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Nations and Nationalisms as Expressions of Identity

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by Alexandru Nica

(Image credit: Jakob Braun)

Psychologically speaking, the stability of one’s life is arguably conferred by the coherence of the Self, to use a Jungian term. In turn, it are values that generate the core of our identity, thereby bringing about psychological stability. This article investigates the importance of national identity from a psycho-social perspective. Its purpose is to show that while nationalism may be a new concept in the timeline of our existence, national identity is an expression of our historical and psychological needs to belong. As a link in the chain that forms our psyche, national identity is an important factor of psycho-social existence and stability for each and every one of us.

Large-group affiliation continues to be a defining element in determining one’s identity. Indeed, religion, ethnicity, national identity, and culture are at the core of the individual’s psyche. Very often, these pieces are interdependent, with national identity involves a certain culture or religion. As such, the pursuit of national identity and the birth of nationalism did not necessarily originate in the West and are consequences of deeper historical roots. Hence, while nationalism might have been coined in the modern era, national identity preceded that modernity. Moreover, even if contemporary literature may define it as an ideology, nationalism is not an ideology for a simple reason. Nationalism correlates to a wide range of ideologies, both Left-wing and Right-wing: from communism (communist nationalism) to Nazism (national socialism), from unionism to separatism, from secularism to ecclesiasticism (or religious nationalism). Indeed, while nationalism is an element most closely related to right-wing politics, along with conservatism, capitalism, individualism, and religious belief, it is not an ideology in and by itself.

In the West, it is widely acknowledged that nationalism was born within romanticism, as a reaction to the French Revolution and to the rationalism of the Enlightenment that was perceived as threat to the purported continuity of historical evolution, as they catalysed in Napoleon’s Empire. More precisely, German intellectuals were refuting both French territorial and intellectual domination. The German intellectual ‘counterattack’ was called Romanticism. In the ‘nation’, Edmund Burke and, later, Joseph de Maistre perceived an expression of a superior order, an organic community, as opposed to a simple group of citizens equal in rights. In German Romanticism, influenced by the ideas of Herder or Fichte, put forward in the latter’s Addresses to the German Nation, the nation became an expression of linguistic purity and popular or cultural mythology. The purpose was to return to, and embrace, the old traditions, as a form of protest against the French cultural hegemony and military occupation over the German states. The common culture and unique spirit, will, or soul, expressed by language, myths, traditions, and laws were the fundamental elements in the construction of nations.

This traditional current of thought, again, rooted in Romanticism, was considered to be the essence of nationalism itself. The 19th century was the time of a powerful return of popular, folk culture and of a certain interest for old traditions and practices (besides France and Germany, other national states were forming as well: Italy, Greece, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and so on). It was an attempt to affirm the authentic culture, personified in the people, who began to call for national self-determination. The force of this type of cultural speech was impressive, both because it conferred legitimacy to the ideal of national self-determination ideal and because responded to the need of developing a psychological identity.

A number of authors and historians reject this hypothesis. However, their theories are not anchored in historical, cultural and societal realities, but mainly come as a post-war pejorative reinterpretation of nations and nationalism which served as a theoretical base for new social movements. They argue, basically, that the ordinary people were unable to become aware of the fact that they belong to a Nation, hence intellectuals and elites were needed to tell them about it and guide them in discovering their origins and national conscience. Following this logic, Ernest Gellner uses the example of Central and Eastern Europe to support his theory about different ages of the continent. He splits Europe into four different zones and disagrees with the fact that the East had the necessary preconditions for creating national states. The result, Gellner says, are a group of states which became national only because of the Wilsonian political project of self-determination; and so, they lacked the historical age that would legitimise them as organic, national states. Gellner believed that it was nationalism that produced the nation, and not vice-versa. This reading means that the national states of Central and Eastern Europe are not a natural product of history, but of political conjuncture.

Considering this idea of political conjuncture, albeit for a different period and context, Liah Greenfeld tries to assemble a theory based on the political and social context in which England found itself immediately after the War of Roses (1455-1485). Greenfeld argues that nationalism and the need for national identity appeared artificially and accidentally, only as a sort of legitimacy for the newly-emerging aristocracy. In this context, national identity came as a need to explain these new social mutations which were previously unimaginable in a feudal society, defined by strict differences between classes. Thus, for Greenfeld, national identity came to surpass the previous social identity, as a need for acquiring legitimacy and dignity.

However, when judging from the arguments and logical aspects presented above, one can consider Greenfeld’s theory to be false for two main reasons. First, nationalism did not appear in the English space, but in the German space, as a reaction to the French diffusion of culture and values, which were dominant in the romanticist period. Second, nationalism and national identity are not the same things. Nationalism is just a conceptualisation of an element of psychological identity which defines humans and their communities, all over the world. Indeed, the process of developing the idea of nation and national identity was somewhat different in the East, due to a specific political and historical context. However, both Gellner and Greenfeld ignore crucial aspects regarding psychological identity, as materialised into cultural specificity and social evolution.

In other words, the nation is a pre-modern entity, a group with a specific societal identity. Even Kohn himself omits this aspect when he differentiates between Western and Eastern nationalism, because he creates an unnecessary dichotomy between an alleged ‘bad’ (ethnic) nationalism, an alleged characteristic of Eastern societies, and a ‘good’ (civic, secular) nationalism in the West. In the context of an international society that was recently shattered by exacerbated nationalism, Kohn’s approach was somewhat understandable. However, he neglects the deeper and psychological character of national identity, which is a universal and fundamental one. A few decades later, Brockmann analysed national identity as a psychological notion, as a component of a wider psychological identity. By paraphrasing Verdery, it can be summarised that the term ‘nation’ is a name for the relationship that connects a socio-political entity – a large group characterised by various specific features – to the individuals that form it, like links of a chain.

Therefore, even if national identity and nationalism were maybe reflected differently in the East, the idea of a ‘nation’ was born under the same principles. Nations like Romania or Serbia were formed out of a need for psychological identity among the people in those areas. In the East, nationalism was a reaction to the continuously expanding policies of some surrounding states which did not correspond to any ethnic, historical, cultural, or demographical borders. It was a reaction to the policy of enforcing the right of conquest led by surrounding multinational empires: the Habsburg – later Austro-Hungarian – Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire. Thus, at first, Romanians, Serbians, but also Bulgarians and Greeks started to vocally acknowledge their national identity for the purpose of emancipation from the empires which were controlling them politically, militarily, economically, socially, and even culturally. These peoples had, at first, the purpose to survive the attempts of assimilation organised by the empires. Then, after the First World War, the Wilsonian project allowed these nations to emerge more powerful than before (Romania, for instance, has doubled its population and territorial size in 1918, after the unification with all Romanian-inhabited territories that were previously under foreign rule).

