the recruitment and retainment of cyberspace operators. 71% of young Americans do not qualify for military service today, typically due to recreational drug use, obesity, or medical issues as minor as eczema. Today’s cyber and space experts reside in this broader cross-section of society, and until the military can loosen restrictions on physical fitness, appearance, and medical standards – relics of a historic past continually revived by the media – they remain out of reach as contributors to the safety and security of America.

So, what can be done? The military and the media need to work in concert to move away from the classic embodiment of the American war hero. The Space Force is the perfect opportunity to begin opening doors to military service for a broader sect of the American public, and this needs to be both advertised and praised. While many cyber and space capabilities are classified, increased education and awareness of American strength in these areas can help shape public opinion. Finally, bring back the Distinguished Warfare Medal, or some form of it. Demonstrating that both the military and the public support these new war heroes will be critical if America hopes to field a competent, skilled, and battle-ready force for the 21st century.

[Disclaimer: The opinions and assertions contained herein are the private opinions of the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the United States Department of Defense or the United States Air Force.]

Mary Hood is a graduate student at King’s College London as well as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force. Her interests include women and mental health in the military, lethal autonomous weapons, and artificial intelligence.

Women and children first: how the Myth of Protection is harming… men

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By Amber Holland

A refugee appears exhausted while swimming towards the shore after a dinghy carrying Syrian and Afghan refugees deflated about 100 meters before reaching the Greek island of Lesbos, Sept. 13, 2015. (Credit: Alkis Konstantinidis/Reuters)

Since the start of the refugee crisis, multiple media outlets have consistently portrayed male refugees as deceitful economic migrants, whilst only women and children are deemed to be fleeing violence. Although an attractive narrative due to the simplicity it involves, our collective failure to recognise men as victims of violent conflict potentially endangers the lives of many, whilst characterising women as eternal victims simultaneously robs them of their agency. Luckily, Feminist International Relations (IR) Theory offers both an explanation and a route to solving this, namely through deconstructing the Myth of Protection.

The Myth of Protection is one of the core philosophies of Feminist IR Theory. Intrinsically linking conflict and gender, it rests on the repeated lie that wars are fought to primarily protect women, children and the extremely vulnerable. This directly contradicts the shocking statistic that 90% of all casualties are civilian, the majority of whom are women and children. From this Myth, comes other fallacies, such as women playing little to no active role in conflict and the idea that inside a state’s borders, women are automatically considered ‘safe’. Both these concepts have been proven false, from the 40% female personnel rate in the Kurdish YPG, to the use of rape as a weapon of war in the DRC earning the grim title of the “rape capital of the world”.

Beyond robbing women of their agency, the Myth of Protection has also resulted in a worrying trend of discounting male victims of violent conflict. This is due to them not falling into the socially acceptable category of ‘vulnerable’, tied to traditional masculine and feminine gender roles. Perhaps the most visceral example of this is seen in the reaction of news outlets to the ongoing refugee crisis. Britain’s newly crowned best-selling newspaper, The Daily Mail, has regularly covered its front page with pictures and news relating to boats crossing The English Channel, although its reaction to stories involving men and children has been quite different. Whereas as harrowing pictures of three year old Aylan Kurdi dead on a beach in Turkey should make readers “shudder in collective horror”, males crossing in the same manner are described as an “influx”, which should make Britain “worried”. As unaccompanied men are portrayed as making the treacherous journey for economic reasons, they are judged as undeserving of our empathy and assistance just by virtue of their gender. Contrastingly, media outlets consistently highlight in their article titles instances that involve the deaths of women and children refugees, implying they are more deserving of our sympathy. When it comes to the continuing exemption of men as victims of violent conflict, the zeitgeist has remained quiet.

