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Vietnam: a power on the rise?

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By Carlotta Rinaudo

The lush vegetation of the Mekong Delta (Credit: Carlotta Rinaudo, 2017)

In April 1975 the Vietnam War was over. Roads and bridges were left in rubble, and orphans were walking barefoot in the streets of Saigon. Following the war, the US had imposed a trade embargo prohibiting any commercial dealings with Vietnam, isolating the country from international trade.

Unsurprisingly, in the early 1980s Vietnam was one of the poorest places on earth. The Vietnamese Communist Party adopted a centrally planned economy that led to stagnant agricultural production, explaining why a country covered with lush paddy fields had to import rice from abroad. One-fifth of the Vietnamese population was on the brink of starvation, and electricity was available only 4 hours per day.

This situation changed in 1986, when the country opened to the world. Vietnam launched a set of reforms known as “Doi Moi”, successfully replicating the Chinese model: the country would preserve its single-party system while shifting towards a market-based economy. These reforms quickly boosted the economy and attracted massive Foreign Direct Investments. If a few years before Vietnam had had to import rice from abroad, by 1989 it had become the second largest rice exporter in the world.

Over recent decades, Vietnam has presented itself as a good international citizen, earning recognition and respect within the ASEAN group. It has signed a wide array of bilateral trade agreements, while joining the WTO, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and recently, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In 2019 it took a mediating role in global diplomacy by hosting the second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, and in 2020 it assumed the ASEAN chairmanship while successfully handling the Covid19 pandemic. Hanoi was in fact praised for giving one of the world’s best responses to the pandemic, quickly introducing a massive program of contact tracing while mobilizing the Vietnamese society in a collective fight against the virus.
These factors suggest that Vietnam is walking the path of a rising middle power, demonstrating a growing ability to shape international events in three particular areas: the global supply chain, the South China Sea, and the realm of 5G technologies.

Vietnam’s place in the global supply chain

Amidst the China-US trade war, many multinational companies have been looking to relocate their supply chain outside of the Chinese mainland, adopting a “China Plus One” business strategy. In this context, Vietnam has emerged as the ideal “Plus One” candidate, thanks to its ability to offer solid infrastructure coupled with a large low-wage workforce. Nike and Samsung have been outsourcing their production to Vietnamese factories for years, and recently Apple has started to assemble its AirPod earphones on Vietnamese soil too. This is not to say that “Made in Vietnam” will ever be able to replace “Made in China”: Vietnam doesn’t have the capacity to become the new factory of the world. To Vietnam’s 55 million manufacturing workers, China has 800 million; and while Ho Chi Minh City’s container port can accommodate 6 million containers annually, Shanghai reaches 40 million. Yet, in a “China Plus One” world, Vietnam has been able to emerge as a valid alternative, thereby securing an important position in the global supply chain.

Vietnam in the South China Sea

According to scholar Do Thanh Hai, Vietnam’s psyche has been shaped by its cyclical and perennial struggle against Chinese invasions from the North. This traditional Vietnamese perception of China remains in the country’s consciousness. Vietnam often sees China not as a conventional neighbor, but, rather, as a force of nature - “like floods and storms that feed into the deltas (…) to which Vietnamese, like reeds, must at once bend while remaining firmly intact.”

Aware of its military inferiority, Vietnam does not seek direct confrontation with its northern giant, instead it resists, “firmly intact”, protecting Vietnamese interests.

When, in 2014, China deployed one of its oil rigs in Vietnamese waters, Vietnam responded with a policy of “cooperation cum struggle”, displaying extraordinary pragmatism. First, Vietnam resolutely responded by raising global media attention to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, therefore internationalizing and securitizing a bilateral issue. Then, when China pulled the oil rig back, Hanoi sent its officials to Beijing to heal their diplomatic ties.

Although this approach might appear unusual, Vietnam only revived an old tradition of the past, when, after a territorial dispute, it used to send symbolic homages and annual tributes to Chinese emperors in order to secure peace, harmony, and recognition. This policy of “cooperation cum struggle” is a mix of soft and hard methods that helps Vietnam escape a battle it cannot win, while vigorously standing up for its own territorial sovereignty.