Like Volkan later would come to theorise, these nations became aware of the link between national identity and core, psychological identity when they were confronted with gradual assimilation. In order to achieve unity and independence, these nations used their unique features as arguments. For Romanians, Serbians, Bulgarians, or Greeks, this awareness included strong ties with their Orthodox Churches, as a factor of difference between them and the surrounding empires. For this reason, nationalism and even Enlightenment were not anti-clerical in the East, which explains the different character of nationalism in this geographical space.

Coming back to our times, one can see an apparent revival of national sentiments, at least in Europe. Despite an era of globalisation, nations demonstrate a tendency towards closing the ranks. Nationalist movements have recently arisen in the East (i.e. Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic), as well as the West (i.e. Italy, Spain, France, Germany, coming to a climax with Brexit). A possible explanation can relate to the need for a psychological identity, with national identity as a part of it. In the West, the immigration issue starts to be perceived as a threat to the national specifics. In the East, it is more about the perception that people are beginning to face a two-speed European Union, where these newer members are being left behind.

To conclude, national identity is not synonymous with nationalism, because it is not just a constructed doctrine or a current of thought. Instead, it is an important factor of psycho-social identity and stability of any individual, regardless of where he or she lives. Although nationalism, as a concept, is modern, the need for identification with a large group, with a nation, precedes modernity and still prevails today. Yet it is important to note that neither nationalism nor national identity appeared by accident. National identity is an expression of the need to belong, which in itself is an organic feature of the human psyche, or at least that of a healthy, functional human psyche.

Using the metaphor of a canvas tent, Vamik Volkan emphasises the idea that a nation protects its members by offering them an identity, like a mother who protects her children. Indeed, there is a nuance here: some nations emphasise the mother figure as a fundamental symbol (i.e. Russian Motherland), whereas other nations highlight the father figure (i.e. German Fatherland). However, this nuance is psychologically irrelevant. The point is that the nation can play the role of a caregiver – which is a crucial role for one to become a ‘healthy, functional adult’, using Donald Winnicott’s words. Judging by this analogy, it makes it very difficult to replace or reshape this reality through constructed speech, if at all. There is only a slight variance, an empirical nuance – this need for national identity was acknowledged under different circumstances, in different contexts, throughout history. However, it remains so that national identity preceded modernity.

Alexandru Nica is currently pursuing an MA in Political Psychology at Bournemouth University. He holds a BA in History and is interested in how politics, media, psychology, and technology are interconnected and shape our fast-paced contemporary society.

Nationalism in Foreign Policy: Anachronism or Necessity?

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by Alexandru Nica

Hungary’s Orbán and the EU, a troubled relationship (Image Credit: Wikimedia)

Let us take the following statement by way of introduction. ‘A nation […] is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors’. In this article, I will demonstrate how this statement is false, since nations and nationalism are, after all, expressions of identity. As such, nationalism will continue to shape foreign policy as long as nations continue to be the main actors on the international stage. Before discussing about nations, nationalism or foreign policy as their bond, however, one ought to first define these concepts.

Nationalism, nation, what is the difference?

The concept of nationalism has at its core the idea of a nation. This large group of people lives on a common territory and has a common cultural inheritance, a history, a language, a shared religion, and ultimately, interests. It can thus be argued that the concept of a ‘nation’ also develops a feeling of moral affectivity and solidarity among its members. It is not so much about political institutions, structures, or ideologies but rather more about cultural ties and ethnic legacies.

In a nutshell, nationalism can be defined as a current of thought or a doctrine which puts nations and their interests above any other individual or collective interest. In this sense, nationalism implies that nations should be entitled to govern themselves and their territory independently, without any foreign or other external interference. At the same time, nations should be the only legitimate foundation of states. In so doing, states should reflect the national identities and national unity.

However, some historians “have attributed to nationalism a variety of harmful consequences, ranging from absurd social and cultural policies to totalitarian terror and global destabilization”. This fact has often led to misinterpretations when the matter was politicised. Because of some political or diplomatic contexts or to support some extreme ideologies, nationalism can sometimes take exacerbated forms. Xenophobia or chauvinism are but two examples. Nonetheless, in order to understand nationalism’s true nature and purposes, a clear difference must be made between nationalism and these derived concepts.

According to the same Anthony Smith, some definitions consider nationalism to be an artificial doctrine, with almost nothing to do with the organic concept of a ‘nation’. However, there are also perspectives connecting nationalism with a national state of mind, reflected in feelings of national identity and belonging. Therefore, it is not only about people’s desiderata to have their own states and to be masters of their own destiny but also about the sense of belonging, of connection, of ancestry and continuity. It is an indispensable element of one’s core identity, because it implies integrating oneself in your past, present, and future. An existential perpetuity, if you will.

One might be tempted to think that nationalism, as it is perceived today, belongs to modernity. Indeed, nationalism appeared in the German space, as a reaction to the French Revolution of 1789. As such, it might indeed be considered ‘modern’, chronologically speaking. However, the fundamental element that nationalism operates with is the ‘nation’, an organic entity rooted in the pre-modern era (with the 100 Years War or the Spanish Reconquista as examples). In so doing, we can consider that nationalism precedes modernity, semantically speaking. Nonetheless, this argument can be developed separately, as the debate is too wide and complex to be covered here. For now, let us return to foreign policy.

Nationalism in foreign policy

It can be affirmed that foreign policy belongs to modernity, even if certain elements of diplomatic interaction can be identified even back to the era of Ancient Greece or the Roman Empire. At present, upon analysing the contemporary international environment, it can also be stated that nationalism has an important role in shaping world politics and no doubt that foreign policy reflects national interests of many states, even if the world is facing an ever-increasing process of globalisation.

For many states, the role of nationalism in the construction of their foreign policy has to do with a certain need for legitimising foreign affairs. As an analogy, this need for legitimacy can be traced back to the Roman Empire (which had an active and intense propaganda meant to express the civilising role of Rome and the relations with the ‘barbarians’). Historiography, which arose back then, is nowadays still an important factor of legitimacy, especially for countries with expanding tendencies.

When it comes to how national interest can be reflected into foreign policy, Russia is another great example. Even if the U.S.S.R. collapsed in 1991, Russia’s great power aspirations never ceased to be. For this reason, after a decade of internal difficulties and a faulty foreign policy (under Primakov’s policy), Russia adopted a new realism under Putin. This strategy was influenced by the national interests of the state and we can clearly notice a reflection of nationalism in Russia’s foreign policy even more now, in the last decade.