Unfortunately, this characterisation of male refugees as economic migrants is observable in influencing both national government and multinational organisation’s policies. Canada, a nation traditionally known for its welcoming attitude towards refugees, decided to exclude unaccompanied men from its fast track programme for 25,000 refugees in 2015. Although later confirming that men could still apply through other routes, it has been suggested that the discounting of lone males from this flagship policy, resulted in many being forced to pick up arms in the Syrian war and exacerbating the conflict. The demonisation of the ‘Other’ male refugee, built in part off the isolated (but nonetheless horrific) case of the Cologne New Year’s assaults on women, has resulted in the assumption that male victims of conflict are something to be feared, even in the upper echelons of power. In the UN’s 2008 Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls, this dichotomised and gendered view of victims is present, with men characterised as the perpetrators of violence regardless of their refugee status.

Of course, some nuance is needed here. It is important to remember that 35% of women globally have experienced physical and/or sexual violence, and that 38% of all murders of women are committed by their partners. Across the globe, being a woman is still incredibly dangerous. Moreover, it could be argued that the prioritising of female victims of violent conflict is indeed necessary, especially when coming from nations where they lack the political, social and economic agency to protect themselves. However, this gender-differentiated policy can result in paternalistic and infantizing programmes, conceptualising women through virtue of their womb, as opposed to their humanity.

Fortunately, possible solutions to the Myth of Protection can be found by returning to Feminist IR theory, and feminism in general. At the core of the Myth of Protection, are the gendered values that are rife in a patriarchal society. Far from helping, the prizing of men as brave fighters, who hold the traits of aggression and force, has resulted in an inability to view them as victims of violent conflict. Instead, there is an expectation that men do not flee from violence, rather staying to fight and protect their values (I refer you to the Pub Brawl Analogy for an excellent deconstruction of this reductionist view). However, anyone can feel terror, and no one is invincible against the barrel of a gun. More importantly, more violence is not the answer to these conflicts.

Feminism, through deconstructing gender and unburdening individuals from the stereotypes they feel they must conform to, offers a route to accepting men as victims of violent conflict worthy of our support. Beyond liberating women and girls, destroying patriarchal norms is also beneficial to men and boys, with a direct correlation observable between the state of gender equality in a nation and lower rates of male mental health issues and suicide.

Under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, it is established in customary international law, that refugees should not face discrimination by virtue of their sex. By consigning the Myth of Protection to IR history books, this can finally become a reality. With the rate of male refugees steadily increasing, due to their ability to survive the treacherous journey to safety, this cannot come soon enough.

 

 

Amber is an MA Conflict, Security and Development student at King’s College London. Her research interests include the relationship between environmental scarcity and international development, and feminist solutions to conflict.

Interview - Journalist Sean Carberry on Afghanistan & conflict reporting

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By Mackenzie Weinger:

Journalist Sean Carberry shut down NPR’s Kabul bureau at the end of 2014 after more than two years reporting in Afghanistan. Photo: Courtesy Sean Carberry
Journalist Sean Carberry shut down NPR’s Kabul bureau at the end of 2014 after more than two years reporting in Afghanistan. Photo: Courtesy Sean Carberry

In December 2014, reporter Sean Carberry shut the doors of NPR’s Kabul, Afghanistan bureau. The United States public radio network had put the bureau’s closure on the calendar back in 2012, deciding to leave the country due to the planned reduction of US troops. After having a bureau in the city since 2006, NPR has now turned its coverage of Afghanistan over to its Islamabad correspondent, and Carberry has returned to the United States.

Carberry, currently a freelance journalist in Washington DC, spoke with Strife about closing NPR’s Kabul bureau, what’s next for Afghanistan, and his advice for reporting in conflict zones.

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What did you think about the bureau closing? Did the justification for shutting it make sense to you, or was it a case of a long war and a short attention span?

I think the decision was more financial than anything else. And the feeling was similar to what they did in Iraq — NPR closed the Baghdad bureau at the end of 2011 when US troops left, so they were following that model. I understand financially why there might have been a need or desire to do that. I certainly don’t think editorially it was a decision that a number of people in management would have made.