While other Southeast Asian countries like Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines have now softened their attitude in the South China Sea, Vietnam is increasingly perceived as the ASEAN champion that can contain Chinese maritime ambitions. This security leadership role has been widely acknowledged by the international community, with countries like Japan offering their support and providing offshore patrol vessels to Hanoi. With regards to China, Vietnam is indeed “bending like reeds, while remaining firmly intact.”

Vietnam in the technological race

Not only did Vietnam not include Huawei in its 5G network: Hanoi built its own domestic infrastructure and appears ready to deploy it for commercial use by 2021. Viettel, a Vietnamese state-owned telecom company, has collaborated with Ericsson to create its own 5G technology, and plans to expand the product to Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. Hanoi has also provided a cheap mass access to the Internet for its citizens, while aiming to become a key player in e-commerce and online payment methods. After Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei, Samsung and ZTE, Viettel is the sixth producer in the 5G race, an impressive result for a country that 40 years ago was not able to keep up with food shortages.

Conclusion

A latecomer to the international community, Vietnam is now increasingly emerging as a regional middle power: it is well-integrated in the world economy, it operates on the front lines in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, and it is one of the only domestic producers of 5G technology. ASEAN was deliberately created to survive without a formal leader to ensure equality between its 10 member states – yet this has translated into mutual weakness rather than collective strength. For this reason, many scholars see in Vietnam a country that will be able to fill this leadership vacuum. From its isolation in the 1980s, Vietnam has come far: today, the vibrant streets of Hanoi tell the story of a place of possibilities.

Making a Documentary: South Vietnamese Veterans Tell Their Forgotten Story

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By Hugh Pham

22 May 2019

Hugh-Doan Pham in conversation with Lieutant Colonel Vu Xuan Thong, a veteran of the Vietnam War (Hugh-Doan Pham)

On 24 April 2018, in Westminster, California, also known as Little Saigon in Orange County, Hugh-Doan Pham interviewed four veterans of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) at the Museum of the Republic of Vietnam. This small building, privately-operated by a handful of volunteers holds events and engagements throughout the year where Vietnamese-American people can learn more about their heritage. This is a behind-the-scenes report on the making of a documentary on these South Vietnamese veterans, before their story is lost to the ages.

Background

The republic of Viet Nam, known as South Vietnam, was allied with the United States of America throughout the conflict with the communist forces of North Vietnam throughout the 1960s. In early 1973, the US urged the South Vietnamese government to sign the Paris Peace Accords. A large majority of US military presence then withdrew from Vietnam but vowed to continue sending aid to the South. However, just one year later, the US Congress voted to stop supplying military material, thereby emboldening North Vietnam, backed by China and Russia to break the agreement and proceed with the invasion. On 30 April 1975, North Vietnam captured Saigon, the capital city of the Republic of Viet Nam. The two countries were the united under the communist government. Millions of South Vietnamese fled as refugees in the decades that followed.

Their Story

After inquiring with Vietnamese-American community leaders, I was granted permission to interview four ARVN veterans that were willing to share their stories for my documentary film, titled Voices of the ARVN: Saigon’s Armed Forces. These interviews almost did not happen: the veterans and the museum’s secretive board of directors initially vetted me but decided after a discussion to entrust me with the personal accounts of these men. Interestingly, their decision was based primarily on my background as a former US Army Military Intelligence Officer of Vietnamese descent.

The aging South Vietnamese veterans hoped to change what they believe are common misconceptions about the conflict, often characterised as a civil war. The first of the interviewees, Nguyen Ngoc Bach was a Lieutenant in South Vietnam’s Navy. He described in the war as a fight against an invasion, “The North Vietnamese, they came to Vietnam – South Vietnam. We had to fight back to protect the border and all the people… When we fought the Communists, we were proud because we protected the people… I served in the (South) Vietnamese Navy for seven years; I am proud of it.”

Decades after the war’s end, these men were attempting to exonerate themselves from mainstream narratives such as John Kerry’s comments which depicted them as cowardly or incompetent. The second of the interviewees, Vu Xuan Thong was a Lieutenant Colonel in South Vietnamese Special Forces and Airborne Ranger Divisions. He often conducted reconnaissance missions alongside US Special Forces and led patrols with only South Vietnamese troops after the American retreat. He told me: “The time I was in Vietnam, most of the media focused on the anti-American people. They never talked about how we go into the battle… It looked like the war in Vietnam… That it’s not our war, it was an American war. They never showed us in the media. And if they had some [stories], it was all bad things: How our generals were corrupt, our fighting… You know… chicken and dying and all that… No. We fight really good.” He attributes South Vietnam’s losses to the restricted resources available to the ARVN after the Paris Peace Accords. He explains how this drawback affected his ability to conduct operations: “We went into war with very limited supplies of ammunition, gas, food, everything. Before, especially in my unit, most the areas [in which] we ran operations [in] were out of artillery range. The only support [came] from [the] air. And then the air [support] was limited by bombs, by munitions, by gas, and by Time of Operations… It was very limited.”