Although Putin’s Russia is not isolationist, his foreign policy made one fact clear: Russia wants to join the Western community. It wants to be integrated among the other great powers, but on its own terms. Simultaneously, it can be observed how Russia is slowly re-emerging as an important power on the international stage, by fully using its resource-rich advantages to pursue its national interests in its relation to the EU.

Speaking about the EU, one can argue that the Old Continent has over the last few years been confronted with a rise of nationalism, a development which is also reflected in foreign policy. This situation was possible also due to the perception that EU members are beginning to face a two-speed Union, where sometimes double standards are applied. Accordingly, Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary) were not satisfied with their position, as the power of each one’s voice wasn’t able to make their national interests heard towards the Western part of the Union. To put it frankly, this is how the “Visegrad Group” took shape.

These countries still accept the EU status-quo and common Aquis. However, in some cases, they take actions according to their own interest, even when this comes in contradiction with Brussels’ policy. Hungary, for instance, went even farther, adopting a sort of dualist foreign policy towards the EU and Russia. Orban’s rhetoric has been focused on opposing globalisation, migration, sexual ideologies, contesting decisions of the European Union, accusing foreign corporations of spoliation, calling for a return to Christian and national values, and so on.

In so doing, Orban presented “illiberal democracy” as a better solution, thereby rendering the term “illiberal” in a positive light – a necessary alternative to liberal internationalism and to an emerging “liberal empire” which is the EU. Moreover, as a constant critic of the EU, Orban rallied behind Polish premier Morawiecki and his similar political program.

In this context, one can argue that the Hungarian premier has come with an approach that functions as a ‘defensive shield’ in front of an outer peril which can dilute the Hungarian essence. The reason why his solution was embraced by a majority of Hungarians might be that it resonates with their inner psychological reaction to what they perceive as threatening for their core identity.

In the end, it’s all about identity

Today, when humanity finds itself in an era of digitalisation and globalisation, it might seem at a first glance that national identities are obsolete and anachronistic. However, national identity is one of the main components of psychological identity, broadly defined. In the case of large groups – nations, countries, this aspect is likely to be reflected in relation to other large groups.

By summarising the post-Cold War international context, Samuel Huntington offers an interesting approach on the need for identity. According to him, people are different mainly because they share different cultures. When facing existential questions, they try to find an answer by looking at their core identity, which is undoubtedly and inevitably shaped by their culture and community. By their traits and groups. People know who they are only when they find out who they are not.

Therefore, dimensionally, the group is going all the way up to the nation, starting from family, friends, and the surrounding environment. Nations determine people to adjust not only their self-confidence, but also their principles and values, by sticking to some of them and rejecting others. A human being needs to identify with something and to belong somewhere, as a “zoon politikon” – social animal – and “zoon logikon” – logical animal, as Aristotle stated in his Politics.

Apart from money or power, the need for identity can lead one to fight wars that are not his, on distant continents, thousands of miles away, as large-group affiliation is a very strong element in determining one’s identity. In other words, religion, ethnicity, national identity, culture, they all are at the core of the individual’s psyche.

Trying to survive and belong comes out of an inferiority complex. Trying to subdue and belong comes out of a superiority complex. Still, both are about identity. To quote Huntington: ‘People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies’. After all, people are both rational and emotional beings. And for such beings, the need for identity is permanent. That’s why nationalism – as an expression of national identity – is undoubtedly present in both foreign and internal policy and it seems it will probably remain like this as long as states will be the main actors on the international stage.

Alexandru is currently pursuing an MA in Political Psychology at Bournemouth University. He holds a BA in History and is interested in how politics, media, psychology, and technology are interconnected and shape our fast-paced contemporary society.

Donald Trump: A Unique Figure in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy?

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by Nicole Brodie

31 July 2019

President Donald Trump at a Make America Great Again rally in Mesa, Arizona, on Oct. 19, 2018. (Image credit: Charlotte Cuthbertson/The Epoch Times)

“Our plan will put America First. Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo. As long as we are led by politicians who will not put America First, then we can be assured that other nations will not treat America with respect.”

This quote, from the 2016 Republican National Convention, is a fantastic summation of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy stance. American foreign policy for the past 70 years has been one of interventionism and globalism. Trump is the only post-Second World War American president to explicitly endorse an ‘America First’ position – a phrase with significant nationalist and isolationist history. The phrase was originally used during the First World War by Woodrow Wilson and other government figures, to represent American neutrality. It was then co-opted in the lead up to America’s involvement in World War II by the America First party, whose anti-Semitic, pro-fascist rhetoric led to it being disbanded in 1941 after Pearl Harbor. This group infamously included far-right, pro-Nazi figures such as Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford. It is difficult to believe Trump and his speech-writing team do not know the historical implications of using such a phrase when referring to his foreign policy, especially when there is a demonstrated understanding of the historical background of his other major slogan, ‘Make America Great ‘, having referenced its prior use by Ronald Reagan several times.

Trump is not the first isolationist president in American history – the Monroe Doctrine, declaring that the United States would not get involved in any European affairs, was a cornerstone of American foreign policy for nearly a century, and Woodrow Wilson was re-elected due to his isolationist policies. It is important to consider the nature of American isolationism at the time, though, as America was not yet a superpower, and at the time had little prior involvement with European politics. However, with the rise of a liberal international order led by the United States in the aftermath of World War II such political views fell to the wayside. World War II made America a superpower, and as the only Western power left relatively unharmed, it began to not only get involved in, but lead global politics. Since then, America’s involvement and influence in international relations has only grown.

Trump is the first president in the past 70 years to express such isolationist opinions openly. His reasoning for having such a nationalist viewpoint is perhaps what makes him a truly unique figure in the history of American foreign policy. Past isolationist presidents have acted largely on the current state of the world and what was best for America in the present– but Trump’s brand of foreign policy has mostly been reactionary, stemming from his own ideas of how America has been treated, not from its current situation. While it could be argued that both Monroe and Wilson were also acting on their own perceptions, both their policies reflected the status of America at the time, as a nation already fairly removed from the rest of the world’s affairs. President Trump, however, is contradicting America’s existing role and wanting to take an entirely different direction. Trump’s vision of America is of a nation which does not bow to the demands of other nations if those demands are not to America’s direct benefit

“Our country is in serious trouble. We don’t have victories any more. We used to have victories but [now] we don’t have them. When was the last time anybody saw us beating, let’s say, China, in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the time. All the time.”