I did have a conversation with a senior manager last summer offering to extend and stay at least through the first half of 2015 because I felt that it was essential to continue to cover the story and see how things play out at least through the first half of the year after this transition period ends. And I was told that there was agreement that editorially that would be preferable, but, you know, it was a non-starter because financially there was not a dollar to put toward that. It was a done deal at that point.

What do you think we can we expect to see from the US-Afghanistan relationship going forward?

The recent Washington visit by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah appears to have been very productive. Ghani was extremely gracious and really bent over backwards to show his appreciation of US investment in Afghanistan – both in dollars and lives. It’s a stark change from former President Hamid Karzai, who became increasingly hostile towards the US.

President Obama agreed to delay his planned draw-down of troops, which both US and Afghan military officials have wanted for some time. The US also announced a new pledge of $800 million in incentive funds that Afghanistan will receive if it meets certain benchmarks. But, the question is, how long will this honeymoon last? There is a lot of Afghanistan fatigue in the US, and the public and many in Congress are wondering what the US is getting for its continued investment in Afghanistan.

Ghani’s going to have to reassure people that he is making progress on some of these key things like corruption, in terms of trying to build an economy, in terms of trying to further peace initiatives and end the fighting there. And it’s going to be difficult because he doesn’t have a lot to show on any of those, even some six months into his presidency, because he doesn’t have a full cabinet and so a lot of the ministries have been just running on fumes.

And just as Karzai gradually alienated many of his supporters in Washington, there is a risk Ghani could too. He was on his best behaviour during this recent visit, but he’s notoriously prickly, and he’s already dressed down a number of western officials and diplomats in Kabul. Some have warned that working with Ghani could become more difficult over time.

What’s your take on the prospect of a peace process? What do you think about Pakistan’s role?

I’m sceptical of that. I think there are a lot of reasons why it should be doubted right now that that process is likely to move forward. The Taliban have been making some gains militarily in parts of the country and so, from their standpoint, if they can continue to make gains then that strengthens their bargaining position. Unless some of the Taliban commanders believe that they’re actually likely to lose ground this year, then maybe they would see an incentive to start talking, but I think a number of Taliban figures are going to think they have an incentive to keep fighting and increase their leverage.

And there are still a lot of questions about Pakistan and whether Pakistan is really going to come to the table and use their influence over the Afghan Taliban to start negotiations. There’s been some optimism that Pakistan is turning over a new leaf, but from some people I’ve talked to that are close to this, they don’t really buy that there is any substantive change in Pakistan’s behaviour. For example, there’s a fundamental conflict that is unresolved between Afghanistan and Pakistan — that Afghanistan still does not officially recognise the border between the two countries. This is the Durand Line that was created by the British in the late 1800s. It took a big chunk of Afghanistan and gave it to what was British India at the time. And even though the international community, the UN, all see this as the legal, defined border, it’s a point of nationalist pride in Afghanistan to say ‘we will never recognise the Durand Line’.

As long as the Afghans refuse to recognise this line, there will be this existential angst and fear in Pakistan that has fuelled their desire to have strong influence in Afghanistan through proxies, whether it’s the Taliban or politicians or what-have-you. So unless Afghanistan decides to recognise this border, I think it’s going to be hard for Pakistan to give up this feeling that it has to have a weak neighbour that isn’t going to someday be strong enough to try to claim back this land. This is an underlying dynamic that doesn’t get a lot of attention, but I think it’s a real festering sore… It’s hard to see a peace process going forward without some resolution of this underlying border conflict.

But that’s just one of many reasons why some people are wary of Pakistan’s intentions and willingness to commit to a peace process. On the Afghan side, there are still questions whether different factions have reconciled and settled on a unified approach to a peace process as well, and they can’t move forward if some powerful people have reservations about the terms of a possible peace deal.

What would you say was the most surprising story you covered while in Afghanistan?

I keep coming back to this story about the police puncturing car tires in the city. It’s just a story that found us. I had someone over to our office that we were interviewing and when he went out, around 7 o’clock at night, his car parked in front of our compound had a couple of flat tires. And he actually had a flat tire on his way over to our house, so he thought that the repair was done badly and a coincidence he had another flat tire. Then, as my Afghan producer was leaving shortly after that to head home, he calls me and says, ‘Hey, I have two flat tires as well’. I said, ‘Ok, there’s something weird about this. Call the police office at our district and tell them this and see what they have to say.’