ARVN uniforms on display at the museum (Hugh-Doan Pham)

These South Vietnamese veterans also wanted to raise awareness to the Communist Re-Education camps where thousands of people were sent to in the years after the war. The third interviewee, Nguyen Ngoc Bach was imprisoned for five years at a re-education camp in the Vietnamese jungle. He recounts the hard labour he endured. “In the re-education camps, I had to work hard. You go to the forest to cut wood and bring back to the camp, about a sixteen-kilometer walk carrying heavy wood.” He also spoke candidly about the torture he was subjected to during interrogation. “The first time they hit me because they thought I was a spy of the United States. But I said, ‘No, I’m not a spy.’ They said, ‘You tell lies, I’ll kill you.’ They put me in a jail for about one month. In handcuffs.” He put his wrists together and held them over his head. “One month. At night, I slept like this, standing up, not lying down. For one month.”

The last interviewee, Lieutenant Colonel Vu was also imprisoned. “Those North Vietnamese people were very smart. They said, “Okay, you’ll go ten days into some kind of class and after that, you know, you can come back… But that wasn’t real, that was a trap. Ten days… afterwards thirty days… I was there for thirteen years.” He is hesitant to elaborate on his specific experience in the camps. He only says, “I don’t need to tell you how [it] feel[s]. Because everybody’s the same. But I am lucky because I’m still alive now with a very good mind… I’m still strong.”

Conclusion

Inhabitants of Little Saigon are the largest Vietnamese diaspora outside of Vietnam. When asked about how he felt about life in the United States, Lieutenant Colonel Vu expressed a sense of dignified gratitude, “That’s a good country. It gives you an opportunity to build up yourself. They help you, if you want to. And they have freedom.” He also told me about feeling estranged when he returned to Vietnam for a visit. “It didn’t feel familiar. But when [I] came back to the United States, I feel pretty good. I don’t know. Maybe we stayed away from the country (Vietnam) too long. Everything’s changed now. No friends, nobody there except the family. When you go out to Saigon, go around the city, hang around the city, you don’t see anything familiar from before ’75.” Vu still referred to the former-capital as “Saigon”, although it was renamed Ho Chi Minh City, after the North Vietnamese Communist leader.

The veterans of the ARVN are secretive, they mostly desire to share their experiences with only the younger Vietnamese generations. However, I believe history can benefit from their unique perspective on war, service, sacrifice, and loss. I hope that my documentary, still in production, will succeed in bringing their stories to an audience beyond the Vietnamese-American community.

For the trailer, follow this link.

In 2018, Hugh Pham wanted to transition away from his career as a counter-terrorism analyst towards a more creative vocation, building upon his degrees in English and creative writing. When his initial film school rejection letter arrived, he became even more determined to tell stories. He decided to take matters into his own hands by making a historical documentary that would give representation to the veterans of South Vietnam, a perspective often neglected in narratives about the Vietnam War.

Book review: 'America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam' by Christopher Lawrence

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Reviewed by: Cheng Lai Ki

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Christopher Lawrence. America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. Oxford, UK. Casemate Publishers, 2015. ISBN: 978-1612002781. Hardcover. £19.99

Compared to other countries around the world, the United States military possesses the largest expenditure rate in the world of around $640,221million, according to a study conducted by the Brookings in 2014.[1] Within the last century, the United States has proven its military capabilities in multiple conflicts. The rise of advanced warfare tactics through technological developments (i.e. Unmanned Combat Vehicles) has allowed distancing from direct confrontation or engagement in hostiles. The increased distance from the battlefield and development of new combat tactics avoiding confrontation makes the determination of conflict victories increasingly elusive. Despite the existence of multiple detailed and comprehensive studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency, most are limited to specific cases or conflicts. Adding complexity to the phenomenon of insurgencies, the lack of detailed (and accurate) information ultimately inhibits the understanding and formation of effective counterinsurgency strategies.