This unwillingness to compromise is dangerous, as America’s influence throughout the past 70 years has been so strong specifically due to its relationships with allies and its reputation as a champion of liberal democracy – though this has been damaged in recent years, especially in the Middle East where backing down from its existing commitments can only harm America’s international standing, as well as the strength of its alliances – one only needs to look at the opinions recently expressed by various world leaders to see this. Trump has also demonstrated a highly revisionist view of American history. Foreign policy moves hailed as triumphs by previous administrations are derided by him and his supporters as examples of America getting taken advantage of – NAFTA, NATO, and the Paris Accords, for example. Every American president from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Barack Obama has supported the strengthening of America’s international ties and the expansion of liberal democracy – all except Donald Trump.

“We want to take our country back. Our country is disappearing. You look at the kind of deals we make. You look at what’s happening, our country is going in the wrong direction, and so wrong, and it’s got to be stopped and it’s got to be stopped fast.”

Trump’s following makes him a unique figure when considering his foreign policy. A significant proportion of his supporter base is intensely focused on identity and culture, and specifically on how theirs is being attacked. This in itself is not particularly unusual, but the way in which his supporters eschew the existing political system in favour of something, and someone, entirely different certainly is. They believe their identity as the ‘average’ middle-class Christian American, and by extension, ‘America’ itself, is being erased by an increasingly multicultural and globalist United States. Many fervently believe Trump and his ‘Make America Great Again’ stance will reverse that process. Even without focusing on the number of far right attacks that have occurred since he took office, Trump’s policies of nationalism and Americanism have allowed a resurgence in such sentiments among the public (and not just in America). Trump himself has decried the far-right and their ethno-nationalism, but his foreign policy stances have had a bolstering effect on them, and have allowed them to interpret his words as supporting their politics. It is unusual for any president to have such an intense following, especially ones who twist his every word to legitimize their views.

Trump’s best-known slogans may not be unique (both ‘America First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’ have been used in past campaigns by Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan, respectively), but his views on foreign policy certainly are, as are his actions and words. He is the only president since before the Second World War (a significant amount of time for a nation only 243 years old) to renounce America’s globalist policies, and the only one in the history of the nation to buck the established tradition quite so thoroughly (and gleefully) based, seemingly, on largely his own opinions. This return to isolationist sentiment has already hurt America’s relationships with its allies, and can only further harm both its relationships and its influence. Trump himself summed up his worldview quite clearly:

“You know they have a word, it sort of became old-fashioned, it’s called a nationalist, and I say ‘really, we’re not supposed to use that word?’ Do you know what I am? I’m a nationalist.”

Nicole Brodie is a third-year History and International Relations student at King’s College London. Her interests are American foreign policy and 20th century European history. You can find her on Twitter @nicoleebrodie. This article is the second of two winning essays of a writing competition jointly organised by the convenors of the module “Contemporary Issues in International History” and the Strife Blog.

Bibliography

Dunn, Susan. “Trump’s ‘America First’ Carries Ugly Echo.” CNN. April 28, 2016. Accessed March 19, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/27/opinions/trump-america-first-ugly-echoes-dunn/index.html.

Trump, Donald J. Speech, Republican National Convention, 21 July 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974

Trump, Donald J. Announcement of Presidental Bid. Speech, Trump Tower, 16 June 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.12b716055c01

Trump, Donald J. Foreign Policy Speech. Speech, Washington D.C., 27 April 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html

Trump, Donald J. Address at Liberty University. Speech, Liberty University (Lynchburg, Virginia), 18 January 2016. https://www.c-span.org/video/?403331-1/donald-trump-remarks-liberty-university

Trump, Donald J. Campaign Rally of Senator Ted Cruz. Speech, Houston, Texas, 22 October 2018. https://www.businessinsider.in/trump-declares-himself-a-nationalist-while-stumping-for-ted-cruz/articleshow/66327534.cms

 

L’impeachment che non fu. Tre appunti per i mesi a venire

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by Andrea Varsori

Il Presidente della Repubblica Sergio Mattarella arriva nella sala stampa del Quirinale la sera di domenica 27 maggio (Image Credit: LaPresse)

Per l’Italia, gli ultimi giorni del mese scorso sono stati estremamente movimentati, anche per gli standard a cui la politica nazionale e internazionale ci ha abituato negli ultimi anni. Tra il 28 e il 29 maggio, abbiamo assistito all’impennarsi di tensioni interne e esterne. Politici, osservatori e cittadini hanno preso parte a uno scontro senza precedenti tra il Presidente della Repubblica e le due forze politiche che stavano formando il governo, la Lega e il Movimento 5 Stelle. Quest’ultima ha seriamente proposto la messa in stato d’accusa del Presidente. Alla chiamata nelle piazze da parte del M5S ha risposto il Partito Democratico, in una escalation di mobilitazione. Nel frattempo, esponenti politici nazionali si sono scontrati con membri della Commissione Europea e parlamentari europei. Investitori stranieri hanno perso fiducia nella capacità italiana di ripagare il debito, con immediate conseguenze sul valore dei titoli bancari e sul costo pagato dal Paese per rifinanziarsi sui mercati. Almeno in questo senso, sembrava di essere tornati nel caos del novembre 2011.

A vedere, invece, quello che è successo nei giorni successivi, c’è di che stupirsi. Una frattura che, lunedì e martedì, sembrava insanabile e capace di dividere il Paese, si è ricomposta con il semplice spostamento di Paolo Savona, economista fortemente critico della partecipazione italiana all’euro, dal Ministero dell’Economia al meno importante Ministero agli Affari Europei. Il veto del Presidente è stato così superato. Tra giovedì sera e venerdì pomeriggio, un governo tecnico nato morto è stato accantonato, e un governo politico è nato e ha giurato fedeltà alla Repubblica. Quello stesso sabato, Giuseppe Conte, il neo-premier, sedeva sorridente al fianco di Mattarella. E ora, con la fiducia ottenuta in entrambe le camere, il governo Conte è una realtà solida, al contrario di quello che si poteva pensare solo qualche giorno prima.

Sarebbe sbagliato, però, pensare che tutto questo non conti più. Gli eventi degli ultimi giorni di maggio possono ora sembrare sepolti dalle dichiarazioni di quelli che adesso sono esponenti di Governo, soprattutto considerando quanto poco durino le notizie nel clima mediatico in cui viviamo. Per quanto la nascita del governo Conte abbia cambiato la situazione politica nazionale, però, non ha cambiato di certo alcuni fattori strutturali. Questi fattori persistono, e riguardano l’instabilità politica interna, che può tornare in qualsiasi momento; la debolezza economica italiana, che conta ancora moltissimo; e il rapporto tra Italia ed Unione Europea, ormai più di scontro che di confronto.