He calls them, and then calls me back and says: ‘I talked to the police commander and he said they did it, that this is a new policy to try to prevent car theft. If people park their car in the street at night, they’re going to puncture the tires so the cars can’t be stolen and used as suicide car bombs.’ When he explained this, I thought, this is unusual. It clearly is a solution to a problem — I’m not sure it’s the best solution to the problem.

What the police were saying was, ‘Look, there is no other way to solve this problem’. And this phrase is something that I heard constantly in Afghanistan, that ‘this is the only way’, or ‘there’s no other way’. It was a fascinating phenomenon that this was how decisions would be made and rationalised in a lot of cases.

That’s the one that’s always stuck with me as this weird, little specific thing, but it was emblematic of so many bigger aspects.

How would you suggest reporters entering war zones or areas impacted by conflict approach their jobs?

I spent time in Libya in 2011 and spent time in Iraq and other conflict zones, and I think one thing I would say is every conflict is different. Even though someone’s a war reporter, each situation has its own dynamics and things you do need to study and learn and pay attention to before you get on the ground. There are some places where it’s safe to associate with certain rebel groups and things like that, and they’ll take care of you, but in all these cases — especially when you’re doing any kind of embedding — you are taking a side in the story.

When you’re embedded with US troops, you are part of that. You are a target whether you want to be or not. You can try to argue to the Taliban that you’re a journalist, but they’re not going to see it that way. You’re part of that establishment. And the same thing in Libya. If you’re there, embedded with the rebels back in 2011, you’re taking a side. And there was, I think, a clear western narrative that the rebels were on the right side and the Gaddafi regime was on the wrong side.

That’s just one of the big ethical questions for all of us in this industry: Are we always neutral? There are times where there’s a decision that the Taliban is the enemy and so if you’re reporting there are you going to be biased against the Taliban? Conceptually, I would have loved to have embedded with the Taliban to cover their side of things. My greatest reservation was that I didn’t want to be with a group of Taliban when a drone strike happened and just felt the risk factor of trying to get that other side was pretty high.

You end up embedding with forces that you can logistically do it with, so you get that part of the story, but you don’t necessarily see the other parts. And sometimes, news organisations, countries, etc., decide: ‘Well, look, this group is bad, so it’s okay to embed with the good guys and do reporting that’s focused on how they’re trying to kill the bad guys.’ But, every once in a while, I see conversations about that and discussions asking: what are the ethics and journalistic responsibilities to try to cover these things in a more neutral fashion? Or should people buy into a narrative that says, ‘This group is the enemy and therefore the reporting is going to reflect that’?

There are different things that dictate how that’s going to come out, but, as I say, it’s easy to embed with the US army, it’s not so easy to embed with ISIS, Taliban, a militia in Libya these days… There are some people that are going out and doing that, trying to do that, and, journalistically it’s worth doing. But I almost feel like it’s people who are just trying to push the edge and I’m not always sure about the quality of the reporting that comes out of some of those efforts. I think often a lot of the reporting tends to be about the journalist rather than the people that you’re trying to report on.

I get the draw to want to do that kind of thing, but I am just very wary of stories that start with the word ‘I’ or ‘we’. It’s not about us. I think that’s the challenge, to realise that we’re witnesses, we’re not participants.

Mackenzie Weinger is an MA student in War Studies at King’s College London focusing on the media and conflict. Twitter: @mweinger

The Hizbullah Phenomenon

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By Mohammad I. Aslam:

Lina Khatib, Dina Mater and Atef Alshaer, The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication, Published by Hurst, 2014. New from £18.84 (Amazon paperback). ISBN: 1849043353.

In Hizbullah: Politics and Communication, a trio of authors endeavour to shine light on the evolutionary transformation of arguably the most powerful sub-state political and military movement in the Middle East, Hizbullah. They do this by dissecting its sophisticated political communications strategy.