In America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, Christopher Lawrence offers a more systematic, quantitative approach towards the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This was accomplished utilising resources obtained from his role at The Dupuy Institute (TDI), a non-profit organisation focused on academic research and studies around historical data associated to armed conflicts and acclaimed resolutions. TDI has collaborated in the past with the governmental agencies. Between 2002 – 2004, TDI produced three annual reports developed for the United States Department of the Army regarding the combat effectiveness within cities.[2] Through extremely comprehensive quantitative studies, the book critically examines the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam wars to determine the various elements and factors supporting the ultimate outcome of each conflict.

Studies and publication conducted by TDI revolve around the examination of historical resources. This academic and research discipline allows for evidentiary based analyses to be conducted. Ergo, Lawrence was able to conduct an extremely comprehensive strategic analysis and its outcomes of several conflicts where United States played a significant role. The book begins with TDI outlining their casualty estimate for the United States government agencies. Impressed by their statistical collection methodologies supporting their estimates, other agencies ultimately expanded their contracts with the institution for additional data collection and subsequent studies. Over the course of the Iraq War, Lawrence coordinated multiple projects involving quantitative researchers. TDI’s relationship with various department within the United States government has thus allowed its researchers access to the extensive material available from internal departments and centers (i.e. United States Army Center of Military History). As an individual, Lawrence has also published several papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation in addition to an amalgamation of assessments for the Department of Defense.[3] The book fundamentally centres upon quantitative variables of indigenous and intervening government typologies, insurgency motivations, insurgency structure, typology of counterinsurgency waged, rules of engagement and the nature of the conflict’s resolution.

Throughout the book, Lawrence identifies several correlations between variables that could be applied consistently throughout the three major wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. His analysis revealed a correlation between force ratios and insurgent motivations. Comparing his discoveries towards conventional counterinsurgency assessments and studies, Lawrence has quantifiably identified that although overwhelming force ratios (between counterinsurgents and insurgents) are not required for counterinsurgency success, it is larger fighting forces that ultimately yields counterinsurgency victory. Within the analysis, Lawrence also suggests several other variables that might influence the outcome of counterinsurgencies. However, it would appear from the text that limited statistical emphasis or research was placed into these considerations. Throughout the book, Lawrence develops several statistical models to describe and analyse the dynamics of the counterinsurgency campaigns that essentially defined the Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam wars. However, acclaimed to examine the three modern wars of the United States has devoted a considerable amount of focus on the Iraq and Afghan War in contrast to Vietnam. Any book of this scope often focuses on specific reader categories. Therefore, the following section briefly addresses overarching benefits and limitations of the book for two main categories of readers: Academics and Practitioners.

With multiple elements within warfare categorically quantified within the book, academics could find the level of depth significantly beneficial to their studies. This book is an invaluable resource that both analyses and summarizes – with statistical support – three counterinsurgencies fought by the United States. For example, in Iraq, Lawrence argues that the counterinsurgency by the United States (Coalition) and the Iraqi Government was a success due to the generation of an overwhelming force-ratio compared to the insurgents. Given the nature of academia, criticism/rebuttal against his assentation is a given, as some would question the true definition of successfulness of the United States during Iraq, given its current state-of-affairs.[4] Its limitations reside in its dense and hyper-focus upon statistical analysis; how the ‘numbers’ reflect reality could be (at times) difficult to understand and internalise – let alone contextualise against other theories within security studies.

Practitioners on the other hand might be initially overwhelmed by the sheer amount of quantitative/statistical data Lawrence goes into. However, it does not remove the quantitative benefits of the book for individuals within military domains. Providing an extremely comprehensive statistical analysis of the three counterinsurgencies, policy-makers would also benefit from this source of information. Fundamentally taking a historic approach, reflective analysis of the book can be a valuable resource for strategists to evaluate the effectiveness of American decisions during the wars. However, limitations of the book arguably depend heavily on the statistical knowledge (and interest) of the reader; especially when addressing practitioners. Regardless, to practitioners, the book is an invaluable resource to expand their horizon and understanding of United States activities during the three counterinsurgencies. The professional data collection and analytics compiled into this singular source makes America’s Modern Wars a valuable resource to understand (quantifiably) elements that can influence the outcome of counterinsurgencies.