 

Politica italiana: mai davvero stabile

La prima osservazione che si può fare è che, almeno per i prossimi mesi, non potremo dire che la situazione politica italiana si sia davvero stabilizzata. Questo punto di vista può sembrare molto pessimista, considerato che il governo Conte è nato e ha una maggioranza relativamente solida e un contratto di governo già pronto. La mia risposta a queste obiezioni si limita a evidenziare due eventi accaduti dopo che è emerso il veto di Sergio Mattarella su Paolo Savona. Il primo è la scelta di Matteo Salvini di abbandonare il tavolo dei negoziati e far saltare, in un primo momento, il governo Conte. Sull’opportunità politica della mossa di Mattarella, ovviamente, si può discutere: ma non è quello che interessa qui. La crisi tra M5S, Lega e Quirinale, infatti, si poteva benissimo evitare, soprattutto nel caso sia vera l’ipotesi che Mattarella avesse proposto Giancarlo Giorgetti, storico esponente leghista, come alternativa a Savona. È probabile che la mossa di Salvini sia stata motivata dalla crescita in popolarità che ne sarebbe seguita per la Lega, fotografata da molti recenti sondaggi. Anche se questo non fosse vero, però, la crisi di rapporti si poteva benissimo evitare. La nascita del governo Conte con Savona agli Affari Europei dimostra che un’alternativa era possibile. La reazione di Salvini ha mostrato, nel caso peggiore, opportunismo, nel caso migliore mancanza di capacità di gestire negoziati politici.

Ancora più grave è stata la reazione di Luigi Di Maio, con l’immediata proposta di mettere Mattarella in stato d’accusa. Questa idea, infatti, è stata chiaramente lanciata senza pianificazione alcuna. Ne è testimone il fatto che la Lega da subito si sia dimostrata scettica, pur criticando fortemente il Presidente, e se ne sia tirata fuori già lunedì 28 maggio. Di Maio ha scommesso una parte rilevante del suo capitale politico e delle possibilità di successo del suo partito su una mossa rischiosa, polarizzante, e senza molte possibilità di ottenere risultati tangibili. Ha perfino convocato una manifestazione a Roma che, man mano che la settimana passava, ha dovuto assistere a una paradossale inversione di toni. Chiedere la messa in stato d’accusa è stata una mossa autolesionista per Di Maio e il M5S; il che è grave, dato che denota, come nel caso di Salvini, opportunismo oppure mancanza di capacità di gestire delle crisi.

Queste dimostrazioni di inabilità politica non fanno ben sperare, viste le differenze di storia e retorica tra Lega e M5S. La coordinazione tra le due forze, nei giorni peggiori della crisi istituzionale, è stata scarsa, per non dire inesistente. Questo aspetto potrebbe migliorare se le due forze politiche sapranno imparare a coordinarsi e a guadagnare una la fiducia dell’altra. Ma, stante come si sono comportate la settimana scorsa, questo non succederà certo nel breve periodo. Ancora per qualche mese non potremo dire che l’Italia sia davvero stabile. Un qualsiasi inciampo può accadere di nuovo, con tutte le conseguenze negative che abbiamo visto.

 

Economia italiana: una continua debolezza

Le conseguenze negative sono state, principalmente, di natura economica e hanno dimostrato che l’Italia è ancora molto fragile sotto questo punto di vista. Questa affermazione è basata su dati, piuttosto che pregiudizi. La situazione attuale di moderata crescita non deve infatti mascherare il fatto che i fondamentali economici sono ancora deboli. Innanzitutto, la crescita economica italiana è ancora minore di quella degli altri Paesi dell’Eurozona e, secondo stime del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, probabilmente rallenterà l’anno prossimo. La produttività italiana è bassa e stagnante ormai da decenni. L’Italia non è considerata un buon ambiente per fare impresa e non ha molto successo nell’attrarre investimenti esteri, con Regno Unito, Francia e Germania in una posizione molto migliore, nonostante alcuni miglioramenti recenti. La pressione fiscale è tra le più alte d’Europa; il tasso di povertà è in aumento; il tasso di disoccupazione è ancora relativamente alto, specialmente per i giovani, e anche la sua recente diminuzione è dovuta perlopiù a creazione di posti di lavoro a tempo determinato. Infine, la crescita economica italiana è principalmente trainata dalle esportazioni, che saranno particolarmente vulnerabili alle guerre commerciali che gli Stati Uniti stanno iniziando con l’Unione Europea.

Tutto questo aggrava la situazione del debito pubblico. L’Italia ha il secondo rapporto tra debito e PIL più alto d’Europa, superata in questo solo dalla Grecia, e il quinto più alto nel mondo. Il 32% del debito sovrano italiano è in mano a investitori esteri. Questo è un fatto fondamentale, poiché, nel momento in cui questi hanno ragioni per temere che l’Italia non possa o non voglia ripagare il suo debito, il costo che il Paese affronta per finanziarsi sui mercati si alza, limitando immediatamente la disponibilità di soldi del governo. A partire dalla crisi del debito sovrano del 2011, in realtà, la quota di debito in mano a investitori esteri è progressivamente diminuita. È passata dal 51% del 2010 al 36.1% del 2016; in questo, le operazioni di Quantitative Easing della BCE hanno costituito un’occasione che gli investitori esteri hanno sfruttato per liberarsi di circa 78 miliardi di euro di titoli di stato italiani tra il 2015 e l’inizio di quest’anno. Da una parte, questa diminuzione è un fenomeno positivo, poiché riduce in una certa misura il rischio di contagio tra Italia e Unione Europea e rende Roma meno dipendente dai mercati esteri. Dall’altra parte, però, le banche italiane ora possiedono una porzione maggiore del debito sovrano nazionale. Questo significa che qualsiasi crisi del debito italiano si traduce immediatamente in una crisi bancaria, comportando minore accesso al credito per imprese e famiglie.

È molto difficile che questi fondamentali economici cambino nel breve periodo.