The authors, evidently aware that most previous studies on the Hizbullah movement have tended to focus on its cultural, ideological, military and political paradigms, attempt to bridge a gap in the analysis of the movement by focusing on how the dexterous use of mass communication goes hand in hand with its nearly 30 years of exponential growth.

The main gist of the narrative is therefore designed to furnish readers with a corollary of descriptive examples demonstrating how the movement was able to not only successfully remain relevant through turbulent times, wars and civil upheavals, but to propagate into a global movement in the process.

The authors attempt to accomplish this by analysing and connecting segments of Hizbullah’s elaborate interplay of culture, image, language and self-presentation on the one hand, and spectacular military and political campaigns on the other.

In addition to this, a sizeable and crucial concentration is given to the movement’s most successful propagator of political communication, its Secretary-General, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, whom the authors quite rightly view as giving the movement a sense of exaltation and infallibility.

Other essential factors which are given credence are the movement’s central messages of “victimisation”, a successful penetration into archenemy Israel’s political and military establishment, and Hizbullah’s emphasis on nationalism, which is aligned with the group’s political progression.

The book has many strengths. Firstly, the authors are all Middle Eastern with expertise in media studies, and are thus able to provide readers with a better understanding of the complexities and emotions that are inherent in Arab audiences – and for that matter confessional groups in Lebanon of which the Hizbullah-supporting Shiites happen to be the largest.

Secondly, and despite generally appearing to be complimentary of Hizbullah’s communicative efforts, all three authors are clearly scholars with no personal interest or stake in the movement’s message. This is vital to ensure a balanced and concise view of its communicative success and failures.

The final chapter of the book keeps audiences aware that despite an impressive run of communicating its political message across the country (and even internationally to a certain extent), apparent shortcomings and weaknesses in this otherwise very successful strategy have become more noticeable. In particular, the movement’s media strategy designed to justify its support of the incumbent regime in Syria has not been selling well with Arab audiences.

Overall, the book is a diligent piece of media analysis and one that deserves the attention of those interested in the nonlinear communicative strategies of powerful sub-state actors like Hizbullah.

Mohammad I. Aslam is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the institute of Middle-Eastern Studies, Kings College London. His research analyses the Political and Military dynamics of Lebanese Hezbollah.

 

 

 

 

‘There is something of the propagandist in everyone’: A Syrian Perspective

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As this week sees the 1,000th day of conflict in Syria pass, Muttahir Salim reflects on the role of propaganda in the conflict.

The Editor

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‘There is something of the propagandist in everyone’: A Syrian Perspective

by Muttahir Salim

“To plunder, to slaughter, to steal, these things they misname
empire, and where they make a wilderness, they call it ‘peace.”
Tacitus

You know it and I know it, ‘there is something of the propagandist in everyone’.[1] Human nature is, and always will be, bound by a jaded and prejudiced view of the world. No matter how we try, and without the proper checks and balances in place,[2] propaganda will always form an exceptional instrument of choice for galvanizing favourable public opinion, particularly in times of conflict. Indeed the notorious and brutal Syrian civil war is an exact proponent of this notion.

As was once a notion wholly utilised by 19th century anarchists,[3] select modern scholars have now coined this activity as ‘Propaganda of the Deed (POTD)’. The idea of POTD as suggested in Bolt and Betz’ 2008 Whitehall report[4] is that it is a form of mass media political marketing with the aim of forming sympathetic patronage by way of the patron’s representative client.[5]

In 21st century conflicts, POTD has shown to be an incredibly effective instrument for galvanising and mobilising public opinion. What has been especially remarkable in this rather unforgiving Syrian Civil War has been the prolific and successful use of POTD from all sides of the conflict including established media outlets. Indeed the swift media reaction and western governments’ spin, hastening affirmative military action over the chemical weapons attack on Ghouta in August of this year, was especially remarkable. Earlier claims relating to the use of chemical weapons declared Assad had crossed the ‘red line’ and claims of his irrefutable guilt, fed directly into a rapidly escalating western government media-blitzkrieg, mostly led by the US and the UK, for a ‘justifiable’ offensive on Syria.