Despite the sheer depth of statistical analysis into the elements within counterinsurgencies, Lawrence’s analysis places significant value on available (and accessible) information. America’s Modern Wars is unlikely to end any debates regarding the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategies used in the three campaigns – as it may prove controversial should any such claim be made. It is commendable that Lawrence acknowledges the propensity for analyses to be revised in light of new data. The analysis does, however, provide an interesting perspective for practitioners and academics focusing on security issues associated to the activities of the United States. This source of analysis that utilises quantifiable information is a useful source – especially to practitioners drafting approval papers/plans. However, there remains a widespread belief that the complexity of warfare (and more importantly insurgencies) cannot be categorised or exclusively studied solely through quantifiable research. Regardless, Lawrence does manage to quantifiably identify one of the largest flaws of the United States strategies in the three conflicts, which is their inherent misunderstanding of counterinsurgency.[v] Nonetheless, America’s Modern Wars is still recommended for anyone aiming to obtain a comprehensive quantitative understanding of United States strategies in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam.

Formerly with the Singapore Armed Forces, Cheng holds a Bachelor’s Honors degree in Criminology. During his military service, he was a senior tactical and operational instructor for the Armour Formation. He is currently reading for an MA in International Intelligence and Security at King’s where his academic specialties revolve around proxy strategies such as private military security companies, drones and cyber-warfare. In May 2016, he published an article on the vulnerabilities of transatlantic submarine cables in IHS Jane’s.

Notes:

[1] Dews, F. ‘Charts: U.S. Army size and defense expenditures relative to other nations’, Brookings [Online], (Oct 14 2015), Available from: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2015/10/charts-us-army-size-defense-expenditures, (Accessed May 21 2016)

[2] ‘Publications’, The Dupuy Institute [Online], Available from: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipubs.htm, (Accessed May 21 2016)

[3] Lawrence, C.A. ‘President Obama’s Casualty Estimates’, Mystics & Statistics [Online], (Dec 27 2015); Available from: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2015/12/27/president-obamas-casualty-estimates/ (Accessed Jan 2016)

[4] Cordesman, A.H., ‘American Strategic and Tactical Failures in Iraq: An Update’, Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [Online], (Aug 8 2006); Available from: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060808_iraqfailures.pdf, (Accessed Dec 2015).

[5]Ubaldi, J. ‘Why Civil Military Operations will be a Combat Multiplier in Counterinsurgency Operations’, SmallWarsJournal.org [Online], (2009).

Virtual conflict as cultural catharsis: re-fighting Vietnam 2.0

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By Ben Collins:

Private C Miller (by deviantArt user spyash2)

Storytelling is a core part of how we communicate with each other, understand complex issues and come to terms with the world around us. The prevalence of so-called ‘talking therapies’ show that such processes are important in helping to overcome and move past negative events and experiences. The experience of 9/11 left long-lasting and deep collective and cultural damage on the US/Western collective psyches. The ‘War on Terror’ has been compared to what Vietnam was for Lyndon Johnson: ‘a vast, tragic distraction in which he must be seen to be winning, lest the domestic agenda he really cares about be derailed.’[i] Popular culture, in this case Western-developed video/computer games, have become a medium in which the cathartic and curative process of storytelling is taking place on a cultural level, to move past and overcome both of these ‘unfinished’ conflicts.

War and conflict have been staple thematic topics in games for decades, as far back as Space Invaders and Missile Command in the late 1970s. However, the games released after 9/11 show an interesting pattern indicating a marked swing in direction and focus. Between 2002 and 2005 there were two games released that were set during the first Gulf War (Conflict: Desert Storm I & II), at least nine games released set during the Vietnam War (Vietcong, Vietcong 2, Battlefield: Vietnam, Conflict: Vietnam, Shellshock: ‘Nam 67, Wings over Vietnam, Platoon, Men of Valor, Line of Sight: Vietnam) as well as many more set in the modern day in real or analogous Middle-Eastern theatres. One of the most stand-out titles from this period was America’s 10 Most Wanted, whose finale consists of the player fighting Osama Bin Laden in hand-to-hand combat, and subsequently bundling him into a helicopter that flies off into the sunset while the credits roll. From this period mainstream game development began to shift to reflect changing current events. From 2008 games in this thematic field have often adopted Private Military Contractors in both pro and antagonistic roles. after the details of Blackwater’s/Xe’s involvement in Iraq became wider public knowledge and a hot topic of the time.