 

Rapporto Italia-UE: i pregiudizi hanno la meglio

Infine, gli eventi della scorsa settimana ci hanno dimostrato che il rapporto tra Italia e Unione Europea probabilmente sarà di scontro, piuttosto che di cooperazione. Si tratta di uno scontro che riguarda innanzitutto le regole europee. Per quanto ci siano notevoli differenze tra Lega e Movimento 5 Stelle, queste due forze politiche hanno un obbiettivo comune: convincere Bruxelles ad allentare i limiti sulla spesa pubblica e a rimandare qualsiasi tentativo di riduzione del debito sovrano italiano. Carlo Cottarelli, qualche giorno prima di essere coinvolto nello sfortunato tentativo di formare un governo tecnico, aveva pubblicato con l’Osservatorio Conti Pubblici dell’Università Cattolica di Milano uno studio in cui analizzava costi e coperture del contratto di programma M5S-Lega. Lo studio evidenziava che le proposte avanzate dalle forze di governo costeranno tra i 108.7 e i 125.7 miliardi di euro, con coperture previste per solo mezzo miliardo. Anche se il neonato governo Conte dovesse decidere di realizzare solo parte del suo contratto, difficilmente risolverà questo problema. È probabile allora che il nuovo esecutivo cerchi di ottenere, anche con metodi energici e poco ortodossi, un allentamento dei vincoli europei.

Non sembra, però, che a Bruxelles ci sia molta voglia di concedere ciò. Anche se altri Paesi mediterranei dovessero unirsi al tentativo italiano (cosa affatto scontata), alcuni Stati settentrionali, come Paesi Bassi e Finlandia, si opporranno alle richieste di Roma. La Germania farà altrettanto. Concedere tempo e margine economico all’Italia, infatti, sarebbe visto come una resa nei confronti di un Paese che poco ha fatto per rimettere i conti a posto, nonostante il massiccio aiuto offerto dalla Banca Centrale col Quantitative Easing. Una mossa conciliatoria nei confronti dell’Italia sarebbe dunque immediatamente criticata dal partito euroscettico Alternativa per la Germania, il principale rivale della CDU, il partito della cancelliera Angela Merkel. Per quanto riguarda la Francia, l’impulso del Presidente Emmanuel Macron sembra essersi per ora esaurito. Le sue proposte di riforma hanno trovato più ostacoli del previsto, soprattutto nei Paesi citati sopra, e sono state considerevolmente ridimensionate da Merkel domenica scorsa. Il nuovo governo italiano può fare poco per cambiare questa situazione, anche se decidesse di abbandonare il progetto di alcuni suoi esponenti di usare la minaccia di uscire dall’euro come strumento per ottenere concessioni.

Lo scontro tra Italia e Unione, però, non sarà solo di regole, ma anche di idee e pregiudizi. Lo abbiamo già visto nei giorni successivi al veto di Mattarella alla nomina di Savona. A Bruxelles, esponenti politici europei si sono lasciati andare a commenti di dubbia utilità politica, con commentatori, giornalisti e politici italiani pronti a brandirli come prova che l’Europa stesse condizionando la politica nazionale. Tra gli episodi più noti c’è senza dubbio la frase “i mercati insegneranno agli italiani come votare per il lato giusto”, attribuita al commissario europeo Günther Oettinger martedì 29 maggio. La frase, però, era solo una sintesi molto semplicistica scritta dall’intervistatore in un tweet. Il giorno dopo, un membro tedesco del parlamento europeo, esponente della CSU, partito alleato alla CDU di Angela Merkel, ha dichiarato in un’intervista che, in caso di bancarotta italiana, “bisognerebbe invadere Roma e prendere possesso del Ministero dell’Economia”. Anche questo commento, certamente eccessivo e irrispettoso, è stato denunciato in Italia, col risultato di ingigantirne l’importanza. Allo stesso modo, dall’altro lato delle Alpi, stereotipi sui tedeschi hanno cominciato a riemergere. L’esempio più famoso ha riguardato Milena Gabanelli, che, in un video per la Dataroom del Corriere della Sera, ha usato un copricapo militare nazista per rappresentare i tedeschi. Accomunare la Germania di oggi a quella degli anni ’30 e ’40, però, viene fatto in maniera più esplicita da molti, incluso il nuovo Ministro agli Affari Europei. È evidente che, in questo contesto, è molto facile per tutt’e due le parti non solo lasciarsi andare a dichiarazioni colme di pregiudizi, ma anche denunciarle e amplificarle, dando così l’impressione che l’intera nazione le condivida.

Questo contribuisce ad accrescere la distanza tra Italia e Germania, oltre che tra Italia e Unione Europea. Questo avviene in un terreno già fertile. Studi annuali dell’Eurobarometro, che si occupa di registrare l’evoluzione dell’opinione pubblica europea, mostrano che l’Italia è tra i Paesi meno convinti dell’appartenenza all’Unione. In un sondaggio di quest’anno, solo il 44% degli italiani crede che l’Italia abbia beneficiato dal fare parte dell’Unione Europea. In un altro studio recente, la maggioranza relativa degli italiani (il 46%) ritiene che l’Italia avrebbe un futuro migliore fuori dall’Unione; in questo, sorpassata solo dal Regno Unito. Questo non vuol dire, ovviamente, che Roma seguirà le orme di Londra. Lo scetticismo verso Bruxelles, però, è ormai un fatto conclamato. E il risvegliarsi di rivalità nazionali, che vanno dai semplici stereotipi a un vero e proprio nazionalismo, può rendere il contrasto tra Italia e Unione ancora più difficile da risolvere.

 

Lo scontro a venire

A mio parere, è proprio questo scontro il fattore più importante per i prossimi mesi. I primi giorni della crisi lo hanno rivelato, con il pronto ricorso a pregiudizi da ambedue le parti. Sappiamo da tempo che le rivalità nazionali in Europa non sono scomparse. In Italia, la loro esistenza era stata mascherata per anni da una retorica europeista ideologica, e forse un po’ ingenua, adottata dalle maggiori istituzioni nazionali. Il velo di questo europeismo è stato probabilmente squarciato nel novembre 2011, con il governo Monti. A quell’epoca, l’idea che l’Unione Europea consista in restrizioni e interferenze, piuttosto che libertà e benefici, ha cominciato a farsi strada. È un’idea, questa, portata avanti con forza dalla Lega e, in passato, anche dal Movimento 5 Stelle. Ora che queste due forze politiche tenteranno di realizzare il loro contratto di governo, può farsi ancora più forte.