While the UN has not yet established exact culpability, Syrian-allies Iran and Russia pointed the fingers at the rebels, and the US and its allies have blamed the Assad regime for the attack. Some could argue that the rebels had the motivation, the intent and plausible capability to gain the most from a POTD-related attack to mobilise favourable public opinion. However, uncertainty as to who carried out the Ghouta attacks remains.[6] What is sure though is that UN inspectors have confirmed that sarin gas was used on relatively large scale massacring hundreds of people. However, obtaining substantiated proof is fraught with difficulty, particularly when the issues of collection of verifiable hard evidence (i.e. chemical samples), human and image intelligence are complex and often gathered under ambiguous ever changing front lines.

According to UN reports, nearly 93,000 people have been killed, though current invalidated figures put the casualties much higher,[7] while millions have been driven from their homes due to the conflict. What began in March 2011 as an uprising against Bashar al-Assad that has now descended into a vicious civil war, where largely Sunni Muslim rebels are pitted against Assad’s forces (a Shi’ite Alawite). The onset of this is the potential to widen the conflict regionally (and to some degree it already has) and open up old cold war rivalries. Underneath the shadow of this forgotten Cold War contention,both sides have expertly utilised their patrons and have become connoisseurs in exploiting this rivalry to their distinct advantage.

As the civil war has gathered pace and both sides, the rebel forces in particular, have vied for international public opinion, it would seem that POTD ‘activity’ has become the mainstay tool of rebel fighters to correct deep-rooted grievances. By inference, when the resources of the protagonists differ significantly and there is no natural institutional outlet, POTD directive action looks at balancing the odds. Indeed, we know that the resources of the ‘belligerents’ differ significantly whilst both attempt to exploit each other’s weaknesses. The weaker of the two has attempted to use a strategy to offset deficiencies and given the lack of earlier unconvincing Superpower support (i.e. US Support) has arguably been left to the few ‘effective’ devices available to them, that being POTD.

There is still uncertainty as to which parties will be attending the UN-brokered Syrian conference scheduled for 22 January 2014 in Geneva, Switzerland. However one thing is for sure: in the run up to the conference there will be an upsurge of propaganda activity. Indeed, we expect the representatives that do attend the conference will be actively looking to optimise their preliminary negotiating position by way of mobilising the masses with a view to boosting favourable international public opinion. This may sadly involve further terrorist actions aimed at gaining support through their preferred choice of media outlets. It would seem that the protagonists of POTD acknowledge and agree that in ‘today’s fast changing political landscape where social and political agendas are being interpreted and shaped by global media’[8] it has become the latest vogue that which its protagonists expect rapid response times.

We would not want to overstep the mark here in terms of advocating responsibility of the use of such horrific weapons as there is yet no substantiated evidence to the fact. However, POTD would seem to be an effective asymmetric weapon of choice for the weaker of the two and the moral boundaries in which POTD is being used may have become inauspiciously blurred.

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Muttahir Salim is an MA postgraduate student (War in the Modern World) at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He is currently the Middle East lead for Arup’s Resilience, Security and Risk practice based out of Abu Dhabi.

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NOTES

[1] Eugen Hadamovsky (1933), Propaganda und nationale Macht: Die Organisation der öffentlichen, Meinung für die nationale Politik (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling).
[2] http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Anarchism_and_violence.html
[3] Neville Bolt, David Betz & Jaz Azari (2008), Propaganda of the Deed 2008 Understanding the Phenomenon, Whitehall report 3-08, pp. 2, (The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies)
[4] Ibid. pp. 2
[5] ‘United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013’
[6] UN Report - http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45162 (accessed on 27 November 2013,-13:17hrs)
[7] Neville Bolt, David Betz & Jaz Azari (2008), Propaganda, pp. 1.