The ability of popular culture to serve as a space for cultural catharsis and as a coping mechanism isn’t a new one; after the collective cultural trauma of Vietnam a similar process of mourning and understanding took place. The trajectory of tone and content in the ‘war is hell’ films from the 1970s such as Apocalypse Now and The Deer Hunter shifted dramatically to the restorative and cathartic films from the 1980s like Top Gun and Rambo. These films either painted the US military in a far more positive and victorious light or, in the case of Rambo, literally re-fighting Vietnam on-screen.

What is interesting is that in games after 9/11 this process moved in the opposite direction. The games that emerged in the first few years after 9/11 can broadly be interpreted as revenge power-fantasies. The largely tactical focus of these titles place the player in the position of a soldier with a ‘grunt’s-eye view’. This creates a space in which the player can rewrite history, restore agency and re-establish the ‘correct’ order of the world on an individual level; winning the battles AND winning the war. It is only in recent years that some developers have taken steps to question and critique what can be seen as a largely jingoistic and cynically simplified streamlining of complex geopolitical issues.

The 2012 game Spec Ops: The Line was a deeply critical response to the way in which war and conflict had been portrayed in games. Taking Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as inspiration, the game took a cynical approach to the increasingly detailed yet sanitised depiction of war. Starting out as a formulaic tale of Western intervention to help a sandstorm-buried Dubai, the game depicts ambiguous moral choices as well as civilian collateral damage in a highly critical and subversive way. The game makes the player stop to reflect on their actions, something that is normally outside the usually simplistic and circular justifications other games use for the violent acts that the player witnesses and facilitates. Similarly, the 2008 game Far Cry 2 borrows lightly from Heart of Darkness, taking place in a fictional African country in the grips of a civil war between two greedy and ruthless militias.

As western military involvement in the Middle East has, at least in the eyes of the western audiences, wound down to be out of sight and out of mind, western popular culture has adapted to react to new threats. Wikileaks, Anonymous and Edward Snowden are being explored as the new sources of cultural anxiety and trauma; Call of Duty: Black Ops II features a hacker antagonist, who in the near future takes control of the United States’ expanded drone forces. The recently released Watch_Dogs puts the player in the shoes of a skilled hacker in a near-future Chicago, and can be interpreted as a warning against the danger hackers pose to increasingly centralised and interconnected systems. At the same time it offers up a new revenge fantasy to anyone who has been the victim of the seemingly unending frauds, data thefts and security breaches of many internet-based services.

Why does this matter? The medium of games is a uniquely textured and tactile environment to continue the human necessity of storytelling; whether it be in moment-to-moment gameplay experiences or the underlying story or theme a particular game is exploring. A generation has grown up being bombarded with messages about the necessity for increased security, updates on the latest protracted conflict in a place they have never seen or heard of in any other context, and the constant threat of terrorism hanging over them like the sword of Damocles; all of this is delivered through a ubiquitous, 24-hour news media. It is entirely possible that games are the first instance of many people engaging with any of these topics on a participatory and interactive level. It is worth considering the way that game portray war and conflict, and how these messages are received by audiences due to the potential for their affecting of popular thought relating to real world events and issues. The condensing and streamlining of conflicts like Vietnam and the ‘War on Terror’ into simple and easily digestible narratives applies the same maximal and binary filtering logic of George W. Bush’s “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” speech. As a medium that lets us tell ourselves the stories through interactivity, games should be telling us what we need to know rather than what we want to hear. The difficult truths about these traumatic moments in our cultural memory are important. Without them the conflicts they depict will remain ‘unfinished’ and the cultural catharsis sought through them will remain out of reach.

 

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Ben Collins is a 2nd year PhD student looking at hacker activists in comparison to 19th century Anarchism. Other focus includes how war and conflict are portrayed in videogames, as well as how players interact and question both the events in them and the relevant analogous real-world wars, conflicts and insurgencies we see in comparison.

 

NOTES

[i] M.S., The war on terror is Obama’s Vietnam, The Economist, 10/06/13, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06/why-we-spy, accessed 04/06/14