Si può già delineare un possibile scenario. Prima o dopo le elezioni europee del 2019, Lega e M5S cercheranno di fare più deficit per avverare le proprie promesse elettorali. Facendo questo, si scontreranno con l’Unione e, in particolare, con i Paesi del Nord, più fiscalmente conservatori. In questo contesto, sarà difficile resistere alla tentazione di ricorrere alla retorica delle rivalità nazionali per ottenere voti e consenso in patria. Naturalmente, è possibile che Salvini e Di Maio si fermino prima, consci dei rischi a cui esporrebbero il Paese andando a uno scontro frontale. Da come si sono comportati la scorsa settimana, però, è lecito dubitarne. Si correrà dunque il rischio di cadere in una spirale di accuse reciproche. Convincere gli italiani che la colpa è della Germania e di Bruxelles, però, può colpire la partecipazione italiana all’Unione nelle sue fondamenta ideali.

 

The English version of this piece is available here.

 

Andrea is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, as well as the Editor-in-Chief of Strife. His research focuses on the strategy of urban armed groups in the Global South, in particular on their decision-making processes and their methods of territorial control. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus of the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include criminal organisations, drug trafficking networks, urban riots, and urban insurgencies. You can follow him on Twitter @Andrea_Varsori.

Image Source: https://www.repstatic.it/content/nazionale/img/2018/05/28/034107183-8b461394-435c-4763-beaa-fa88f54be243.jpg

Strife Feature – Italy’s short circuit week and the fight over Europe

by

by Andrea Varsori

The President of the Italian Republic, Sergio Mattarella (Image Credit: LaPresse)

 

Italy’s short circuit week

Last week, Italy’s political system went into short circuit. 84 days after the last national elections, an apparently successful attempt at forming a government unexpectedly collapsed at the last minute. Ten days earlier, the two political forces behind the attempt, the right-wing League and the anti-politics Five Star Movement (5SM), had already produced a joint manifesto, a “government contract”. Their members had already approved it: the League had organised voting at hundreds of stands across Italy, while the Movement, coherently with its calls for direct democracy, let its members vote on its online platform, Rousseau. The two forces had already chosen someone for the role of Prime Minister: Giuseppe Conte, a little-known lawyer and professor. They had already agreed on the future ministers. In short, everything seemed ready to go.

Italy’s political system, however, proved to be an obstacle for their plans. In Italy, the President of the Republic nominates the ministers, while the Prime Minister proposes the names. In the days before the collapse of government formation, the President, Sergio Mattarella, had signalled informally that he would not approve the prospective choice for the Minister of Economy. The League wanted Paolo Savona for that role; however, Savona, an economist and former minister, is a hardline Eurosceptic, known for his statements on the euro as a “cage” for the Italian economy and as an instrument of German economic domination. On few occasions, he had stated that Merkel’s Germany amounted to a new version of Hitler’s Third Reich. Most importantly, on May 26, the Italian Huffington Post showed that, in 2015, Savona had presented a Powerpoint presentation proposing a secret plan to leave the euro. On May 27, Mattarella formally declared that he would not accept Savona as Minister, due to the risks he posed to the savings of Italian citizens.

This decision set off what was to be defined as Italy’s deepest constitutional crisis. The League, in fact, reacted by stating that they would never accept to form a government without Savona as the Economy Minister. Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, claimed that Savona was rejected because “he would have defended the interests of Italians, not Germans”. Luigi Di Maio, political leader of the 5SM, went even further, declaring that the Movement would propose Mattarella’s impeachment. If enacted, this would have constituted an unprecedented move in Italian politics. Due to the role of the President as the symbol of the Italian state, rather than a political actor, impeachment was considered seriously only twice in the past, and on both the occasions the Presidents resigned before the process could even start. On May 28, however, Di Maio, in a Facebook video, confirmed the intention to proceed with impeachment and called for a general mobilisation to respond to the President’s decision. On May 29 the Democratic Party, Italy’s main left-of-centre party, organised counter-demonstrations to support Mattarella. In the meantime, most parties were agreeing on holding elections as soon as late July.

 

What ended the short circuit?

Considering that this was happening as early as the morning of Tuesday 29, it seems incredible that, on Friday afternoon, the same Giuseppe Conte was swearing the oath as Prime Minister, with Savona on his government team. In little more than two days, Italy went from a high-level political crisis to successful government formation; from early elections to political stability (of sorts); from the delegitimisation of the head of State to smiles and toasts with him. What had happened in the meantime? The answer is a mix of economic and political events.

Earlier, on May 27, just after having vetoed Savona, Mattarella tried to form a “neutral”, caretaker government, led by former IMF Departmental Director Carlo Cottarelli. Mattarella had already announced a similar initiative on May 7, when negotiations for a political government had seemed to stall. The prospective Cottarelli government seemed to follow in those steps; besides, the institutional and technocratic character of its components was expected to reassure the markets. This, however, did not happen. In the following two days (May 28-29), the difference in yield between Italian and German government bonds skyrocketed from 191 points to 306 points, pointing out to investors considering Italian sovereign debt as a riskier asset. Stock markets in Europe, Asia, and North America fell, with Italian banks the most hit. This backlash seemed to defy the purpose of the Cottarelli government. The latter also seemed condemned to fail from the start, as only a handful of MPs were ready to vote in its favour.

On the other hand, Di Maio soon understood that he had gone too far, as even the League was refusing to support the impeachment process. He let go of that on the evening of Tuesday 29 and started to pressure Salvini into modifying the government team, moving the controversial Savona to another portfolio. On his part, Salvini was looking forward to new elections, as fresh polls said that his party was due to achieve strong gains; however, a new election would have posed financial problems for the League. Moreover, while Salvini could market himself as the defender of Italian democracy, his continued refusal to form a government without Savona as Economy Minister risked to attract the blame on him. Besides, the opportunity of being part of the government and becoming the Home Minister seemed an acceptable outcome.

Consequently, at the end of a frantic week, Italy received a political government. Notwithstanding the fact that the Five Star Movement is not pro-business at all, and that the League still has a decidedly Eurosceptic tone, investors seem to have valued this development positively. Starting from May 30, global stock markets, including Italian bank shares, recovered. On June 1, the same day as Conte was sworn in as PM, the difference between German and Italian government bonds continued to fall, although to this day it continues to be higher than in April. There seems to be relative harmony between the Five Star Movement and the League, as well as between political parties and the President, notwithstanding the calls for his impeachment a few days earlier and the demonstrations against the President’s decision that were due to take place on June 2. Instead, on that day, also observed as Italy’s Republic Day, Conte was sitting next to Mattarella at the celebrations taking place in Rome.

 

The three main takeaways

If this were the end of Italy’s short circuit week, all these events would be relatively uninteresting; just another episode in the national political drama. Instead, they are tremendously important, not only for the country, but also for the whole continent. There are, in fact, three main conclusions to be taken from all this.

The first takeaway is that, after this week, the Italian political system cannot be really seen as stable, regardless of the existence of a government. This judgment is not based on prejudice: rather, it flows from the behaviour of the governing parties and their leaders. Italy, in fact, could have at least partly avoided the turmoil in the markets. There is a distinct possibility that Matteo Salvini engineered the collapse of the negotiations because the veto on Savona was a great opportunity to go to early elections and gain a larger share of votes. That would amount to an irresponsible act of political opportunism that exposed the instability of the country. Even if that was not true, however, the knee-jerk reaction of the 5SM, Italy’s largest political force, is an even more serious event. Instead of keeping in touch with the President, Luigi Di Maio opted to propose impeachment, without even knowing if the League would have followed him. He was then forced to withdraw that idea. This mix of opportunism, radical tones, and lack of coordination is, potentially, the sign of further instability to come. It may happen again.

The second insight is that Italy is still economically weak and exposed to the opinion of investors. The relatively good economic situation of the country must not mask Italy’s long-standing issues. Italy’s growth is still smaller than most other countries in the Eurozone, and it is expected to slow down next year. The country also has a historically low productivity and a mediocre environment for doing business, beyond being relatively unattractive to foreign investments, lagging behind the UK, Germany, and France, despite recent improvements. Taxes are among the highest in Europe; poverty is increasing; unemployment rate is still high, especially for people between 25 and 34; and the country’s extant growth is dependent on exports, which may be hard hit by the potential U.S.-EU trade wars.

Most importantly, Italy has the 2nd largest sovereign debt in Europe as a percentage of GDP and 5th largest in the world. A 32% share of this debt is owned by external investors. This is important, as any concern regarding the country’s ability or will to repay its debts translates quickly into a higher cost of obtaining funds on the markets, which in turn restricts greatly the government’s ability to spend money for its policies. Foreign ownership of the Italian sovereign debt has been steadily declining in the past years: the share of foreign investors-held debt was 36.1% in 2016, and around 51% in 2010; the ECB’s quantitative easing has been an opportunity for these investors to shed a reported €78 billion of Italian bonds between 2015 and early 2018. On the one hand, decline in foreign ownership is a positive development, as it lowers the risk of contagion between Italy and the EU and makes Italy less dependent on foreign markets. This also means, however, that domestic banks now hold a comparatively larger share of debt. Every sovereign debt crisis, then, translates quickly into a bank crisis, restricting access to credit for firms and families. All these economic fundamentals are unlikely to change anytime soon.

The third insight is that there is still a battle being waged over the common currency and the future of the European Union. It is, first of all, a battle of rules. The new Italian government, although relatively divided on several topics, shares a common goal: relaxing European rules regarding the reduction of debt and restrictions on deficit spending. Cottarelli, a few days before being nominated PM designate, published with his Observatory on Public Budget, a study outlining that the prospective costs of the 5SM-League government amounted to at least €108.7 ($126.8 or £95) billion, with prospective revenues for only €0.5 billion. Although it is likely that the government will enact only some of these policies, it is clear that the 5SM-League executive will try to negotiate, even forcefully, more freedom for Italian economic policy. However, there seems to be scarce appetite for that in Brussels. Although Spain and Greece may join Italy in this battle, Northern countries, and in particular the Netherlands and Finland, will oppose all such moves. The German government will also ward off such requests. Surrendering to Italy’s demands would attract fierce criticism from the right-wing, Eurosceptic party Alternative for Germany, the main rival to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU. As for France, President Emmanuel Macron’s reform drive seems to have stalled months ago. His ideas have found formidable obstacles in the countries cited above and have been considerably downsized by Merkel just on last Sunday. The Italian government can scarcely change that, even if it abandoned Savona’s brinkmanship, with his project of obtaining concessions in Brussels by threatening to leave the euro.

This is, however, a battle of feelings as well. In the first half of the past week, the tension between Italy and the European Union skyrocketed. In Italy, politicians, pundits, and citizens instantly and vehemently condemned statements coming from Brussels. In a famous episode, on Tuesday 29, Deutsche Welle journalist Bernd Riegert attributed the sentence ‘the markets will teach the Italians to vote for the right thing’ to EU Budget Commissioner Günther Oettinger. This then was confirmed to be a very simplistic synthesis of Oettinger’s words, written by Riegert himself. The following day, an MEP for the German CSU party was quoted in an interview saying that, in case of Italian bankruptcy, ‘it would be necessary to invade Rome and take over the Ministry of Finance’. On the other hand, in Italy, older German stereotypes started surfacing again. In a video explaining Italy’s relationship with the EU and the ECB, Milena Gabanelli, one of the country’s most famous journalists, used a Nazi military hat to represent Germany (while the French were portrayed with a less controversial, but still stereotypical, Napoleonic hat). In general, Matteo Salvini quickly seized the comments reported above to convince Italians that Germany and the EU had pressured Mattarella into vetoing Savona’s nomination as Minister. This happens in a country where only 44% of the citizens think that they benefited from EU membership, one of the lowest results in Europe. In another recent poll, the relative majority of Italians (46%) believes that the country would have a better future outside the Union: only the UK showed a higher percentage. In the next months, then, the relation between the EU and Italy risks to become the terrain for a battle between opposed national rivalries and prejudices.

 

Italy’s new government: a wedge into a divided Europe

This outbreak of contrast between Italy and the EU is the most important part of this week of instability and constant turnarounds. National rivalries within the European Union are all but gone. In the case of Italy, they have been waking up for quite some time: at least since the birth of the technocratic government of Mario Monti, in November 2011, when Italians started believing that the EU membership entailed more interferences and restrictions than benefits. This is an idea that the League is enthusiastically embracing. It may become stronger as the two governing parties try to enact the government contract. They will seek to cover its expenses with more public debt, thus clashing with European rules. In this contrast, both governing parties will find politically convenient to accuse Germany of imposing its will on Italy. National rivalries will then take centre stage, shaking the ideational foundations of Italy’s EU membership to their core.

 

The article is now available in Italian! Link

 

Andrea is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, as well as the Editor-in-Chief of Strife. His research focuses on the strategy of urban armed groups in the Global South, in particular on their decision-making processes and their methods of territorial control. Andrea holds an MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna; he is also an alumnus of the Institute of Advanced Studies at the same university. His main interests include criminal organisations, drug trafficking networks, urban riots, and urban insurgencies. You can follow him on Twitter @Andrea_Varsori.

Image Source: https://www.repstatic.it/content/nazionale/img/2018/05/28/034107183-8b461394-435c-4763-beaa-fa88f54be243.jpg